In re Commitment of Kugler ( 2020 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2020.05.26
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In re Commitment of Kugler, 2019 IL App (3d) 180305Appellate Court In re COMMITMENT OF DEVIN M. KUGLER (The People of the
Caption State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Devin M. Kugler,
Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. Third District
No. 3-18-0305
Filed December 4, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No.
Review 07-MR-214; the Hon. Frank R. Fuhr, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Nate Nieman, of Rock Island, for appellant.
Appeal
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,
Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Rachel L. Barbat,
Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Carter and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial, the court found that respondent, Devin M. Kugler, was a sexually
violent person (SVP) subject to commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2006)) based on acts he committed when he was 16.
Respondent appealed his commitment. This court affirmed. See In re Detention of Kugler, No.
3-08-0123 (2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). In September
2017, the State filed its tenth motion for periodic reexamination as required by the Act. In May
2018, respondent filed a motion to vacate order of commitment/motion to dismiss. On May 18,
2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions. It denied respondent’s combined motions
and granted the State’s motion. On appeal, respondent argues that his commitment is
unconstitutional as applied to him in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). We
affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The actions underlying respondent’s commitment are detailed in this court’s order
affirming his commitment. See Kugler, No. 3-08-0123. We will repeat only those facts
necessary to our analysis.
¶4 In April 2007, the State filed a petition alleging respondent, then age 21, was an SVP
subject to commitment under the Act. The petition alleged that in 2002, when respondent was
16 years old, a court adjudicated respondent delinquent for the offense of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(2)(i) (West 2002)) because he penetrated the anus of an
8-year-old girl with his finger and rubbed her buttocks. At the time of conviction, he admitted
that he fantasized about having sex with young children between the ages of 8 and 11.
Treatment providers for respondent alleged he reported sexually abusing two other young
girls, ages six and eight. Also, respondent had sexually deviant fantasies about his young
cousin. A doctor diagnosed respondent with (1) pedophilia, sexually attracted to females, and
(2) antisocial personality disorder. The petition contended that these mental disorders affected
respondent’s emotional and volitional capacity and created a substantial probability that he
would commit future acts of sexual violence.
¶5 The court held a bench trial on the matter. A clinical psychologist testified as an expert in
the evaluation and treatment of SVPs. She interviewed respondent as part of the SVP
commitment proceedings. Respondent admitted to the offense that led to his 2002 conviction.
The psychologist reviewed his records from a treatment facility where he admitted to engaging
in sexual activities with his foster sister when she was 4 or 6 and he was 12. He would take
showers with her, masturbate in front of her, fondle her, and place his penis against her
buttocks when they were in a pool. Respondent performed oral sex on another girl when she
was eight or nine. Respondent denied these acts when the psychologist questioned him. He did
admit to having sexual fantasies about his underage cousin but claimed he did not act on them.
The psychologist was concerned that respondent’s deviant behavior had persisted from age 12
through age 20.
¶6 Respondent also committed several nonsexual offenses, including two convictions and an
additional charge for aggravated battery. In 2006, a young woman obtained an order of
protection against respondent. She alleged that respondent threatened to kill everyone she
loved, called her multiple times a day, stalked her at the mall, tried to get her alone, begged her
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for sex, and told her that he wanted to rape her. The psychologist opined that these offenses
indicated respondent’s tendency to disobey the law and demonstrate violent, sometimes
sexually violent, behavior.
¶7 The circuit court found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent was an
SVP under the Act. Respondent chose not to have a dispositional hearing. The court ordered
respondent committed for institutional care in a secure facility. Respondent appealed, arguing
that the State failed to meet its burden of proof. This court affirmed.
¶8 The Act requires the State to file a motion for periodic reexamination at least annually. 725
ILCS 207/55 (West 2006). In September 2017, the State filed its tenth motion for periodic
reexamination. In May 2018, respondent filed a motion to vacate order of commitment/motion
to dismiss, citing Miller’s holding “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 567
U.S. at 479.
¶9 On May 18, 2018, the court held a hearing on the pending motions. The court considered
Dr. David Suire’s written report based on his July 2017 examination of respondent. Suire
opined that respondent remained in the self-application (or third) phase of the treatment
program for SVPs. Although respondent made progress since his last reexamination, he
continued to struggle with many reoccurring issues like denial of his recidivism risk and
inappropriate sexual interests. Respondent remained ignorant as to the full range of his
treatment needs and risk factors. He stopped taking his psychotropic medication. Suire found
this decision concerning due to respondent’s therapist’s observation that respondent was
developing a romantic/sexual interest in a female therapist. This was a reoccurring issue for
respondent over the course of his treatment. Respondent denied behaving inappropriately
toward the woman who obtained a restraining order against him, suggesting a lack of insight
into his behavior. Suire scored respondent on the STATIC-99, which is an actuarial assessment
that measures an offender’s sexual recidivism risk. Respondent’s risk of recidivism was
between three and a half and four times higher than the typical sex offender in the normative
sample. Suire found that respondent met the diagnostic criteria for pedophilic disorder,
sexually attracted to females, nonconsenting females, delusional disorder, erotomanic type
(currently in an acute episode), antisocial personality disorder with borderline features, and
other specific paraphilic disorder. Suire believed that it was “substantially probable” that
respondent would reoffend. Ultimately, the court denied respondent’s combined motions and
granted the State’s motion for periodic reexamination.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, respondent argues that his SVP commitment is unconstitutional in light of
Miller and recent decisions from this district. Respondent made an “as-applied” challenge to
the constitutionality of his commitment. In making an as-applied challenge, respondent
contends that the pertinent sections of the Act are unconstitutional as applied to the particular
circumstances of respondent’s situation. People v. Garvin, 2013 IL App (1st) 113095, ¶ 17. He
argues that involuntary commitment is punitive, such that it violates the eighth amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent presents this court with a
question of constitutional validity of a statute, which calls for de novo review. People v. Doll,
371 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1138 (2007).
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¶ 12 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a mandatory sentencing
scheme that imposed a life-without-parole sentence on a 14-year-old child was
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at 474. A jury found the named
petitioner guilty of murder. Id. at 469. The trial court sentenced him to the mandatory
punishment as part of the relevant sentencing scheme. Id. When addressing whether the
sentencing scheme violated the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment, the Court found these mandatory punishments “prohibit a sentencing authority
from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a
juvenile offender,” noting that youth is a factor the sentencing court should be able to take into
consideration. Id. at 474. The Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at
479. The holding was narrow and specific, as the Court refused to fashion a bright line rule
barring life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. See id. Attendant facts and circumstances
matter; the eighth amendment requires the sentencing court take them into account. Id. at 480.
¶ 13 Illinois went a step further with its application of the Miller rule. Our supreme court
declared de facto life sentences unconstitutional as well. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271,
¶ 10. Respondent contends his SVP commitment is a de facto life sentence, bringing him under
the Miller umbrella. He asks this court to hold that SVP commitment is punitive in nature,
relying on cases that no longer have precedential force because the Illinois Supreme Court
vacated the judgments. Respondent can cite no case holding that SVP commitment is
considered punishment or applying Miller and its progeny to the Act.
¶ 14 Before Miller, our supreme court addressed the constitutionality of the Act in In re
Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 559 (2000). The defendant argued the Act was
unconstitutional in that it (1) denied due process and equal protection, (2) violated the
prohibition against double jeopardy and ex post facto principles, and (3) infringed upon the
right to trial by jury. Id. at 557-58. The court emphasized that “proceedings under the [Act] are
civil rather than criminal in nature.” Id. at 559. It echoed the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), that held involuntary confinement
pursuant to a similar Kansas statute was not punitive. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 559. Our
supreme court noted “[t]he flaw in defendant’s analysis is that this is not a criminal case.” Id. at
560.
¶ 15 Samuelson controls. Here, respondent is asking this court to declare the Act
unconstitutional because of principles the Supreme Court enumerated in a criminal case.
Respondent attempts to persuade us that involuntary commitment is punishment such that
Miller applies. Our supreme court, and the United States Supreme Court, have held otherwise.
“The appellate court lacks authority to overrule decisions of [the supreme] court, which are
binding on all lower courts.” People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2009). For this reason, we
reject respondent’s constitutional challenge and affirm the circuit court’s grant of the State’s
motion for periodic reexamination.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island
County.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
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