People v. Trujillo ( 2023 )

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 210489-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-21-0489 April 5, 2023
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Sangamon County
MOISES B. TRUJILLO, ) No. 17CF310
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Ryan M. Cadagin,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his
confession based on the totality of the circumstances.
(2) The trial court conducted a sufficient Krankel hearing on defendant’s claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(3) The trial court did not err in making a record of its sentencing determination.
(4) Defendant’s sentence was not subject to double enhancement due to the
application of a 25-year firearm enhancement.
¶2 In April 2021, after a jury trial, defendant, Moises B. Trujillo, was found guilty of
first degree murder and armed robbery. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate
sentence of 80 years’ imprisonment.
¶3 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress statements, (2) the court held an insufficient Krankel hearing (People v. Krankel, 102
Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)), (3) the court failed to make an adequate record of its
sentencing determination, and (4) defendant’s sentence was subject to double enhancement. We
affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On March 17, 2017, the victim, Dezmeion Poole, agreed to provide cannabis for
defendant. Poole had previously sold cannabis and Xanax to defendant, who both used and
resold the drugs. Antonio Ragsdale and Caston Rosa accompanied defendant to Poole’s
apartment complex, but defendant entered the residence alone. During an altercation, defendant
shot Poole, and Poole later died of his injuries.
¶6 On March 21, 2017, defendant was arrested in relation to a failure-to-appear
warrant related to Sangamon County case No. 16-CF-666. Detectives suspected defendant was
involved in the death of Poole. Therefore, they placed him in an interrogation room before he
was booked into jail on the failure-to-appear warrant. Before questioning, detectives gave
defendant Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). During the
interview, defendant denied shooting Poole but admitted to purchasing drugs from him on March
17. After approximately five hours of questioning, the detectives left the room. While the
detectives were gone, defendant placed a chair on the table and used it to climb into the ceiling.
Officers pulled defendant out of the ceiling, and he fell to the floor and repeatedly asked the
officers to kill him. The detectives terminated the interview and defendant was taken to the
hospital.
¶7 After being released from the hospital, defendant was booked into the Sangamon
County jail. The jail staff placed defendant in a high-risk cell due to his escape attempt and
suicidal statements after being pulled from the ceiling.
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¶8 On March 23, 2017, detectives conducted a second interview with defendant,
during which he confessed to shooting Poole. On March 25, defendant requested to speak with
detectives and confirmed his confession.
¶9 A grand jury indicted defendant for four counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1), (2), (3) (West 2016)) and one count of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West
2016)). After initially being appointed counsel, defendant elected to proceed pro se for a period.
¶ 10 A. Motion to Suppress
¶ 11 In March 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress his statements to
detectives. In his motion, defendant argued his statements were involuntary and detectives
coerced his statements under severe emotional duress. Defendant alleged detectives (1) denied
him the right to make a reasonable number of phone calls, contact family, and obtain legal
representation; (2) kept him in isolation; and (3) implied he would receive more lenient treatment
if he confessed. Defendant also claimed he was a “worn-out drug addict with a low IQ and
withdrawing from drug abuse after taking Xanax pills all week.”
¶ 12 The State filed a written response and argued defendant was allowed to contact
his mother and his girlfriend, Chris Kennedy, knew his whereabouts. The State further contended
the detectives did not make any promises but merely encouraged defendant to tell the truth.
According to the State, there was no evidence defendant was under the influence or withdrawing
from any substance, and defendant was kept in a high-risk cell for only two days before his
statements.
¶ 13 The trial court held a hearing on the motion, where the video recordings of
defendant’s March 21, 23, and 25 interviews were admitted. As the hearing was not finished on
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the first date, the matter was continued. At the next hearing date, defendant requested the
appointment of counsel, which the court allowed.
¶ 14 Defendant’s trial counsel filed an amended motion to suppress statements, which
fully incorporated defendant’s pro se motion. The amended motion further alleged defendant
was arrested on a failure-to-appear warrant on March 21, but officers did not bring defendant
before the court until March 27, in violation of requirements of the warrant and section 109-1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/109-1(a) (West
2016)) to bring defendant before a judge “without unnecessary delay.” The motion expanded on
defendant’s claim he was unable to contact family by arguing he was denied phone access in
violation of section 103-3 of the Criminal Procedure Code (id. § 103-3). Finally, the motion
argued detectives induced defendant’s confession with specific promises. In response, the State
incorporated its prior response to defendant’s pro se motion and added an argument defendant
was provided Miranda warnings.
¶ 15 The trial court held a two-day hearing on the amended motion. Detective Michael
Flynn testified defendant was arrested on March 21, 2017, pursuant to a warrant. Officers placed
defendant in an interrogation room, removed his handcuffs, allowed him to wash his hands, and
provided him with water, food, and cigarettes. According to Flynn, defendant looked “fine,”
other than small, superficial scratches on his nose and forehead, and did not seem to be
intoxicated. Before questioning defendant with Detective Paula Crouch, Flynn provided
defendant with Miranda warnings. Flynn stated he made no specific promises and encouraged
defendant to tell the truth. After approximately five hours, the detectives left the room. Once
alone, defendant placed a chair on the table and used it to climb into the ceiling. Immediately,
officers entered the room and pulled defendant out of the ceiling, and defendant fell to the floor.
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Defendant repeatedly asked officers to kill him. Before being taken to the hospital, defendant
was allowed to see Kennedy. After his release from the hospital, defendant was booked into jail.
¶ 16 During the second interview with defendant on March 23, Flynn testified
defendant asked to call his mother. Flynn responded, “When you’re done talking and if you’re
honest, I don’t have a problem with you calling her.” Flynn explained defendant was placed in a
high-risk cell due to his statements after being pulled from the ceiling. During this second
interview, Flynn testified defendant confessed to killing Poole. After detectives finished
speaking with defendant on March 23, he was allowed to call Kennedy, his mother, his brother,
and an immigration official. Two days later, on March 25, defendant requested to speak with
detectives again, where he confirmed his March 23 confession.. Defendant requested phone
access during his third interview. Defendant’s phone at the county jail was shut off because
Ragsdale had not been located. He was given full phone access on March 27, though Ragsdale
had not yet been located. Flynn testified he did not make any promises during the interviews.
¶ 17 During cross-examination, defendant offered into evidence: (1) the original arrest
warrant, (2) the probable-cause statement for criminal damage related to defendant climbing into
the ceiling, which showed bond set at $100,000, (3) court records in case No. 16-CF-666, which
showed defendant was not brought before a judge until March 27, and (4) the probable cause
statement for armed robbery entered March 23. The parties also stipulated to the admission of
defendant’s jail and hospital records.
¶ 18 Detective Crouch testified she assisted Flynn during defendant’s interrogations.
On cross-examination, Crouch acknowledged by the second interview, she was aware defendant
had “some issues with Xanax.”
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¶ 19 Defendant moved for a directed finding on his motion to suppress his statements,
which the trial court denied.
¶ 20 Defendant testified he was 23 years old at the time of the interrogations, he had a
ninth-grade education, and Spanish was his first language. He admitted on cross-examination he
had no issues speaking English. Defendant testified he had been arrested “a couple of times” and
was familiar with the county jail system, but he had never been interrogated or given Miranda
warnings. When defendant was arrested on prior occasions, his mother or brother would assist
him in posting bond, but he testified he was not allowed to call them until after he gave his
statement on March 23. On that date, defendant believed Kennedy was in custody because
detectives showed him Kennedy’s booking photos. According to defendant, he “felt like [he] had
no choice but to give the statement in order to communicate with [his] family or to see a judge
later.”
¶ 21 Defendant acknowledged he abused alcohol, Xanax, cocaine, and cannabis. He
described his Xanax use as: “I would pop pill after pill just all day long.” Defendant started to
feel withdrawal symptoms the day he was arrested. He did not tell jail staff he was withdrawing
because he was afraid he would be kept from the phones if they believed he was high risk. On
March 25, defendant was taken to the hospital because he had a panic attack and was given
Librium to treat his withdrawal symptoms.
¶ 22 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, stating it considered:
“the factors as laid out in the case law, including the Defendant’s age,
intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, physical
condition at the time of the questioning, legality and duration of the detention,
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presence of Miranda warnings, the duration of the questioning, and any physical
or mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises.”
The court further found “the delay, itself, or the duration of the detention” did not make
defendant’s statement involuntary. The court noted, as to Xanax withdrawal, defendant was
“following along the questions, answering questions appropriately, speaking in complete
sentences,” and did not appear to be under the influence or withdrawing in the video recordings
of the interrogations. As to promises, the court found the detective’s statements were open-ended
and not promises, except for Flynn’s statement on conditional phone use, which the court found
did not make defendant’s statement involuntary when reviewing the totality of the
circumstances. Finally, the court explained the purpose of phone calls is to let family members
know where an arrestee is located and enlist help for procedural safeguards, which defendant’s
interactions with Kennedy satisfied. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the court
determined defendant’s statements were not involuntary.
¶ 23 B. Trial
¶ 24 Defendant’s jury trial commenced in April 2021. During opening statements, the
State presented its theory of the case that defendant planned to rob Poole, obtained a firearm,
displayed the firearm to rob Poole, and fatally shot Poole in the ensuing scuffle. The defense’s
theory of the case asserted Poole attacked defendant during the cannabis transaction, causing
defendant to use justified force, and defendant’s contrary admissions were the result of coercive
police tactics. It was not disputed that defendant shot Poole, causing his death.
¶ 25 Poole’s body was discovered on March 17, 2017. He was found in his bedroom,
which was in disarray, and blood was splattered on the walls and furniture. Loose cannabis and
currency were visibly strewn on the floor, and Poole was found with $354 in cash in his pockets.
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Two firearms were located in Poole’s bedroom—a rifle lying under the bed and a handgun under
the mattress. Poole was shot five or six times, with the most significant injury to Poole’s
stomach. Review of Poole’s cell phone records showed calls from defendant’s phone number at
2:30 p.m. and 2:51 p.m. on March 17, 2017.
¶ 26 Police arrested defendant at his residence, where he was found hiding in the attic.
In defendant’s and Kennedy’s bedroom, police found $762, a scale, smoking pipes, and 37.3
grams of cannabis. Officers located defendant’s cell phone, which revealed Internet searches
about Springfield homicides after the shooting.
¶ 27 The State offered as evidence portions of the videos of defendant’s three
interviews with detectives. In the first interrogation on March 21, defendant denied shooting
Poole, but eventually he admitted to purchasing drugs from Poole on March 17, 2017. The first
interview ended with defendant’s attempted escape into the ceiling. In the second interview, on
March 23, defendant told investigators he planned the robbery with Rosa, and defendant was
given a firearm. Defendant acknowledged he “upped” the interaction with Poole by displaying
his gun, and defendant and Poole got into a fight. During the altercation, defendant discharged
the firearm multiple times, striking Poole. Then defendant left with Poole’s flip phone, which
Poole used exclusively for drug transactions, Poole’s wallet, and a jar of cannabis. Defendant
returned the firearm, disposed of the wallet and phone, and burned his bloody clothing.
¶ 28 Rosa testified for the State. Rosa acknowledged he was currently facing charges
as an accessory to Poole’s murder and had other unrelated pending charges. He confirmed no
promises were made for his testimony, but he was hoping the State would consider his
cooperation. On March 17, 2017, defendant called Rosa looking for a ride. Defendant agreed to
supply Rosa with cannabis at a reduced rate in exchange for a ride. Rosa arranged for a ride with
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Ragsdale and gave defendant $50. Defendant went inside an apartment alone for 5 to 10 minutes.
When defendant returned, he looked like he had been in a fight, was cursing, and had a jar
containing cannabis, which he did not possess before entering the apartment. The group returned
to defendant’s residence, where defendant placed a gun, a wallet, two phones (“a flip phone and
maybe an iPhone”), and cannabis on a table. Defendant gave Rosa more cannabis than he had
paid for and asked him to leave. A few days later, defendant contacted Rosa and stated they
needed to talk. When Rosa spoke to the police, he told them about defendant’s plan to rob Poole
because he believed that was the story the officers wanted to hear. The State then introduced
Rosa’s prior inconsistent statements, in which Rosa told detectives defendant intended to rob
Poole and Rosa helped him procure a firearm.
¶ 29 Juan Carlos Reyes testified he was a prior acquaintance of defendant. In the
evening of March 17, 2017, defendant came to Reyes’s house with a bag of cannabis. At that
time, defendant appeared skittish and had bruising and scratches. Reyes stated defendant was
mumbling that he had been “thinking about some robberies,” that he “might have hurt
somebody,” and that he “f*** up.”
¶ 30 At trial, defendant testified in his defense. In 2017, defendant used and sold
cannabis and Xanax. At some point, he had traded cannabis for a small firearm, which he used
for protection. According to defendant, on March 17, Rosa asked him for cannabis. Once Rosa
offered defendant a ride and provided him with $50, he contacted Poole, who often sold him
cannabis. Mistakenly, defendant believed he had $400, but he had been using Xanax and did not
count the bills. When Poole accused him of not having enough money, a fight ensued and
defendant was knocked to the ground and raised his firearm. As Poole turned towards his
dresser, where defendant believed Poole kept a firearm, defendant discharged his firearm several
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times at Poole. As they fought over the firearm, defendant was able to shoot Poole one more
time. After that shot, Poole stopped and sat down. Believing he had paid for the cannabis,
defendant took the jar of cannabis and Poole’s flip phone, which he was afraid would link him to
the altercation, and left. Defendant admitted he “freak[ed] out” and did not “cop[e] real well”
after the incident, which led to his escape attempt after his arrest. According to defendant, he told
detectives “what they wanted to hear” so he could make phone calls and get out of a high-risk
cell.
¶ 31 The jury found defendant guilty of intentional murder, including that defendant
personally discharged the firearm causing Poole’s death, and armed robbery.
¶ 32 C. Krankel Hearing
¶ 33 While still represented by counsel, defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial,
which made several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Specifically, defendant alleged
counsel, William Vig, was ineffective for: (1) failing to request a jury instruction for involuntary
manslaughter, (2) proceeding to trial when defendant had filed a complaint with the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) against Vig, (3) refusing to adopt
defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss the indictment, (4) failing to raise the State’s failure to
prove corpus delicti as to defendant’s armed robbery offense, (5) failing to instruct the jurors on
the one-act, one-crime doctrine, (6) failing to object to certain statements of the prosecutor, and
(7) failing to present exculpatory evidence.
¶ 34 At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged defendant’s
motion and, pursuant to Krankel, gave defendant the opportunity to elaborate or explain his
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant detailed the following claims of
ineffective assistance: Vig failed to (1) object to certain statements made by prosecutors that
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mischaracterized evidence, (2) object to the State not calling Ragsdale or other witnesses on the
witness list, (3) present evidence indicating defendant already possessed narcotics and would
have no motivation to rob Poole, (4) adopt defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss the indictment,
(5) argue Rosa had motivation to lie, (6) offer an involuntary manslaughter instruction, and
(7) communicate with defendant in light of the outstanding ARDC complaint. After allowing Vig
to respond, the court determined defendant’s claims had no factual basis and the claims related to
trial strategy.
¶ 35 Following the Krankel hearing, the trial court proceeded to sentencing.
¶ 36 D. Sentencing
¶ 37 At sentencing, the State alleged numerous aggravating factors, including
defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm, defendant received compensation for
committing the offense, defendant’s criminal history, the need for deterrence, and defendant’s
lack of remorse. The State recommended 50 years for murder, including a 25-year firearm
enhancement, and 35 years for armed robbery, including the mandatory 25-year enhancement if
the trial court found defendant caused great bodily harm, for an aggregate prison sentence of 85
years.
¶ 38 Defense counsel maintained serious harm was an element of first degree murder
and armed robbery, compensation was a factor inherent in armed robbery, and defendant had no
prior felony convictions. Defense counsel also stated, “I would argue, Your Honor, and I will
concede I have not found case law that supports my argument, but I believe that is inherent to the
idea of due process, that the same gun and the same death should not enhance multiple offenses.”
Counsel requested an aggregate sentence of no more than 51 years.
¶ 39 The trial court sentenced defendant as follows:
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“Having now considered the trial evidence, the Presentence Investigation
Report and exhibits and additions and corrections, the history, character and
attitude of the Defendant, the evidence and arguments, statement of allocution
presented, considering all the factors in aggravation, the appropriate ones, and
mitigation, and with due regard to the circumstances of the offense, I do find as
follows and I hereby sentence the Defendant to serve in the aggregate, it’ll be
eighty years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the breakdown of that
is Counts I through IV would merge into a sentence of forty-nine years to be
served at a hundred percent with the firearm enhancement and three years
mandatory supervised release.
That is consecutive to a thirty-one year sentence with a great bodily harm
finding and gun enhancement at eighty-five percent, with three years mandatory
supervised release, for an aggregate of eighty years in the Illinois Department of
Corrections.”
¶ 40 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, in part, the court erred by
(1) applying a 25-year firearm enhancement to both counts and (2) “failing to ‘specify on the
record the particular evidence, information, factors in mitigation and aggravation or other
reasons that led to his sentencing determination’ as required by 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c) when
imposing a sentence for a violent crime.” The court disagreed and denied the motion.
¶ 41 This appeal followed.
¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 43 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress statements, (2) the court held an insufficient Krankel hearing, (3) the court failed to
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make an adequate record of its sentencing determination, and (4) defendant’s sentence was
subject to double enhancement. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 44 A. Motion to Suppress
¶ 45 Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his
confession because his confession was involuntary. Specifically, defendant maintains, his will
was overborne by (1) the limitations on his phone access, (2) the conditions of his confinement,
including the length of time before he saw a judge, (3) withdrawing from Xanax, and
(4) promises of leniency from detectives.
¶ 46 “Where the defendant challenges the admissibility of an inculpatory statement by
filing a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the statement was voluntary.” People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 84, 202
N.E.3d 283. On review, we will reverse the trial court’s factual findings only if they are against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 75. However, “the ultimate legal determination as to
whether suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo.” Id.¶ 47 “The rule prohibiting the admission of an involuntary confession is rooted in the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment [citation] and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.” Id. ¶ 76. “To ascertain the admissibility of a confession under either
amendment, courts consider whether the defendant’s confession was voluntary and will exclude
a confession that is involuntary.” Id. “[T]he test of voluntariness is whether the defendant made
the statement freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion of inducement of any sort, or whether
the defendant’s will was overcome at the time he or she confessed.” People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.
2d 484, 500, 670 N.E.2d 606, 613 (1996). “The voluntariness of a confession depends on the
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totality of the circumstances of the particular case, and no single factor is dispositive.” Salamon,
2022 IL 125722, ¶ 81.
“The relevant factors include the defendant’s age, intelligence,
background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the
time of questioning. [Citation.] In addition, courts consider the legality and
duration of the detention, the duration of the questioning, the provision of
Miranda warnings, and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the
existence of threats or promises.” Id.¶ 48 Although the voluntariness of a confession depends on the totality of the
circumstances, we will first address each of defendant’s contentions regarding his motion to
suppress individually before reaching an ultimate conclusion based on the totality of the
circumstances.
¶ 49 1. Phone Access
¶ 50 Defendant first contends his confession was involuntary because the detectives
improperly denied him telephone access.
¶ 51 Section 103-3(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (725 ILCS 5/103-3(a) (West
2016)) states:
“Persons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate with an
attorney of their choice and a member of their family by making a reasonable
number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner. Such
communication shall be permitted within a reasonable time after arrival at the first
place of custody.”
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The statute does not provide what a “reasonable time” may entail. The purpose of section 103-3
is to permit an accused “to notify his family of his whereabouts and to notify them of the nature
of the offense with which he is charged so that arrangements may be made for bail,
representation by counsel, and other procedural safeguards that the defendant cannot accomplish
for himself while in custody.” People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 69-70, 289 N.E.2d 601, 606 (1972).
The statute contains no remedy for a violation, and appellate courts have found the statute is not
violated if the defendant does not indicate he wants a phone call specifically to enlist legal
representation. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 142733, ¶ 30, 88 N.E.3d 66.
¶ 52 In this case, the trial court determined officers allowed defendant to make
contacts with his family consistent with the purpose of the statute, “to let family members know
where an arrestee is and enlist their help for procedural safeguards.” Defendant was allowed to
speak to Kennedy in person on March 21, before he made any confession. Defendant then called
Kennedy on March 22 at 12:18 a.m. to inquire about obtaining bail money. Kennedy informed
defendant she had contacted his family and informed them of his situation. Defendant had been
arrested between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on March 21, meaning he had contact with Kennedy “in any
other reasonable manner” within hours of his arrest and placed a phone call to her within nine
hours of his arrest. In addition, defendant was allowed further calls to his mother, brother, and an
immigration officer on March 23. Defendant’s family therefore knew his whereabouts, and he
was able to enlist their help for procedural safeguards. See People v. Green, 2014 IL App (3d)
120522, ¶¶ 53-55, 19 N.E.3d 13. As the record is devoid of any evidence that demonstrates
defendant’s later requests to call family members were made for assistance in obtaining legal
representation, denial of those requests was not a violation of the statute.
¶ 53 2. Conditions of Confinement
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¶ 54 Defendant argues he was not properly brought before a judge until six days after
his arrest, rendering his confession involuntary.
¶ 55 Section 109-1(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code (725 ILCS 5/109-1(a) (West
2016)) provides:
“A person arrested with or without a warrant shall be taken without
unnecessary delay before the nearest and most accessible judge in that county ***
and a charge shall be filed. Whenever a person arrested either with or without a
warrant is required to be taken before a judge, a charge may be filed against such
person by way of a two-way closed circuit television system, except that a hearing
to deny bail to the defendant may not be conducted by way of closed circuit
television.”
Noncompliance with section 109-1(a) “does not, by itself, obviate a confession or render an
otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible at trial.” People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 176, 794
N.E.2d 788, 805 (2002). Delay in bringing the arrestee before a judge is merely a factor to be
considered on the question of voluntariness. Id.¶ 56 Whether there was “unnecessary delay” must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 177. There is no fixed number of hours which constitutes an unnecessary delay;
however, “Illinois decisions suggest a delay of 24 to 36 hours prior to presentment is usually not
considered to be unnecessary.” Id. at 177-78.
¶ 57 In this case, defendant was arrested on a warrant between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. on
Tuesday, March 21, 2017. Defendant was brought before a judge on Monday, March 27, 2017,
in case No. 16-CF-666. Defendant acknowledges his detention was lawful, as on March 21, the
trial court made a probable cause finding on defendant’s charges of criminal damage and
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attempted escape, though the proceeding was held ex parte. Rather, defendant argues the
increase in bail from $5000 to $100,000, the length of his confinement without seeing a judge,
and his placement in a high-risk cell combined to create an environment where defendant
believed “the detectives controlled his immediate fate” and increased the “coercive nature” of the
interrogation.
¶ 58 The trial court found the duration of detention did not make defendant’s
confession involuntary. However, the court did not state the delay was not unreasonable. Rather,
the court stated, “the delay, itself, or the duration of detention, I don’t find that that makes it
involuntary.” There is nothing in the record to cause us to question our deference to the court’s
factual determination, because the court did not determine the delay was reasonable. Therefore,
there is no need for us to determine whether there was an actual violation of section 109-1(a).
We instead defer to the court’s factual finding and consider defendant’s length and conditions of
his detention as a factor in our analysis of the totality of the circumstances.
¶ 59 3. Drug Withdrawal
¶ 60 Defendant next alleges his confession was involuntary because he was suffering
from withdrawal symptoms due to his use of Xanax.
¶ 61 “The fact that an accused is under the influence of drugs, self-administered or
otherwise, when he or she makes a confession does not make the confession automatically
inadmissible.” People v. Crenshaw, 2011 IL App (4th) 090908, ¶ 15, 959 N.E.2d 703.
Suppression of a statement based on intoxication is warranted if the evidence “plainly shows that
a suspect is so grossly intoxicated that he no longer has the capacity to knowingly waive his
rights.” People v. Feagans, 134 Ill. App. 3d 252, 259, 480 N.E.2d 153, 158 (1985). Evidence of
less than gross intoxication goes to the weight to be accorded defendant’s statement, not its
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admissibility, and the trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding
defendant’s confession. Id.; People v. Koesterer, 44 Ill. App. 3d 468, 478, 358 N.E.2d 295, 303
(1976).
¶ 62 In this case, defendant did not argue he was under the effects of a drug. Rather, he
maintains he was suffering from the withdrawal effects of not taking a drug. The trial court
determined, after reviewing the video of defendant’s interviews, defendant had no problem
“following along [with] the questions, answering questions appropriately, [and] speaking in
complete sentences.”
¶ 63 We see no evidence to override our deference to the trial court’s factual
determination. Defendant failed to present any evidence of how withdrawing from Xanax
affected him. Admittedly, defendant had a panic attack on March 25 and had “some anxiety.”
Otherwise, defendant gave no indication withdrawal affected his mental state sufficiently to
make his confession involuntary. On appeal, defendant points to his attempted escape through
the ceiling of the interrogation room on March 21. However, in viewing the video of defendant’s
escape attempt, defendant is clearly planning his journey into the ceiling tiles, attempting to
disguise glances at the ceiling by stretching. A calculated decision, no matter how poor a
decision, is not indicative of gross intoxication. Further, on March 22 and 23, mental health
observations and reviews of defendant support the court’s finding. The evaluator found
defendant’s “mood and affect [were] appropriate and congruent,” “[t]here [were] no observations
or reports of mental status concerns,” and defendant denied he was or would be withdrawing
from any drugs or alcohol. Therefore, even if defendant was experiencing the effects of
withdrawal from Xanax, the evidence supports a finding it was not extensively impacting
defendant’s mental state.
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¶ 64 4. Promises of Leniency
¶ 65 Defendant next contends promises made by the detectives induced his confession.
¶ 66 “Confessions induced by promises or suggestions of leniency have been held
involuntary.” People v. Veal, 149 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623, 500 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (1986). In order
to constitute a promise of leniency, an officer’s statement “ ‘must be coupled with a suggestion
of a specific benefit that will follow if [the] defendant confesses.’ ” People v. Henslick, 2022 IL
App (4th) 200481, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Johnson, 285 Ill. App. 3d 802, 808, 674 N.E.2d 844,
848 (1996)). There is no “promise of leniency” if the benefit the defendant will allegedly receive
is left open-ended. Id. “Advising a defendant that, judicially or otherwise, telling the truth would
be the most beneficial course of action is not a promise of leniency in return for a confession.”
Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 67 “[E]ven where promises or suggestions of leniency have been made, the
confession is not necessarily inadmissible.” Veal, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 623; People v. Robinson,
286 Ill. App. 3d 903, 906, 676 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (1997). Rather, “[t]he ultimate question is
whether, considering the totality of the attendant circumstances, defendant’s will was overcome
at the time he confessed.” Veal, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 623.
¶ 68 In the instant case, the trial court found the majority of statements made by the
detectives were merely encouraging defendant to tell the truth, and the detectives did not offer
defendant specific benefits for his confession. Defendant acknowledged, on the first day, the
detectives did not make any promises, and he did not testify to any promises given during the
other interviews. The detectives testified they did not make any promises. On appeal, defendant
points to specific statements from detectives: (1) to have a life with Kennedy, defendant would
need to tell the truth and (2) detectives would have no “problem” with defendant calling his
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mother if he was honest. The first statement is not a firm promise sufficient to override our
deference to the court’s factual determination. See Henslick, 2022 IL App (4th) 200481, ¶ 38 (“If
the benefit that a defendant purportedly will reap from telling the truth is left open-ended instead
of being specified, there is no promise of leniency—and hence there is no factor to balance.”).
As to the second statement, the court specifically noted it may have been a promise; however, it
was not sufficient to find defendant’s statement was involuntary in a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis. We do not find that the court’s determination as to these statements is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. As such, we defer to the trial factual determination
and consider the final statement in our totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
¶ 69 5. Totality of the Circumstances
¶ 70 Reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s confession,
we do not find defendant’s statements to be involuntary.
¶ 71 Defendant was 23 years old at the time of his arrest. He had a ninth-grade
education, appeared to understand the questions asked of him, and answered appropriately and in
complete sentences. Defendant mentioned Spanish was his first language, but he spoke English
fluently and never requested a translator or showed any indication he did not understand. He was
provided with food and water, allowed to use the restroom as needed, and given cigarettes.
Defendant was in good physical condition, other than the minor injuries sustained from his
attempted escape. He did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs and acted reasonably
in the circumstances. Defendant also had at least some experience with the criminal justice
system.
¶ 72 Defendant’s detention of six days before seeing a judge was lengthy but, as
defendant acknowledges, legal due to the ex parte probable cause hearing. Further, defendant’s
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first confession occurred just over 48 hours after his arrest. Defendant’s placement in a high-risk
cell was due to his attempted escape and evidence he may have been suicidal. Defendant was
questioned for relatively short durations. His first interview lasted approximately five hours
before it was terminated due to defendant’s escape attempt. His second interview two days later
lasted a little over an hour, including defendant’s confession. He was then provided with food
and allowed to make phone calls. His final interview, which we note defendant requested, lasted
approximately 30 minutes. Detectives provided defendant Miranda warnings, and defendant
indicated he understood. Only one statement by police could be interpreted as a promise: that
detectives would not have “a problem” with defendant calling his mother if he told the truth.
¶ 73 Based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s will was not overcome at
the time of his confession. The length of his detention and one statement by detectives is
insufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence defendant’s confession was voluntarily and
freely given two days after his arrest. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err by denying
defendant’s motion to suppress his confession.
¶ 74 B. Krankel Hearing
¶ 75 Defendant next alleges the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient Krankel
hearing into his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although defendant made
several ineffective assistance claims before the court, defendant raises only one issue as to the
Krankel hearing on appeal. Defendant contends the Krankel hearing was insufficient because the
court failed to ask defendant to explain his claim defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
argue the State did not prove the corpus delicti of his armed robbery offense.
¶ 76 “The sole question in a Krankel inquiry is whether to appoint independent counsel
to represent the defendant on his pro se ineffective assistance claims.” People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL
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App (4th) 160917, ¶ 12, 128 N.E.3d 1100. “However, the trial court is not required to
automatically appoint new counsel when a defendant raises such a claim.” People v. Ayres, 2017
IL 120071, ¶ 11, 88 N.E.3d 732. Rather, the trial court must “ ‘conduct an adequate inquiry ***,
that is, inquiry sufficient to determine the factual basis of the claim.’ ” Id. (quoting People v.
Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154, 213, 934 N.E.2d 435, 468 (2010)). “[A] trial court’s method of inquiry at
a [preliminary] Krankel hearing is somewhat flexible.” People v. Flemming, 2015 IL App (1st)
111925-B, ¶ 85, 31 N.E.3d 935. Ordinarily, an adequate inquiry may include “(1) questioning
the trial counsel, (2) questioning the defendant, [or] (3) relying on [the court’s] own knowledge
of the trial counsel’s performance in the trial.” People v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339, 833
N.E.2d 396, 407 (2005). We review the adequacy of the trial court’s Krankel inquiry de novo.
In re T.R., 2019 IL App (4th) 190529, ¶ 81, 146 N.E.3d 692.
¶ 77 According to defendant, the trial court’s preliminary inquiry was inadequate
because it did not inquire into his claim trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a
corpus delicti defense. “The corpus delicti of a crime has two components: (1) proof of the
occurrence of the harm, and (2) that the harm was caused by criminal conduct.” People v.
Marcotte, 337 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 787 N.E.2d 369, 374 (2003). Corpus delicti may not be
proved by a defendant’s confession alone. People v. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d 554, 576, 831 N.E.2d
574, 586 (2005). “The defendant’s statement must be corroborated with independent evidence
which tends to show that the offense occurred.” Marcotte, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 803. Importantly, it
is not required that this independent evidence be sufficient to prove the existence of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d at 576.
¶ 78 Here, we conclude the trial court’s inquiry was adequate under Krankel. In his
motion for a new trial, defendant asserted counsel “failed to raise the corpus delicti rule and that
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the State’s prosecutor did not prove the corpus delicti.” Subsequently, at the Krankel hearing, the
court invited defendant to “go ahead and go through any issues [he] like[d].” Although defendant
did not use the term “corpus delicti” at the hearing, defendant explained, among his other claims,
counsel “failed to raise the issue that the evidence [the State] supported for armed robbery was
not sufficient because there was certain messages *** showing that [he] had no intention to
commit *** armed robbery,” as the messages indicated he “had these drugs before the incident
ever happened.” Defendant, therefore, had the opportunity to explain his belief trial counsel was
ineffective for not challenging the State’s proof armed robbery occurred at all.
¶ 79 Further, even if defendant failed to explain the factual basis for his corpus delicti
claim, he raised it in his written motion. The trial court may rely on its own knowledge of trial
counsel’s performance when considering if issues raised have a sufficient factual basis. Peacock,
359 Ill. App. 3d at 339. At trial, Rosa testified, when defendant returned to the vehicle from
Poole’s apartment, he had a jar containing marijuana with him that he did not have when he went
into the apartment. When they returned to defendant’s residence, defendant placed a gun, a
wallet, two phones, one of which was a flip phone, and the cannabis on the table. It was therefore
reasonable to conclude based on the evidence and defendant’s confession that defendant was in
possession of property, the cannabis, that did not belong to him and that he obtained during his
encounter with Poole. Defendant’s belief he paid Poole for the cannabis is irrelevant to the State
proving the evidence tended to show a robbery occurred. The court could rely on its own
knowledge of this evidence presented at trial to conclude there was no factual basis for
defendant’s corpus delicti claim. As the court could reasonably determine defendant’s claim had
no factual basis based on its available knowledge, the court conducted a sufficient Krankel
hearing.
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¶ 80 C. Sentencing Record
¶ 81 Defendant next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider his
sentence because the court did not make a record of the basis for defendant’s aggregate 80-year
sentence.
¶ 82 “The trial court is vested with broad authority to craft and impose an appropriate
sentence.” People v. Sims, 2022 IL App (2d) 200391, ¶ 148. A reviewing court gives substantial
deference to the trial court’s sentencing decision because the trial judge, having observed the
defendant and the proceedings, is in a much better position to consider these factors. People v.
Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d 656. There is a presumption that a trial court
considered all relevant factors in determining a sentence, and that presumption will not be
overcome without explicit evidence in the record that the trial court did not consider mitigating
factors. People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158, 935 N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (2010). We will not
reverse the court’s sentencing determination absent an abuse of discretion. Snyder, 2011 IL
111382, ¶ 36. An abuse of discretion will be found only “where the sentence is greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.¶ 83 Section 5-4-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) states:
“In imposing a sentence for a violent crime *** when such offense
resulted in the personal injury to someone other than the defendant, the trial judge
shall specify on the record the particular evidence, information, factors in
mitigation and aggravation or other reasons that led to his sentencing
determination. The full verbatim record of the sentencing hearing shall be filed
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with the clerk of the court and shall be a public record.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c)
(West 2016).
Our supreme court has held section 5-4-1(c) does not require the trial court to set out its reasons
for imposing a particular sentence. See People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 162-63, 442 N.E.2d 855,
858 (1982). In Davis, the court held that “shall” was permissive rather than mandatory and that
the trial court has “no independent duty” to provide reasons for a particular sentence. Id.¶ 84 Defendant acknowledges the supreme court’s holding in Davis. He argues that,
unlike the defendant in Davis, defendant here demanded the court abide by section 5-4-1(c) in
his motion to reconsider. Defendant does not cite any authority expressing his request for more
specificity requires the trial court to explain its reasoning for defendant’s sentence. Accordingly,
“we adhere to the ‘well-established precedent’ that a trial court is neither required to specify on
the record the reasons for the sentence imposed, nor recite and assign value to each factor
presented at the sentencing hearing.” People v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 160924, ¶ 18, 129
N.E.3d 150 (quoting People v. Barnes, 2017 IL App (1st) 143902, ¶ 95, 90 N.E.3d 1117).
¶ 85 Further, even if a trial court were required to provide its reasoning for a particular
sentence at the defendant’s request, the trial court here has provided the level of specificity
required. In sentencing defendant, the court explained:
“Having now considered the trial evidence, the Presentence Investigation
Report and exhibits and additions and corrections, the history, character and
attitude of the Defendant, the evidence and arguments, statement of allocution
presented, considering all the factors in aggravation, the appropriate ones, and
mitigation, and with due regard to the circumstances of the offense, I do find as
follows ***.”
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Although the court’s explanation was not to the level of specificity defendant would like, the
court did explain the evidence it considered in fashioning defendant’s sentence. See People v.
Carron, 298 Ill. App. 3d 676, 679, 699 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1998).
¶ 86 We note we encourage the trial courts to give defendants an explanation of their
sentencing decision. See Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 163-68 (Simon, J., dissenting); People v. Jackson,
375 Ill. App. 3d 796, 804-10, 874 N.E.2d 592, 598-603 (2007) (McDade, J., specially
concurring, and Wright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); People v. Bryant, 2016 IL
App (1st) 140421, ¶¶ 25-35, 55 N.E.3d 97 (Hyman, J., specially concurring). However, a lack of
an expansive explanation does not render a sentencing determination inadequate. As the trial
court stated it considered the proper evidence before it, we do not find the court erred in its
pronouncement of defendant’s sentence or in denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
¶ 87 D. Double Enhancement
¶ 88 Finally, defendant maintains the trial court erred by imposing a 25-year firearm
enhancement to his sentence for first degree murder. Specifically, defendant argues that because
the use of a firearm is a factor inherent in defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, the resulting
sentence constitutes an impermissible double enhancement.
¶ 89 As discussed, a trial court has broad discretion in crafting a sentence. Sims, 2022
IL App (2d) 200391, ¶ 148. A court abuses that discretion when it considers an improper factor
in aggravation. People v. McAfee, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1096, 774 N.E.2d 469, 473 (2002). A
court, in general, may not use an element of the offense for which the defendant was convicted
as an aggravating factor at sentencing. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 809 N.E.2d 1214,
1220 (2004). In other words, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and
as a basis for imposing “a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.” (Internal
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quotation marks omitted.) Id. This prohibition against “double enhancements” is based on the
assumption the legislature considered that aggravating factor in determining the appropriate
penalty range for that offense. People v. White, 114 Ill. 2d 61, 65-66, 499 N.E.2d 467, 469
(1986). However, “where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some
aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly expressed, there is no prohibition.” Phelps,
211 Ill. 2d at 15. Whether the trial court considered an improper double enhancement when
sentencing a defendant is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Morrow, 2014
IL App (2d) 130718, ¶ 14, 39 N.E.3d 44.
¶ 90 In this case, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery.
First degree murder carries a penalty of 20 to 60 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West
2016). Because the jury found defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused
the death of Poole, the Corrections Code mandated a 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement. Id.§ 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii). Defendant was sentenced to 49 years for first degree murder, including a
25-year firearm enhancement. Armed robbery, a Class X felony, carries a 6- to 30-year sentence,
and defendant was subject to a mandatory 25-year-to-life sentencing enhancement because the
court made a finding of great bodily harm. Id. § 5-4.5-25(a); 720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 2016).
Additionally, defendant’s convictions required consecutive sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1)
(West 2016).
¶ 91 Armed robbery is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder, and
defendant was convicted of two distinct offenses based on two distinct acts—the act of robbing
Poole and the act of Poole’s murder. Our supreme court has held, “even when subject to
consecutive sentencing, ‘[e]ach conviction results in a discrete sentence that must be treated
individually.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 14 (quoting People v. Carney, 196
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Ill. 2d 518, 530, 752 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (2001)). Applying these principles, no enhancement was
used twice to improperly elevate a single sentence. Rather, defendant’s discrete sentences were
statutorily enhanced as the legislature intended. Indeed, at oral arguments, defense counsel
conceded the legislature’s authority to impose both enhancements where it clearly elects to do so
and acknowledged there is no case law limiting this power for aggregate sentences. The trial
court did not err in sentencing defendant as the statute required.
¶ 92 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 93 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 94 Affirmed.
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