People v. Williams , 2023 IL App (1st) 191309-U ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (1st) 191309-UFIFTH DIVISION
April 14, 2023
No. 1-19-1309
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 04 CR 22049
)
SEITH WILLIAMS, ) Honorable
) Michael McHale,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Navarro concurred in the judgment.
Justice Mitchell concurred in part and dissented in part.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment summarily dismissing the defendant’s postconviction
petition is affirmed.
¶2 The defendant-appellant, Seith Williams, filed a pro se postconviction petition in the
circuit court of Cook County following his conviction for first degree murder alleging, inter alia,
that his trial counsel was ineffective. The thrust of his allegation of ineffectiveness was trial
counsel’s failure to file a pretrial motion to suppress Mr. Williams’ statement and failure to
challenge his 49-year sentence of imprisonment as unconstitutional. The circuit court summarily
No. 1-19-1309
dismissed Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition at the first stage of postconviction proceedings,
and Mr. Williams now appeals. On appeal, we affirmed the judgment stating that Mr. Williams
waived his right to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
¶3 On October 21, 2022, Mr. Williams filed a petition for rehearing. We now modify our
decision upon our grant of Mr. Williams’ petition for rehearing. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 In 2004, Mr. Williams was charged by indictment, along with his codefendants, Hernandez
Holeman and Katrina Battiste, with twenty-six counts of first-degree murder, three counts of armed
robbery, four counts of home invasion, and three counts of residential burglary for the August 16,
2004, death of Mattie Battiste, 1 who was the mother of Mr. Williams’ girlfriend, Katrina Battiste. 2
Mr. Williams was 21 years old at the time of the offense. In December 2004, court-appointed
private counsel, Daniel Coyne, filed his appearance on behalf of Mr. Williams. In January 2005,
because the State had filed an intent to seek the death penalty, the trial court appointed additional
counsel, Geary Kull, as well as a forensic social worker to assist the defense.
¶6 On June 5, 2006, Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to first degree murder of Mattie Battiste. Mr.
Williams’ guilty plea stated that, along with his codefendants, he “without lawful justification,
intentionally or knowingly strangled and inflicted multiple injuries which killed Mattie Battiste,
*** [and] the murdered individual was actually killed during the course of an underlying felony,
to wit: armed robbery, in violation of chapter 720 Act 5 Section 9-1(a)(1).” The State entered a
1
We use the victim’s first name since the victim and one of the codefendants share a last name.
2
In the interest of clarity and brevity, only those facts of the crime necessary to resolve this appeal
will be presented, as most of the details of the crime itself are irrelevant.
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No. 1-19-1309
nolle prosequi on the remaining charges.
¶7 Mr. Williams’ guilty plea resulted in a sentencing range of 20 years’ imprisonment to the
death penalty. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Mr. Williams to 49 years’
imprisonment. The trial court then admonished Mr. Williams that he had a right to appeal his
sentence, but that in order to do so, he must first move to withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days.
Mr. Williams did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and did not file a direct appeal.
¶8 On February 27, 2019, Mr. Williams filed a pro se postconviction petition, which is the
subject of this appeal. Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition made the following claims: (1) his
guilty plea was void because the factual basis of the plea was a coerced confession by an assistant
state’s attorney; (2) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a pretrial motion
to suppress Mr. Williams’ confession; (3) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
file a pretrial motion “to [] suppress [Mr. Williams’] video-taped statement taken during a police-
initiated interrogation in which the ‘question first, warn second’ technique deprived him of a free
and rational choice about whether to speak ***, [and] violated his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination [to not] give a statement,” because “he did not have a real choice to
decline to make the second statement due to the compulsion by” the assistant state’s attorney; and
(4) based on recent case law from this court concerning the sentencing of young adults, he is
entitled to a lesser sentence since he was 21 years old at the time of his offense. In support of his
petition, Mr. Williams attached numerous documents: an affidavit from himself; an affidavit from
Katrina Battiste; a transcript of the first few minutes of his videotaped confession; and a partial
transcript from his plea and sentencing hearings.
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No. 1-19-1309
¶9 Aside from his claim challenging his 49-year sentence, all of Mr. Williams’ claims were
based on the following allegations in his petition. On August 17, 2004, police officers arrived at
Mr. Williams’ sister’s apartment and asked to speak with Mr. Williams’ girlfriend, Katrina, in
connection with the death of her mother. The police officers did not request to also speak with Mr.
Williams, but he asked them if he could accompany Katrina to the police station “to provide
emotional support” for her interview with the police. The police officers granted his request.
¶ 10 According to Mr. Williams, however, once at the police station, the police separated him
from Katrina and directed him to an interrogation room alone. Once inside the interrogation room,
detectives began interrogating him about the statement he had given the day before regarding the
death of Mattie Battiste. Mr. Williams confirmed his previous statement, and the detectives left
him alone in the locked interrogation room for approximately five minutes. When the detectives
returned, they took Mr. Williams’ cell phone and keys and handcuffed him to the wall. Mr.
Williams was never given any Miranda warnings.
¶ 11 Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition continued that he was detained in the interrogation
room for 48 hours. Over that time, he invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel
numerous times, but the detectives and an assistant state’s attorney nonetheless questioned him
two more times. At one point, the assistant state’s attorney “slapped [Mr. Williams] on the side of
the head” with several photographs, raised his voice, pointed his fingers in Mr. Williams’ face,
and threatened to take away Mr. Williams’ unborn child and his sister’s children if he “did not
start talking.” Eventually, Mr. Williams gave “his inculpatory statement” that was “created by a
subtly coercive environment in which his will was overcome,” and therefore, his statement was
not voluntary. After being in the interrogation room for a lengthy period of time, Mr. Williams
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No. 1-19-1309
was finally read his Miranda rights for the first time. Mr. Williams waived his Miranda rights and
gave a videotaped statement in which he confessed to murdering Mattie Battiste.
¶ 12 Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition argued that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when counsel advised him to plead guilty instead of moving to suppress the confession.
In his affidavit attached to his postconviction petition, he asserted that he told his trial counsel on
two separate occasions the circumstances behind his inculpatory statement, but during each
meeting, his counsel said he was still waiting for discovery and would address Mr. Williams’
concerns when he was more familiar with the case. During their third meeting, his trial counsel
suggested Mr. Williams take a plea because of the inculpatory statement that Mr. Williams made
to officers. Mr. Williams did not state that his counsel’s advice was the reason that he pleaded
guilty. Instead, he argued that the coerced confession “carried over to taint the guilty plea, [as] the
conviction was based on the factual basis of the prior statement, as offered proof by the
prosecution. An adduced confession cannot form the factual basis of a voluntary guilty plea as
contemplated by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(c).”
¶ 13 In his additional claim alleging that his 49-year sentence of imprisonment is
unconstitutional, Mr. Williams cited recent case law from the United States Supreme Court as well
as this court, all stemming from Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). His arguments
concerned the development of young adult brains and its impact on sentencing, contending that
that because he was 21 years old and had other “developmental challenges” at the time of the
murder, he should receive a reduced sentence pursuant to the tenets of Miller.
¶ 14 On May 3, 2019, the trial court entered a written order summarily dismissing Mr. Williams’
postconviction petition. The order stated:
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“The pre-trial issues were known to [Mr. Williams] prior to his plea and
thus, are waived. Further, Miller applies to defendants 18 years and younger. [Mr.
Williams] was 21 years old at the time of the offense. His petition and issues
presented are frivolous and patently without merit and [the petition] is therefore
dismissed.”
This appeal followed. On October 21, 2022, Mr. Williams filed a petition for rehearing arguing
that various United States Supreme Court and Illinois cases support his argument that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims cannot be waived. Also, Mr. Williams alleged that a plea after a
coerced confession is “by definition, involuntary.”
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Although Mr. Williams’ pro se notice of appeal was not filed until June 6, 2019, (34 days
after the trial court’s judgment), Mr. Williams certified that he placed the notice of appeal in the
prison mail system on May 30, 2019, and the postage stamp was dated June 3, 2019. This was a
timely notice of appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017), which
provides that service is proved: “in case of service by mail by a self-represented litigant residing
in a correctional facility, by certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the
person who deposited the document in the institutional mail, stating the time and place of deposit
and the complete address to which the document was to be delivered.” We, therefore, have
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
¶ 17 Mr. Williams presents the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing his postconviction petition. He argues that the factual allegations in his
petition made an arguable claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial
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No. 1-19-1309
counsel advised him to plead guilty instead of moving to suppress his confession. Mr. Williams
avers that such a motion to suppress would have been meritorious because his confession was:
involuntary; the product of an illegal arrest; elicited without proper Miranda warnings; and\or
elicited after he invoked his right to remain silent. So according to Mr. Williams, his counsel
should have moved to suppress his confession. He argues that the failure to do so was evidence of
ineffectiveness. Mr. Williams additionally alleges that his postconviction petition made the
arguable claim that his 49-year sentence of imprisonment is an unconstitutional de facto life
sentence because he was 21 years old at the time of the offense. He submits that his individual
characteristics at the time reflected the mitigating qualities of youth such that he is entitled to a
lesser sentence pursuant to the tenets of Miller. Asserting that his pro se postconviction petition
stated the gist of two different constitutional claims, he alleges the trial court erred in dismissing
it.3 He asks us to reverse the trial court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction petition and
remand this case for second stage postconviction proceedings.
¶ 18 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism by which a criminal
defendant can assert that his constitutional rights were substantially violated in his original trial or
sentencing hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2018); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 455
(2002). A postconviction proceeding contains three distinct stages. People v. Gallano, 2019 IL
App (1st) 160570, ¶ 22. The first stage concerns the sufficiency of the allegations of the petition.
Section 122-2 of the Act requires that a post-conviction petition must “clearly set forth the respects
in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2012). In a non-
3
Although Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition pleaded other claims, he does not raise those
claims on appeal.
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No. 1-19-1309
capital case, the Act directs that “[i]f *** the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently
without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and
conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.2(a)(2) (West 2012). Thus,
at the first stage of a post-conviction proceeding, the trial court reviews the petition to “determine
whether the petition is frivolous or patently without merit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted).
People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. The trial court may dismiss a petition during the first stage if
the court determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. Gallano, 2019 IL App
(1st) 160570, ¶ 22. As most postconviction petitions are drafted by pro se defendants, the threshold
for a petition to survive the first stage of proceedings is low. People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶
24. We review de novo a trial court’s first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition. People v.
Shipp, 2015 IL App (2d) 131309, ¶ 7. “Under the de novo standard of review, this court owes no
deference to the trial court.” People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (1st) 111116, ¶ 75.
¶ 19 The first claim in Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition is that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel when his counsel advised him to plead guilty instead of first moving to
suppress his confession.
¶ 20 Illinois caselaw is clear that a “voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors,
including constitutional defects.” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 21. “A valid
guilty plea also renders irrelevant—and thereby prevents the defendant from appealing—the
constitutionality of case-related government conduct that takes place before the plea is entered.”
Class v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018). “[A] plea of guilty in a state court is not subject to
collateral attack in a federal court on the ground that it was motivated by a coerced confession
unless the defendant was incompetently advised by his attorney.” McMann v. Richardson, 397
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U.S. 759, 772 (1970). The question of whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and thus vulnerable
to attack is not based on whether a court would retrospectively consider trial counsel’s advice
incorrect but on whether it falls within the “range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71.
¶ 21 In Mr. Williams’ petition for rehearing, he argues that this court erred in citing People v.
Smith, 2021 IL App (5th) 180196 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23),4 for the
proposition that Mr. Williams waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he
pleaded guilty. In support of his argument, he cites McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970),
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011), and People v.
Mendez, 336 Ill. App. 3d 935, 939 (2003). We briefly address each.
¶ 22 In McMann, 397 U.S. at 767, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a counseled defendant,
whose confession is the reason he decided to plead guilty, was entitled to habeas corpus relief if
the confession was coerced. The Court distinguished that scenario from another scenario, where
the defendant has his own reasons for pleading guilty regardless of the strength of the State’s case.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 767. In the later instance, the defendant is not entitled to relief after a plea,
even if the confession given was coerced. McMann, 397 U.S. at 767. The Court recognized that in
those circumstances, at best, the defendant could argue that he or she was mistakenly advised by
counsel about the admissibility of the confession, which made the plea of guilty unintelligent.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 768. However, the Court was not convinced that was a cognizable claim
under the law since guilty pleas are not so vulnerable to collateral attacks. McMann, 397 U.S. at
4
Unpublished orders from the Illinois Appellate Court entered after January 1, 2021, may be cited
for persuasive purposes. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021).
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769. The Court held that a “guilty plea based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea
not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the
defendant’s confession.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 770. The question of whether the advice was
reasonably competent is not one looked at retrospectively but, at the time of the advice, whether
counsel’s decision or advice fell within the range of competence of criminal defense attorneys.
McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71. The Court determined the question to be whether counsel’s allegedly
erroneous advice induced the plea. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. The Court also noted that “a
defendant who alleges that he pleaded guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without
more, entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
¶ 23 In Tollet, 411 U.S. at 265, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the defendant, who was
African-American, could attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea since the grand jury
who indicted him allegedly impermissibly excluded African-Americans and this fact was not
known until after his plea. Like Mr. Williams, the defendant sought to challenge an issue which
arose prior to the plea of guilty. The Court drew the distinction between this case and McMann
since in the case of the defendant of McMann, all the facts were known prior to his plea of guilty.
However, the Court held that while the defendant could not waive an issue he was not aware
existed, the defendant after pleading guilty could not directly attack any constitutional violation,
which occurred prior to the plea. Tollet, 411 U.S. at 266 (“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the
chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process”). The Court found that to succeed
on the federal habeas corpus claim under the circumstances, the defendant had to establish
unconstitutional discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and that counsel’s advice to plead
guilty without inquiring into the composition of the grand jury was outside the range of
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competence of criminal defense attorneys. Tollet, 411 U.S. at 268.
¶ 24 In Premo, 562 U.S. 115, factually the closest case to Mr. Williams, the Supreme Court
faced the question of the adequacy of a trial counsel’s representation regarding a plea bargain when
it did not first move to seek a suppression of a confession which was allegedly improper. The
Court held that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under those circumstances,
the defendant had to show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was
prejudiced by the performance or decision not to file a motion to suppress. “In applying and
defining this standard, substantial deference must be accorded to counsel’s judgment.” Premo, 562
U.S. at 126. The Court noted that the stakes for a defendant pleading guilty early in a case are high
and some defendants may choose to forgo the right to assert their innocence, when balancing
between the possibility that the State’s case can get stronger and benefits of a plea to a potential
lesser charge or reduced sentence. Premo, 562 U.S. at 129.
¶ 25 In Mendez, 336 Ill. App. 3d 935, which was before the Third District of the Illinois
Appellate Court, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea and raised a defense of entrapment.
Unlike Mr. Williams, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, due to his possible defense. The
defendant also alleged that he only met with his attorney on two occasions and that during both
meetings he urged him to plead guilty, without informing him of potential defenses. The Third
District determined that the defendant who pleaded guilty was entitled to a second stage
proceeding on his postconviction claim, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The court
held that while a plea typically waives nonjurisdictional issues, ineffective assistance of counsel is
an exception to the waiver rule and a plea is only voluntary if entered with the assistance of
competent counsel. Mendez, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 939. As stated, a guilty plea generally results in
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waiver of challenges which are not related to the voluntariness of the plea. Mendez, 336 Ill. App.
3d at 939.
¶ 26 Importantly, Mr. Williams does not attack the nature of his guilty plea, such as claiming
that he was threatened into pleading guilty or that he failed to understand the charges, nor did Mr.
Williams move to withdraw his guilty plea. Moreover, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel does not revolve around the voluntariness of his plea. See, e.g., Mendez, 336 Ill. App. 3d
at 939 (the defendant alleged the gist of a constitutional claim that his plea was involuntary because
his attorney was ineffective in failing to inform him of the defense of entrapment). Rather, Mr.
Williams claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress his confession
considering the circumstances surrounding his confession. This is an important distinction from
claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that his plea was made voluntarily
and intelligently. See People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2005) (in the context of a guilty plea,
an attorney’s conduct is deficient if the attorney failed to ensure that the defendant’s guilty plea
was entered voluntarily and intelligently); See also People v. Smith, 383 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1086
(finding that the defendant did not attack her guilty plea but instead argued ineffective assistance
of counsel for failure to present a defense of compulsion, thereby waiving her claims because she
pleaded guilty).
¶ 27 Here, Mr. Williams is not claiming actual innocence or newly discovered evidence. At the
time of the plea, all parties were aware of the incriminating statement. Mr. Williams is now, on
appeal, making the argument that his trial attorney induced his plea by failing to provide legal
advice about the suppression of his confession but he did not make that claim in his postconviction
petition. As the State points out, Mr. Williams’ alleged error arose because his trial attorney failed
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to challenge the admissibility of his confession, which is a claim that was waived when petitioner
pleaded guilty. While Mr. Williams did claim in his postconviction petition that his attorney
“ ‘suggested that [he] take a plea, because of the alleged self-incrimination,’ importantly, Mr.
Williams did not claim that he chose to plead guilty because his attorney was mistaken about the
admissibility of the confession.”
¶ 28 While Mr. Williams mentioned that trial counsel advised him that he should plead guilty,
in part because of his confession, that explanation does not give us insight into Mr. Williams’
motivations for pleading guilty. In the litany of cases that Mr. Williams cites in his petition for
rehearing, the question raised is whether the defendant would have proceeded to trial but for the
representation of the attorney, who provided incompetent advice. That is not the case here. Mr.
Williams does not state this advice was the basis of the plea; therefore, this challenge is more akin
to a collateral attack on the confession, which is impermissible at this stage. McMann, 397 U.S. at
766-69. Mr. Williams’ allegations are similar to the defendant in People v. Johnson, 2021 IL App
(1st) 152310.
¶ 29 In Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶¶ 8-9 the defendant challenged, in a successive
postconviction petition that he confessed to a crime he did not commit and gave officers a coerced
confession because of the abuse and torture they imposed on him. The defendant asserted in his
postconviction petition that the coerced confession rendered his plea involuntary and not
knowingly made since the confession served as the sole factual basis for the plea of guilty.
Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 9. The trial court denied the defendant’s successive
postconviction petition, and this court reviewed the trial court’s denial. Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st)
152310, ¶ 14. This court acknowledged that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional claims.
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Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 25. This court found that it was irrelevant to its waiver
analysis that the guilty plea was solely based on the defendant’s alleged coerced confession.
Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 25; See People v. Anderson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 121, 133
(2007) (stating that since the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty, his claim that his due process
rights were violated due to a coerced confession were waived.); see also People v. Stice, 160 Ill.
App. 3d 132, 138 (1987) (This court found “that while the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s
confession in reciting the factual bases of defendant’s crimes to the court, it is apparent that the
defendant, in pleading guilty, acknowledged the truth of the facts contained in the confession-and
not just the fact that he made a confession.”). This court explained that the only method, by which
a defendant can challenge their guilty plea based on constitutional issues and overcome the waiver
of a plea, is by saying they were incompetently advised by counsel to plead guilty. Johnson, 2021
IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 26. This court found that the defendant waived his claim of regarding the
coerced confession because he did not allege that ineffective assistance of counsel led him to plead
guilty. Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 27.
¶ 30 We find likewise to the court in Johnson, 2021 IL App (1st) 152310, ¶ 25. As Mr. Williams
did not claim the purported ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s advice led to his
decision to plead guilty, he cannot now challenge it in a postconviction petition, and we find that
Mr. Williams waived this claim by pleading guilty. McMann, 397 U.S. at 767; See Smith, 383 Ill.
App. 3d at 1086.
¶ 31 However, even if we did not find that Mr. Williams waived this claim and proceeded to a
Strickland analysis, Mr. Williams’ claim would still fail. A defendant’s claim of ineffective
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assistance of counsel is analyzed under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11.
¶ 32 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show both
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant.” People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496 (2010). To establish deficient performance, a
defendant must show his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
“Effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect representation.” Evans, 209 Ill.
2d at 219 (quoting People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-92 (1984)). Mistakes in trial strategy or
tactics do not necessarily render counsel’s representation defective. See People v. Hayes, 2021 IL
App (1st) 172417, ¶ 78 (finding that the decision to not file a motion to suppress is typically a
matter of trial strategy, in which courts of review give great deference to counsel’s decision).
¶ 33 To establish the second prong of Strickland, prejudice, a defendant must show that “but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” People v. Houston, 229 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2008). “To establish prejudice in
the guilty plea context, ‘the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ”
People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). “A
defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test and a failure to satisfy any one of the
prongs precludes a finding of ineffectiveness.” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35.
¶ 34 Mr. Williams does not argue that counsel’s advice regarding his plea contributed to his
decision to plead guilty. Instead, he argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
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counsel by failing to file a motion to suppress his confession. Regarding the analysis for the
prejudicial prong of the Strickland test, Mr. Williams fails to state in his postconviction petition
and the record is silent as to whether he would not have pleaded guilty and instead proceeded to
trial except for counsel’s mistake. Mr. Williams does not assert that he would have proceeded to
trial if his confession was suppressed. When balancing between the possibility of death or life in
prison against a determinate set of years imprisonment, Mr. Williams may have decided the less
risky approach was a better option and counsel’s trial strategy may not be seen as substandard
representation under those parameters. See Premo, 562 U.S. at 129.
¶ 35 Mr. Williams’ other claim in his postconviction petition is that his 49-year sentence is
unconstitutional pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. His
argument is premised upon recent case law governing the sentencing of juveniles and young adult
offenders, which is an evolving area of law stemming from the United States Supreme Court case,
Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455.
¶ 36 While there has been a recent trend to expand Miller’s sentencing protections for juveniles
to young adult offenders, pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution,
presently the case law strictly applies to young adult offenders under the age of 21. See People v.
Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33 (while there has been an expansion of
the Miller protections, those expansions have been restricted to individuals who were between 18
and 20 years old). And it is undisputed that Mr. Williams was 21 years old when he committed the
murder. Thus, the Miller tenets which Mr. Williams relies upon cannot be applied to him. We
recognize that the evolving science of brain development may support Miller claims for those over
20 at some point in the future; but as this court has previously noted, such an expansion should be
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made by the legislature or the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430,
¶ 27. “[F]or now[,] individuals who are 21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults
for purposes of a Miller claim.” Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33. As such, Mr.
Williams’ constitutional challenge to his 49-year sentence is meritless.
¶ 37 In sum, we find Mr. Williams’ postconviction petition without merit and affirm the trial
court’s dismissal of his petition at the first stage.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
¶ 41 JUSTICE MITCHELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 42 It is hornbook law that the forfeiture which attaches to legal errors preceding a voluntary
guilty plea does not extend to defects implicating the plea itself. See 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 21.6(a) (4th ed. Nov. 2022 Update) (“the forfeiture rule *** has no
application to defects *** concerning advice of counsel, *** interference with counsel, *** or
circumstances which make the plea other than voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”). The Supreme
Court acknowledged in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 767 (1970), that “a guilty plea is
properly open to challenge” if, for example, “the circumstances that coerced the confession have
abiding impact and also taint the plea.” See id. at 772 (“[A] plea of guilty in a state court is not
subject to collateral attack in a federal court on the ground that it was motivated by a coerced
confession unless the defendant was incompetently advised by his attorney.” (emphasis added)).
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Our Illinois Supreme Court has similarly recognized that erroneous legal advice provided prior to
a guilty plea can render the plea involuntary:
“If the defendant’s pleas were made in reasonable reliance upon the advice or
representation of his attorney, which advice or representation demonstrated
incompetence, then it can be said that the defendant’s pleas were not voluntary; that
is, there is not a knowing and intelligent waiver of the fundamental rights which a
plea of guilty entails.” People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 549 (1985).
See also People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 474 (1994) (“Resolution of the question of whether a
defendant’s pleas, made in reliance on counsel’s advice, were voluntary and knowing depends on
whether the defendant had effective assistance of counsel.”).
¶ 43 Did our defendant Seith Williams allege that he relied on incompetent legal advice in
deciding to plead guilty? Mr. Williams’ complaint is that his confession was coerced and that
despite raising the issue repeatedly with his attorney, counsel failed to bring a motion to suppress.
Ultimately, counsel recommended that Mr. Williams plead guilty: “On June 5, 2006, Petitioner
was approached by counsel, who suggested that Petitioner take a plea, because of the alleged self
incrimination.” On that same day, Mr. Williams followed his lawyer’s advice and pled guilty.
Further, the petition alleges the following relationship between the plea and counsel’s allegedly
poor performance:
“Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to raise
[the coerced confession] and *** Petitioner was prejudice [sic] as it is a violation
of due process of law to stand convicted upon a factual basis in support of a guilty
plea that is as a matter of law void.
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No. 1-19-1309
***
The record does not positively rebut that the basis of the guilty plea was ‘arguably’
petitioner’s confession, thus these well plead [sic] facts must be taken as true ***.
***
Here it is arguable had trial counsel moved to suppress *** there is a reasonable
probability that the pretrial motion would have been granted, counsel’s failure was
objectively unreasonable ***.
***
[T]he factual basis for the guilty plea was the confession which arguably not
‘purge of the primary taint of the unlawful arrest.’ ”
¶ 44 While not a model of clarity, the petition was prepared pro se by an individual without
legal training. Our cases recognize that such petitions should be construed liberally. E.g., People
v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 188 (2010) (rejecting the “strict reading” of a first-stage petition as
inconsistent with the liberal construction standards); People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2009)
(“Where defendants are acting pro se, courts should review their petitions ‘with a lenient eye.’ ”).
Given that lenient standard, Mr. Williams has alleged enough to satisfy that purposely low
threshold of a “gist of a constitutional claim.” See People v. Ligon, 239 Ill. 2d 94, 104 (2010). At
the first stage, by design, there are limited bases for summarily dismissing a petition as relying on
an “indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.”5 Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16.
5
It is improper to consider “trial strategy” or “substantive” legal questions in analyzing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel at the first stage. People v. Wilson, 2014 IL App (1st) 113570, ¶ 46 (“[W]e
do not consider arguments related to strategy when reviewing first-stage postconviction petitions.”); People
v. Smith, 326 Ill. App. 3d 831, 839-40 (2001) (“Substantive questions relating to the issues raised in the
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No. 1-19-1309
¶ 45 Despite clear black letter law that creates an exception to the general forfeiture rule for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim interlocking with a guilty plea, confusion nonetheless
abounds. For example, the circuit court here summarily declared without any reasoned elaboration,
“The pre-trial issues were known to the petitioner prior to his plea and thus, are waived.” That is
an incorrect statement of law because it is incomplete: it fails to acknowledge the exception
squarely at issue in this case. And we, too, committed a similar analytic error, which prompted the
original panel to which this case was first submitted to vacate its decision and grant Mr. Williams’
petition for rehearing. Order Granting Petition for Reh’g, People v. Williams, No. 1-19-1309 (Nov.
9, 2022).
¶ 46 Because I conclude that Mr. Williams has alleged a gist of a constitutional claim related to
ineffective assistance counsel and his guilty plea, I would reverse the trial court’s summary
dismissal, and I would remand the petition for second-stage consideration. I agree and join the
majority’s analysis and judgment as to Mr. Williams’ proportionate penalties argument.
petition are not to be addressed at the first stage.”). Those are considerations for the second stage after the
State has answered the petition and the defendant has appointed counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122-4, 122-5 (West
2018); People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472-73 (2006) (at the second stage, the defendant is afforded
the advantages of appointed counsel, and the State may move to dismiss or answer the petition).
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