Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. ( 2014 )


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  •                                     
    2014 IL App (1st) 133145
    FIFTH DIVISION
    May 23, 2014
    No. 1-13-3145
    CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON,                                     )
    Subscribing to Certificate No. CRCC001448,                                   )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                                                  )    Appeal from
    )    the Circuit Court
    v.                                                           )    of Cook County
    )
    CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,                                            )    12 CH 19785
    )
    Defendant-Appellee                                                    )    Honorable
    )    David B. Atkins,
    (Golden Nail Builders, Inc., Erik Electric Service, Inc., and Pawel          )    Judge Presiding
    Bowal,                                                                       )
    )
    Defendants).                                                          )
    JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Palmer concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1     General contractor Golden Nail Builders, Inc. (Builders), was the named insured on a
    commercial general liability insurance policy it obtained from Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
    London (Underwriters) and an additional insured on a commercial general liability insurance
    policy that subcontractor Erik Electric Service, Inc. (Erik Electric), obtained from Central Mutual
    Insurance Company (CMIC). When an employee of a sub-subcontractor was injured on a home
    construction site, the two insurers disagreed as to which was the primary insurer and which was the
    excess insurer. The disagreement arose because although Erik Electric was contractually required
    to maintain insurance coverage for Builders as an additional insured, the subcontractor agreement
    did not specify that the additional coverage be primary or excess. Underwriters filed this
    1-13-3145
    declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it was the excess insurer. However, on
    cross-motions for summary judgment, CMIC persuasively argued that the circumstances were
    nearly identical to those in River Village I LLC v. Central Insurance Cos., 
    396 Ill. App. 3d 480
    ,
    483, 
    919 N.E.2d 426
    , 428 (2009), in which the court determined the additional coverage at issue
    there was excess because (a) the agreement between the general contractor and subcontractor was
    silent as to whether the additional coverage obtained for the general contractor was to be primary
    or excess and (b) the "other insurance" clause in the subcontractor's insurance policy stated that
    coverage would be excess " 'unless a contract requires that this insurance be *** primary.' "
    Underwriters appeals, urging us to find that the controlling case is Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v.
    Oak Builders, Inc., 
    373 Ill. App. 3d 997
    , 
    869 N.E.2d 992
     (2007), in which the court found that two
    insurers were coprimary rather than primary and excess. Underwriters also contends CMIC is
    estopped from asserting policy defenses because it neither filed its own declaratory judgment
    action nor assumed Builders' legal defense, and that Underwriters is entitled to reimbursement of
    the funds it has expended on defending Builders.
    ¶2     Builders and Erik Electric are Chicago companies that entered into a subcontractor
    agreement on May 19, 2008. The agreement provided for subcontractor Erik Electric to "maintain
    coverage" for the duration of its project with contractor Builders, that the coverage limits of the
    liability insurance would be no less than $1 million, and that Builders "will be included as [an]
    Additional Insured." As we just noted above, the subcontractor agreement did not specify whether
    the additional insured coverage provided to Builders needed to be primary or excess insurance.
    Primary insurance coverage is coverage whereby, under the terms of the policy, liability attaches
    immediately upon the happening of an event that gives rise to liability. Whitehead v. Fleet Towing
    2
    1-13-3145
    Co., 
    110 Ill. App. 3d 759
    , 764, 
    442 N.E.2d 1362
    , 1366 (1982). A primary insurer provides " 'first
    dollar' " coverage up to the limits of its policy. Scott M. Seaman & Charlene Kittredge, Excess
    Liability Insurance: Law and Litigation, 
    32 Tort & Ins. L.J. 653
    , 655 (1997). In contrast with
    primary insurance, excess insurance coverage is a secondary layer which protects an insured when
    a judgment or settlement exceeds the primary policy’s limits of liability. Id. at 656. A secondary
    insurer covers the same risks as the primary insurer (id. at 657), but under the terms of an excess
    policy, the secondary insurer’s "liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary
    coverage has been exhausted" (Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 
    189 Ill. App. 3d 732
    , 738, 545 N.E.2d 2d 541, 545 (1989); 1 Eric Mills Holmes & Mark S. Rhodes,
    Holmes's Appleman on Insurance 2d §2.16, at 323 (1996)). Put another way, an excess policy does
    not broaden the underlying coverage, it increases the amount of coverage available to compensate
    for a loss. Excess insurance premiums are typically less expensive than primary insurance
    premiums because excess insurers experience less frequent claims and incur lower costs than
    primary insurers. See Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
    
    227 Ill. 2d 102
    , 116, 
    879 N.E.2d 305
    , 314 (2007); Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An
    Overview of General Principles and Current Issues, 
    24 Tort & Ins. L.J. 715
    , 718 (1989).
    ¶3     Erik Electric obtained a certificate of liability insurance from CMIC dated May 20, 2008,
    which stated on its face, "[Builders] is named as an additional insured as respects General
    Liability, as required by written contract." The certificate also stated that it was "issued as a matter
    of information only and confers no rights upon the certificate holder" and "does not amend, extend
    or alter the coverage afforded by the policies below."
    ¶4     Builders and Casagrande Architects were sued by electrician Pawel Bawol on August 18,
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    1-13-3145
    2010, and in a first amended complaint Bawol added Erik Electric as a defendant. Bawol alleged
    that he was severely injured due to the defendants' negligence on or about November 26, 2008,
    while he was in the employ of an electrical sub-subcontractor and assisting Builders with the
    construction of a single-family home at 1920 North Hudson Avenue, Chicago. Bawol alleged he
    was hurt when he fell from a ramp made of piled masonry debris that tradesmen were to use when
    entering or leaving through the front door of the house under construction.
    ¶5     Builders tendered its defense of Bawol's suit to Underwriters on September 13, 2010, and
    Underwriters accepted the defense subject to a reservation of rights. Builders' defense attorney
    then tendered Builders' defense to CMIC on May 18, 2011. On October 27, 2011, however,
    CMIC's claims adjustor responded to counsel, "I do not see where our insurance coverage is
    triggered in this situation. Why do you feel your [client, Builders,] would qualify as an additional
    insured under our policy?" After getting no response, the claims adjustor sent a similar letter on
    December 5, 2011, to the defense attorney, stating, "I have not heard from you regarding my letter
    to you of 10/27/11. For your convenience I have included a copy of that letter. I look forward to
    hearing from you in the future." After still not receiving a response, CMIC sent another letter on
    January 13, 2012, but this time advising that the lack of response led CMIC to conclude that the
    tender of defense was being withdrawn and, if this was not correct, to contact CMIC. Builders still
    did not respond to CMIC, and on February 28, 2012, CMIC again wrote to Builders, this time
    stating that it considered the "silence on this matter" to be a withdrawal of the tender of defense
    and also that CMIC was declining coverage based on CMIC's policy language. On April 13, 2012,
    Underwriters contacted CMIC for the first time and said that Builders did not intend to withdraw
    its tender and that it would write again after taking the time to research the coverage issues. On
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    1-13-3145
    April 19, 2012, Underwriters sent a detailed letter in which it "re-tender[ed]" Builders' defense and
    explained why it considered CMIC to be the primary insurer and liable for indemnifying
    Underwriters for opposing the Bawol suit. On May 10, 2012, CMIC declined the "re-tender."
    ¶6     Underwriters then initiated this declaratory judgment action, CMIC filed an answer which
    included affirmative defenses, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After
    briefing and oral arguments, the circuit court granted in part Underwriter's motion for summary
    judgment, based on the court's finding that CMIC owed additional insured coverage to Builders.
    The court also, however, granted in part CMIC's motion for summary judgment, based on the
    court's findings that the CMIC coverage was excess only based on the plain language of the
    policies and that CMIC was not estopped from asserting policy defenses due to the fact that the
    excess insurer had no duty to defend Builders and had timely rejected the tender and "re-tender"
    and defended against Underwriters' declaratory judgment action. This appeal followed.
    ¶7     The construction of an insurance policy and the determination of contractual rights are
    questions of law that are appropriately addressed through the summary judgment process.
    Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 
    359 Ill. App. 3d 749
    , 755, 
    835 N.E.2d 890
    , 896
    (2005). While the entry of summary judgment is considered a "drastic measure," it is a proper and
    expeditious means of disposing of a lawsuit when the moving party's right to judgment is "clear
    and free from doubt" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Outboard
    Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 
    154 Ill. 2d 90
    , 102, 
    607 N.E.2d 1204
    , 1209 (1992);
    735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2008) (the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of
    summary judgment only where the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"). We review de novo the
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    1-13-3145
    trial judge's entry of summary judgment. Outboard Marine, 
    154 Ill. 2d at 102
    , 
    607 N.E.2d at 1209
    .
    ¶8     If the words used in an insurance contract, when given their plain and ordinary meaning,
    are unambiguous, then we apply the terms of the policy as written. CMK Development Corp. v.
    West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 
    395 Ill. App. 3d 830
    , 837-38, 
    917 N.E.2d 1155
    , 1162 (2009).
    When construing insurance contracts, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the contracting
    parties' intentions as expressed in the agreement or agreements they signed. CMK Development,
    395 Ill. App. 3d at 837-38, 
    917 N.E.2d at 1162
    .
    ¶9     "Other insurance" clauses came about in response to the targeted tender doctrine. River
    Village, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 487, 
    919 N.E.2d at 431
    .
    "The targeted tender doctrine allows an insured who is covered by multiple
    and concurrent [primary] insurance policies to select, or 'target,' which insurer
    he wants to defend and indemnify him regarding a specific claim. [Citation.]
    The insured essentially can choose which insurer among his several
    co-insurers will participate in the claim against him; he can elect one insurer
    over another, or, even deactivate coverage with an insurer he previously
    selected in order to invoke exclusive coverage with another. [Citations.] This
    allows an insured who has paid for multiple [forms of] coverage to protect his
    interests, namely, keeping future premiums low, optimizing loss history and
    preventing policy cancellation among the insurers he chooses. [Citation.]
    In an effort to override this right of the insured to choose among
    co-insurers, insurers developed 'other insurance' excess provisions in their
    policies. These provisions attempt to render otherwise primary insurance as
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    1-13-3145
    excess over any other collectible insurance, most often with statements in the
    policy that declare the insurer's coverage to be excess over any other valid and
    collectible insurance available to the insured. [Citation.] In such instances, the
    'other insurance' excess provision requires the insured to exhaust the policy
    limits of the other co-insurers before being able to trigger a defense and
    indemnification duty in that insurer. [Citation.]" River Village, 396 Ill. App.
    3d at 486-87, 
    919 N.E.2d at 431
    .
    ¶ 10   The contract between Underwriters and Builders indicates the insurance coverage is
    primary unless there is other primary insurance available to Builders. Section IV of the
    Underwriters contract, which is entitled "Commercial General Liability Conditions," states in
    pertinent part:
    "4. Other Insurance
    If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a
    loss *** our obligations are limited as follows:
    a. Primary Insurance
    This insurance is primary except when b. below applies. ***
    b. Excess Insurance
    This insurance is excess over:
    ***
    (2) Any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for
    damages arising out of the premises or operations, or the products and
    completed operations, for which you have been added as an additional
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    1-13-3145
    insured by attachment of an endorsement."
    ¶ 11   The CMIC policy also includes an "other insurance" clause. According to the "General
    Liability Plus Endorsement" to the CMIC policy:
    "[The CMIC coverage to an additional insured] is excess over:
    Any other valid and collectible insurance available to the additional insured
    whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis unless a contract
    specifically requires that this insurance be either primary or primary and
    noncontributing. Where required by contract, we will consider any other
    insurance maintained by the additional insured for injury or damage covered
    by this endorsement to be excess and noncontributing with the insurance."
    This CMIC policy language is reiterated in an amendment, which states:
    "Any coverage provided hereunder shall be excess over any other valid
    and collectible insurance available to the additional insured whether primary,
    excess, contingent or on any other basis unless a contract specifically requires
    that this insurance be either primary or primary and noncontributing. Where
    required by contract, we will consider any other insurance maintained by the
    additional insured for injury or damage covered by this endorsement to be
    excess and noncontributing with the insurance."
    ¶ 12   Summarizing these clauses: (1) the Underwriters' policy plainly states that Underwriters is
    the primary insurer, but if other primary insurance is available, then the Underwriters coverage
    will become excess, and (2) the CMIC policy plainly states that CMIC is the excess insurer unless
    a condition precedent is met: there is a contract requiring CMIC to be the primary insurer.
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    1-13-3145
    Accordingly, we next look to whether CMIC is "required by contract" to be primary. The
    subcontractor agreement between Builders and Erik Electric is undisputedly silent as to whether
    the coverage provided to Builders as an additional insured will be primary or excess insurance.
    Also, the CMIC certificate of liability insurance that identified Builders as an additional insured
    gives no indication as to whether that coverage is primary or excess.
    ¶ 13   In River Village, the court considered the same two clauses we have quoted above and the
    same circumstances, that is, where a subcontractor was contractually required to obtain additional
    insured coverage for a general contractor but the parties' contract did not spell out whether that
    coverage had to be primary or excess. River Village, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 482, 
    919 N.E.2d at 428
    . In
    that case, the court concluded that the condition precedent language that appears in the CMIC
    policy, namely, there must be a contract dictating that the additional insurance will be primary, did
    not exist and that the additional coverage defaulted to being excess only. River Village, 396 Ill.
    App. 3d at 491, 
    919 N.E.2d at 435
    .
    ¶ 14   Consistent with this opinion, we conclude that the clear and unambiguous condition
    precedent language in the CMIC policy was not satisfied and that the CMIC policy provides only
    excess coverage to Builders for the Bawol lawsuit. We also find it clear and unambiguous that
    Underwriters agreed to provide primary coverage in all instances except where it is shown that
    other primary coverage is available and that because there is no other primary insurance available,
    Underwriters is the primary insurer to Builders.
    ¶ 15   Underwriters argues River Village is distinguishable because that primary insurer did not
    provide its insurance policy for the court's review. This does not, however, change the fact that the
    River Village court analyzed the same policy language at issue here (the "other insurance" clause
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    1-13-3145
    in the subcontractor's policy) and held that because the subcontractor agreement did not
    specifically require that the CMIC coverage be primary, that the condition precedent to primary
    coverage was not met. River Village, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 491, 
    919 N.E.2d at 435
    .
    ¶ 16   Underwriters argues that Oak Builders, 
    373 Ill. App. 3d 997
    , 
    869 N.E.2d 992
    , is dispositive
    of the main issue in this case because the two policies there contain the same "other insurance"
    clauses that are in the CMIC and Underwriters policies and, as a consequence, the trial court
    should have concluded that the CMIC and Underwriters policies are incompatible and therefore
    cancel each other out, rendering the insurers coprimary. We disagree with this conclusion. In Oak
    Builders, the court quoted but did not analyze the condition precedent language, operated from the
    presumption that the general contractor's insurer was a primary insurer, and then analyzed whether
    the other insurer was a coprimary or excess insurer. Oak Builders, 
    373 Ill. App. 3d 997
    , 
    869 N.E.2d 992
    . Here, the condition precedent language in the CMIC policy is pivotal in determining
    which of the two insurers is primary and which is excess, we have no grounds for presuming that
    either insurer is primary, and nothing in the subcontractor agreement or either insurance policy
    suggests that a coprimary arrangement is the appropriate conclusion to draw in this instance.
    ¶ 17   The Oak Builders court found that because both policies contained "other insurance"
    clauses that converted otherwise primary coverage into excess coverage whenever primary
    coverage was available, the clauses were irreconcilable and that the insurers should share the cost
    of defending and indemnifying the underlying tort suit. Oak Builders, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1004, 869
    N.E.2d at 997. One reason the court determined the "other insurance" clauses were irreconcilable
    was that the facts of that case led to a different result depending upon which policy was read first.
    Oak Builders, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1003, 869 N.E.2d at 996-97. The majority rule for resolving
    10
    1-13-3145
    "other insurance" disputes is that these provisions should be reconciled whenever possible in order
    to effectuate the intent of the parties, but that the court cannot arbitrarily pick one policy to be read
    first and undermine the intention of the insurer whose policy is read second. Oak Builders, 373 Ill.
    App. 3d at 1001, 869 N.E.2d at 995 (citing Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 
    48 Ill. 2d 71
    ,
    78-79, 
    269 N.E.2d 97
    , 100-101 (1970) (deeming identical "other insurance" clauses to be
    incompatible is fair when there is no rational basis for applying the clause of one policy and
    refusing to apply the clause of the other policy)). It is unclear from the Oak Builders opinion why
    the court presumed the general contractor's insurer was primary coverage and that the issue before
    the court was whether the subcontractor's additional insured endorsement rendered it coprimary
    coverage or excess coverage. Oak Builders, 
    373 Ill. App. 3d 997
    , 
    869 N.E.2d 992
    . But here, the
    two "other insurance" provisions can be easily reconciled regardless of which policy is read first.
    Above, we set out the terms of the plaintiff's policy (Underwriters) before setting out the
    defendant's policy (CMIC), but the order makes no difference and does not change the contracting
    parties' words and apparent intent. The two policies are compatible primary and excess policies. It
    would be arbitrary and unfair to disregard the condition precedent in the CMIC contract, follow
    Oak Builders, and conclude that the two insurers are co-primary. Oak Builders, 
    373 Ill. App. 3d 997
    , 
    869 N.E.2d 992
    . We find the reasoning in River Village to be thorough, persuasive, and on
    point, and we chose to follow that precedent.
    ¶ 18    For these reasons, we reject appellant Underwriters' main appellate contention that the trial
    court erred in following River Village instead of Oak Builders and erred in concluding that the
    subcontractor's insurer, CMIC, provided excess coverage only.
    ¶ 19    Our next consideration is whether CMIC is estopped from asserting any policy defenses to
    11
    1-13-3145
    coverage because it neither defended Builders in the Bawol tort suit under a reservation of rights
    nor timely filed a declaratory judgment action for an adjudication of its obligations to Builders.
    Underwriters argues that CMIC was "sitting on the sidelines and doing nothing" while the
    underlying tort suit was underway.
    ¶ 20   The estoppel doctrine arose from the principle that an insurer's duty to defend its insured
    "is so fundamental an obligation that a breach of that duty constitutes a repudiation of the
    [insurance] contract." Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 
    186 Ill. 2d 127
    ,
    151, 
    708 N.E.2d 1122
    , 1135 (1999). An insurer's duties under an insurance agreement are
    ordinarily triggered when the insured or someone acting on behalf of the insured tenders the
    defense of an action that is potentially within the scope of coverage. See, e.g., Alcan United, Inc. v.
    West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 
    303 Ill. App. 3d 72
    , 75, 
    707 N.E.2d 687
    , 689 (1999) (in which
    tenders were made by insurance broker and third-party claims adjustor). When an insurer
    determines that an underlying suit potentially implicating coverage is not covered under the policy
    that includes a duty to defend, the insurer may not simply refuse to defend the insured. Employers
    Insurance, 
    186 Ill. 2d at 150
    , 
    708 N.E.2d at 1134-35
    . Instead of "sitting on the sidelines" as
    Underwriters argues occurred here, the insurer must act on one of two options. The insurer must
    either defend the suit under a reservation of rights or seek a declaratory judgment that there is no
    coverage. Employers Insurance, 
    186 Ill. 2d at 150
    , 
    708 N.E.2d at 1134-35
    . If the insurer fails to
    take one of these two steps "and is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage, [then] the
    insurer is estopped from raising policy defenses to coverage." (Emphasis added.) Employers
    Insurance, 
    186 Ill. 2d at 150-51
    , 
    708 N.E.2d at 1134-35
    . "An insurer cannot safely or justifiably
    refuse to defend an action against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that
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    1-13-3145
    the claim is beyond the policy's12q a coverage." Korte Construction Co. v. American States
    Insurance, 
    322 Ill. App. 3d 451
    , 457, 
    750 N.E.2d 764
    , 769 (2001).
    ¶ 21   Consistent with these legal principles, we make two findings. First, the estoppel doctrine is
    not relevant here where the CMIC coverage was excess only and did not obligate CMIC to defend
    the Bawol suit. CMIC's policy provided, "When this insurance is excess, we will have no duty to
    defend the insured against any 'suit' if any other insurer has a duty to defend the insured against
    that 'suit.' " Thus, the principle that Underwriters is relying upon is not applicable to the facts of
    this case. CMIC did not breach a duty to defend and is not estopped from asserting policy defenses
    to coverage.
    ¶ 22   Our second finding is based on a record that indicates CMIC was not just "sitting on the
    sidelines and doing nothing" as the Bawol suit progressed. The record indicates that the Bawol
    defense was tendered to CMIC on May 18, 2011, and that CMIC responded with three letters,
    dated October 27, 2011, December 5, 2011, and January 13, 2012, in which it attempted to
    investigate the coverage question, but Builders' attorney did not respond to the three inquiries. On
    February 28, 2012, CMIC sent a letter to Builders' attorney stating that the lack of a response was
    being construed as a withdrawal of the defense tender to CMIC (and also that the claim did not
    come within the scope of CMIC coverage). After this, a third party employed by Underwriters
    reviewed the file and wrote to CMIC on April13, 2012, stating that Builders did not intend for its
    silence to be construed as a withdrawal of the tender. Builders then changed attorneys and on April
    19, 2012, Builders' new lawyer "re-tender[ed]" the defense to CMIC. Very shortly afterward, on
    May 10, 2012, CMIC denied the "re-tender," and very shortly after that, on May 20, 2012,
    Underwriter initiated the present coverage suit. Underwriters named CMIC as a party to this
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    1-13-3145
    declaratory judgment action. CMIC filed an answer and affirmative defenses seeking a favorable
    declaratory judgment, and ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
    CMIC's coverage position. Accordingly, our second finding is that CMIC timely sought a
    declaratory judgment regarding its contractual obligation to Builders when CMIC filed an answer
    and affirmative defenses seeking a declaration in CMIC's favor. It was not necessary for CMIC to
    initiate a separate declaratory judgment action. Ayers v. Bituminous Insurance Co., 
    100 Ill. App. 3d 33
    , 35, 
    424 N.E.2d 1316
    , 1318 (1981) (indicating an insurer sought a favorable declaratory
    judgment by filing an answer to the insured's declaratory judgment action and a third party
    complaint against the plaintiff in the personal injury action, and that by doing so the insurer had
    discharged its duty to pursue judicial declaration of its rights under the policy).When an insurer's
    unreasonable delay, however, forces an insured to institute litigation to determine their rights and
    duties under the insurance contract, merely filing an answer will not stave off the estoppel
    doctrine. Korte Construction, 
    322 Ill. App. 3d at 458
    , 
    750 N.E.2d at 767-68
     (affirming application
    of the estoppel doctrine and the entry of statutory penalties for unreasonable and vexatious claim
    handling where an insured repeatedly asked the insured to provide a defense, but the insurer
    repeatedly refused, "abandoned its insured," "did absolutely nothing," and "wait[ed] for the
    insured to institute litigation"). Nonetheless, the estoppel doctrine is not meant to provoke "a race
    to the courthouse" and the insured should not be able to estop the insurer from asserting policy
    defenses merely because the insured was the first to the courthouse with a complaint for
    declaratory judgment. Korte Construction, 
    322 Ill. App. 3d at 458
    , 
    750 N.E.2d at 769-70
     ("[w]hile
    there need not be a race to the courthouse," and the insured does not trigger estoppel merely by
    filing first, the insured must take action within a reasonable time of a demand by the insured).
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    1-13-3145
    After reviewing the parties' conduct in light of these principles, we find that even if CMIC had a
    duty to defend, CMIC did not breach that duty because CMIC timely sought a judicial declaration
    of its duties. Underwriters' reliance on the estoppel doctrine is misplaced.
    ¶ 23    For the reasons discussed above, we reject Underwriters' arguments for reversal. We
    conclude that CMIC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that it is an excess insurer only and
    that it is not estopped from asserting policy defenses to coverage for Builders. The judgment of the
    circuit court is affirmed.
    ¶ 24    Affirmed.
    15