People v. Davis ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (1st) 1192046-U
FIFTH DIVISION
MARCH 31, 2023
No. 1-19-2046
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 05 CR 8598
)
DORWIN DAVIS, ) Honorable
) Alfredo Maldonado,
Defendant-Appellant, ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err by denying the defendant leave to file his successive
postconviction petition.
¶2 On April 8, 2005, the defendant-appellant, Dorwin Davis, was charged by the State with
first degree murder, armed robbery, and vehicular invasion. Following a jury trial in the circuit
court of Cook County in January 2009, the jury found Mr. Davis guilty of murder and armed
robbery, and Mr. Davis was sentenced to 52 years’ imprisonment. On February 21, 2019, Mr.
Davis requested leave to file a successive postconviction petition, alleging that his sentence
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violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution because he was 18 years old at the time of the offense and was
given a de facto life sentence. The trial court denied Mr. Davis leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. On appeal, Mr. Davis contends that the trial court erred in denying him
leave to file a successive postconviction petition because he presented a prima facie case of
violation of the Illinois proportionate penalties clause under the cause and prejudice test. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In January 2009, following a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Davis guilty of murder and
armed robbery. Mr. Davis was 18 years old at the time of the offense. For a full recitation of the
facts leading up to Mr. Davis’ conviction, see People v. Davis, 2011 IL App (1st) 090743-U. Mr.
Davis appealed his conviction and sentence, and in that appeal, this court vacated Mr. Davis’
sentence and remanded the case back to the trial court for resentencing. Upon remand, the trial
court ordered a pretrial investigation. Mr. Davis’ presentence investigation report reflects that he
graduated from high school, which was his highest level of education. The conviction before the
trial court was his first arrest and conviction. Mr. Davis, who was 22 years old at the time of
sentencing, had a 6-year-old child and prior to the offense was working at a community college.
Mr. Davis also stated he was not affiliated with any gangs and did not have any mental health
diagnoses. In resentencing, the trial court sentenced Mr. Davis to 46 years for the murder
conviction and 6 years on the armed robbery conviction, to be served consecutively, which resulted
in an aggregate sentence of 52 years’ imprisonment. Notably, Mr. Davis did not include a transcript
of the resentencing proceedings in the record before this court.
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¶5 On February 21, 2019, Mr. Davis requested leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, after his initial postconviction petition was denied. In his successive postconviction
petition, Mr. Davis alleged that his sentence of 52 years’ imprisonment violated the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution. Mr. Davis asserts that his sentence of 52 years was a de facto life sentence and since
he was 18 years old at the time of the offense, the eighth amendment, as applied to juveniles, was
violated when the trial court did not give due consideration to his “youthfulness.” We note that
throughout Mr. Davis’ postconviction petition, he claims that the eighth amendment and Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), applies to individuals 18 years old and younger, seemingly
implying that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense.
¶6 On August 22, 2019, the trial court denied Mr. Davis leave to file his successive
postconviction petition. The court, in its ruling, stated that Mr. Davis did not present any evidence
beyond “[his] age, basic information, and general information about brain development,” which is
necessary to establish an as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution. The court also found that the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution did not apply to Mr. Davis’ circumstances because he was 18 years old at the time of
the offense and the eighth amendment applies only to individuals under the age of 18 years old.
On September 16, 2019, Mr. Davis filed his notice of appeal.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 We first note that we have jurisdiction in this case because Mr. Davis filed a notice of
appeal within 30 days from the trial court’s August 22, 2019, denial of his request for leave to file
a successive postconviction petition. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651 (eff. July 1, 2017); Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b)
(eff. July 1, 2017).
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¶9 On appeal, Mr. Davis asserts that the trial court erred by denying him leave to file a
successive postconviction petition as he established a viable claim of a violation of the
proportionate penalties clause as applied to him.
¶ 10 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) provides
a method by which convicted persons under a criminal sentence can assert that their constitutional
rights were violated. People v. Allen, 2019 IL App (1st) 162985, ¶ 29. The Act generally
contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition, and any claim not presented in the
initial petition is forfeited. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); Allen, 2019 IL App (1st) 162985,
¶ 29. However, a court may grant a defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition if
he demonstrates cause for failing to raise the claim in his earlier petition and prejudice resulting
from that failure. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); Allen, 2019 IL App (1st) 162985, ¶ 32. Under
this cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant must establish both cause and prejudice. Allen, 2019 IL
App (1st) 162985, ¶ 32. “ ‘Cause’ is established when the defendant shows that ‘some objective
factor external to the defense impeded his ability to raise the claim’ in his original postconviction
proceeding.” Allen, 2019 IL App (1st) 162985, ¶ 32 (quoting People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381,
393 (2002)). And “ ‘[p]rejudice’ is established when the defendant shows that the ‘claimed
constitutional error so infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.’ ” Allen,
2019 IL App (1st) 162985, ¶ 32 (quoting Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 393). If the defendant makes a
prima facie showing of cause and prejudice, the court should grant the defendant leave to file his
successive postconviction petition. People v. Ames, 2019 IL App (4th) 170569, ¶ 13. This court
reviews the denial of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition
de novo. Ames, 2019 IL App (4th) 170569, ¶ 13.
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¶ 11 Mr. Davis argues that his 52-year sentence of imprisonment, for an offense he committed
while 18 years old, is unconstitutional pursuant to an evolving area of law governing the sentencing
of juveniles and young adult offenders. Citing the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, the United States Supreme Court in Miller held that mandatory life sentences
without the possibility of parole, imposed upon juvenile defendants (those who are under 18 years
old), are unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution because
such sentences prevent the trial court from considering the mitigating qualities of youth, such as
the defendant’s age, background, and mental and emotional development. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476,
489.
¶ 12 The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted Miller in a manner applicable to juvenile
defendants convicted and sentenced under Illinois law. Under our supreme court’s interpretation
of Miller, a life sentence, whether natural or de facto, whether mandatory or discretionary, is
unconstitutional for individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their offense where
the trial court did not consider the mitigating qualities of youth described in Miller. Reyes, 2016
IL 119271, ¶ 9 (“sentencing a juvenile offender to a mandatory term of years that is the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment”); People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40 (life sentences,
whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile defendants are disproportionate and violate the
eighth amendment, unless the trial court considers the defendant’s youth and its attendant
characteristics). And in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, our supreme court drew the line
at 40 years in order for a prison term to be considered a de facto life sentence.
¶ 13 Each of the aforementioned cases pertain to juveniles; however, the Illinois Supreme Court
recently opened the door for young adult offenders to demonstrate that their own specific
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characteristics at the time of their offense were so like those of a juvenile that the imposition of a
life sentence, absent the safeguards established in Miller, violates the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App
(1st) 171738, ¶ 25; see People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44 (the 19-year-old defendant
could not challenge his sentence as unconstitutional as applied to him pursuant to Miller for the
first time on direct appeal but was “not necessarily foreclosed” from asserting the claim in
postconviction proceedings).
¶ 14 In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 1, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed this court’s
holding that the 18-year-old defendant’s sentence of 76 years violated the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court explained that because the defendant
did not raise his as-applied constitutional challenge in the trial court, the trial court did not hold an
evidentiary hearing on that claim and therefore did not make any findings of fact on the defendant’s
specific circumstances. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40. The Illinois Supreme Court held that this
court erred in finding a constitutional violation because such a finding cannot be made without a
developed evidentiary record. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40. Thus, the Harris court set in motion
a method for young adult offenders to demonstrate, through an adequate factual record, that the
tenets of Miller apply to them individually. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25.
¶ 15 Having opened the door for an application of the Miller principles to young adult offenders
in sentencing, this court has remanded numerous cases for further postconviction proceedings
where the defendants, between the ages of 18 and 21, have yet to have the opportunity to ask a
court to consider whether they were more akin to juveniles at the time of their offenses. See People
v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 63 (noting the recent trend in treating offenders under 21
years old differently than adults in remanding the 18-year-old defendant’s postconviction petition
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for further proceedings); Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 34 (remanding for further
postconviction proceedings on the 18-year-old defendant’s petition because the law has continued
to trend in the direction of increased protections for youthful offenders); People v. Ross, 2020 IL
App (1st) 171202, ¶ 27 (ordering further proceedings on the 19-year-old defendant’s petition to
allow the trial court to determine whether the defendant’s individual characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense rendered him functionally younger than 19 years old);
People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 67 (remanded for further postconviction
proceedings because “[a]lthough [the] defendant was seven months past his 21st birthday at the
time of his offense,” his argument that mental health issues may lower a defendant’s functional
age finds support in recent case law); People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d) 170705, ¶ 14 (held that
the defendant, who was 19 years old at the time of his offense, pleaded enough facts to warrant
further proceedings on his claim that Miller applies to him where he had been diagnosed with an
antisocial personality disorder and exhibited symptoms similar to characteristics of juveniles).
¶ 16 Notably, Illinois courts consider the sentencing claims of young adult offenders under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution rather than the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51. Unlike Illinois, federal
courts have drawn a bright line at under 18 years of age to bring a claim under the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51.
Therefore, young adult offenders under the age of 21 years old must bring their claims under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st)
171628, ¶ 51. In a defendant’s postconviction petition, he or she cannot make passing mention of
the proportionate penalties clause but must allege specific circumstances that qualifies him or her
for protection under the Illinois Constitution. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40.
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¶ 17 Unlike the cases described above, Mr. Davis in this case did not appropriately argue in his
petition that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
His petition did mention the Illinois Constitution in passing, but the petition otherwise failed to
make any detailed arguments pertaining to the proportionate penalties clause, which would be the
appropriate path for relief under the facts of this case. Instead, his postconviction petition mostly
argued that his sentence violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. While
Mr. Davis effectively laid out the case law relevant to eighth amendment arguments, that is not the
proper relief for him since he was not a juvenile at the time of the crime. See Franklin, 2020 IL
App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51 (“This is because federal cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of
age [citation] and because *** the proportionate penalties clause offers a broader path to the same
types of relief.”).
¶ 18 Assuming arguendo Mr. Davis brought his claim under the proportionate penalties clause,
his postconviction petition was not sufficient for the court to grant leave for a successive filing.
Young adult offenders are not entitled to the presumption that the tenets of Miller apply to them
pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 52. Indeed, they
must establish a record to support their argument, should they choose to pursue relief via that
route. Although Mr. Davis in this case made arguments in his petition, regarding the evolution of
the caselaw as it is applied to juveniles, most of those arguments were related to relief under the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and did not address his circumstance as a
young adult offender. As we have explained, the eighth amendment is not an avenue of relief that
is available to the Mr. Davis here. Moreover, in order for a young adult offender to receive
sentencing protections pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution,
which would be the appropriate path of relief for Mr. Davis, he must plead and ultimately prove
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that his specific and individual characteristics require the application of Miller. Ruiz, 2020 IL App
(1st) 163145, ¶ 52. Although at the pleading stage Mr. Davis is not required to prove anything, he
still needs to plead some facts justifying further proceedings. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st)
163145, ¶¶ 54-55.
¶ 19 In this case, other than alleging that he was 18 years old when he committed his offense
and was sentenced to 52 years’ imprisonment, Mr. Davis’ petition failed to set forth any individual
characteristics which would require the trial court to apply the sentencing protections set forth in
Miller. See Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 78 (a defendant should make allegations that
there were issues particular to him at the time of his offense that rendered him functionally younger
than his chronological age). Consequently, Mr. Davis’ successive postconviction petition, which
is the subject of this appeal, was insufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of the cause-and-
prejudice test so as to warrant further proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016) (to
establish prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that the claim not raised in an initial
postconviction proceeding so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated
due process).
¶ 20 While the law and science, which undergirds the evolving law, moves in the direction of
increased protections for young adult offenders, through postconviction proceedings, those
seeking such protections must plead specific and individual characteristics as related to them.
Indeed, the trial court is the appropriate tribunal for development of the factual record, which is
why it is paramount for a defendant to allege specific characteristics to enable the trial court to
develop the record. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 27.
¶ 21 This is the only way to establish that they are entitled to the protections provided by Miller
and its progeny as interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court. The failure to present the factual
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allegations necessary to evaluate the tenets of Miller and make arguments under the proportionate
penalties clause are fatal to Mr. Davis’ claim. As a result, Mr. Davis’ petition fails to support an
as-applied challenge to his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s order denying Mr. Davis’ motion for leave to
file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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