Thounsavath v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ( 2017 )

Digitally signed by
Reporter of Decisions
Illinois Official Reports Reason: I attest to the
accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2017.10.04
16:09:28 -05'00'
Thounsavath v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
2017 IL App (1st) 161334Appellate Court PHOUNGEUN THOUNSAVATH, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-
Caption Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-
Appellant.
District & No. First District, Fifth Division
Docket No. 1-16-1334
Filed June 30, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2014-CH-02511;
Review the Hon. Kathleen M. Pantle, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Frank C. Stevens, of Taylor Miller LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appeal
Eric J. Parker, of Stotis & Baird Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Lampkin concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The plaintiff, Phoungeun Thounsavath, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against
the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). The plaintiff
sought a declaration that, as applied to her, the driver exclusion endorsement in the automobile
liability policies issued to her by State Farm violated section 143a-2 of the Illinois Insurance
Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2 (West 2012)) and the public policy of Illinois. State Farm answered
the complaint and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the
plaintiff was not entitled to underinsured coverage under her automobile liability policies with
State Farm. The circuit court denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and granted
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. State Farm appeals.
¶2 On appeal, State Farm contends that, as to the plaintiff, its driver exclusion endorsement
does not violate section 7-317(b)(2) of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility
Law (Financial Responsibility Law) (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2012)), section 143a-2 of
the Insurance Code, or Illinois public policy.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff was injured while a passenger in a vehicle driven
by Clinton M. Evans. At the time of the accident, Mr. Evans was insured by American Access
Insurance Company (AAIC), and the plaintiff was insured by State Farm under two
automobile liability policies. The plaintiff made a claim against Mr. Evans for her personal
injuries, which was paid by AAIC in the amount of $20,000.
¶5 The plaintiff then filed an underinsured motorist claim with State Farm. State Farm denied
coverage under the following provision contained in both of the automobile liability policies it
issued to the plaintiff:
“ ‘IT IS AGREED WE SHALL NOT BE LIABLE AND NO LIABILITY OR
OBLIGATION OF ANY KIND SHALL ATTACH TO US FOR BODILY INJURY,
LOSS OR DAMAGE UNDER ANY OF THE COVERAGES OF THIS POLICY
WHILE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE IS OPERATED BY: CLINTON M. EVANS’ ”
(Emphases in original.)
¶6 On May 27, 2015, the circuit court denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. The
court found that while named driver exclusions are recognized in Illinois, the issue was
whether such exclusions may be used to deny coverage to the named insured. The court
determined that such exclusions do not override the plain language of section 7-317(b)(2) of
the Financial Responsibility Act and denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the
circuit court on May 4, 2016.
¶7 On May 10, 2016, State Farm filed its notice of appeal from the May 27, 2015, and May 4,
2016, orders of the circuit court.
-2-
¶8 ANAYLSIS
¶9 I. Standards of Review
¶ 10 We review the granting of summary judgment, the construction of an insurance policy, and
the construction of a statute de novo. Goldstein v. Grinnell Select Insurance Co., 2016 IL App
(1st) 140317, ¶ 10.
¶ 11 II. Applicable Principles
¶ 12 “Summary judgment is proper if, and only if, the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
affidavits and other relevant matters on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.
v. Hall, 363 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993 (2006). “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,
147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992).
¶ 13 The rules of construction applicable to contracts apply as well to insurance policies.
Goldstein, 2016 IL App (1st) 140317, ¶ 13. The primary objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the parties’ intentions as expressed in the policy’s language. Goldstein, 2016 IL App
(1st) 140317, ¶ 13. The policy is construed as a whole giving effect to every provision;
unambiguous words in the policy are to be given their plain, ordinary and popular meaning.
Goldstein, 2016 IL App (1st) 140317, ¶ 13.
¶ 14 III. Statutes and Public Policy
¶ 15 A. Illinois’s Mandatory Insurance Statutory Scheme
¶ 16 Under the Financial Responsibility Law, no one may operate a motor vehicle or allow a
vehicle to be operated without obtaining sufficient insurance. 625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West
2012); see 625 ILCS 5/7-605(a), 7-203 (West 2012) (setting forth the mandatory minimum
amounts of insurance to be carried). Section 7-317(b) of the Financial Responsibility Law
provides that the owner’s policy of liability insurance “[s]hall insure the person named therein
and any other person using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles with the
express or implied permission of the insured.” 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2012).
¶ 17 “The ‘principle purpose’ of the mandatory liability insurance requirement is ‘to protect the
public by securing payment of their damages.’ ” Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d
48, 57 (2011) (quoting Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 129 (2005)). In furtherance of that purpose, the Insurance Code
requires automobile liability insurance policies to include uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage. See 215 ILCS 5/143a, 143a-2 (West 2012). Uninsured-motorist coverage is required
so that the policyholder is placed in substantially the same position he would occupy if he were
injured or killed in an accident where the party at fault carried the minimum liability coverage
specified in section 203 of the Financial Responsibility Law. Phoenix Insurance Co., 242 Ill.
2d at 57; see 625 ILCS 5/7-203 (West 2010). From the legislative history, the supreme court
concluded that the “legislative purpose of the underinsured-motorist coverage provision is the
same as that of uninsured-motorist coverage, ‘i.e., to place the insured in the same position he
would have occupied if the tortfeasor had carried adequate insurance.’ ” Phoenix Insurance
Co., 242 Ill. 2d at 57 (quoting Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 555).
-3-
¶ 18 B. Public Policy
¶ 19 “ ‘Parties to a contract may agree to any terms they choose unless their agreement is
contrary to public policy.’ ” Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Trujillo, 2014 IL
App (1st) 123419, ¶ 18 (quoting Sulser, 147 Ill. 2d at 559). “An agreement will not be
invalidated unless it is clearly contrary to what the constitution, the statutes, or the decisions of
the courts have declared to be the public policy of Illinois or unless the agreement is
‘manifestly injurious to the public welfare.’ ” Phoenix Insurance Co., 242 Ill. 2d at 55 (quoting
Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois, 215 Ill. 2d at 129-30).
¶ 20 IV. Discussion
¶ 21 State Farm maintains that the named driver exclusion in the automobile liability insurance
policies it issued to the plaintiff does not violate either the provisions of the Illinois Insurance
Code or Illinois public policy. We disagree.
¶ 22 In general, named driver exclusions in automobile liability insurance policies are permitted
in Illinois. American Access Casualty Co. v. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 15. Such exclusions
have been enforced by both the supreme court and the appellate court. In Heritage Insurance
Co. of America v. Phelan, 59 Ill. 2d 389 (1974), the supreme court upheld the denial of
uninsured motorist coverage to the son of the named insured where the son was excluded from
liability coverage under a restrictive endorsement. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.
Smith, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (2003), the appellate court, as a matter of first impression,
determined that section 7-602 of the Financial Responsibility Law, requiring an insurance card
to provide warnings if the insurance policy contained coverage restrictions, permitted named
driver exclusions from the mandatory liability insurance requirement. To the extent section
7-602 conflicted with section 7-317(b)(2) of the Financial Responsibility Law, the court held
that in enacting section 7-602, the legislature intended to create a limited exception to the
mandatory insurance laws and, therefore, the named driver exclusion did not violate Illinois
public policy. Smith, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1060, 1062. See Rockford Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Economy & Casualty Co., 217 Ill. App. 3d 181 (1991) (the named driver exclusion
endorsement precluded uninsured motorist coverage where the decedent was a passenger in a
vehicle whose driver was the subject of the exclusion endorsement).
¶ 23 Smith and the cases relied on by State Farm are distinguishable. In those cases, the named
driver exclusion was enforced as to parties other than the named insured.
¶ 24 The plaintiff relies on a line of cases beginning with Barnes v. Powell, 49 Ill. 2d 449(1971), in which Illinois courts refused to enforce named driver exclusion endorsements. See
Barnes, 49 Ill. 2d 449 (injured insured entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under her own
policy, where she was a passenger in her vehicle driven by an individual, who was uninsured at
the time of the accident); Madison County Automobile Insurance Co. v. Goodpasture, 49 Ill.
2d 555 (1971) (citing and following Barnes); Kerouac v. Kerouac, 99 Ill. App. 3d 254 (1981)
(policy exclusion for family members rendered the vehicle driven by the defendant-son
uninsured, and therefore, the uninsured motorist coverage available to the plaintiffs-father and
brother); Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 547 (1972)
(finding that section 143a of the Insurance Code directed insurance companies to provide
uninsured motor vehicle coverage for an insured regardless of whether, at the time of injury,
the insured occupied or operated vehicles declared in the subject policy, citing Barnes).
-4-
¶ 25 Moreover, in Rockford Mutual Insurance Co., the appellate court ruled that since the
named driver exclusion rendered the Economy-insured vehicle uninsured, the decedent’s
mother was required to seek recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage in her own
Rockford insurance policy for the death of her son. Rockford Mutual Insurance Co., 217 Ill.
App. 3d at 187. The court further held that its ruling was consistent with cases such as Barnes
and Kerouac, where a specific exclusion rendered the insureds’ own vehicles in which they
were riding uninsured. Rockford Mutual Insurance Co., 217 Ill. App. 3d at 187. The court
stated further as follows:
“To deny any insurance policy coverage to these policyholders would indeed violate
the public policy expressed in section 143a of the Illinois Insurance Code. The instant
case is distinguishable from those cases, however, in that in the instant case the injured
party is not seeking to recover under his or her own insurance policy, but under the
policy of the vehicle which was rendered uninsured at the time of the injury and of
which the injured party was neither a policy holder nor a named insured.” Rockford
Mutual Insurance Co., 217 Ill. App. 3d at 187.
¶ 26 Moreover, our courts have applied the analysis in Barnes even in different factual
situations. In Doxtater, the reviewing court stated as follows:
“Although we recognize that the facts of Barnes v. Powell are distinguishable from
the facts at bar, we nonetheless cannot overlook the Supreme Court’s statements
therein regarding the legislative intent behind Section 143a. The expansive
interpretation applied by a majority of that court leads us to conclude that, presented
with the issue at bar, our Supreme Court would interpret Section 143a of the Insurance
Code as a direction to insurance companies to provide uninsured motor vehicle
coverage for ‘insureds,’ regardless of whether, at the time of injury, the insureds
occupied or operated vehicles declared in the subject policy.” Doxtater, 8 Ill. App. 3d
at 552.
See Comet Casualty Co. v. Jackson, 125 Ill. App. 3d 921, 924 (1984) (in light of the supreme
court’s expansive interpretation of section 143a in Barnes, “the decision was intended to be an
expression of the legislative objective to provide extensive uninsured motorist coverage for
those insured under a valid automobile liability policy”).
¶ 27 State Farm points out that the cases relied on by the plaintiff were decided prior to the
enactment of the mandatory insurance requirements authorizing named driver exclusions. See
Pub. Act 85-1201, § 1 (eff. July 1, 1989) (adding 625 ILCS 5/7-602). We disagree with State
Farm’s premise that the enactment of mandatory insurance would have rendered the cases
relied on by the plaintiff inapplicable because exclusions are now authorized. The supreme
court in Phelan, decided in 1974 and cited by State Farm, upheld a restrictive endorsement.
Phelan, 59 Ill. 2d at 399.
¶ 28 The issue in the present case is whether the named driver exclusion violates our mandatory
insurance requirements and public policy where the exclusion bars coverage for the named
insured. While none of the cases relied on by either party addresses this precise issue or fact
pattern, we find the supreme court’s analysis in Reyes instructive.
¶ 29 In Reyes, the defendant was the sole named insured under her automobile policy with
American Access Casualty Company (American Access). In consideration for the premium
charged for the policy, an endorsement to the policy barred coverage where the insured vehicle
was operated by the defendant. While the defendant was the named insured, she was excluded
-5-
from coverage if she operated the vehicle. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 4. Subsequently, while
driving the insured vehicle, the defendant struck two pedestrians, resulting in the death of one
individual and injury to the other individual.
¶ 30 In response to the wrongful death suit brought against the defendant, American Casualty
filed a declaratory judgment suit, seeking a declaration that it owed no liability coverage to the
defendant based on the named driver exclusion. The circuit court granted summary judgment
to American Casualty, but the appellate court reversed, finding the exclusion violated public
policy. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 6.
¶ 31 On further review, our supreme court identified the issue as “whether an automobile
liability policy can exclude the only named insured and owner of the vehicle without violating
public policy.” (Emphasis in original.) Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 9. In its analysis, the court
first observed that a statute that exists for the protection of the public cannot be overridden by
private contracts, since members of the public are not parties to the contract. The court further
observed that the public policy demands adherence to statutory requirements, but it was also in
the public’s interest not to unduly restrict the freedom to contract. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601, ¶ 9.
In order to invalidate a contract provision on public policy grounds it must be “clearly contrary
to what the constitution, the statutes, or the decisions of the courts have declared to be the
public policy or unless it is manifestly injurious to the public welfare.” Reyes, 2013 IL 115601,
¶ 9 (citing Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois, 215 Ill. 2d at 129-30). Such a
determination depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Reyes, 2013 IL 115601,
¶ 9.
¶ 32 The court in Reyes held that under the plain and unambiguous language of section
7-317(b)(2), defendant, as the named insured, could not be excluded from coverage. Reyes,
2013 IL 115601, ¶ 13. The court rejected American Casualty’s argument that section 7-602 of
the Financial Responsibility Law allowed the exclusion of “ ‘any driver.’ ” The language of
section 7-602 permitted the exclusion of an owner or policy holder or insured “for other
vehicles, not the vehicle that is insured. This clause does not authorize a named driver
exclusion for the sole insured and owner of the vehicle.” (Emphasis in original.) Reyes, 2013
IL 115601, ¶ 17.
¶ 33 The court rejected American Casualty’s public policy argument that the exclusion allowed
individuals with high risk factors to obtain insurance at reasonable rates rather than operate a
vehicle with no insurance at all. The court found that the public policy was expressed in the
plain language of section 7-317(b)(2) and found that the interest in protecting the driving
public outweighed an individual’s desire to obtain a lower insurance premium. Reyes, 2013 IL
115601, ¶ 19 (citing Williams v. U.S. Agencies Casualty Insurance Co., 2000-1693, p. 6 (La.
2/21/01); 779 So.2d 729 (superseded by statute)).
¶ 34 In the present case, Mr. Evans’s vehicle was underinsured. The plaintiff sought to recover
for her injuries under her own automobile liability insurance policy, which provided the
underinsured motorist coverage mandated by section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code. Barnes
and its prodigy, together with Reyes, support the conclusion that a named driver exclusion in an
insured’s policy that bars liability, uninsured, or underinsured coverage for the named insured
violates Illinois’s mandatory insurance requirements and Illinois public policy. Therefore, the
named driver exclusion endorsement in the plaintiff’s automobile liability policies with State
Farm is not enforceable against the plaintiff, as the named insured.
-6-
¶ 35 CONCLUSION
¶ 36 We affirm the orders of the circuit court denying State Farm’s motion for summary
judgment and granting summary judgment to the plaintiff.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
-7-