In re E.R. ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 220932-UOrder filed March 15, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
In re E.R., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
a Minor ) Knox County, Illinois,
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 4-22-0932
) Circuit No. 20-JA-55
v. )
)
Jodi M., ) Honorable
) Curtis S. Lane,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm, concluding the trial court’s unfitness and best-interests findings were
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, Jodi M., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as
to her minor child, E.R., under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS
405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)).1 She contends the court’s findings that she was unfit and that
terminating her parental rights was in E.R.’s best interests were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Adjudicatory and Dispositional Phase
¶5 On October 7, 2020, respondent gave birth to E.R., her third child and second with Jay R. 2
When respondent and E.R. were discharged from the hospital on October 10, 2020, the Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) took protective custody of E.R. and placed her with her
paternal aunt and uncle, who were already caring for E.R.’s siblings.
¶6 On October 13, 2020, the State petitioned for an adjudication of neglect as to E.R. In its
petition, the State alleged E.R. was neglected based on an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-
3(1)(b) (West 2020)). Specifically, the State alleged (1) respondent had been found unfit in
proceedings concerning her other minor children (Knox County case Nos. 19-JA-16 and 19-JA-
17) and had not yet restored her fitness; (2) respondent had three indicated findings of neglect
based on domestic-violence and substance-abuse issues; (3) domestic violence between
respondent and Jay R. had increased since the birth of E.R.’s sibling in October 2018; (4) one of
E.R.’s siblings had been struck at least once in a domestic-violence incident involving respondent
and Jay R.; (5) respondent had obtained an order of protection against Jay R. but then allowed him
to violate the order; and (6) respondent had tested positive for methamphetamine on three
1
Respondent initiated her appeal in the Fourth District. On February 6, 2023, the supreme court, in the
exercise of its administrative and supervisory authority, transferred the matter for decision to this district. Ill. S. Ct.,
M.R. 31650 (Feb. 6, 2023).
2
Jay R. is not a party to this appeal.
2
occasions and failed to appear for drug tests on at least 23 occasions since September 2019. After
a hearing, on January 5, 2021, the trial court found E.R. was neglected as alleged in the State’s
petition.
¶7 On February 2, 2021, the trial court entered a dispositional order, finding (1) respondent
was unfit, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, educate
supervise, or discipline E.R.; and (2) it was in E.R.’s best interests that she be placed in DCFS
custody. The court determined the appropriate permanency goal was a return home within 12
months and ordered respondent to (1) cooperate with all tasks designated in DCFS’s client service
plan, (2) obtain and maintain a legal and verifiable source of income, (3) follow all
recommendations for domestic-violence victim services, (4) complete a mental-health assessment
and follow all recommendations, (5) maintain housing that meets minimal parenting standards,
(6) complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, and (7) comply with
all requested random drug screens.
¶8 B. Permanency Reviews
¶9 1. August 17, 2021
¶ 10 On August 17, 2021, the trial court conducted a permanency review. During the hearing,
the court admitted several documents, including reports from the Center for Youth and Family
Solutions (CYFS) and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), and heard testimony from
Erica Baumgardner, a CYFS caseworker. The evidence established respondent had signed all
necessary consents and regularly attended her weekly parent-child visits at the CYFS office in
Galesburg. But, at the time of the hearing, she had failed to maintain contact with CYFS, allow
CYFS access to her home, maintain a substance-free lifestyle, and failed to complete most of her
recommended services.
3
¶ 11 Respondent successfully completed “domestic violence survivor’s sessions” at Safe
Harbor in March 2020. (She began those classes after the State commenced the proceedings
involving E.R.’s older siblings.) However, while she was completing those services, she became
pregnant with Jay R.’s child, E.R. Respondent remained in contact with her provider for support
after she completed the sessions. But she refused Safe Harbor’s recommendation to obtain an order
of protection against Jay R., citing fear of violent retaliation. According to Baumgardner,
respondent had failed to demonstrate progress as a result of those services, because she refused to
obtain an order of protection against Jay R. and had another child with him.
¶ 12 Respondent was involuntarily discharged from substance abuse treatment in January 2021,
due to her failure to attend. Respondent tested positive for methamphetamines on February 23,
2021, and March 16, 2021, and she failed to attend any of her random drug screens since that time.
Respondent reported to CYFS that, in August 2021, she had completed a new substance-abuse
assessment through the county health department, and the health department recommended she
receive “extensive outpatient treatment.”
¶ 13 Respondent was engaged in individual counseling at CYFS. Her therapist, had expressed
concerns that she was “regressing substantially in her sessions and had attendance issues.” The
therapist reported respondent had trouble accepting responsibilities for her actions. The therapist
planned to discharge respondent because she believed respondent needed more intensive
counseling than she could provide. The therapist had worked with respondent for two years and
observed a pattern in which respondent would briefly progress but then regress.
¶ 14 Respondent reported living in an apartment in Galesburg. In January 2021, a previous
caseworker was twice scheduled to visit the apartment to observe it and complete a “Home Safety
Checklist.” However, respondent rescheduled both visits and later “continue[d] to cancel home
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visits.” In early August 2021, respondent reported obtaining employment as an in-home caregiver,
but CYFS was unable to verify her employment at the time of the hearing. Respondent frequently
changed her phone number and had “no call[ed]/no show[ed] *** many scheduled appointments”
with CYFS and her service providers.
¶ 15 Because only six months had passed since the dispositional order, Baumgardner
recommended the permanency goal not be changed. The trial court found respondent had not made
reasonable efforts or progress toward the return of E.R. but determined the goal should remain as
return home within 12 months.
¶ 16 2. January 13, 2022
¶ 17 On January 13, 2022, the trial court conducted another permanency review hearing. The
court again admitted several documents, including reports from CYFS and CASA. The court also
heard testimony from respondent and Rene Pelotte, a CYFS caseworker assigned to the case in
early November 2021.
¶ 18 The evidence established respondent had signed all necessary consents and continued to
regularly attend her once-weekly parent-child visits with E.R. Since the previous permanency
hearing, respondent had been referred for mental-health services at Bridgeway. Respondent
reportedly attended one session but CYFS had no documentation reflecting her attendance or
engagement. Respondent reported that, after her August 2021 substance-abuse assessment, she
engaged in substance-abuse treatment at Bridgeway and had attended one visit. She admitted to
using methamphetamines in July 2021 and failed to attend any random drug screens since August
5
27, 2021. 3 CYFS made efforts to visit respondent’s apartment, but respondent canceled at least
two scheduled appointments. Most recently, Pelotte scheduled a visit for December 6, 2021. After
respondent failed to respond to text messages to confirm a time, the caseworker attempted to visit
respondent but was unable to make contact with her. Respondent later told the caseworker she had
forgotten about the appointment and was meeting with her attorney at the time. Respondent
reported she had been offered employment in July 2021 but the offer had since been rescinded. (It
is not clear whether the July 2021 offer was for the in-home caregiving services referenced in the
reports admitted at the August 2021 permanency hearing.)
¶ 19 Respondent testified that, since the last permanency hearing, she worked for about two
weeks at a fast-food restaurant. However, because she was only offered 20 hours per week, she
sought employment at NAEIR through a temp agency. She was scheduled to begin work there
later in January 2022. At the time of the hearing, respondent had been engaged with a drug
counselor at Bridgeway twice a week for “well over a month, a month and a half.” She also
attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Respondent was performing regular drug screens at
Bridgeway, and she was not using any substances. The most recent screen was “an instant test”
which came back negative. Respondent did not know the results of the other screens. Respondent
confirmed she was referred to Bridgeway for mental-health treatment but was placed on a three-
month waiting list. Thus, she planned to seek treatment through the county health department.
¶ 20 Respondent testified she had not seen Jay R. in approximately six months. She visited with
E.R. every Tuesday for three hours. She explained she had been late to recent visits because she
3
Evidence admitted at a later permanency-review hearing established that respondent did, in fact, comply
with four random drug screens in November and December 2021 and three times tested positive for
methamphetamines.
6
relied on a bicycle for transportation and was coming from appointments at Bridgeway, which was
“way on the edge of Galesburg.”
¶ 21 The trial court found respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress and entered
an order changing the permanency goal to substitute care pending the determination of parental
rights.
¶ 22 C. Termination Phase
¶ 23 1. The State’s Petition
¶ 24 On January 24, 2022, the State petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights, which
it later twice amended. In its second amended petition, the State alleged respondent was unfit, in
part, because between September 28, 2021, and June 28, 2022, she failed to make (1) reasonable
efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for E.R.’s removal (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)
(West 2020)); and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of E.R. (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). The State
further alleged it was in E.R.’s best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
¶ 25 2. Fitness Hearing
¶ 26 On August 30, 2022, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. The State presented the
testimony of Cecily Dorsett, Rene Pelotte, and Stephanie Brockett. Respondent also testified. The
trial court later stated it did not consider Dorsett’s testimony in reaching its decision; thus, we omit
from our account her testimony.
¶ 27 The evidence established respondent was required to verify that she had income and
housing, comply with random drug screens, and cooperate with CYFS. She was also required to
complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, engage in mental-health
services, and integrate into her daily life the lessons from her previously completed domestic-
violence services.
7
¶ 28 a. Pelotte
¶ 29 Pelotte was E.R.’s caseworker between November 1, 2021, and January 24, 2022.
According to Pelotte, respondent did not “do any mental health services” during those three
months. Respondent failed to appear for drug screens on November 15, November 23, December
6, and December 15. Respondent reported that she had an apartment but CYFS was not able to
verify. Pelotte testified respondent agreed to allow her to visit respondent’s apartment, but when
Pelotte arrived, respondent was not home. Respondent did not have any in-home parent-child visits
with E.R. during that time period.
¶ 30 b. Brockett
¶ 31 Brockett was Pelotte’s supervisor from November 1, 2021, to January 24, 2022. She took
over as E.R.’s caseworker from January 24, 2022, to April 2022, and then supervised E.R.’s
caseworker beginning in May 2022. Brockett testified CYFS was never able to verify respondent
had adequate housing or obtained employment. On May 17, 2022, respondent made a threat of
self-harm to E.R.’s foster parent. CYFS attempted to contact respondent but respondent did not
respond to phone calls or texts. The next day, Brockett went to respondent’s apartment to check
on her. Brockett knocked on and saw movement under the door, but respondent did not answer.
¶ 32 With respect to respondent’s substance abuse, Brockett testified respondent attended an
assessment but was discharged when she failed to complete it. Respondent reported in February
2022 that she was engaged in services at Bridgeway and was being screened. CYFS received
records from Bridgeway, which indicated respondent had positive drug tests in November and
December 2021, had a single clean screen in December 2021, and gave a sample, on January 24,
2022, “that was unsuitable for testing due to *** protein levels in the urine,” suggesting the sample
had been tampered with.
8
¶ 33 Respondent began mental-health services at Bridgeway but, to the agency’s knowledge,
did not complete the assessment or participate in any mental-health treatment.
¶ 34 According to Brockett, respondent “sometimes” cooperated with CYFS. She explained
respondent attended visits with E.R., at which time CYFS could speak with respondent. However,
Brockett had scheduled meetings with respondent at her apartment that fell through. Thus, Brockett
scheduled a meeting with respondent at the CYFS office. On the morning of the meeting,
respondent called and said “her ride didn’t come through.” They met briefly over the phone, but
respondent became upset and ended the call.
¶ 35 c. Respondent
¶ 36 Respondent testified she had lived in the same apartment in Galesburg for more than two
years. Since January 2021, she had been generally unemployed, except she worked at a fast-food
restaurant for about a week and worked as a caretaker for an older man with whom she was friends.
(Respondent did not specify when she worked these jobs or how long she worked as a caretaker.)
Most recently, beginning in June or July 2022, respondent worked at Dick Blick, where she was
still employed at the time of the hearing.
¶ 37 Respondent completed a domestic-violence course through Safe Harbor in 2020. At some
point before the hearing, she had engaged in substance-abuse treatment at Bridgeway. She
explained Bridgeway had changed her counselor to one with whom she previously was engaged
and with whom she did not “click.” She did not request a new counselor and was discharged when
she missed her first appointment.
¶ 38 Respondent acknowledged she had not completed any mental-health treatment. She
explained that, at the direction of an old caseworker, she sought and obtained an assessment at the
health department, with the plan of receiving treatment and counseling at Bridgeway. When she
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returned to Bridgeway, however, she was placed on a six-month waiting list. About two months
before the hearing, she sought treatment at the health department. According to respondent, had
she sought treatment originally at the health department and not Bridgeway, she would have been
much further along in her treatment.
¶ 39 d. The Trial Court’s Findings
¶ 40 The trial court found respondent unfit based on her failure, between September 28, 2021,
and June 28, 2022, to make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought E.R. into
care and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of E.R.
¶ 41 4. Best-Interests Hearing
¶ 42 On September 29, 2022, the trial court conducted a best-interests hearing. Respondent
failed to appear.
¶ 43 The trial court admitted reports from CYFS and CASA and heard testimony from Sarah
Decker, a CYFS caseworker who was currently assigned to E.R.’s case. The evidence showed E.R.
was now almost two years old and was doing well in her foster home, where she had been since
her discharge from the hospital three days after her birth. She was well-bonded with her foster
parents and referred to them as “mom” and “dad.” E.R. cried when the foster mother dropped her
off for her visits with respondent but calmed down when the foster mother assured E.R. that she
would be back. She was also well-bonded with her foster and biological siblings that lived with
her in the foster home. E.R. appeared to be safe, secure, and comfortable in the foster home. She
was “current with medical” and was a “very happy, busy little girl.” The foster parents had
completed adoption classes, were willing to provide her with permanency, and were excited and
eager to soon adopt E.R. and her siblings.
10
¶ 44 Respondent was still attending visits, though they had been reduced to three hours every
two weeks. Respondent agreed to allow CASA to visit her apartment but never contacted CASA
to schedule an appointment. CASA made three attempts to set up a visit, calling both cell phone
numbers respondent had provided, but respondent ignored those attempts.
¶ 45 E.R. “struggle[d] to listen to [respondent] at times during visits, and in response
[respondent would] often let [E.R.] have her way instead of sticking with the boundaries she
establishe[d].” Respondent was “able to focus on [E.R.] intermittently but struggle[d] to remain
focused *** when she [was] feeling angry about her case.” During visits, respondent spent
“significant time expressing her discontentment about her case to the visit supervisor instead of
focusing her attention on [E.R.]”
¶ 46 Decker opined it was in E.R.’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. She
based her opinion on respondent’s inability to meet E.R.’s basic needs for health, safety, education,
and well-being. By contrast, the foster parents had met all of E.R.’s needs since birth. E.R.
displayed attachment to the foster parents and her siblings; her “sense of security and familiarity
[lay] with her foster family.”
¶ 47 After hearing arguments, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights, finding it
was in E.R.’s best interests to do so.
¶ 48 This appeal followed.
¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 50 On appeal, respondent contends the trial court’s fitness and best-interests findings were
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 51 A. Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights
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¶ 52 Proceedings to terminate parental rights are principally governed by the Juvenile Court Act
and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2020)) and consist of two phases. In re Deandre
D., 405 Ill. App. 3d 945, 952 (2010). First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence
the parent is unfit on any one of the grounds listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D) (West 2020)). Deandre D., 405 Ill. App. 3d at 952. Second, if the court finds the parent is
unfit, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent’s
rights is in the minor’s best interests. Id. at 953.
¶ 53 We will not disturb the trial court’s unfitness or best-interests findings unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064, 1072
(2006). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when it is unreasonable. In re
D.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 124, 139 (2008).
¶ 54 B. Unfitness Finding
¶ 55 The trial court found the State proved respondent was unfit on two grounds: her failure to
make (1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought E.R. into care (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)) and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of E.R. (id.
§ 1(D)(m)(ii)). Because the grounds for finding unfitness under the Adoption Act are independent,
we may affirm the trial court’s judgment if the evidence supports any one of the grounds alleged.
In re B’Yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30.
¶ 56 We conclude the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of E.R. during the nine-month period between September 28, 2021, and June 28,
2022, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reasonable progress is an objective
standard that requires, at a minimum, “measurable or demonstrable movement” toward
reunification. Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067. “Reasonable progress exists when the trial
12
court can conclude that it will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near
future.” Id.
¶ 57 The evidence established respondent was required to verify that she had income and
housing, comply with random drug screens, and cooperate with CYFS. She was also required to
complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, engage in mental-health
services, and integrate into her daily life the lessons from her previously completed domestic-
violence services.
¶ 58 At the fitness hearing, the State presented evidence that respondent had made no progress
in regard to her mental-health or substance-abuse issues. Admittedly, respondent participated in
mental-health and substance-abuse assessments during the relevant time period, but she failed to
actually engage in treatment. And while she made some effort to engage in mental-health services,
by her own admission, she could have been much further along in her treatment at the time of the
hearing. Further, respondent chose not to engage in substance-abuse treatment, terminating the
services because she did not “click” with her provider. Instead, she continued to use drugs, testing
positive for drugs on three occasions in November and December 2021.
¶ 59 We acknowledge that Brockett testified respondent “sometimes” cooperated with CYFS.
But, as a whole, the evidence established that respondent’s cooperation with CYFS was poor.
Though respondent reported she lived in the same apartment for more than a year, CYFS was never
able to verify that fact. Despite multiple attempts and scheduled appointments, respondent did not
once allow CYFS to enter her apartment to assess its safety and suitability for a young child.
Respondent also failed to communicate with CYFS unless she was present in the CYFS office for
her parent-child visits. She failed to return phone calls, failed to attend an in-person meeting with
Brockett, and terminated a telephone meeting when she became upset.
13
¶ 60 Additionally, respondent failed to obtain and maintain adequate employment throughout
much of the nine-month period. She testified she had been generally unemployed since January
2021, except for two brief periods of employment at a fast-food restaurant and as an in-home
caregiver for a friend. She never provided any verification of these jobs to CYFS. It was not until
the very end of the nine-month period at issue that respondent obtained stable employment.
¶ 61 Respondent nevertheless argues she made measurable movement toward the goal of
reunification. She notes she completed domestic-violence services “in a satisfactory manner many
months prior and no service plan or testimony evidences any further recommended classes to
address domestic[-]violence concerns.” She also points out that she “rarely, if ever, missed a visit”
with E.R., “had consistent, safe, and stable housing,” had obtained employment, and was engaged
with a mental-health counselor. Based on this evidence, respondent asserts, the trial court should
not have found she failed to make reasonable progress toward reunification. We disagree.
¶ 62 Admittedly, respondent satisfactorily completed a domestic-violence victim class.
However, that class was completed well before the nine-month period at issue, and we fail to see
how that demonstrates reasonable progress during the relevant timeframe. Moreover, the record
shows that, while respondent was enrolled in domestic-violence services, she continued her
involvement with her abuser, Jay R., had a child with him after she completed those classes, and
had contact with him well into 2021. Given her continued contact with her abuser, the trial court
could properly find she failed to implement into her life what she learned in the classes.
¶ 63 Further, we reject respondent’s assertion that she had “consistent, safe, and stable housing.”
We appreciate that respondent reportedly lived in the same apartment throughout much of this
case, which supports her assertion that her housing was consistent and stable. But despite multiple
14
opportunities, she never permitted CYFS to enter the apartment to determine whether it was safe
or suitable for E.R. Thus, the safety of her home was never evaluated or verified.
¶ 64 We likewise reject respondent’s argument that she demonstrated reasonable progress
toward addressing her mental-health concerns and achieving stable employment during the nine-
month period at issue. To be sure, respondent testified she had reengaged in mental-health
treatment at the county health department about two months before the fitness hearing, i.e., in June
2022. In the same vein, she testified she obtained employment at Dick Blick about two months
before the fitness hearing, in June or July 2022. However, the record establishes she engaged in
no mental-health treatment and was unemployed during a large portion of the nine-month period.
She did not engage in treatment or obtain the job at Dick Blick until the very end of that period.
See In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 592, 599 (1996) (“A recent ‘flurry of activity’ regarding [the
respondent’s] goals immediately prior to the *** hearing on the petition *** can hardly overcome
several months where her efforts were minimal at best.”). Respondent’s delay undercut her ability
to establish she made “measurable or demonstrable movement” toward reunification. See Daphnie
E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067.
¶ 65 We acknowledge respondent regularly attended her weekly, supervised parent-child visits
at the CYFS office. We do not disagree that respondent’s efforts in this regard were laudable.
However, efforts should not be confused with progress. See In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 999
(2004). Here, respondent never progressed from weekly supervised visits to more frequent or in-
home, unsupervised visits and failed to demonstrate her ability to independently parent E.R.
¶ 66 Simply put, we agree with the trial court’s finding that, at the time of the fitness hearing,
E.R. was no closer to returning home than she was at the inception of the case, almost two years
earlier. Respondent made little, if any, progress during the relevant time period. Accordingly, we
15
conclude the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit based on her failure to make reasonable
progress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In light of our conclusion, we need
not determine whether the State also proved she failed to make reasonable efforts. See B’Yata I.,
2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 30.
¶ 67 C. Best-Interests Finding
¶ 68 The trial court’s focus at the best-interests stage is the child’s welfare and whether
termination would improve the child’s future financial, social, and emotional atmosphere. In re
D.M., 336 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772 (2002). “[A]t a best[-]interests hearing, the parent’s interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home
life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). When making a best-interests determination, the court
must consider the following factors: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child; (2) the
development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of
attachment, including where the child feels love, attachment, and security; (5) the child’s wishes
and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s needs for permanence,
including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and
other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks attendant to entering and
being in substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705
ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).
¶ 69 We conclude the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
in E.R.’s best interests was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence presented
at the best-interests hearing established E.R. was almost two years old and had been with her foster
parents, her paternal aunt and uncle, since her discharge from the hospital three days after her birth.
E.R. was thriving in her foster home and all of her needs were met. She was well-bonded with her
16
foster parents, referred to them as “mom” and “dad,” and was also well-bonded with her foster and
biological siblings that lived in the home.
¶ 70 Respondent was still attending visits, though they had been reduced to three hours every
two weeks. E.R. cried when the foster mother dropped her off for her visits but calmed down when
the foster mother assured E.R. that she would be back. E.R. appeared apprehensive toward
respondent at the beginning of the visits but would eventually warm up. E.R. “struggle[d] to listen
to [respondent] at times during visits, and in response [respondent would] often let [E.R.] have her
way instead of sticking with the boundaries she establishe[d].” Respondent was “able to focus on
[E.R.] intermittently but struggle[d] to remain focused *** when she [was] feeling angry about her
case.” During visits, respondent spent “significant time expressing her discontentment about her
case to the visit supervisor instead of focusing her attention on [E.R.]”
¶ 71 E.R. appeared to be safe, secure, and comfortable in the foster home. She was “current with
medical” and was a “very happy, busy little girl.” The foster parents had completed adoption
classes, were willing to provide her with permanency, and were excited and eager to soon adopt
E.R. and her siblings.
¶ 72 Respondent nevertheless asserts she had remedied the conditions that brought E.R. into
foster care. Thus, she argues, there exists no basis on which to terminate her parental rights. We
disagree.
¶ 73 First, we note that, while we may consider a parent’s conduct at the best-interests stage,
our focus is primarily on the child. In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 959 (2005). Second, we reject
respondent’s assertion that she had remedied the conditions that brought E.R. into care. For the
reasons discussed above, that assertion is simply not true.
17
¶ 74 In any event, the evidence overwhelmingly established that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in E.R.’s best interests. Indeed, throughout E.R.’s entire life, her foster parents
met each and every one of her needs and their home was the only home E.R. ever knew. The foster
parents fully integrated E.R. into their family, treated her as their own, and were ready, willing,
and able to provide permanency to E.R. Simply put, based on the evidence presented, the trial
court correctly declined to prolong these proceedings for an indeterminate period of time so that
respondent could demonstrate her ability to effectively parent E.R. Under these circumstances, we
conclude the trial court’s best-interests finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 75 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 76 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County.
¶ 77 Affirmed.
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