Meier v. Ryan , 2023 IL App (1st) 211674 ( 2023 )


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    2023 IL App (1st) 211674
    No. 1-21-1674
    Opinion filed March 17, 2023
    SIXTH DIVISION
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    FIRST DISTRICT
    MARY ELLEN MEIER, Individually and as        )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
    Independent Executor of the Estate of Edmund )     of Cook County.
    Meier, Deceased,                             )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                 )
    )
    v.                                   )     No. 20-L-5020
    )
    PAUL D. RYAN, M.D.; BARRY J. SIDOROW,)             The Honorable
    M.D.; PAUL A. FREIER, M.D.; ADVENTIST )            John H. Ehrlich,
    HEALTH PARNTERS, INC., d/b/a                 )     Judge, presiding.
    Suburban Cardiologists, d/b/a                )
    Adventist Heart And Vascular                 )
    Institute, a/k/a Amita Health                )
    Medical Group Heart and Vascular;            )
    JOHN C. CONROY, D.O.; ALEXIAN                )
    BROTHERS AHS MIDWEST REGION                  )
    HEALTH COMPANY, d/b/a Amita Health           )
    Medical Group; MICHAEL MILANI,               )
    D.O.; RISHA M. FOSTER, M.D.;                 )
    UROPARTNERS, LLC, d/b/a                      )
    Uro-Partners Lagrange Urology;               )
    MELISSA M. KELLY, D.O.; STEPHEN M.           )
    SLOAN, M.D.; ALI H. BAWAMIA, M.D.;           )
    ADVANCE INPATIENT MEDICINE, LLC; )
    JAIME BELMARES AVALOS, M.D.; METRO)
    INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONSULTANTS,              )
    P.I.I.C.; and ADVENTIST MIDWEST              )
    HEALTH d/b/a Adventist Hinsdale              )
    Hospital d/b/a Amita Health                  )
    Adventist Medical Center Hinsdale,           )
    )
    Defendants-Appellees.                )
    No. 1-21-1674
    JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Justices C.A. Walker and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1             This is a permissive interlocutory appeal with a single issue: whether the trial court
    abused its discretion when it granted defendants’ forum non conveniens motion to transfer this
    medical malpractice case from Cook County to Du Page County, where the alleged malpractice
    occurred. As plaintiff acknowledges, she faces a high burden on this appeal. To obtain a
    reversal, she must show that no rational person could take the view taken by the trial court.
    Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 
    219 Ill. 2d 430
    , 442 (2006). For the following
    reasons, we cannot make such a finding and affirm.
    ¶2                                        I. BACKGROUND
    ¶3             Plaintiff Mary Ellen Meier, the executor of the estate of the deceased, Edmund Meier
    (Edmund), alleges that Edmund began treatment in 2008 with defendant Adventist Health
    Partners and other defendants for cardiac issues. On January 7, 2018, Edmund was admitted to
    defendant Hinsdale Hospital and released 10 days later. On May 5, 2018, Edmund was again
    admitted to defendant Hinsdale Hospital and discharged two days later. On May 7, 2018, upon
    arriving home from the hospital, Edmund collapsed and was transported by ambulance back
    to Hinsdale Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. Hinsdale Hospital is located in Du Page
    County, where plaintiff continues to reside.
    ¶4             On May 6, 2020, plaintiff filed this suit in Cook County. On October 6, 2020,
    defendants filed the forum non conveniens motion to transfer the case to Du Page County.
    After both discovery and briefing, the trial court granted the motion on December 2, 2021. The
    trial court found that the following factors favored transfer to Du Page County:
    2
    No. 1-21-1674
    (1) convenience of the parties, (2) the relative ease of access to evidence, (3) settling local
    controversies locally, and (4) the unfairness of imposing expense and burden on a county with
    little connection to the litigation. The trial court found that the following factors were neutral:
    (1) compulsory process of unwilling witnesses, (2) the cost of obtaining the attendance of
    willing witnesses, (3) viewing the premises, and (4) other practical considerations that make a
    trial expeditious. The trial court found that only one factor favored Cook County—namely,
    that Cook County had the ability to dispose of cases faster.
    ¶5             The trial court concluded:
    “[Plaintiff’s] choice of forum is given little deference, but not no deference, because
    she is forum shopping. Further, a review of the relevant factors shows that four favor
    Du Page County, four are neutral, and only one favors Cook County. Moreover, the
    most significant factors—party and non-party convenience, locus of controversy, and
    burden shifting—each favors transfer to Du Page County. This one-sided tilt plainly
    meets the exceptional circumstances to justify the transfer of a case pursuant to the
    forum non conveniens doctrine.”
    ¶6             The trial court then ordered that “[t]his matter is transferred to the Eighteenth Judicial
    Circuit in Du Page County” and that “defendants shall pay all the costs for the transfer.” On
    December 30, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
    Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (authorizing permissive interlocutory appeals from
    denials of forum non conveniens motions), which this court granted on February 1, 2022. After
    various motions for extensions of time, briefing was completed. The appeal is now ready for
    our consideration.
    3
    No. 1-21-1674
    ¶7                                              II. ANALYSIS
    ¶8                With a forum non conveniens motion, the issue for an appellate court is not what we
    would have done in the first instance. Vivas v. Boeing Co., 
    392 Ill. App. 3d 644
    , 657 (2009).
    The sole issue for us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in its ruling. See
    Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 441-42
    . An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person
    could take the view that the trial court took, and we cannot find that here. Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 442
    .
    ¶9                As we explain in more detail below, in a case where most of the factors either favor
    transfer or are neutral, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
    defendants’ motion.
    ¶ 10                                        A. Standard of Review
    ¶ 11              “Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine founded in considerations of
    fundamental fairness and the sensible and effective administration of justice.” Langenhorst,
    
    219 Ill. 2d at
    441 (citing Vinson v. Allstate, 
    144 Ill. 2d 306
    , 310 (1991)). “This doctrine allows
    a trial court to decline jurisdiction when trial in another forum ‘would better serve the ends of
    justice.’ ” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 441
     (quoting Vinson, 
    144 Ill. 2d at 310
    ).
    “Forum non conveniens is applicable when the choice is between interstate forums as well as
    when the choice is between intrastate forums,” such as in the case at bar. Glass v. DOT
    Transportation, Inc., 
    393 Ill. App. 3d 829
    , 832 (2009).
    ¶ 12              The discretion afforded a trial court in ruling on a forum non conveniens motion is
    “considerable.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 441
    . As a result, “[w]e will reverse the circuit
    court’s decision only if defendants have shown that the circuit court abused its discretion in
    balancing the relevant factors.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at
    442 (citing Dawdy v. Union Pacific
    4
    No. 1-21-1674
    R.R. Co., 
    207 Ill. 2d 167
    , 176-77 (2003)). “A circuit court abuses its discretion in balancing
    the relevant factors only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the circuit
    court.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at
    442 (citing Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177); Glass, 393 Ill. App.
    3d at 832.
    ¶ 13             “The issue, then, is not what decision we would have reached if we were reviewing the
    facts on a clean slate, but whether the trial court acted in a way that no reasonable person
    would.” Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 657; see also Hefner v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
    
    276 Ill. App. 3d 1099
    , 1103 (1995) (“the question on review is not whether the appellate court
    agrees with the circuit court’s denial of a forum non conveniens motion, but whether the circuit
    court ‘acted arbitrarily, without employing conscientious judgment *** [and] exceeded the
    bounds of reason’ ” (quoting Mowen v. Illinois Valley Supply Co., 
    257 Ill. App. 3d 712
    , 714
    (1994))). In addition, “we may affirm a trial court’s forum non conveniens order on any basis
    found in the record.” Ruch v. Padgett, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 142972
    , ¶ 40.
    ¶ 14             When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we must also keep in mind that the burden
    is always on the movant to show that the relevant factors strongly favor a transfer. Koss Corp.
    v. Sachdeva, 
    2012 IL App (1st) 120379
    , ¶ 106 (the burden is on the movant to show a transfer
    is strongly favored); Erwin v. Motorola, Inc., 
    408 Ill. App. 3d 261
    , 275 (2011); Woodward v.
    Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 
    368 Ill. App. 3d 827
    , 833 (2006). In the case at bar, the trial court
    was clearly aware of the high burden on the movant when it found that this case exhibited the
    “exceptional circumstances” needed to justify transfer.
    ¶ 15                                    B. Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum
    ¶ 16             “Before weighing the relevant factors, a court must first decide how much deference to
    give to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 657 (citing Langenhorst, 219
    5
    No. 1-21-1674
    Ill. 2d at 448 (the supreme court determined the appropriate amount of deference before
    weighing the relevant factors)).
    ¶ 17             It is “ ‘assumed on a forum non conveniens motion that the plaintiff’s chosen forum is
    a proper venue for the action.’ ” Lagenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 448
     (quoting Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at
    182). “Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference.” Lagenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 448
    ; First American Bank v. Guerine, 
    198 Ill. 2d 511
    , 521 (2002) (“the battle over forum
    begins with the plaintiff’s choice already in the lead”). However, when neither the plaintiffs’
    residence nor the site of the injury is located in the chosen forum, the plaintiff’s choice is
    “entitled to somewhat less deference.” (Emphasis in original.) Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 448
    ;
    Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 517. While “ ‘the deference to be accorded to a plaintiff regarding his
    choice of forum is less when the plaintiff chooses a forum other than where he resides ***
    nonetheless the deference to be accorded is only less, as opposed to none.’ ” (Emphases in
    original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 448
     (quoting
    Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518). Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
    in finding that plaintiff’s choice of Cook County was entitled to less deference.
    ¶ 18                                       C. Private Interest Factors
    ¶ 19              When a court considers a forum non conveniens motion, the Illinois Supreme Court
    found that it must consider both “the private and public interest factors.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 443
    ; Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172-73; see also Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 658. “[N]o single
    factor is controlling.” Erwin, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 274 (citing Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 443
    ).
    ¶ 20             First, we consider the private interest factors, which are “ ‘(1) the convenience of the
    parties; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial, documentary, and real
    evidence; and (3) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and
    6
    No. 1-21-1674
    inexpensive.’ ” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 443
     (quoting Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516); Dawdy,
    207 Ill. 2d at 172; see also Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 658.
    ¶ 21                                     1. Convenience to the Parties
    ¶ 22             As discussed below, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by
    concluding that convenience to the parties favored transfer.
    ¶ 23             With respect to this factor, “the defendant must show that the plaintiff’s chosen forum
    is inconvenient to the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 450
    ; Vivas,
    392 Ill. App. 3d at 658. In other words, “one party cannot argue the other party’s convenience.”
    Ruch, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 142972
    , ¶ 51; Susman v. North Star Trust Co., 
    2015 IL App (1st) 142789
    , ¶ 27.
    ¶ 24             In this suit, plaintiff named a total of 16 defendants: 10 individuals, plus 6 medical
    groups or hospitals. Of the 10 individuals named as defendants, all are doctors. Seven of the
    doctors submitted affidavits averring that a trial in Cook County would be significantly
    inconvenient for them and that a trial in Du Page County would be significantly more
    convenient. All seven averred that they treated the decedent in Du Page County. Five averred
    that they are residents of Du Page County, while two are residents of Cook County, living in
    LaGrange and Glenview. A corporate representative of defendants Adventist Health Partners,
    Inc., AMITA Health Medical Group, and Hinsdale Hospital submitted an affidavit averring
    that, although she lives in Cook County, a trial in Du Page County would be significantly more
    convenient for her because that is where she works. The facts asserted in the affidavits were
    uncontroverted and, thus, assumed to be true. Barrett v. FA Group, LLC, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 170168
    , ¶ 32 (when facts are established by affidavit and are uncontradicted by opposing
    affidavit, those facts are assumed to be true).
    7
    No. 1-21-1674
    ¶ 25              Although plaintiff’s chosen forum is presumed to be convenient for her, we are not
    required to overlook the fact that she lives in Du Page County, as did the decedent when the
    events at issue transpired.
    ¶ 26              Plaintiff argues that two doctors who submitted affidavits actually live in Cook County.
    However, they still averred that Du Page County was significantly more convenient, and we
    cannot find that the trial court acted unreasonably in relying on their affidavits. Vivas, 392 Ill.
    App. 3d at 657. Plaintiff argued that Dr. Sloan, for example, lived and did some work in Cook
    County. However, Dr. Sloan averred that all of the interactions that he had with the deceased
    occurred at Hinsdale Hospital in Du Page County, that a significant amount of his work occurs
    at Hinsdale Hospital, that he planned on attending trial every day and working in the mornings
    and evenings before and after trial, and that seeing patients before and after trial would be
    difficult due to the time and expense associated with traveling from Hinsdale Hospital to the
    Cook County courthouse in Chicago. As for Dr. Bawamia, plaintiff argued that he also lived
    and did some work in Cook County. Like Dr. Sloan, Dr. Bawamia averred that all of the
    interactions he had with the deceased occurred at Hinsdale Hospital in Du Page County, that a
    significant amount of his work is done in the western suburbs, that he planned on attending
    trial daily, and that it would be difficult to see patients before and after trial if it were held at
    the Cook County courthouse in Chicago. As stated above, we cannot find that the trial court
    acted unreasonably by relying on these affidavits, given their averments regarding their intent
    to attend trial daily and the negative impact that would have on their ability to continue
    working.
    8
    No. 1-21-1674
    ¶ 27             Plaintiff notes that, of the three doctors who did not submit affidavits, two live in Cook
    County. However, the two doctors, who both live in Cook County and did not submit affidavits,
    are in the minority.
    ¶ 28             In light of the affidavits from a majority of the individual defendants averring that Cook
    County is a significantly less convenient forum for them, and plaintiff’s residence in the
    transferee forum, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the
    convenience of the parties favored transfer to Du Page County.
    ¶ 29                                    2. Ease of Access to Evidence
    ¶ 30             The next factor is the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial, documentary,
    and real evidence. Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at
    443 (citing Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516); Dawdy,
    207 Ill. 2d at 172; see also Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 658. Since this is a malpractice case and
    most of the treatment at issue occurred in Du Page County, the trial court found that this factor
    favored transfer.
    ¶ 31             First, we consider the testimonial evidence. Plaintiff argued below that defendants
    failed to provide affidavits from the deceased’s nonparty treating doctors. However, as the trial
    court noted, defendants are barred from contacting the deceased’s treating doctors by the
    Petrillo doctrine. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 
    148 Ill. App. 3d 581
    , 587-88 (1986)
    (prohibiting defendants and their attorneys from engaging in ex parte discussions with a
    plaintiff’s treating physicians). Accord Kujawa v. Hopkins, 
    2019 IL App (5th) 180568
    , ¶ 10
    n.1; McChristian v. Brink, 
    2016 IL App (1st) 152674
    , ¶ 13 (“ex parte communications are
    barred between plaintiff’s treating doctor and defense counsel, in order to preserve the patient’s
    trust and confidence in her doctor, as well as to honor the doctor’s duty as a fiduciary to refrain
    from helping the patient’s legal adversary”). Relying on Petrillo, the trial court found that
    9
    No. 1-21-1674
    defendants’ non-production of these affidavits was no surprise. In addition, the trial court found
    the fact that plaintiff “did not provide affidavits from [decedent’s] non-party treaters only
    means that this court cannot determine whether a trial in Du Page or Cook County would be
    more convenient to any of them.”
    ¶ 32             In her appellate reply brief, plaintiff argued that a number of the nonparty treating
    doctors live in Cook County and, “presumably,” their home forum is more convenient for them.
    This presumption overlooks the fact that the decedent’s treatment was primarily in Du Page
    County. Plaintiff argued, without a citation, that defendants contact treating physicians all the
    time and that the trial court “abused its discretion by taking Defendants’ Petrillo argument as
    God’s honest truth.” First, arguments should not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. Ill.
    S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“[p]oints not argued” in the appellant’s initial brief “are
    forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief”). Although the trial court relied on the
    Petrillo case as part of the basis for its order, the case is not mentioned in plaintiff’s initial
    appellate brief. Second, this court is entitled to have legal arguments supported by citation.
    Lozman v. Putnam, 
    379 Ill. App. 3d 807
    , 824 (2008) (this court has repeatedly held that a party
    waives a point by failing to provide citation to relevant authority); Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.
    Oct. 1, 2020) (argument “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor,
    with citation of the authorities”). Even a cursory computer search reveals that the Petrillo
    doctrine is alive and well in this jurisdiction. In sum, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s
    arguments that the trial court’s finding on this factor was an abuse of discretion.
    ¶ 33             Next, we consider the location of real and documentary evidence. The trial court found
    this to be an insignificant factor, since materials may be easily “physically or electronically
    transferred between the two counties” and no party disputes this finding on appeal. See also
    10
    No. 1-21-1674
    Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 659 (“the location of documents, records and photographs has
    become a less significant factor in forum non conveniens analysis in the modern age of e-mail,
    Internet, telefax, copying machines and world-wide delivery services, since they can now be
    easily copied and sent”).
    ¶ 34                In sum, with respect to the relative ease of access to proof, we cannot find that the trial
    court’s reasoning was a view which no reasonable person would take. Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d
    at 657.
    ¶ 35                                        3. Other Practical Problems
    ¶ 36                The last private interest factor is a consideration of “ ‘all other practical problems that
    make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.’ ” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 443
    (quoting Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516); Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172; see also Vivas, 392 Ill. App.
    3d at 658. The trial court broke this factor down further into (1) the availability of compulsory
    process for unwilling witnesses, (2) the ability to view the premises, (3) the cost of obtaining
    attendance of willing witnesses, and (4) the location of the parties’ attorneys. The trial court
    found that all four of these factors were neutral, and we cannot find an abuse of discretion in
    this finding.
    ¶ 37                First, the trial court found that there was no need for compulsory process for unwilling
    witnesses, since “[a] judge in either Cook or Du Page County would have equal authority to
    subpoena unwilling witnesses.” Neither party disputes this finding, and plaintiff specifically
    conceded in her appellate court that the trial court “correctly” made this finding. Second,
    plaintiff agreed with the trial court’s finding that the ability to view the premises was a neutral
    factor.
    11
    No. 1-21-1674
    ¶ 38              Third, plaintiff argued, in one of the headings in her appellate brief, that “[t]he trial
    court abused its discretion when it found that the cost to obtain the presence of willing
    witnesses was greater in Cook County.” However, the trial court made no such finding. The
    trial court specifically found that this factor was “neutral.” Later, in the body of her brief,
    plaintiff argued that “[t]he trial court’s determination that this factor is neutral ignores the fact
    that Defendants did not name any witnesses.” Plaintiff argued further that the presence of her
    named non-party witnesses in Cook County establishes that costs there would be cheaper. But
    the trial court considered this argument and found that plaintiff had failed to provide any factual
    support for this assertion. Plaintiff acknowledged that “[t]he short distance” between the two
    counties “makes it unlikely that trial would be *** more costly in Cook County.” We agree
    and, thus, cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by finding this factor neutral.
    ¶ 39              Fourth, with respect to the location of attorneys, plaintiff argues: “All parties have
    retained counsel in Cook County. It would present a hardship to travel to Wheaton for court
    and trial.” Although attorney location may be considered, our supreme court has cautioned
    “that the location of the parties’ attorneys is accorded little weight in determining a
    forum non conveniens motion.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 450
     (affirming the denial of a
    motion to transfer). This is particularly true where the transfer at issue is an intrastate transfer
    between adjoining counties, as it was in Lagenhorst and as it is here.
    ¶ 40              In sum, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
    consideration of practical problems was a “neutral” factor. As plaintiff stated in her brief to
    this court, “Cook County and Du Page County are adjacent: the proximity, and the many roads
    and trains between, reduce any practical problems.”
    12
    No. 1-21-1674
    ¶ 41                                       D. Public Interest Factors
    ¶ 42              When deciding a forum non conveniens motion, a court must also consider the public
    interest factors. These factors include “(1) the interest in deciding controversies locally; (2) the
    unfairness of imposing trial expense and the burden of jury duty on residents of a forum that
    has little connection to the litigation; and (3) the administrative difficulties presented by adding
    litigation to already congested court dockets.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at
    443-44 (citing
    Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 516-17); Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
    217 Ill. 2d 158
    , 170 (2005); Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173; see also Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 660.
    ¶ 43              First, we consider the respective forums’ interests in deciding these controversies and
    the fairness of imposing jury duty on the forums’ residents. In Langenhorst, our supreme court
    affirmed a trial court’s decision not to transfer a case from St. Clair County to Clinton County,
    which was the scene of the railway accident at issue. Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 451, 454
    . In
    considering the respective forums’ interest, the court observed that St. Clair County had as
    much interest in the controversy as Clinton County because “this same railway line” involved
    in the accident “bisects all of St. Clair County.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at 451
    . In Malloy v.
    DuPage Gynecology, S.C., 
    2021 IL App (1st) 192102
    , ¶ 70, this court found that what was true
    in Langenhorst was “equally true here, where the product at issue is regularly prescribed and
    distributed throughout Cook County.” See Vivas, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 661 (Illinois residents had
    an interest in resolving defective products claims against a defendant corporation, particularly
    when that corporation was headquartered here). However, this case does not concern a train
    hurtling through two counties or a defective product used extensively in both counties. This
    case concerns medical services occurring primarily in Du Page County, for a Du Page County
    resident. While the defendant doctors may work in both counties and while patients from Cook
    13
    No. 1-21-1674
    County may also be treated in Du Page County, that does not change the fact that the deceased
    was released from, and shortly thereafter pronounced dead in, a brick-and-mortar structure
    located only in Du Page County. Given the residence of the deceased, the circumstances of his
    death, and the location of his medical treatment, we cannot find that the trial court abused its
    discretion by finding that these locality factors strongly favored transfer.
    ¶ 44                Lastly, we must consider “the administrative difficulties presented by adding litigation
    to already congested court dockets.” Langenhorst, 
    219 Ill. 2d at
    443-44 (citing Guerine, 198
    Ill. 2d at 516-17). The trial court found “that Cook County has the ability to dispose of cases
    faster” and, thus, it found that this was the lone factor favoring Cook County, However, as
    plaintiff conceded in her brief, court congestion is a relatively minor factor. See, e.g., Brummett
    v. Wepfer Marine, Inc., 
    111 Ill. 2d 495
    , 503 (1986) (“Courts should be extremely reluctant to
    dismiss a case from the forum rei gestae merely because the forum’s docket has a backlog
    ***.”).
    ¶ 45                Plaintiff argues that in the case of Evans v. Patel, 
    2020 IL App (1st) 200528
    , ¶¶ 51, 62,
    this court affirmed the denial of a motion to transfer a case out of Cook County, despite the
    fact that the alleged medical malpractice did not occur there. While there are a number of
    differences between that case and ours, key among them is the fact that, in that case, the abuse-
    of-discretion standard worked in favor of denying the motion, whereas in our case it works in
    favor of granting it. While the cases are, in some ways, factually dissimilar, in both cases, we,
    the appellate court, affirmed the lower court. In Evans, we emphasized that it is “conceivable
    that, on these facts, a different conclusion could be reached.” Evans, 
    2020 IL App (1st) 200528
    ,
    ¶ 60. However, we stressed that “our duty is not to reweigh the private and public factors, but
    to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Evans, 
    2020 IL App (1st) 200528
    ,
    14
    No. 1-21-1674
    ¶ 60. This, we could not find, so we affirmed in both Evans and must do the same in the case
    at bar.
    ¶ 46                For all the foregoing reasons, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in
    finding that the public and private factors did not require dismissal. We find that the trial court
    considered all the relevant private and public interest factors and did not abuse its discretion
    when it granted defendants’ motion to transfer based on forum non conveniens.
    ¶ 47                                            III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 48                After carefully considering and weighing every factor in the forum non conveniens
    doctrine, the trial court found only one factor favoring Cook County. The trial court concluded
    that “Du Page County residents” simply had “a far greater interest in a case involving the
    practice of medicine on a Du Page County resident by physicians practicing in Du Page
    County.” After examining the trial court’s analysis on every factor, we cannot find that it
    abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order
    granting defendants’ forum non conveniens motion to transfer this case to the Eighteenth
    Judicial Circuit in Du Page County.
    ¶ 49                Affirmed.
    15
    No. 1-21-1674
    Meier v. Ryan, 
    2023 IL App (1st) 211674
    Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 20-L-5020;
    the Hon. John H. Ehrlich, Judge, presiding.
    Attorneys                    Patricia E. Raymond, Clark M. Raymond, Robert L. Raymond,
    for                          and Timothy R. Borchardt, of Raymond & Raymond, Ltd., of
    Appellant:                   Schaumburg, for appellant.
    Attorneys                    Aiju C. Thevatheril, Catherine Basque Weiler, and Kristine M.
    for                          Reveille, of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP, of Chicago, for
    Appellee:                    appellees Melissa M. Kelly, Stephen M. Sloan, Ali Bawamia,
    and Advance Inpatient Medicine, LLC.
    Steven C. Steinback and Jason D. Gluskin, of Barker, Castro &
    Steinback, LLC, of Chicago, for appellees Adventist Health
    Partners, Inc., Alexian Brothers AHS Midwest Region Health
    Company, Adventist Midwest Health, Paul D. Ryan, Barry J.
    Sidorow, Paul A. Freier, and John C. Conroy.
    No brief filed for other appellees.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1-21-1674

Citation Numbers: 2023 IL App (1st) 211674

Filed Date: 3/17/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/17/2023