People v. Manley ( 2023 )

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220347-U FILED
This Order was filed under March 15, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-22-0347 Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
DOUGLAS LYNN MANLEY, ) No. 20CF683
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) William A. Yoder,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Doherty and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court vacated two of defendant’s convictions for resisting a peace
officer where the evidence proved that defendant committed a single act of resisting
arrest. Defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass to real property was affirmed
where the county sheriff had statutory authority to maintain courthouse security and
to order defendant to leave the premises. The appellate court held that defendant’s
prison sentence for felony resisting a peace officer causing injury was not
excessive.
¶2 Defendant, Douglas Lynn Manley, appeals his convictions of resisting a peace
officer causing injury (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), (a-7) (West 2020)) and criminal trespass to land (720
ILCS 5/21-3(a)(3) (West 2020)) following a jury trial. Defendant contends that his sentence to the
Illinois Department of Corrections was excessive, his convictions of three counts of resisting a
peace officer violated the one-act, one-crime rule, and the evidence was insufficient to prove
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal trespass to land. We affirm in part and
vacate in part.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On July 21, 2020, defendant was charged by information with three counts of
resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), (a-7) (West 2020)) (counts I-III). Count I charged
that defendant resisted Deputy Jayson Kessinger’s attempt to handcuff him and that defendant’s
resistance caused an injury to Kessinger. Count II charged that defendant resisted Deputy Jason
Hammond’s attempt to arrest him. Count III charged that defendant resisted Deputy Jordan
Krone’s attempt to arrest him. The information also charged defendant with one count of criminal
trespass to a building (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(1) (West 2020)) (count IV) and one count of criminal
trespass to land (720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(3) (West 2020)) (count V). On August 5, 2020, count I of the
information was superseded by an indictment for resisting a peace officer causing injury (720 ILCS
5/31-1(a-7) (West 2020)). The superseding indictment charged the identical offense that count I of
the information had charged. Before trial, the State dismissed count IV of the information.
Defendant proceeded pro se to a jury trial on the superseding indictment and the remaining counts
of the information. We include those facts necessary to understand the issues raised in this appeal.
We will include additional facts as necessary in the analysis section of this Order.
¶5 A. The State’s Case
¶6 Lieutenant Matt Lane of the McLean County Sheriff’s Department testified as
follows. On July 21, 2020, Lane was in charge of security at the McLean County courthouse. The
chief judge had ordered that no one except parties, litigants, and attorneys were allowed entrance
to the courthouse due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of people allowed inside the
courthouse was also limited.
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¶7 Deputy Jason Hammond testified that he and Deputy Jordan Krone screened
persons at the courthouse entrance on the morning of July 21, 2020. They allowed only those
persons with court business into the facility.
¶8 Hammond testified that defendant and a woman approached the deputies the
morning of July 21, 2020. The woman confirmed that she had a court appearance. Defendant said
he was the woman’s attorney. When the deputies asked to see defendant’s bar identification,
defendant refused. The deputies then asked defendant multiple times to leave the courthouse.
Hammond testified that defendant ran past security and through the metal detectors. According to
Hammond, defendant was “very agitated, very angry, very loud,” and was yelling profanities.
Defendant was protesting that the deputies were violating his constitutional rights. Hammond
testified that he physically blocked defendant from entering through the metal detectors. (This
testimony was contradicted by a surveillance video showing that defendant walked back through
the metal detectors on his own before Hammond was able to stop him from entering through
security.)
¶9 Hammond testified that the deputies ordered defendant to leave the property of the
Law and Justice Center, not just the building itself, because defendant was causing a public
disturbance. Deputy Jayson Kessinger, who had joined Hammond and Krone, placed defendant
under arrest after defendant threatened to “get” the deputies. Hammond testified that defendant
yanked his arm away as Kessinger attempted to place handcuffs on defendant. During the struggle,
Kessinger was cut. Hammond identified videos taken by security cameras that morning and
described their contents to the jury as the videos depicted the events concerning defendant.
¶ 10 Krone testified that at about 9:30 a.m. on July 21, 2020, defendant appeared at the
courthouse entrance accompanying a woman who confirmed she was there for a court appearance.
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Krone testified that defendant denied he needed to be an attorney or a litigant to enter the
courthouse. According to Krone, defendant stated the constitution gave him permission to enter
the premises. Krone described defendant as “hostile.” Krone testified that defendant walked
through the metal detectors but was turned back by Hammond.
¶ 11 Krone testified that defendant was loud and causing a disturbance, so the deputies
ordered defendant to leave the premises. Kessinger arrived, and the three deputies inched
defendant toward the exit, repeating their commands for him to leave. Krone testified that they
were outside the building when defendant threatened to “get” Hammond. Then, Kessinger told
defendant he was under arrest for trespass. According to Krone, defendant walked away. Kessinger
then grabbed defendant’s arms to place defendant in handcuffs. Krone also had one of defendant’s
arms, but defendant pulled away. Krone testified that Kessinger received a cut on his hand while
attempting to handcuff defendant.
¶ 12 The video of defendant’s encounter with the deputies inside the courthouse lobby
showed the following. Defendant and a woman (later identified as Gayle Norbury) approached a
counter adjacent to a conveyor and magnetometer. Defendant was carrying a slim manila folder.
Two uniformed officers (identified as Hammond and Krone) were behind the counter. While they
engaged defendant in conversation, Norbury waited but then placed her belongings on the
conveyor, proceeded through the magnetometer, and disappeared from the screen. The deputies
continued to engage defendant in conversation, during which defendant’s gestures became
animated. Defendant then bypassed screening and strode purposefully through the magnetometer,
but he reversed stride before Hammond reached him. Then, defendant opened the folder he was
carrying and appeared to argue with the deputies about something in the folder. Defendant’s
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gestures were excited. The deputies began steering defendant toward the exit. A third deputy
(identified as Kessinger) appeared, and the three deputies escorted defendant outside the building.
¶ 13 Kessinger testified that he was called to assist Hammond and Krone on the morning
of July 21, 2020. When Kessinger arrived at their location, the deputies were telling defendant to
leave the premises. According to Kessinger, the three deputies formed a “wall” and backed
defendant outside the building. Kessinger testified that he then ordered defendant to leave the
property or be arrested. When defendant stepped forward instead of leaving, Kessinger told
defendant he was under arrest. Defendant then walked quickly away from Kessinger. Kessinger
caught up to defendant, who then turned aggressively on Kessinger. Kessinger testified that he
grabbed defendant’s left arm and placed a handcuff on it. Kessinger testified that his right hand
was cut while he was trying to place the right handcuff on defendant. Kessinger testified that he
felt pain and later wiped blood off his hand with a paper towel. According to Kessinger, defendant
was “actively resisting” by “[t]ugging, pulling, [and] tightening up.” Kessinger identified a
photograph depicting the wound on his hand after he wiped off the blood. Kessinger also identified
a video depicting the incident, during which he described defendant as screaming obscenities and
making lewd hand gestures at the deputies.
¶ 14 The videos of the plaza surrounding the courthouse showed the following.
Defendant left the building. The deputies came out behind him, making shooing gestures at
defendant, as if indicating for defendant to leave the premises. Defendant walked away a distance
but then circled back toward the building. The deputies then formed a solid line and walked
defendant toward the perimeter of the plaza.
¶ 15 As defendant walked quickly from the right of the screen toward the left, Kessinger
ran and caught him. Defendant appeared to move his arms behind his back to submit to handcuffs,
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but then he pulled away as Hammond and Krone joined Kessinger. Defendant continually
struggled and pulled away from the deputies as they attempted to handcuff him. After the deputies
handcuffed defendant behind his back, they walked defendant back inside the courthouse.
¶ 16 Following Kessinger’s testimony, the State rested, and the trial court denied
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
¶ 17 B. Defendant’s Case
¶ 18 Norbury testified that she appeared in court on July 21, 2020, on a charge of driving
on a revoked license. Norbury testified that she was disabled with multiple sclerosis and that she
was also cognitively impaired. Norbury described defendant as her “significant other,” who
assisted her. According to Norbury, defendant accompanied her to court that morning as her family
member and counsel. When she and defendant arrived at the courthouse, she told the deputies
about her court date, but she did not tell them about her disabilities. Defendant told the deputies
that Norbury had the constitutional right to have someone with her. Norbury testified that she
“definitely” wanted defendant to be there. According to Norbury, she was relying on the
constitution in asserting defendant’s right to accompany her to court. Norbury testified that
defendant was carrying a “stack of paperwork” that morning showing his right to be with her in
court.
¶ 19 Defendant testified on his own behalf in narrative form, as follows. Defendant
testified that he agreed to accompany Norbury to court on July 21, 2020, because of Norbury’s
disabilities and because he is “very versed” in both “manmade” and “natural” law. At about 9:45
a.m., they arrived at the courthouse. Norbury told the officers she had a court date. Defendant
explained to the officers that he was there to “console” Norbury and consult with her as her
counsel, even though he was not an attorney. Defendant testified that it is the right of Americans
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to have counsel, who need not be an attorney. Defendant testified that the officers stated that he
could not enter due to the pandemic. Defendant testified that the pandemic does not suspend the
constitution, which is what tells us what we can and cannot do. Defendant testified that he left the
building when the officers asked him to leave. According to defendant, he was not creating a
controversy but, rather, was “addressing [his] grievances.” According to defendant, he stopped
immediately when ordered to do so and placed his hands behind his back to be handcuffed.
Defendant testified that it caused him discomfort, so he moved from “side to side” to take the
weight off his foot. Defendant testified that the officers wrongly interpreted that movement as
resisting arrest. Defendant stated that he “offered” himself to the officers because he knew they
had to do their jobs. Defendant testified that he had an envelope in his hand, which could have
been what caused Kessinger’s injury. Defendant testified that he was “completely compliant” with
the officers, except when one of them stuck his hand down defendant’s waistband, which “freaked
[defendant] out.” On cross-examination, defendant testified that he complied with the deputies’
orders to leave the building, only he failed to comply fast enough to suit the officers. Defendant
also testified that he had the right to enter the building. On redirect examination, defendant again
testified in narrative form that it was his “right to inquire into why I was being asked to leave.”
Defendant testified that he “had to ask questions” and needed answers so he could later file a
formal complaint against the deputies. Following his testimony, defendant rested.
¶ 20 C. Rebuttal and Verdict
¶ 21 In rebuttal, the State introduced defendant’s two prior convictions for felony
domestic battery. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant’s previous convictions could be
considered only as they affected the believability of the witness. The State rested. The jury
convicted defendant of all charges. Defendant did not file any posttrial motions.
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¶ 22 D. Sentencing
¶ 23 Defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on December 17, 2021. Defendant again
represented himself. The trial court admitted the presentence investigation report into evidence
over defendant’s objection that neither the state’s attorney, his assistants involved in the case, nor
the trial judge were authorized to practice law. The State recommended a period of four years’
incarceration on defendant’s conviction on count I (the superseding indictment charging resisting
with injury to Kessinger). That recommendation was based on defendant’s prior convictions, the
nature of the present offense, and defendant’s previous noncompliance with community-based
sentences.
¶ 24 Defendant disputed certain of the prior criminal convictions noted in the
presentence investigation report. Defendant then argued that he did not intend to cause a
disturbance when he accompanied Norbury to court. Defendant argued that he relied on the Citizen
Participation Act (735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2020)) in asserting his right to attend court
proceedings. Defendant maintained that the deputies’ orders for him to leave the Law and Justice
Center were unconstitutional as they denied him the right to participate in a governmental function.
Defendant denied that he resisted arrest. Defendant also asserted that there was no evidence
showing how Kessinger got a cut. Defendant argued against imprisonment, stating that he was 57
years old, tired, not in good health, and solely responsible for caring for Norbury. Defendant
argued that his criminal past was due to being younger and “[not] very smart.”
¶ 25 The trial court stated that it considered the presentence investigation report, the
evidence and arguments presented, and all of the factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court
noted that the deputies showed patience with defendant when he insisted on entering the
courthouse, ran through the metal detectors, and disrupted the flow of courthouse traffic. The court
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found that courthouse security was jeopardized because everyone was focused on defendant for an
extended period of time. The court noted that defendant’s record consisted of “many
misdemeanors,” “several felony offenses,” and “does not include a *** record of success on
probation.” The court noted:
“[The presentence investigation report] shows probation sentence [sic] as being
terminated unsatisfactorily on multiple occasions. It shows the defendant failing to
follow through with recommendations while on probation. It demonstrates the
defendant’s reluctance to ever accept responsibility for his own conduct.”
¶ 26 The trial court further noted that a 2013 mental health examination showed that
defendant “takes no responsibilit[y] for his behaviors,” is “very blaming of the victims” and the
legal system, and is “too toxic” for group counseling. The court noted that defendant was also
unsuccessful in individual counseling. The court found that further community-based sentencing
would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. The court sentenced defendant to three and a half
years’ incarceration on count I (the superseding indictment) plus fines and court costs. As to
defendant’s convictions on counts II and III of the information (resisting a peace officer), the court
fined defendant $75 plus court costs and ordered defendant to serve 48 hours in jail. (The written
financial sentencing order reflects only the fines and court costs.) As to count V of the information
(criminal trespass to land), the court imposed a fine of $75 and court costs. The court denied
defendant’s pro se motion to reconsider the sentence.
¶ 27 Defendant obtained a supervisory order from our supreme court allowing him to
file a late notice of appeal on October 28, 2022.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 29 Defendant, who is now represented by counsel, raises three arguments: (1) the
sentence of three and a half years’ incarceration on count I (superseding indictment) was excessive,
(2) defendant’s convictions of three counts of resisting arrest violated the one-act, one-crime rule,
and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass to land.
¶ 30 A. Defendant’s Sentence Was Not Excessive
¶ 31 Defendant contends that his sentence of three and a half years in prison for resisting
a peace officer was disproportionate to the trivial nature of Kessinger’s injury. Defendant also
argues that the trial court did not consider his poor health and his need to care for Norbury.
Additionally, defendant argues that the court ignored his reasonable reliance on supreme court
guidelines stating that a family member or friend could accompany pro se litigants to court during
the pandemic. Defendant requests that we reduce his sentence for felony resisting arrest to two
years’ incarceration. Alternatively, defendant requests that we remand for resentencing.
¶ 32 It is well-settled that a trial court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence.
People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). Absent an abuse of that discretion, we cannot alter
a sentence on review. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209-10. A reviewing court accords the trial court’s
sentencing decision great deference because the trial court is generally in a better position to
determine the appropriate sentence. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. The trial court can weigh factors
such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social
environment, habits, and age. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. A sentence that is within statutory limits
will be deemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion only where the sentence is greatly
at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or where it is manifestly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209-10.
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¶ 33 Here, the superseding indictment charged defendant with resisting a peace officer
causing injury. This offense is a Class 4 felony for which the sentencing range is one to three years’
incarceration. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2020). However, the maximum prison sentence for
an extended-term Class 4 felony is six years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 2020). Here, defendant
concedes he was eligible for the extended term due to his prior convictions. Defendant also
concedes that his sentence of three and a half years’ incarceration was within the statutory limits.
Nevertheless, defendant argues that the sentence was an abuse of discretion because Kessinger’s
injury was only a minor cut to the base of his right index finger.
¶ 34 Acts of struggling and wrestling with a police officer are physical acts that
constitute resisting and will support a conviction for resisting a peace officer even if the underlying
attempted arrest was unwarranted. People v. Miller, 199 Ill. App. 3d 603, 611 (1990). The evidence
showed that Kessinger was cut during the struggle to handcuff defendant. Defendant characterizes
the injury as a “paper cut,” though the photograph depicts a round wound with flesh missing, and
Kessinger testified that it caused him pain. Kessinger also testified that he wiped off blood before
the photograph was taken. Defendant acknowledges that the cut to Kessinger’s finger was serious
enough to constitute an “injury” within the meaning of the felony resisting or obstructing statute.
See People v. Bethel, 2022 IL App (1st) 200049-U, ¶ 28 (holding that “injury” for purposes of the
statute means an act that causes bodily pain.) In Bethel, the court specifically noted that an injury
causing pain is not a trivial injury. Bethel, 2022 IL App (1st) 200049-U, ¶ 28. Accordingly, we
hold that defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
¶ 35 Next, defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factor
that defendant served as Norbury’s caregiver. Norbury suffered from multiple sclerosis and
cognitive impairment. Although the court did not specifically mention defendant’s relationship
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with Norbury in its remarks, the court noted that it considered all of the statutory factors in
aggravation and mitigation. The trial court is not required to expressly indicate its consideration
of all mitigating factors and the weight it assigned to each. People v. Walker, 2021 IL App (4th)
190073, ¶ 74. Nor does the fact that mitigation exists require the court to reduce a sentence that is
otherwise within the statutory range of permitted sentences. Walker, 2021 IL App (4th) 190073,
¶ 74.
¶ 36 For the same reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court ignored
defendant’s own poor health as a mitigating factor. At sentencing, defendant told the court that he
was 57 years old, tired, and not in good health. The presentence investigation report indicated that
defendant suffered ongoing complications from an appendectomy. However, the court noted that
it considered all matters in mitigation in making its sentencing determination. There is a
presumption that the court considered all the relevant factors in determining the proper sentence
and that presumption is not overcome unless the defendant presents explicit evidence from the
record that the court did not consider mitigating factors. People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155,
158 (2010). Here, defendant merely argues that the court did not expressly articulate that it
considered defendant’s and Norbury’s health, which is insufficient to overcome the presumption.
See People v. Halerewicz, 2013 IL App (4th) 120388, ¶ 43.
¶ 37 Next, defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider that there were
substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify his offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(4) (West
2020). Defendant maintains that he was acting pursuant to the supreme court’s “Guidelines for
Resuming Illinois Judicial Branch Operations During the COVID-19 Pandemic” when he
attempted to enter the courthouse and then refused to leave. The guidelines provided, inter alia,
that “[s]elf-represented litigants should be allowed to bring one friend or family member with them
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into the courthouse.” Defendant argues that his reasonable belief that he was being denied his
constitutional right to attend court with Norbury lessens his culpability. Defendant asserts that the
court did not consider this factor, but instead praised the deputies for their patience in trying to
implement Lane’s potentially illegal order to keep everyone except litigants out of the courthouse.
¶ 38 Defendant omits the evidence that he did not present his case for entering the
courthouse to the deputies reasonably or rationally. The evidence showed that defendant used loud,
abusive language and hand gestures and attempted to run through the metal detectors. It then took
three deputies to escort defendant from the building. The evidence showed that the sheriff had six
deputies detailed to courthouse security, and three of them were distracted from courthouse
security while dealing with defendant. The evidence also showed that, even when defendant was
outside the building, he continued his unruly behavior, which culminated in an injury to Kessinger.
Defendant has not shown that anything in the supreme court’s guidelines condones or excuses his
disruptive conduct.
¶ 39 Lastly, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors
deprived him of a fair sentencing hearing. Because we find no error, we reject this argument. In
addition to considering all of the factors in mitigation, the court also considered defendant’s
extensive criminal history and past poor response to community-based sentencing. The
presentence investigation report showed defendant’s long history of offenses and violations of
probation as well as his failure to follow through with mental health treatment. Based upon this
record, we cannot say that the sentence on count I, which was in the middle of the range permitted
by statute, was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 40 B. Defendant’s Three Convictions for Resisting a Peace Officer Violated the
One-Act, One-Crime Rule
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¶ 41 A person is guilty of resisting a peace officer where the person knowingly obstructs
the performance of one known to the person to be a peace officer of any authorized act within his
or her official capacity. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2020). Here, the jury convicted defendant of
three counts of resisting, and the trial court imposed three sentences. Defendant maintains that his
behavior constituting resisting arrest consisted of one continuous act of twisting away from the
deputies as they applied the handcuffs. Defendant argues that the one-act, one-crime doctrine
prohibits three convictions for this one continuous act.
¶ 42 The one-act, one-crime rule prohibits convictions for multiple offenses based on
the same physical act. People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 13. Defendant asks us to vacate the
convictions relating to Hammond and Krone. See In re Tyreke H., 2017 IL App (1st) 170406,
¶ 122 (stating that where a defendant is convicted of more than one offense arising from the same
physical act, the conviction for the less serious offense must be vacated). The State argues that
defendant’s three convictions were proper, as his act of resisting arrest involved three separate
officers.
¶ 43 Defendant concedes that he forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court.
Nevertheless, defendant argues that the issue is reviewable under the plain-error doctrine. The
plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider errors affecting a defendant’s substantial
rights where (1) the evidence was closely balanced or (2) the error was so serious as to affect the
integrity of the judicial process. People v. Morgan, 385 Ill. App. 3d 771, 773-74 (2008). An alleged
one-act, one-crime error is reviewable under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine because
such error affects the integrity of the judicial process. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 14. Conventional
plain-error analysis requires us first to determine whether any error occurred. People v. Vesey,
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2011 IL App (3d) 090570, ¶ 21. Whether a one-act, one-crime violation occurred is a question of
law we review de novo. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 15.
¶ 44 Defendant relies on the following factors in arguing that he committed but one
physical act: (1) whether the defendant’s actions were interposed by an intervening event, (2) the
time interval between the successive parts of the defendant’s conduct, (3) the victim’s identity,
(4) the similarity of the defendant’s acts, (5) whether the defendant’s conduct occurred in the same
location, and (6) the State’s intent, as shown by the charging instrument. People v. Sienkiewicz,
208 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2003). Defendant argues that every factor except the third supports that he
committed only a single act. Specifically, defendant asserts that there were no intervening events
between those when defendant attempted to avoid arrest and that every “potential ‘act’ ” of
resistance occurred at the exact same location in the courthouse plaza. Defendant also maintains
that the charging instruments and the State’s closing argument alleged the identical conduct as to
all three officers. We agree.
¶ 45 Count I (the superseding indictment) charged that defendant injured Kessinger by
resisting Kessinger’s application of handcuffs to defendant’s wrists. Count I alleged that the
resisting consisted of “physically struggling with Officer Kessinger and attempting to pull from
the grasp of Officer Kessinger.” Count II of the information charged that defendant resisted being
arrested by “physically struggling with Officer Hammond and attempting to pull from the grasp
of Officer Hammond.” Count III of the information charged that defendant resisted being arrested
by “physically struggling with Officer Krone and attempting to pull from the grasp of Officer
Krone.”
¶ 46 Hammond testified that the deputies and defendant were outside the courthouse in
the plaza when Kessinger told defendant to leave the premises or be arrested. According to
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Hammond, defendant stepped toward the deputies, yelling at them. Kessinger told defendant he
was under arrest. Hammond testified that all three deputies then approached defendant. Hammond
described what followed. Defendant turned and walked “briskly” away. Kessinger ran up to
defendant. Hammond and Krone restrained defendant with their hands. Defendant took a step
away. Kessinger attempted to double-lock handcuffs on defendant while Hammond and Krone
searched defendant, but defendant “yanked” his arm away from Kessinger. On cross-examination,
Hammond testified that he was on defendant’s right side and Krone was on defendant’s left side.
Hammond testified that defendant resisted arrest by pulling away from the deputies the entire time
they were attempting to take him into custody.
¶ 47 Krone testified that when Kessinger grabbed defendant by his arms, defendant put
his hands behind his back as though complying with being placed under arrest. Krone stated that
he was holding one of defendant’s arms and felt defendant pull away from him.
¶ 48 Kessinger testified that they were outside the building when he gave defendant the
“ultimatum” to leave “now” or be arrested. Kessinger stated that defendant “stepped forward,” and
Kessinger told defendant he was under arrest. Kessinger described what next occurred. Defendant
walked away quickly, and Kessinger ran to catch him. Defendant turned on Kessinger
aggressively. Kessinger grabbed defendant’s left arm and placed a handcuff on it. Then Hammond
and Krone arrived. Kessinger grabbed defendant’s right arm and attempted to place the handcuff
when defendant pulled away, and Kessinger’s finger was caught in the handcuffs.
¶ 49 In his closing argument, the prosecutor described defendant’s resisting pertaining
to Kessinger as “pulling away and walking away from the officers as they were trying to restrain
[defendant] in the handcuffs.” Regarding the charge of resisting Hammond, the prosecutor argued:
“It’s the same acts that we just saw [pertaining to Kessinger].” The prosecutor stated:
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“The officers are trying to hold [defendant’s] arms so that they can put [the]
handcuffs on him, the defendant continually pulls away, tries to walk forward, is
moving his body around, resisting their attempts to place him into custody.”
¶ 50 Regarding count III of the information, pertaining to resisting Krone, the prosecutor
stated: “Count [III] is the same offense. *** Again, we have seen the video where the defendant is
walking away, pulling his arms away from [Krone], resisting the efforts to place [defendant] into
custody.”
¶ 51 The surveillance video showed that after Kessinger told defendant he was under
arrest, defendant fast-walked away from the deputies across the courthouse plaza. Kessinger ran
after defendant and caught him at almost the same instant when Hammond and Krone arrived.
Kessinger attempted to handcuff defendant behind his back, with Hammond and Krone on either
side of defendant. Defendant weaved and tugged while all three deputies attempted to handcuff
him. Defendant made a final lurch away from the deputies before they subdued him and escorted
him back into the courthouse.
¶ 52 Multiple convictions for resisting arrest are appropriate where a defendant commits
multiple acts of resisting against more than one officer. People v. Floyd, 278 Ill. App. 3d 568, 572
(1996). In Floyd, for instance, the defendant was convicted of four counts of resisting arrest. Floyd,
278 Ill. App. 3d at 569. After the complainant reported the defendant’s inappropriate behavior
toward her, six or seven police officers responded “in waves” to the defendant’s attempt to resist
arrest. Floyd, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 572. The police first attempted to place the defendant in handcuffs,
then the defendant and four officers fell to the ground, and finally two different officers attempted
to place the defendant into a squad car. Floyd, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 572. The incident lasted 15
minutes and consisted of “at least” four separate acts against four separate officers. Floyd, 278 Ill.
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App. 3d at 572. In People v. Wicks, 355 Ill. App. 3d 760, 761 (2005), the defendant was convicted
of two counts of resisting a peace officer. The appellate court upheld both convictions where the
defendant refused to be arrested by pulling away from the first officer’s grasp and then struggled
with a second officer, who attempted to place the defendant in handcuffs. Wicks, 355 Ill. App. 3d
at 765.
¶ 53 Here, defendant aptly distinguishes Floyd and Wicks based upon the length of time
the acts of resisting lasted, the multiple sequences, and the number of police officers involved in
those cases. By contrast, in our case, there was but one brief sequence in one location involving
all three deputies.
¶ 54 The State argues that the one-act, one-crime doctrine applies only to multiple acts
against a single victim, relying on our decision in People v. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442,
¶ 25. The State maintains that multiple convictions are proper where there are separate victims,
again relying on Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶ 25. In Avelar, we affirmed the defendant’s
three convictions of violation of an order of protection. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶ 2.
The defendant’s three children were the subjects of a plenary order of protection. Avelar, 2017 IL
App (4th) 150442, ¶ 5. In violation of an order of protection, the defendant took the children to a
McDonald’s restaurant, where an argument ensued between the defendant and his ex-girlfriend,
who was the mother of the defendant’s three children. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶¶ 5, 7.
The police were called, and they arrested the defendant for violation of the order of protection.
Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶ 7. The State charged the defendant with three counts of
violating the order of protection against three different victims. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442,
¶ 26. We held that because three separate persons were protected under the order of protection, we
need not reach the issue of whether the defendant’s activity constituted a single act or multiple
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acts. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶ 26. We stated that the defendant violated the order of
protection in three ways, as to three different victims. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶ 30.
¶ 55 Avelar is inapposite. Our holding in that case was based on our analysis that the
statute under which the defendant was charged did not prohibit multiple convictions based on
multiple victims. Avelar, 2017 IL App (4th) 150442, ¶ 30. Also, in our case—as the prosecutor
made clear in closing argument—the three counts of resisting a peace officer were all based on the
same conduct. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s convictions of resisting a peace officer based
on counts II and III of the information.
¶ 56 C. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Defendant Guilty Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt of Criminal Trespass to Land
¶ 57 Count V of the information charged defendant with the offense of criminal trespass
to land. A person commits criminal trespass to real property when he or she remains upon the land
of another after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to depart. 720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(3)
(West 2020). This statute forbids remaining on property after being told to leave, even if the initial
entry was lawful. People v. DeRossett, 237 Ill. App. 3d 315, 326 (1992). Here, the evidence showed
that the deputies instructed defendant to leave not only the courthouse, but also the plaza
constituting the courthouse grounds, multiple times, and defendant refused to leave.
¶ 58 Defendant contends that McLean County was the owner of the property and that
there was no direct evidence that the sheriff’s deputies were “occupants” or were delegated the
authority by the owner to evict defendant from the property.
¶ 59 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether the evidence
presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, enables any rational trier
of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
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443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A guilty verdict can be supported not only by the evidence itself, but
also by any reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Chai, 2014 IL App (2d)
121234, ¶ 33.
¶ 60 Section 3-6023 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-6023 (West 2020)) provides
that the sheriff “shall maintain the security of the courthouse.” That section further provides that
the sheriff’s courthouse security function can be carried out by deputy sheriffs. 55 ILCS 5/3-6023
(West 2020). Further, section 3-6023 provides that the sheriff, “in person or by deputy,” shall obey
the lawful orders and directions of the court. 55 ILCS 5/3-6023 (West 2020). Here, the evidence
established that (1) the McLean County sheriff maintained courthouse security, (2) Lane was the
sheriff’s deputy in charge of courthouse security, (3) the chief judge issued an order limiting who
could enter the courthouse due to the pandemic, (4) courthouse security included stationing
Hammond and Krone at the entrance to the courthouse to screen persons entering to make sure
they complied with the chief judge’s order, and (5) Kessinger was a sheriff’s deputy who assisted
Lane, Hammond, and Krone in maintaining courthouse security and enforcing the chief judge’s
order. It is also clear that the sheriff’s authority extended beyond the building to the plaza where
the arrest took place. See O’Connor v. County of Cook, 337 Ill. App. 3d 902, 908 (2003) (holding
that the sheriff’s custodial duties include the courthouse grounds that serve the needs of the
courthouse and jail). O’Connor cited County of McDonough v. Thomas, 84 Ill. App. 408, 412
(1899), for the proposition that a sheriff had common law powers regarding the care and “custody”
of a county courthouse.
¶ 61 Defendant argues that O’Connor is inapposite because it involved a slip and fall in
a parking garage across the street from the criminal courthouse, rather than a violation of the
criminal trespass to real property statute. Defendant argues that O’Connor has no bearing on
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whether the sheriff can evict someone from courthouse premises. We believe it is obvious that by
giving the sheriff authority over courthouse “security,” the legislature intended to include the
authority to evict persons who pose a hazard to the security of the courthouse building and grounds,
as well as the welfare of courthouse patrons and employees. Because the sheriff and his or her
deputies are designated by statute to maintain custody of the courthouse and its security, we hold
that the State’s evidence in the instant case proved the elements of criminal trespass to real property
beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 63 For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant’s convictions on counts II and III and
otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 64 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
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