People v. Byrd , 2023 IL App (1st) 220570-U ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (1st) 220570-UNo. 1-22-0570
Order filed June 28, 2023
Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 18 CR 10809 (01)
)
CORTEZ BYRD, ) Honorable
) Timothy J. Joyce,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a
felon over his contention that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Cortez Byrd was found guilty of multiple unlawful use
or possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) offenses, violation of the Firearm Owners
Identification Card Act (FOID Act), and possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The court
merged the counts into one count of UUWF (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)) and sentenced
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defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had constructive possession of a firearm discovered by officers
under the floorboards of a residence because the State did not establish that he knew about the
weapon or lived in the residence. We affirm.
¶3 During the execution of a search warrant, police recovered firearms, ammunition, and
cannabis from a home where defendant and his brother, Corey Byrd, were present.1 Premised on
the items police recovered from the second floor attic of the residence, defendant was charged with
nine counts of UUWF predicated on his possession of five different firearms and four types of
ammunition, one count of possession of a stolen firearm, one count of violation of the FOID Act,
and one count of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. Corey was charged with offenses
arising from the items police recovered from the basement of the residence. Defendant and Corey
were tried in a joint bench trial.
¶4 Chicago police officer Cesar Guerrero testified that around 7:30 a.m. on June 27, 2018, he
helped execute a search warrant on a single-family residence on the 8700 block of South Ada
Street in Chicago (Ada residence). Guerrero entered the home and went directly to the basement,
where he saw Corey with a woman and detained them. In the basement, Guerrero recovered a
black nylon rifle case containing an AR-15 assault rifle, an empty magazine and another that
contained live ammunition, and a tripod attachment for the rifle. Another officer, Officer Hardy,
recovered multiple boxes of .223-caliber rifle rounds in the basement.
1
As Corey Byrd shares the same last name as defendant, we will refer to Corey by his first name.
Corey is not a party to this appeal.
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¶5 On cross-examination, Guerrero stated that the residence had a basement, a first floor, and
an attic. 2 Guerrero did not see defendant or Corey engaged in narcotics activity. The case for the
assault rifle had no indicia of ownership and was found inside a wall in a storage room. Guerrero
did not know when it was placed there or by whom. Hardy found the boxes of ammunition on a
shelf in the same storage room. The ammunition also lacked identifying information, and Guerrero
did not see who placed it there. Guerrero did not recover proof of residency for defendant or Corey
from the basement. None of the items recovered from the basement yielded fingerprints.
¶6 On examination by the court, Guerrero testified that the officers recovered 38 boxes of rifle
rounds each containing 20 bullets. The ammunition fit the rifle recovered in the basement.
¶7 Chicago police officer Francisco Gonzalez testified that he recovered a loaded blue steel
semiautomatic handgun from a nightstand next to the bed in a first-floor bedroom of the residence.
¶8 On cross-examination, Gonzalez stated that a man opened the door to the residence when
the officers arrived. Gonzalez did not see defendant or Corey entering or exiting the bedroom.
Gonzalez did not know who placed the firearm on the nightstand, and the firearm did not have any
indicia of ownership or fingerprints. Gonzalez did not recover any items with defendant’s or
Corey’s names from the bedroom.
¶9 Chicago police detective Daniel Fava testified that he searched the upstairs of the residence
while executing the search warrant. The second floor had a common area with a bedsheet or curtain
in front of a connected bedroom. A second bedroom was connected to the first bedroom, and only
accessible through it. A third room, situated at the front of the second floor but only accessible
through the second bedroom, resembled a “very small” closet. During Fava’s testimony, he
2
Throughout the report of proceedings, the attic is also referred to as the second floor.
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discussed several photographs of the residence that were published, included in the record on
appeal, and reviewed by this court.
¶ 10 Fava observed defendant, whom he identified in court, walking from the second upstairs
bedroom. After defendant was detained, Fava cleared the rest of the upstairs; no one else was
present. In the “front area,” situated past the second bedroom, Fava observed a “false
compartment” in the floor. A photograph of the front area depicts a room with green carpeting and
a wooden box on the floor.
¶ 11 In the first bedroom, Fava observed a small, knotted bag containing pills, later determined
to be Oxycodone, and cannabis in plain view on a nightstand. In the closet of the first bedroom,
Fava peeled back the carpet and discovered another false compartment with knotted bags of
cannabis. Also in the first bedroom, Fava discovered a third hidden compartment underneath a
loose floorboard; it held two Glock semiautomatic pistols with extended magazines and more
cannabis. One pistol contained 9-millimeter rounds. The other pistol, which contained .45-caliber
rounds, had its serial number defaced. Fava also discovered “a significant amount of ammunition”
in boxes and magazines in the same compartment. Photographs depict the first bedroom and closet,
each with a rectangular hole cut in the floor with a wooden “lid,” and the contents of the
compartments. The photograph of the wooden compartment in the closet shows several knotted
bags inside. The photograph of the wooden compartment in the bedroom shows a firearm, clear
plastic bag containing a green substance, and a blue tote bag inside. A closeup photograph of the
blue tote bag shows that it contains another firearm and multiple boxes of ammunition.
¶ 12 In the second bedroom, beneath the carpet under a TV stand, Fava observed a fourth hidden
compartment with three more loaded firearms and ammunition. Photographs depict the second
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bedroom with a bed, TV stand, and rectangular wooden compartment in the floor underneath the
TV stand. The compartment contained three firearms, firearm magazines, and two plastic bags
containing multiple boxes of ammunition.
¶ 13 Fava further testified that another officer recovered a “gun offender hard card registration”
form for defendant in the front room. Fava identified photographs of the document, which are
included in the record on appeal and have been viewed by this court. The form, titled “Gun
Offender Registration Notification,” contains defendant’s name and date of birth, lists his address
as the Ada residence, and is dated December 18, 2017. The Criminal Registrants Notification of
Requirements discovered with the registration notification is dated December 26, 2017, and lists
defendant’s name, date of birth, and signature, but states that defendant was not registered because
he had “no proof of residency,” A third document, titled Witness Information Form-Preliminary
Parole Revocation Hearing, lists defendant’s name and Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
number, and is dated December 18, 2017.
¶ 14 On cross-examination, Fava stated that, during the search, other people were in the
residence besides defendant and Corey, but he did not recall how many were present. Fava first
saw defendant emerge from behind a curtain across the door leading into the second bedroom from
the first bedroom. Fava did not see defendant attempt to conceal or discard anything. No
contraband was recovered from defendant’s person. The recovered contraband, including firearms,
ammunition, and drugs, had no identifiers of ownership or proof of residency.
¶ 15 Chicago police officer Xavier Chism testified that defendant was arrested and Mirandized.
Defendant subsequently stated “[t]hat all of the guns weren’t his.” On cross-examination, Chism
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stated that he authored the arrest report, and agreed that it stated defendant was Mirandized, but
he did not write that defendant said that “all of the guns weren’t his.”
¶ 16 On redirect examination, Chism testified that the arrest report was a preliminary report,
and the case report, generated afterward, is more detailed. According to Chism, the case report
describes his conversation with defendant and his statement about the weapons. On recross
examination, Chism agreed that he did not recall defendant “making admissions to whether [he]
owned the weapons or not.”
¶ 17 The State introduced a stipulation that defendant did not have a valid Firearm Owner’s
Identification (FOID) card and was not eligible for one. At the time of the search, defendant had a
prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). The recovered firearms were
not submitted for fingerprint analysis. The State also introduced a stipulation that forensic scientist
Adrienne Hirsch would testify that she analyzed three items inventoried in the case and determined
they tested positive for 201, 448.5, and 14.8 grams of cannabis.
¶ 18 The court granted defense counsel’s motion for a directed finding regarding defendant’s
charge for possession of a stolen firearm.
¶ 19 In closing, defense counsel argued that the State did not establish that defendant had
exclusive control over the contraband recovered from the second floor, since none of the items had
identifying information and the only alleged proof of his residency was over six months old.
Further, defense counsel asserted that defendant’s statement about “all the guns” constituted a
denial and not an admission.
¶ 20 The court found defendant guilty of all UUWF counts, violation of the FOID Act, and
possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. In ruling, the court noted that the officers were
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credible regarding the discovery of the items and the statement defendant made after he was
Mirandized, which the court characterized as “at least all the guns weren’t mine.” The court found
that this statement, together with the numerous firearms and the “gun offender notification card”
discovered on the second floor, where defendant was found alone, established his knowledge and
control over the items. The court commented that while the document was dated six months before
the date of the search, the judge’s own driver’s license had been issued several years previously
and was still proof of residency. Considering that defendant was observed exiting a bedroom near
the location of firearms and proof of residency, the court rejected defense counsel’s position that
defendant’s statement that “all the guns aren’t mine” was “essentially not an admission that any of
those guns are mine.” Rather, the court construed defendant’s statement as “claiming he does not
own all those guns.” The court noted, moreover, that “ownership is not synonymous with
possession,” which, instead, “relates to knowledge and control.” The court similarly found that
defendant had knowledge and control over the cannabis discovered with the firearms.
¶ 21 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. At a hearing, defense counsel argued that officers observed defendant
emerge from an upstairs “back room,” but one of the three upstairs rooms had no contraband.
Further, the State did not present defendant’s current proof of residency. The court denied the
motion, commenting that it interpreted defendant’s statement that “[n]ot all those guns are mine”
as “some one or some number of guns are mine although not all of them are mine.”
¶ 22 After a hearing, the court imposed seven years’ imprisonment on the UUWF count
predicated on knowingly possessing a 9-millimeter handgun after having been convicted of
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AUUW. 3 Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence. He timely appealed.
¶ 23 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he constructively possessed
a firearm, because it did not establish that he resided at the Ada residence or knew that a firearm
had been hidden beneath the floorboards.
¶ 24 The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. The trier of fact resolves conflicts in the
testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. Accordingly, this court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Id.¶ 25 In weighing the evidence “the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which
flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations
consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. A reviewing court must allow all reasonable
inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution (People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280
(2004)) and will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is “unreasonable, improbable, or so
unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt” (People v. Jackson, 232 Ill.
2d 246, 281 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3
The trial court did not address the merger of counts at the sentencing hearing, but the mittimus
includes a notation stating, “ALL OTHER COUNTS MERGE.” Similarly, the court’s “order entered”
disposition sheet includes a notation stating, “All other cts to merge.”
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¶ 26 To sustain defendant’s conviction for UUWF as charged, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. 720 ILCS
5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). Defendant only contests whether the State proved he possessed a firearm.
¶ 27 Possession of contraband may be actual or constructive. People v. McCurine, 2019 IL App
(1st) 160817, ¶ 21. Actual possession is proved where the evidence shows the defendant “exercised
some form of dominion” over the item, “such as trying to conceal it or throwing it away.” People
v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788 (2010). Where, as here, there is no actual possession, the State
may establish constructive possession where the defendant (1) had knowledge of the presence of
the contraband and (2) exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where it was found.
McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817, ¶ 22. “Because possession is often difficult to prove directly,
proving possession frequently rests upon circumstantial evidence.” Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 788.
¶ 28 “Knowledge may be shown by evidence of a defendant’s acts, declarations, or conduct
from which it can be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found.”
People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Habitation in the premises where the
contraband was discovered is sufficient evidence of control to establish constructive possession.
People v. Cunningham, 309 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828 (1999). “Where there is no evidence that the
defendant controls the premises, proof of mere presence, even combined with [the] defendant’s
knowledge of the presence of [contraband], will not support a finding of constructive possession
unless there is other circumstantial evidence of defendant’s control over the contraband.” People
v. Tates, 2016 IL App (1st) 140619, ¶ 20. Constructive possession is not diminished by other
individuals’ access to the contraband. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 338 (2010). When the
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relationship of other individuals to the contraband is sufficiently close to constitute possession,
possession over the contraband may be joint. People v. Ingram, 389 Ill. App. 3d 897, 901 (2009).
¶ 29 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and allowing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant constructively possessed a firearm. Officers discovered five firearms, including a 9-
millimeter Glock pistol, hidden on the second floor of the Ada residence, where defendant was
present and alone. Further, defendant’s “Gun Offender Registration Notification” form, which
listed his address as the location of the search, was discovered in the same general area. Lastly,
defendant told Chism “[t]hat all of the guns weren’t his.” This evidence, taken together, was
sufficient to establish that defendant constructively possessed a firearm. See McCurine, 2019 IL
App (1st) 160817, ¶ 22.
¶ 30 Defendant nevertheless contends that the State did not establish that he exercised
immediate and exclusive control over the area where the firearms were discovered. Defendant
argues that the officers thoroughly searched the entire house, and only discovered one item with
defendant’s name and the address for the residence “left like trash somewhere in a small attic
room” that did not have firearms hidden in it. He points out that the State did not present any
evidence that the residence contained any identification for or photographs of defendant or keys
belonging to him, and that at least three other individuals were present in the residence. Defendant
also contends that the firearms were hidden, and the court misinterpreted his statement to police,
and so the State did not establish that he had knowledge of the firearms.
¶ 31 We disagree. First, the totality of the circumstances establish that defendant had knowledge
of the firearms where they had been concealed. Defendant informed Chism “[t]hat all of the guns
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weren’t his.” The court found Chism’s testimony credible and made the reasonable inference that
defendant meant that at least some of the firearms were his. Defendant contends that he intended
to tell Chism that the recovered firearms did not belong to him and, therefore, the court
misconstrued the statement. We find the court’s interpretation of the statement to be a reasonable
inference from the evidence and will not seek out alternative explanations consistent with
defendant’s innocence. See Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. As defendant expressed knowledge
of the firearms which had been hidden throughout the second floor of the residence, this element
of constructive possession is satisfied. See Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17.
¶ 32 Additionally, the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant had control over the
firearms. During the search of the Ada residence, an officer discovered defendant’s “gun offender
hard card registration” form in the same general area as where the firearms were discovered and
defendant was discovered alone, at 7:30 in the morning, emerging from a bedroom. The form lists
his address as the Ada residence.
¶ 33 Defendant contends that the document does not establish his residency, and therefore
control, because it was six months old and had been “discarded like trash” where the officers
discovered it. See People v. Ray, 232 Ill. App. 3d 459, 462-63 (1992) (finding that a six-month-
old cable television bill was not sufficient evidence to link the defendants to the residence to
establish the control element of constructive possession). However, even accepting defendant’s
contention that the form alone is insufficient proof of residence, the State established that
defendant intended to control at least some of the firearms, as he informed the officers that all the
firearms were not his. As explained, the court’s interpretation of this statement to mean that some
of the recovered firearms “were his,” is reasonable. All of the firearms discovered upstairs had
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been hidden in secret compartments. It is a reasonable inference that defendant hid, or was
complicit in hiding, at least some of them. See People v. McLaurin, 331 Ill. App. 3d 498, 501
(2002) (hiding items of contraband “to avoid detection indicates an intent to exercise control over
them.”). As the State presented sufficient evidence showing defendant’s knowledge and control
over the firearms, the evidence was not “unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to
justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson,
232 Ill. 2d at 281.
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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