Jorgensen v. Berrios , 2020 IL App (1st) 191133 ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 191133No. 1-19-1133
Fourth Division
August 13, 2020
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
)
JAMES JORGENSEN and JEAN JORGENSEN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) No. 18 CH 2881
v. )
) The Honorable
JOSEPH BERRIOS, in His Official Capacity as ) David B. Atkins,
Assessor of Cook County; MARIA PAPPAS, in Her ) Judge Presiding.
Official Capacity as Cook County Treasurer and )
ex officio County Collector; and THE COUNTY OF )
COOK, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lampkin and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The instant appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs James and Jean Jorgensen against
Cook County and its assessor 1 and treasurer, in connection with the assessment of the value of
a historic residence owned by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to a tax freeze
under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)) that defendants failed to
1
The assessor at the time plaintiffs filed their complaint was Joseph Berrios, but the current
assessor is Fritz Kaegi.
No. 1-19-1133
apply, and they filed a suit for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and for an injunction.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
consider the matter and further claiming that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a cause of
action for any of their claims. The trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
matter for the taxpayers’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and it granted defendants’
section 2-619 motion to dismiss on that basis. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018). Plaintiffs appeal
and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 I. Property Tax Code
¶4 As the instant appeal concerns a tax freeze under the Property Tax Code, it is helpful to
first discuss the provisions of the statute concerning the claimed tax freeze found in a portion
of the Property Tax Code known as the Historic Residence Assessment Freeze Law (Freeze
Law). See 35 ILCS 200/10-40 to 10-85 (West 2014). In order to encourage the rehabilitation
of historic residences, properties certified under the Freeze Law are eligible for an assessment
freeze that eliminates from consideration the value added by any rehabilitation to the property
and limits the total valuation to the “base year valuation” as defined by the Freeze Law. 35
ILCS 200/10-45 (West 2014).
¶5 A property owner seeking to take advantage of the Freeze Law must file an application for
a certificate of rehabilitation with the Director of Historic Preservation (Director), who shall
approve the application upon finding that certain criteria have been satisfied. 35 ILCS 200/10-
55 (West 2014). As part of the certificate of rehabilitation, the Director identifies the
rehabilitation period, which generally is not to exceed two years. 35 ILCS 200/10-55 (West
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2014). The certificate of rehabilitation is then transmitted to the property owner and to the chief
county assessment officer. 35 ILCS 200/10-55 (West 2014).
¶6 Upon receipt of the certificate of rehabilitation, the assessment officer shall determine the
“base year valuation” of the property. 35 ILCS 200/10-70(a) (West 2014). Under the Freeze
Law, the base year valuation “means the fair cash value of the historic building for the year in
which the rehabilitation period begins but prior to the commencement of the rehabilitation and
does not include any reduction in value during the rehabilitation work.” 35 ILCS 200/10-40(i)
(West 2014). For any property on which the Director has issued a certificate of rehabilitation,
“the valuation for purposes of assessment shall not exceed the base year valuation for the entire
8-year valuation period” (35 ILCS 200/10-45 (West 2014)) commencing from the date of
issuance of the certificate of rehabilitation (35 ILCS 200/10-40(k) (West 2014)).
¶7 After the expiration of the eight-year valuation period, the next four years are considered
an “adjustment valuation period,” in which the assessed valuation gradually increases until, in
the fourth year, the assessed value is the current fair cash value of the property. 35 ILCS
200/10-40(l), 10-50 (West 2014). With respect to both the eight-year valuation period and the
four-year adjustment valuation period, the assessment officer “shall make a notation on each
statement of assessment during the 8-year valuation period and the adjustment valuation period
that the valuation of the historic building shall be based upon the issuance of a certificate of
rehabilitation.” 35 ILCS 200/10-70(a) (West 2014).
¶8 II. Complaint
¶9 On March 2, 2018, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants for declaratory judgment,
mandamus, and for an injunction. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs own a home in Glencoe,
which was designated as a certified landmark by the Village of Glencoe on May 19, 2016. The
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complaint further alleges that plaintiffs filed an application for a certificate of rehabilitation
under the Freeze Law, which was approved on October 26, 2016; a copy of the certificate of
rehabilitation was attached to the complaint. The certificate of rehabilitation identifies the
rehabilitation period as January 2015 through August 2016.
¶ 10 The complaint alleges that the 2015 assessment on the property was $199,735, that the
2016 assessment on the property was $528,480, and that the 2017 assessment on the property
was $462,420. Copies of the assessments for each year were attached to the complaint: (1) for
2015, the original assessed value of the property was $462,420, but plaintiffs appealed to the
Board of Review, which reduced the assessed value to $199,735; (2) for 2016, the assessed
value of the property was $528,480, which was not reduced by the Board of Review; and (3) for
2017, a “proposed” assessed value was $528,480, but after an assessment appeal, the assessed
value was reduced to $462,420 by the assessor’s office as “the result of a Property Tax Freeze
Program for Historic Residences.” The complaint alleges that plaintiffs paid the property taxes
for 2016 and paid the first installment of the 2017 taxes; property taxes for the second
installment for 2017 were not yet due and payable at the time of the filing of the complaint.
¶ 11 Count I of the complaint is for declaratory judgment and alleges that the 2016 and 2017
assessments should have been subject to a tax freeze based on the final assessment in place at
the commencement of the rehabilitation period, which was $199,735. However, count I alleges
that defendants “have refused to implement the freeze value” of $199,735, instead assessing
the property at $528,480 for 2016 and $462,420 for 2017. Count I requests “that the Court
declare [plaintiffs’] rights under the statute, finding that the final 2016 and 2017 assessment
and taxes as determined by Defendants are erroneous, improper, illegal, and void, and that the
correct assessment should be $199,735 under the statute.” Count I further alleges that plaintiffs
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have no adequate remedy at law and are “irreparably damaged in that taxes on the subject
property as assessed by defendants for 2016 and 2017 are significantly higher than what they
should have been had the freeze value been properly implemented in accordance with the
statute.”
¶ 12 Count II of the complaint is for a writ of mandamus and alleges that the Freeze Law
required defendants to assess and tax plaintiffs’ property at the value in place at the
commencement of the rehabilitation period in 2015. Count II requests that, “[b]ecause
Defendants, in their official capacity, have refused to act in a manner required of them by
statute,” the court should enter a writ of mandamus compelling them to do so. Count II alleges
that plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and that it was the assessor’s duty to
permanently input the correct assessment under the Freeze Law and to designate the freeze in
defendants’ records for the entirety of the 12-year period covered by the statute.
¶ 13 Count III of the complaint is for an injunction and alleges that the right of plaintiffs to the
benefits of the tax freeze throughout the 12-year period is a “clear and ascertainable right in
need of protection.” Count III alleges that, if defendants continued to refuse to implement the
freeze, plaintiffs would suffer “repeated and irrevocable harm” in that they would either be
forced to pay the increased taxes in full or would be required to expend resources unnecessarily
appealing the assessment throughout the 12-year freeze period, which would “effectively
negat[e] the benefits of the program.” Count III alleges that plaintiffs have no adequate remedy
at law, as “[n]o amount of monetary relief would make Plaintiff[s] whole or enable Plaintiff[s]
to lawfully enjoy the intended benefits of the freeze without an injunction extended against the
Defendants.” Accordingly, count III requests an order enjoining defendants from assessing
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No. 1-19-1133
plaintiffs’ property at any value other than $199,735 for the eight-year valuation period and to
properly assess the property for the four-year adjustment valuation period.
¶ 14 III. Motion to Dismiss
¶ 15 On May 25, 2018, defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss the complaint under
section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)).
Defendants claimed that, in essence, plaintiffs were challenging their tax assessment and were
asserting that their property had been overassessed. Defendants thus claimed that the complaint
should be dismissed under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West
2018)) because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a challenge to
plaintiffs’ property tax assessment. Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ claim for equitable relief
fails because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Property Tax
Code. Defendants noted that plaintiffs had, in fact, challenged their assessment for 2016
pursuant to those procedures but filed suit before the resolution of their appeal before the
Property Tax Appeal Board. Defendants further argued that the allegations of plaintiffs’
complaint fell “squarely within the realm of statutory remedies and outside the narrow
allowance for equitable relief” because they were merely challenging the amount of their tax
assessment.
¶ 16 Defendants also claimed that the complaint should be dismissed under section 2-615 of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) because plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action
for any of their claims. Defendants further claimed that Cook County should be dismissed as
a defendant under section 2-615 because plaintiffs had failed to allege any facts showing that
the county was responsible for tax assessment and collection of taxes and the county could not,
as a matter of law, be sued for conduct of its independent elected officials.
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¶ 17 In response, plaintiffs claimed that dismissal was improper because the issue was not
merely one of an improper tax assessment, as defendants claimed. Instead, plaintiffs argued
that their claims concerned a specific nondiscretionary directive imposed on the assessing
official, who refused to act in accordance with the statute. Plaintiffs argued that the equitable
relief they sought was the only way in which defendants could be ordered to comply with their
statutory duties for the entirety of the 12-year period covered by the Freeze Law.
¶ 18 On January 15, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
with prejudice, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claims for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court found unpersuasive plaintiffs’ claims that
their equitable claims were properly before the court, finding that plaintiffs did not argue that
the property was exempt from taxation or that defendants had failed to implement the relevant
statutory tax freeze. Instead, the court found that plaintiffs alleged that defendants incorrectly
implemented the tax freeze by applying the wrong yearly assessment in contravention of the
statute, a claim which “remain[ed] squarely within the comprehensive system of the Property
Tax Code.”
¶ 19 On February 14, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied on April 29, 2019. This timely appeal follows.
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss, claiming that the court had jurisdiction to consider their claims and that they stated a
cause of action for each claim. In the case at bar, defendant filed a combined motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code, which permits a party to file a motion to dismiss based
on both section 2-615 and section 2-619 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018).
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However, the trial court’s dismissal was based only on section 2-619 of the Code. A motion to
dismiss under section 2-619 admits the legal sufficiency of all well-pleaded facts but allows
for the dismissal of claims barred by an affirmative matter defeating those claims or avoiding
their legal effect. Janda v. United States Cellular Corp., 2011 IL App (1st) 103552, ¶ 83 (citing
DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006)). When reviewing a motion to dismiss under
section 2-619, “a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiffs’ complaint and
all inferences that can reasonably be drawn in plaintiffs’ favor.” Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich,
231 Ill. 2d 474, 488 (2008). Additionally, a cause of action should not be dismissed under
section 2-619 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle
the plaintiff to relief. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 277-78 (2003). For a section 2-
619 dismissal, our standard of review is de novo. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty
Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579 (2006); Morr-Fitz, Inc., 231 Ill. 2d at 488. De novo
consideration means we perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. Khan v.
BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011). Additionally, even if the trial court
dismissed on an improper ground, a reviewing court may affirm the dismissal if the record
supports a proper ground for dismissal. See Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove,
209 Ill. 2d 248, 261 (2004) (when reviewing a section 2-619 dismissal, we can affirm “on any
basis present in the record”); In re Marriage of Gary, 384 Ill. App. 3d 979, 987 (2008) (“we
may affirm on any basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the trial court based its
decision on the proper ground”).
¶ 22 Defendants’ motion in the instant case was based on section 2-619(a)(1), which seeks
dismissal on the grounds “[t]hat the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action, provided the defect cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court having
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jurisdiction.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2018). Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a
court’s power to hear and decide cases of a general class. Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v.
Esposito, 2015 IL 117443, ¶ 15. With the exception of administrative review actions and
certain cases for which the supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction, circuit courts have original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters pursuant to the Illinois Constitution. Ferris, Thompson &
Zweig, 2015 IL 117443, ¶ 15. Here, defendants claim that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because the Property Tax Code provides plaintiffs with a
complete and adequate remedy at law through the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
¶ 23 “In the field of taxation the general rule applies that equity will not assume jurisdiction to
grant relief where an adequate remedy at law exists.” Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill.
2d 101, 105 (1973); see also Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281,
295 (2010). “[T]he Property Tax Code is a comprehensive statute regulating the assessment
and collection of taxes.” Millennium Park, 241 Ill. 2d at 295. Thus, a taxpayer is generally
limited to first exhausting administrative remedies provided by the statute before seeking relief
in the circuit court, beginning with the Board of Review. Millennium Park, 241 Ill. 2d at 295.
The taxpayer then has the option of either appealing to the Property Tax Appeal Board or filing
a tax objection complaint in the circuit court. Millennium Park, 241 Ill. 2d at 296. “Thus, the
adequate remedy at law is to pay the taxes under protest and file a statutory objection.”
Millennium Park, 241 Ill. 2d at 296.
¶ 24 This general rule is subject to two exceptions: “A taxpayer need not look to the remedy at
law but may seek relief by way of injunction where the tax is unauthorized by law or where it
is levied upon property exempt from taxation.” Clarendon Associates, 56 Ill. 2d at 105. Such
cases constitute independent grounds for equitable relief and do not require that the remedy at
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law be inadequate. Clarendon Associates, 56 Ill. 2d at 105. In the case at bar, plaintiffs do not
contend in their briefs that either of these exceptions applies, but they raised their applicability
for the first time during oral argument on this matter. It is well settled that “[p]oints not argued
[in the appellant’s brief] are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument,
or on petition for rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). Thus, plaintiff’s
arguments concerning the applicability of these two exceptions are not properly before us.
¶ 25 Furthermore, even if properly raised, we would not find these exceptions applicable. “[A]
true ‘unauthorized by law’ challenge arises where the taxing body has no statutory power to
tax in a certain area or has been given no jurisdiction to tax a certain subject, as opposed to a
complaint that merely alleges procedural errors or irregularities in the taxing process, in which
case equity relief would not be available.” Millennium Park, 241 Ill. 2d at 307. Here, there can
be no doubt that defendants had the authority to tax plaintiffs’ property—the only issue is the
amount of the tax imposed. With respect to the second exception, plaintiffs claimed at oral
argument that, because the assessed value under the Freeze Law was lower than the fair value
of the property, any excess in value was “property exempt from taxation” which would support
an equitable remedy. Plaintiffs cite no applicable authority for this novel reading of the law,
and we do not find it persuasive. Thus, even if properly raised before us, we would not find
either of these exceptions applicable.
¶ 26 However, plaintiffs’ main focus in their briefs concerns what they call a third exception. In
Clarendon Associates, our supreme court held that “[t]here will be cases of fraudulently
excessive assessments where the remedy at law will not be adequate and injunctive relief
should then be available.” Clarendon Associates, 56 Ill. 2d at 108. An example of the type of
case falling within this exception can be found in our supreme court’s decision in Hoyne
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No. 1-19-1133
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Hare, 60 Ill. 2d 84 (1974), decided the year after Clarendon
Associates. In that case, the assessed valuation of the plaintiff’s property increased from $9510
in 1970 to $246,810 in 1971. Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 86. The plaintiff first learned of the increased
assessment upon receiving a tax bill on November 5, 1972, shortly before taxes were due on
November 24, 1972, and after the Board of Review had already completed its hearings on the
objections to the assessments on which the 1971 taxes were based. Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 87. The
plaintiff thus did not seek relief from the Board of Review or pay the taxes under protest but
instead filed suit for equitable relief in the circuit court. Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 87. The plaintiff
also chose to file suit instead of pursuing administrative remedies with respect to the 1972
taxes, which were based on the same assessment. Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 87. However, the Board
of Review subsequently reviewed the assessment for 1973 and reduced the assessed valuation
to $55,000. Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 88.
¶ 27 With respect to the 1971 taxes, the supreme court found that “[t]he unusual circumstances
present in this case, coupled with the now admitted fact that the assessment for 1971 was
grossly excessive, require that equity retain jurisdiction of this case to grant relief to the
plaintiff.” Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 89. The court pointed to a number of factors supporting this
conclusion, including (1) the dramatic increase in the assessed valuation of the same property
with the same improvements; (2) the fact that the assessment was based on uses not permitted
by the existing zoning of the property and on inaccurate assumptions as to improvements on
the property; (3) the late issuance of the tax bills and the fact that the plaintiff first received
actual notice of the increased assessment after the Board of Review had “closed its books” for
the 1971 taxes; and (4) the substantially reduced assessment in 1973, which showed that the
1971 assessment was “grossly excessive.” Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 89-90. The court found that
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“[u]nder these circumstances it would be extremely unfair and unjust for this court to adhere
to a rigid formula which would require that all relief from fraudulently excessive assessments
be sought through the legal remedy provided by statute.” Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 90. However, the
court found “[t]he same facts requiring equitable consideration do not exist” regarding the
1972 tax bill, which the plaintiff had ample opportunity to challenge using the remedies
provided by statute. Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 91.
¶ 28 In the case at bar, there is nothing in plaintiffs’ complaint that would suggest that they were
subject to “fraudulently excessive assessments” as contemplated in Clarendon Associates.
Their claims are based on the argument that the assessor’s office failed to properly apply the
tax freeze under the Freeze Law, resulting in a higher assessment. Plaintiffs attempt to style
their claim as one in which the assessor is failing to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the
Freeze Law, suggesting that this would be sufficient to constitute a “fraudulently excessive
assessment.” We do not find this argument persuasive. We must first note that their claim is
not as cut-and-dry as plaintiffs suggest. Looking at the exhibits to plaintiffs’ complaint, the
assessor originally assessed the value of the property in 2015 as $462,420, which would be
considered the “base year valuation” required by the Freeze Law, but this value was reduced
by the Board of Review. This original “base year valuation” is the same assessed value applied
in 2017. 2 Thus, while the Freeze Law requires that “the valuation for purposes of assessment
shall not exceed the base year valuation for the entire 8-year valuation period” (35 ILCS
200/10-45 (West 2014)), it remains a question as to whether the assessor was required to apply
the reduced figure instead of the original “base year valuation,” which is certainly not an
automatic, straightforward decision, as plaintiffs imply. We make no comment as to the answer
2
We note that the 2016 valuation was higher than the original “base year valuation.”
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to this question, as it is not before us on the instant appeal, but it demonstrates that the issues
raised by plaintiffs are more than merely a failure to follow the nondiscretionary dictates of
the Freeze Law. Additionally, plaintiffs’ claims are ones that could easily be raised pursuant
to the mechanisms set forth in the Property Tax Code, and plaintiffs set forth no substantive
reasons why the statutory mechanisms would be unavailable to them or inadequate to address
their concerns.
¶ 29 We also find unpersuasive plaintiffs’ claim that requiring them to file objections for the
12-year period results in irreparable injury. It may be inconvenient for plaintiffs to challenge
their assessments every year, but that does not equate to an irreparable injury. Their only
support for this proposition is a citation of Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin, 385 Ill. 245(1943). However, the supreme court in that case merely made a passing reference to a
“multiplicity of suits” in discussing imprecise language used in an earlier case. 3 Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 385 Ill. at 256. Nothing in that case suggests that plaintiffs may file a suit in
chancery and bypass statutory remedies merely because they would be required to challenge
several years’ worth of taxes. Indeed, in Hoyne, a case cited by plaintiffs in support of their
claims, the supreme court found that the plaintiff could seek equitable relief for 1971 taxes but
3
The supreme court found that, where there was a tax that was unauthorized by law or that was
assessed on exempt property, it was not necessary to establish that there was no adequate remedy at law.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 385 Ill. at 256. The court then noted that there were some cases that appeared to
be in conflict with this rule but that, in those cases, “for the most part the language relied upon as
supporting a contrary rule was inadvertently used, or the cases were those involving irregularities rather
than illegalities.” Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 385 Ill. at 256. As an example, the supreme court pointed to
County of Cook v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 35 Ill. 460 (1864), and noted that, in that case,
“the statement is made that a suit in equity will not lie to restrain the collection of a tax illegally
assessed without setting forth special circumstances showing such collection would be likely to
produce irreparable injury or cause a multiplicity of suits. The injunction granted in that case
restraining the collection of an illegal tax was, however, sustained, so the expression used must be
regarded as inadvertently employed.” Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 385 Ill. at 256-57.
This is the only reference to a “multiplicity of suits” contained in the opinion.
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should have pursued statutory remedies with respect to the 1972 taxes, despite the fact that the
1972 taxes were based on the same assessment as the 1971 taxes. See Hoyne, 60 Ill. 2d at 87,
89. Consequently, we cannot find that the case at bar represents the type of “case[ ] of
fraudulently excessive assessments where the remedy at law will not be adequate and
injunctive relief should then be available.” Clarendon Associates, 56 Ill. 2d at 108.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly found that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. See Dumas v. Pappas, 2014 IL App (1st) 121966, ¶ 19
(affirming dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where plaintiffs had not exhausted
administrative remedies and did not contend that property was tax exempt or that the tax was
unauthorized by law). Since we have determined that the trial court properly dismissed
plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis of section 2-619, we have no need to consider plaintiffs’
arguments concerning section 2-615.
¶ 30 CONCLUSION
¶ 31 The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs do not contend that the tax was unauthorized by law or that their property
was exempt from taxation. Additionally, plaintiffs cannot establish that defendants’ assessment
of their property represented a fraudulently excessive assessment such that the remedy at law
would be inadequate. Accordingly, plaintiffs are required to exhaust the administrative
procedures set forth in the Property Tax Code with respect to challenging their assessments
and may not bring suit directly in the circuit court.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
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No. 1-19-1133
Cite as: Jorgensen v. Berrios, 2020 IL App (1st) 191133Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-CH-
2881; the Hon. David B. Atkins, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Saul Ewing, Arnstein & Lehr LLP, of Chicago (Hal R. Morris,
for David Dunkin, Elizabeth A. Thompson, and Erik
Appellant: VanderWeyden, of counsel), for appellants.
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy McNeil
for Stein and Sarah Cunningham, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
Appellee: counsel), for appellees.
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