Johnson v. Woolsey ( 2022 )

NOTICE
2022 IL App (5th) 200406-UNOTICE
Decision filed 04/11/22. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0406 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
PATRICIA JOHNSON, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) White County.
)
v. ) No. 20-OP-76
)
STACEY WOOLSEY, ) Honorable
) Barry L. Vaughan,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We reverse the White County circuit court’s denial of the respondent’s
motion to set aside and vacate the default stalking no contact order.
¶2 The respondent, Stacey Woolsey, appeals the entry of a default stalking no contact
order pursuant to sections 60(a) and (d) of the Stalking No Contact Order Act (740 ILCS
21/60(a), (d) (West 2020)), and subsequent denial of his motion to set aside and vacate
order of default pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735
ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2020)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the circuit court’s
denial of the respondent’s motion to set aside and vacate the default plenary stalking no
contact order.
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¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 4, 2020, the petitioner, Patricia Johnson, filed a verified petition for a
stalking no contact order in the White County circuit court seeking to protect herself and
her minor children from the respondent. There were two specific instances alleged:
(1) between 2 and 3 p.m. on July 20, 2020, the respondent appeared at the petitioner’s
residence and “verbally intimidate[ed]” her while children were present; and (2) on August
3, 2020, the respondent crossed the center line into the petitioner’s lane before she swerved
to avoid a collision.
¶5 The petitioner’s boyfriend, Matthew Sneed, also filed a verified petition for a
stalking no contact order against the respondent on August 4, 2020, in White County case
No. 20-OP-75. The facts alleged in Sneed’s petition were substantially similar to those
alleged here, the cases were heard together in the trial court, and the respondent has filed a
companion appeal in case No. 5-20-0405 involving Sneed.
¶6 A petition hearing was set for August 5, 2020, and a plenary hearing was set for
August 21, 2020. On August 5, the petitioner and Sneed failed to appear but called the
circuit clerk’s office to inform the court of a medical emergency. The petition hearing was
reset for August 6, 2020.
¶7 On August 6, 2020, the petition hearing was continued until August 7, 2020; the
reason for the continuance is not clear from the record. On August 7, the petitioner and
Sneed appeared via Zoom due to alleged exposure to Covid-19. They were sworn in and
questioned. Thereafter, the trial court found that there had been at least two incidents of
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threats or acts that justified the entry of emergency stalking no contact orders against the
respondent. The plenary hearing was still scheduled for August 21, 2020.
¶8 The respondent was served with a summons and emergency stalking no contact
order for both cases on August 8, 2020. He appeared pro se, as did the petitioner and
Sneed, for the plenary hearing on August 21, 2020. When the cases were called, the
respondent was instructed to approach the bench. He was then informed that, since he
failed to file an answer or entry of appearance within seven days as required by statute, he
was in default. The trial court entered plenary stalking no contact orders against him for a
period of two years. The court briefly viewed the documents the respondent brought with
him to court and informed him that if he wished to proceed with any additional proceedings,
he must do so within 30 days.
¶9 The respondent subsequently retained counsel, and on September 18, 2020, he filed
a motion to set aside and vacate the orders of default in both cases. The motion, filed
pursuant to section 2-1301(e) of the Code (id.), argued that the respondent appeared in open
court on August 21, 2020, ready to proceed on the petition for the stalking no contact order
but had not filed an entry of appearance or answer prior to that date; he worked out of town
and was unaware of the requirement to file an entry of appearance or answer within seven
days; Illinois courts prefer that, if possible, litigation be determined on its merits; the trial
court’s primary consideration in ruling on a section 2-1301(e) motion is “whether
substantial justice is being done between the parties and whether it is reasonable under the
circumstances to proceed to trial on the merits”; and that the court should set aside and
vacate the default plenary stalking no contact orders.
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¶ 10 The trial court held a motion hearing on November 6, 2020, during which the
respondent appeared with counsel, Sneed appeared pro se, and the petitioner failed to
appear. The respondent’s counsel orally moved for a default order on his motion, based
on the petitioner and Sneed’s failure to file a response to the motion and the petitioner’s
failure to appear, which the court denied. Counsel then proceeded on the motion to set
aside and vacate the order of default by proffer. Counsel informed the court that the
respondent worked out of state, was served with the summons and emergency stalking no
contact orders on August 8, 2020, left Illinois to go to work in Mississippi on August 9,
and did not return until August 20 to attend the hearing the next day. Evidence was
presented that, on the day the respondent allegedly tried to run the petitioner off the road,
he was at a dental appointment undergoing a procedure and could not drive so his assistant
drove him home. The respondent also provided copies of the petitioner’s Facebook posts
from August 7, 2020, showing that she and Sneed were on their way to Lambert
International Airport for birthday festivities and had airplane tickets dated for that day,
when they told the court they were unable to appear in person due to Covid-19 exposure.
¶ 11 The trial court questioned Sneed as to why he was unable to appear in court on
August 7, 2020. He initially responded that the trip was on a different day and time.
However, when the court recalled that the petitioner and Sneed were in a vehicle on that
day, Sneed changed his testimony and said a relative that he and the petitioner had been
around had been exposed, but they tested negative for Covid-19 on the day of the scheduled
hearing and their trip to Florida.
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¶ 12 The trial court then asked if the respondent had any additional evidence to present,
and the respondent argued that the petitioner and Sneed had lied to the court to obtain the
emergency stalking no contact orders; the respondent had a meritorious defense; he had
appeared to present evidence on August 21, 2020, as provided by the summons; the motion
to set aside or vacate was filed within 30 days of the entry of default; and the court should
vacate the default order. After hearing the evidence, the court denied the respondent’s
motion to set aside or vacate the order of default. The record indicates that the court found
that “the orders of protection and stalking cases had serious allegations and the parties in
these cases should not have contact” and that “the excuse listed as a basis to vacate the
Plenary order [was] insufficient.” 1 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, the respondent makes three contentions. First, he argues that the trial
court erred in finding him in default for failing to file an entry of appearance or answer
within seven days of service. Second, he asserts that the court erred in finding him in
default after he appeared in open court on the date listed on the summons. Third, he
maintains that, in denying his motion to set aside and vacate the default plenary stalking
no contact order, the court erred in finding that substantial justice was served or abused its
discretion. We find the respondent’s third contention dispositive.
1
We note that the court reporter was not present during any of the hearings before the trial court,
and thus, no report of proceedings was prepared or filed with this court. However, the respondent filed a
motion to approve bystander’s report, which was granted on January 15, 2021. Therefore, our recitation of
the trial court proceedings is taken from the bystander’s report as well as the court’s docket entries.
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¶ 15 Section 2-1301(e) of the Code provides that “[t]he court may in its discretion, before
final order or judgment, set aside any default, and may on motion filed within 30 days after
entry thereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions that shall
be reasonable.” Id. We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s denial of a section
2-1301 motion to vacate. Godfrey Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Toigo,
2019 IL App (5th) 170473, ¶ 38. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary
or exceeds the bounds of reason and ignores principles of law such that substantial
prejudice has resulted. Id.¶ 16 Further, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision was fair and just, such
that the result did not deny the movant substantial justice. Id. We note that, in exercising
its discretion, the court must remain mindful that a default judgment is a “drastic remedy
that should be used only as a last resort.” Id. ¶ 39 (citing In re Haley D., 2011 110886,
¶ 69). Moreover:
“The law prefers that controversies be determined according to the substantive
rights of the parties; the provisions of the Code governing relief from a default
judgment are to be liberally construed toward that end. See In re Haley D., 2011 IL
110886, ¶ 69. A party seeking to vacate a default judgment under section 2-1301(e)
need not allege the existence of a meritorious defense or a reasonable excuse for not
having asserted the defense. [Id.] The overriding consideration is whether
substantial justice is being done between the litigants, and whether it is reasonable,
under the circumstances, to compel the parties to go to trial on the merits. [Id.] In
making its determination, ‘[t]he court should consider all of the events leading up
to judgment and should decide what is just and proper based on the facts of the
case.’ Larson v. Pedersen, 349 Ill. App. 3d 203, 208 (2004).” Godfrey, 2019 IL
App (5th) 170473, ¶ 39.
¶ 17 Having considered the record before us, we find that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied the respondent’s motion to set aside or vacate the default plenary
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stalking no contact order. The record shows that after the respondent was served with the
summons and emergency stalking no contact orders on August 8, 2020, he left the next day
to go to work in Mississippi. He did not return until August 20, 2020, to attend the plenary
hearing the next day. Although the respondent failed to file an answer or an entry of
appearance because he was unaware of that requirement, he appeared at the plenary hearing
ready to proceed with evidence.
¶ 18 After the trial court found him in default, the respondent retained counsel and timely
filed a motion to set aside and vacate the default plenary stalking no contact order.
Although the respondent was not required to present a meritorious defense to have the
default set aside, the evidence he presented at the motion hearing may have provided him
with such a defense against one of the incidents alleged by the petitioner in the petition for
stalking no contact order. The respondent also presented evidence that the petitioner and
Sneed lied to the court during the hearing on the emergency petitions. The respondent was
not allowed his day in court, and in light of the preference to decide cases on the merits,
we find that substantial justice was not done by the entry of default and the court’s refusal
to set aside the default.
¶ 19 After considering the record, including the facts and circumstances leading up to the
entry of the default plenary stalking no contact order, we find that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the respondent’s motion to vacate or set aside, and that substantial
justice requires that the default plenary stalking no contact order be vacated. Because we
are reversing and remanding on this basis, we need not address the respondent’s remaining
claims.
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¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court denying the respondent’s
motion to vacate or set aside the default plenary stalking no contact order; we vacate the
default plenary stalking no contact order; and we remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 22 Reversed and remanded.
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