People v. Moore , 2020 IL App (4th) 190528 ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (4th) 190528FILED
NO. 4-19-0528 September 21, 2020
Carla Bender
IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
TORY S. MOORE, ) No. 97CF1660
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Thomas E. Griffith Jr.,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In July 2018, defendant, Tory S. Moore, filed pro se a motion for leave to file his
second postconviction petition. The trial court later entered a written order finding “[d]efendant’s
Petition for Successive Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed and stricken.”
¶2 Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying him leave to file a
claim his natural life sentence is unconstitutional because the sentence violates the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to
him. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In March 1999, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1) (West 1996)) after he and two codefendants kidnapped the victims at gunpoint.
Defendant and the codefendants drove the victims around in a vehicle, taunting and threatening
them before stopping near a cornfield. Defendant lined up the three victims in front of the
vehicle and shot one in the head and shot him again after he had fallen to the ground. The other
two victims fled. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found the aggravated factor of
felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt but declined to impose the death penalty.
¶5 In May 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to natural life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. In doing so, the court found the offense “was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” This court affirmed the
trial court’s judgment on direct appeal. People v. Moore, No. 4-99-0451 (2001) (unpublished
order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶6 In August 2006, defendant filed pro se a postconviction petition, which the trial
court summarily dismissed. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. People v. Moore, No.
4-06-0899 (2008) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶7 In April 2013, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). The trial court
granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s petition. This court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. People v. Moore, 2015 IL App (4th) 130779-U, ¶ 23.
¶8 On November 6, 2017, defendant filed another section 2-1401 petition, which the
trial court dismissed, finding it untimely filed and the claim raised therein barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. This court again affirmed the trial court’s judgment. People v. Moore, 2020 IL
App (4th) 180132-U, ¶ 19.
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¶9 On July 18, 2018, defendant filed pro se the instant motion captioned “Petition for
Successive Post Conviction.” In his motion, defendant addressed the cause-and-prejudice test,
asserting his issues were based on a new substantive rule of law, noting, inter alia, the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which was decided
six years after the trial court dismissed defendant’s initial postconviction petition. Defendant
argued his natural life sentence was unconstitutional because it violated the eighth amendment of
the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause. In
support of his argument, defendant, who was 19 years old when he committed the crime, cited
Miller regarding the developing brain of young adults. On July 25, 2018, the trial court entered a
written order finding “[d]efendant’s Petition for Successive Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed
and stricken.”
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by denying him leave to raise an
as-applied constitutional challenge to his natural life sentence based in part on Miller and its
progeny in a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 13 A. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act
¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018))
contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450,
¶ 15, 102 N.E.3d 114. Specifically, section 122-3 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2018))
declares “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an
amended petition is waived.” Section 122-1(f) of the Act (id. § 122-1(f)) represents an exception
to the waiver rule. See Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 15. It provides the following:
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“[O]nly one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article
without leave of the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a
petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the
claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and
prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this subsection
(f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor
that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his
or her initial post-conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows
prejudice by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or
her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the
resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS
5/122-1(f) (West 2018).
For a defendant to obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, both prongs of the
cause-and-prejudice test must be satisfied. People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15, 963
N.E.2d 909.
¶ 15 With a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the trial court
conducts “a preliminary screening to determine whether [a] defendant’s pro se motion for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition adequately alleges facts demonstrating cause and
prejudice.” Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. A defendant does not need to “establish cause and
prejudice conclusively prior to being granted leave to file a successive petition.” People v. Smith,
2014 IL 115946, ¶ 29, 21 N.E.3d 1172. However, the cause-and-prejudice test presents a higher
burden than the frivolous or patently without merit standard applied at first-stage proceedings.
Id. ¶ 35. A defendant must “submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court
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to make” the cause-and-prejudice determination. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161, 923
N.E.2d 728, 734-35 (2010). A trial court should deny leave to file a successive postconviction
petition “when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation
submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or
where the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further
proceedings.” Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. In conducting the preliminary screening, our
supreme court has held the State should not be allowed to participate. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450,
¶ 27. When the trial court has not held an evidentiary hearing, this court reviews de novo the
denial of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. See People
v. Gillespie, 407 Ill. App. 3d 113, 124, 941 N.E.2d 441, 452 (2010).
¶ 16 B. Miller and Its Progeny
¶ 17 In Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a sentencing
scheme that mandated life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders (those
under the age of 18), including those convicted of homicide. The Miller Court did not foreclose
sentencing a juvenile convicted of homicide to life in prison, but it emphasized the judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating factors before imposing the harshest possible
penalty on a juvenile. Id. In reaching its holding, the Miller Court explained a sentencing court
must consider how children are different from adult offenders for purposes of sentencing and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing juveniles to a lifetime in prison. Id.
at 480. The juvenile offender’s youth and attendant characteristics must be considered before
imposing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at 483. Thereafter, in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016), the Supreme Court
found the Miller decision announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that was
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retroactive on state collateral review. It also reiterated what must be considered before imposing
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile. See id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at
733-34. The Montgomery Court further emphasized life imprisonment without parole was
unconstitutional “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect
permanent incorrigibility.” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
¶ 18 Before Montgomery, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Davis, 2014 IL
115595, ¶ 39, 6 N.E.3d 709, held Miller stated a new substantive rule of law applicable
retroactively to cases on collateral review. As to the cause-and-prejudice test of section 122-1(f)
of the Act, the Davis court found “Miller’s new substantive rule constitutes ‘cause’ because it
was not available earlier to counsel [citation], and constitutes prejudice because it retroactively
applies to defendant’s sentencing hearing.” Id. ¶ 42. The Davis case involved a defendant who
was 14 years old at the time of the offense and had received a mandatory sentence of natural life
imprisonment. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. In People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, 91 N.E.3d 849, the Illinois
Supreme Court further held “Miller applies to discretionary sentences of life without parole for
juvenile defendants.” There, the trial court exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence of life
without parole for a murder the defendant committed at age 17. Id. ¶ 1.
¶ 19 In People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10, 63 N.E.3d 884, our supreme court
extended Miller to a mandatory term of years which was the functional equivalent of life without
the possibility of parole (de facto life sentence). The Reyes court found the defendant had
received a “de facto life-without-parole sentence,” when he, at 16 years old, committed “offenses
in a single course of conduct that subjected him to a legislatively mandated sentence of 97 years,
with the earliest opportunity for release after 89 years.” Id. ¶ 10. More recently in People v.
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41, 137 N.E.3d 763, our supreme court defined a de facto life sentence
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by declaring “a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender does not
constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment.”
¶ 20 As to young adults, in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 1, 43 N.E.3d 984,
the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant may raise an as-applied constitutional
challenge to his mandatory natural life sentence for the first time on appeal from the trial court’s
dismissal of a petition seeking relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). Citing Miller, the defendant argued his mandatory life sentence
violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).
Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 17. Specifically, the defendant asserted “the sentencing statute
was unconstitutional as applied to him because he was 19 years old at the time of the shooting,
had no criminal history, and impulsively committed the offense after years of abuse by his
father.” Id. The supreme court agreed with the appellate court the defendant’s argument was
forfeited because it was not the type of challenge recognized as being exempt from section 2-
1401’s typical rules of forfeiture. Id. ¶ 39.
¶ 21 While the supreme court determined the defendant could not raise his as-applied
constitutional challenge to his sentence under Miller for the first time on appeal from dismissal
of a section 2-1401 petition, the Thompson court explained the defendant was not necessarily
foreclosed from renewing his as-applied challenge in the trial court. Id. ¶ 44. It noted the
following:
“[T]he Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2012)) is expressly designed to resolve constitutional issues,
including those raised in a successive petition. [Citation.]
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Similarly, section 2-1401 of the Code [of Civil Procedure] permits
either a legal or factual challenge to a final judgment if certain
procedural and statutory requirements are satisfied.” Id.
¶ 22 In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 1, 120 N.E.3d 900, the supreme court was
presented with both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the statutory sentencing
scheme which resulted in a mandatory minimum aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment for
the defendant who was 18 years, 3 months of age at the time of the offenses. The defendant
asserted on direct appeal his aggregate 76-year prison sentence violated both the eighth
amendment and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 17. The
Harris court addressed defendant’s facial challenge based on the eighth amendment and
concluded it failed. Id. ¶ 61. In reaching its conclusion, the Harris court noted the Supreme Court
drew “the line at age 18 because that ‘is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood.’ ” Id. ¶ 60 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 574 (2005)). The Harris court pointed out “[n]ew research findings do not necessarily alter
that traditional line between adults and juveniles.” Id. It noted “claims for extending Miller to
offenders 18 years of age or older have been repeatedly rejected.” Id. ¶ 61 (citing cases). The
Harris court agreed with those decisions and the appellate court and declared, “for sentencing
purposes, the age of 18 marks the present line between juveniles and adults.” Id.¶ 23 On the other hand, the Harris court declined to address the defendant’s as-applied
constitutional challenge based on the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause
because it was premature. Id. ¶ 46. The supreme court noted the following:
“[A] court is not capable of making an as applied determination of
unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and
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no findings of fact. [Citation.] Without an evidentiary record, any
finding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied is premature.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 39 (citing People v. Rizzo,
2016 IL 118599, ¶ 26, 61 N.E.3d 92).
¶ 24 In Harris, the defendant raised the issue for the first time on direct appeal. See id.
¶ 40. “Thus, an evidentiary hearing was not held on his constitutional claim, and the trial court
did not make any findings of fact on defendant’s specific circumstances.” Id. The Harris court
further noted Miller did not directly apply to the circumstances of the defendant, who committed
the offense as a young adult, and thus the record had to be sufficiently developed to address the
claim Miller applied to the defendant’s particular circumstances. Id. ¶ 45.
¶ 25 The Harris court concluded the defendant’s as-applied challenge was more
appropriate for another proceeding. Id. ¶ 48. As in Thompson, the supreme court noted the
defendant could raise his as-applied challenge under the Act, which allows for raising
“constitutional questions which, by their nature, depend[ ] upon facts not found in the record.”
(Internal quotations marks omitted.) Id. (citing People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 33, 63
N.E.3d 871). Such a challenge “could also potentially be raised in a petition seeking relief from a
final judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2016)).” Id.¶ 26 In People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 64, 142 N.E.3d 756, appeal
granted, No. 125124 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2020), the First District found the mandatory natural life
sentence of a defendant who was 19 years and 2 months old when he committed the offense
violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him based on
the circumstances of his case, the reasoning behind the Miller decision, and other recent changes
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in statutory and case law. There, the defendant raised the issue in an amended postconviction
petition, which was dismissed by the trial court at the second stage of the proceedings. Id. ¶ 23.
The House court concluded the defendant’s claim was before it in the posture suggested by the
supreme court’s decision in Harris. It found the defendant’s challenge was not premature, as it
was in Harris. Id. ¶ 32. The House court concluded the defendant’s mandatory sentence of
natural life shocked the moral sense of the community based on the defendant’s age, his family
background, his actions as a lookout as opposed to being the actual shooter, and lack of any prior
violent convictions. Id. ¶ 64.
¶ 27 More recently, the First District reversed the denial of a defendant’s request for
leave to file a successive postconviction petition and found the defendant made a prima facie
showing Miller should apply to him. See People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 2. The
Johnson court found the defendant, who was 19 years old when he committed the offenses,
established prejudice because “even if he had raised a Miller claim in his initial [postconviction]
petition, it would have been rejected out of hand because of his age.” Id. ¶ 26. In addressing the
State’s argument the defendant failed to plead enough facts to justify further proceedings, the
court noted its analysis was not finished as “young adult defendants are not entitled to make an
as-applied challenge to their sentences under Miller unless they first show that Miller applies to
them.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45). The court found the defendant’s petition
and supporting documentation—wherein he (1) pointed to recent research into the neurobiology
and developmental psychology of young adults, (2) described his childhood turmoil and the
pressures of his racial identity, (3) explained how most of the young men he encountered were
gang members who engaged in violence and drug-related activities, and (4) alleged it was more
natural to his immature brain to hang out with such a crowd rather than remove himself or find
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new associations—pleaded sufficient enough facts to justify further proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 29-31;
see also People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 56 (finding the 18-year-old defendant’s
request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, “in detailed, well-cited legal
argument,” pleaded sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing Miller should apply to him).
¶ 28 C. Defendant’s Eighth Amendment Claim
¶ 29 We first turn to defendant’s claim his natural life sentence is a violation of the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, defendant was 19 years old when he
shot the victim. The Supreme Court in Miller explicitly held the eighth amendment only
prohibits “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18” at the time of their
crimes. (Emphasis added.) Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. As discussed, our supreme court further
noted new research findings still “do not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults and
juveniles.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 60. Although defendant urges this court to change where
the line is drawn, such a task is best left to the legislature. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 34-35.
¶ 30 D. Defendant’s Proportionate Penalties Claim
¶ 31 We turn next to defendant’s argument his natural life sentence violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution provides, in relevant part, “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “ ‘cruel,
degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of
the community.’ ” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487, 839 N.E.2d 492, 498 (2005) (quoting
People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522, 795 N.E.2d 208, 220 (2003)). We may determine whether a
sentence shocks the moral sense of the community by considering both objective evidence and
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“the community’s changing standard of moral decency.” People v. Hernandez, 382 Ill. App. 3d
726, 727, 888 N.E.2d 1200, 1202-03 (2008).
¶ 32 Defendant contends his natural life sentence denies him the opportunity of being
rehabilitated into a useful citizen because “[a] sentence that forces that future on someone who
committed a crime as a youth is not a sentence imposed with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship, as required by the proportionate penalties clause.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Defendant argues his petition must advance for further proceedings.
The State responds defendant cannot make a prima facie showing of prejudice because defendant
failed to plead sufficient facts to support his claim he should be treated similarly to a juvenile
offender. We agree with the State.
¶ 33 1. Cause
¶ 34 Defendant initially asserts he demonstrated cause under section 122-1(f) of the
Act for failing to previously raise a Miller-based challenge to his sentence. Defendant notes
Miller and the relevant cases that followed were not decided until after the conclusion of the
earlier proceedings in his case. The State concedes defendant has established cause, and we
agree.
¶ 35 The Supreme Court decided Miller in June 2012. Here, defendant was sentenced
in May 1999, and his direct appeal was decided in October 2001. Additionally, proceedings on
his original postconviction petition concluded in September 2006. Miller and its progeny were
unavailable to defendant at the time of his sentencing, direct appeal, and earlier postconviction
proceedings. See Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 (“In terms of the requisite cause and prejudice of
the *** Act, Miller’s new substantive rule constitutes ‘cause’ because it was not available earlier
to counsel ***.”).
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¶ 36 2. Prejudice
¶ 37 While defendant was an adult when he committed the offense, our supreme court
has recognized a defendant who committed the offense as a young adult may raise an as-applied
constitutional challenge in a postconviction petition based on the evolving science on juvenile
maturity and brain development which helped form the basis of the Miller decision. See Harris,
2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 46, 48; Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44. Our supreme court has applied
Miller to discretionary sentences of life without parole, not just mandatory sentences. See
Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40. The supreme court has also noted the new substantive rule
established in Miller constitutes prejudice “because it retroactively applies to defendant’s
sentencing hearing.” Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42.
¶ 38 Defendant argues he should have the opportunity to develop the record to
determine whether the protections of Miller can apply to a 19-year-old offender. Successive
postconviction petitions, however, are “highly disfavored” (Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 39) and,
as discussed, meeting the cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the test for
surviving the first stage of an initial postconviction petition (Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35). A
defendant must submit enough documentation to allow a trial court to determine whether the
cause-and-prejudice test was met. Id. (citing Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d at 161).
¶ 39 We find the facts in the Fifth District’s recent decision in People v. White, 2020
IL App (5th) 170345, similar to those presented here. In White, the 20-year-old defendant
appealed from the dismissal of his request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition,
wherein he asserted his mandatory natural life sentences violated the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution and proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id.
¶ 13. In support of his contention, the defendant alleged he had cause because case law “only
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recently extended scientific evidence on the adolescent brain development to 18- to 21-year-
olds” and argued “prejudice resulted from failing to bring these claims earlier in that he had
significant rehabilitative potential and had taken college courses in prison, worked full time, and
donated his time to a prison mural project.” Id. The Fifth District, in rejecting the defendant’s
proportionate penalties claim, noted the following:
“Here, the defendant argues that we need not address his
claim on the merits but, instead, should allow him the opportunity
to develop his claim, with the assistance of appointed counsel, as
to whether Miller can apply to a 20-year-old for proportionate
penalties purposes. Harris ***, however, made no mention of
exactly what is necessary to overcome the high bar for leave to file
a successive postconviction petition, and we find that a flat
allegation as to evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain
development is simply insufficient. [Citation.] Other than generally
asserting studies that show that sometimes youthfulness can extend
into a person’s twenties, the defendant does not now allege how he
was particularly affected by any immaturity, and it is undisputed
that he did not suffer from any cognitive or developmental
impairments.” Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 40 Here, other than defendant’s general assertion a 19-year-old’s brain is more
similar to a 17-year-old adolescent’s brain rather than a fully mature adult’s and noting the
present offense being his first adult conviction, defendant’s motion failed to provide any
evidence to indicate how his own immaturity or individual circumstances would provide a
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compelling reason to allow him to file a successive postconviction petition. On appeal, defendant
maintains he established prejudice by offering the same assertions but contends his behavior may
have been influenced by his difficult upbringing where he “was abandoned by his father at a
young age, and *** his mother struggled with drug addiction and keeping her children fed.”
However, these factual allegations were missing from defendant’s motion to file a successive
postconviction petition; instead, his motion merely asserted the brain development commonly
associated with juveniles can also extend into young adulthood. Although we recognize
defendant has limited means while in prison, the standard for successive postconviction petitions
is higher than initial petitions and a defendant is required to provide sufficient documentation.
Defendant’s flat assertion a 19-year-old’s brain is more like a 17-year-old adolescent’s in terms
of development is simply insufficient to survive the more exacting standard that would warrant
the filing of a successive postconviction petition. See id.
¶ 41 We note, briefly, defendant submitted a motion to cite People v. Carrasquillo,
2020 IL App (1st) 180534. We granted the motion but find Carrasquillo distinguishable. When
analyzing the prejudice prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, the First District emphasized three
factors that distinguish Carrasquillo: (1) the appellate court misstated the defendant’s age when
it reviewed his sentence on direct appeal, (2) the defendant’s sentence was “one of the very
harshest” the trial court delivered to an 18-year-old with no prior criminal record, and (3) the
defendant had been eligible for parole and was “turned down over 30 times *** in almost as
many years.” Id. ¶¶ 110-11. We do not find Carrasquillo persuasive.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 We affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition.
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¶ 44 Affirmed.
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No. 4-19-0528
Cite as: People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 97-CF-1660;
the Hon. Thomas E. Griffith Jr., Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Lauren A. Bauser, of State
for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Jay Scott, State’s Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfino, David J.
for Robinson, and Lara L. Quivey, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Appellee: Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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