People v. Zamora-Quinonos , 2023 IL App (3d) 210455-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 210455-UOrder filed
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
) Kankakee County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0455
v. ) Circuit No. 17-CF-710
)
) Honorable
RAUL ZAMORA-QUINONOS, ) Clark E. Erickson and
) William S. Dickenson,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Albrecht and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
¶2 Defendant, Raul Zamora-Quinonos, appeals his convictions, arguing that the Kankakee
County circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On December 15, 2017, the State charged defendant with three counts of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(C), (D),
(a)(1)(B) (West 2016)), unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver (720 ILCS
646/55(a)(2)(E) (West 2016)), and aggravated unlawful possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver (id. § 55(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(D)). On July 26, 2018, defense counsel filed a motion to
suppress evidence, arguing that the police manufactured exigent circumstances to search
defendant’s car and coat without probable cause.
¶5 On February 7, 2019, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the motion to suppress.
Kankakee County Detective Earl Corbett testified that on November 30, 2017, he assisted the Drug
Enforcement Agency by conducting surveillance of a residence and persons leaving that residence
during an investigation. Corbett was instructed to look for a Hispanic male in possession of a large
sum of money. At approximately 1 p.m., Corbett was notified that two Hispanic males exited the
surveilled residence. One individual entered a car and the other entered a truck. The individual that
entered the car “was carrying a jacket in *** his arm.” The car left the residence first and the truck
followed. Corbett was notified that the car did not yield at a stop sign and was instructed to conduct
a traffic stop. Corbett stopped the car while it was waiting to turn left at an intersection. Corbett
was familiar with the area surrounding the intersection. Corbett approached the driver, which was
later determined to be defendant, and requested his driver’s license and proof of insurance.
Defendant provided a Mexican driver’s license. While in the car, defendant did not make any
furtive or suspicious actions and Corbett did not observe any contraband from outside the car.
After defendant exited the car, Corbett observed the truck driving toward them at a high rate of
speed with officers in pursuit. Officers moved defendant to the front of the car to avoid the
“erratic[ly]” driving truck. The “commotion” and the dismissal of two schools had halted traffic.
In the interest of safety, officers moved the investigation across the street to an empty parking lot.
Defendant was not under arrest but was not free to leave due to his traffic violation. An officer
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transported defendant in a police van and Corbett drove defendant’s car. Corbett did not have
consent or a warrant to enter the car. Corbett did not search or “pat anything down while inside”
the car and only touched “[t]he steering wheel” and “gearshift.” Once across the street, officers
removed defendant from the van and continued the investigation. Defendant was not wearing a
jacket. Corbett recalled that the weather was cold enough to wear a jacket and use heat in his car.
Corbett observed that defendant was “really shaking” from being either “really cold or really
nervous.” At this time, Corbett saw a jacket on the passenger seat of defendant’s car that he did
not notice earlier. When Corbett asked defendant if he would like his jacket, defendant responded
“yes.” Corbett retrieved defendant’s jacket from the seat and “felt a large object under *** the
jacket,” which he described as “a heavy something in the coat.” When Corbett picked the jacket
up, the object “fell out on the seat.” Corbett had not touched or held the jacket previously. Corbett
denied reaching “in a pocket inside the coat” and discovering the narcotics as indicated by a report
completed by another officer. Corbett did not write a report. Corbett did not have consent or a
warrant to search the jacket. The parties stipulated that the substance from the jacket was suspected
narcotics that led to the discovery of drugs at the surveilled residence. Corbett’s unmarked squad
car was not equipped with dash camera video and no recording of the stop was made.
¶6 On cross-examination, Corbett clarified that he was in communication with other officers
who informed him that defendant left the residence at approximately 1:36 p.m. and had
subsequently committed a traffic violation. Corbett located defendant’s car and stopped him in the
left turn lane of a multi-lane intersection stoplight. There remained a second lane to continue
straight or turn right. “[S]imultaneously,” while officers confirmed defendant’s Mexico driver’s
license information, Corbett observed the truck traveling “at a high [rate] of speed” toward them.
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When Corbett asked if defendant would like his jacket, Corbett was still waiting for defendant’s
driver’s license and insurance information. Defendant did not testify.
¶7 The court denied defendant’s motion, finding that the evidence showed that the officers
properly stopped and detained him for a traffic violation. Soon after officers moved defendant to
a safer location, defendant “authorized” an officer to retrieve his jacket from the car, “and when
the [officer] did so there was a brick of heroin.” The court also found that the timeline of events
“happen[ed] rather quickly.” Therefore, the court reasoned that the stop was not unduly prolonged.
Separately, the court found that defendant’s removal from the van created less restrictive
circumstances as it related to defendant’s detention and that the officer could search defendant’s
jacket for weapons prior to giving the jacket to defendant via a Terry stop (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21-22 (1968)).
¶8 Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial in front of
a different judge, the court found defendant guilty of all charges. 1 Defendant filed a motion for a
new trial, claiming, in part, that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The court
reviewed the transcripts from the motion to suppress hearing and denied defendant’s motion.
Defendant appealed.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant argues the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence.
Specifically, defendant contends that officers manufactured exigent circumstances and unduly
prolonged the stop to (1) enter defendant’s car to move its location, and (2) enter the car a second
time to retrieve defendant’s jacket.
1
Defendant’s first bench trial ended in a mistrial due to the judge retiring before completing the
trial.
4
“ ‘On a motion to suppress, a defendant must make a prima facie case that
the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure.’ People v. Gipson, 203
Ill. 2d 298, 306-07 (2003). ‘Once the defendant makes out a prima facie case that
a seizure was unreasonable, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with
evidence to rebut.’ People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 21. The ultimate burden of
proof, however, remains with the defendant.” People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037,
¶ 27
¶ 11 We apply a two-part standard when reviewing a court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence. People v. Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 12. Under this standard, we give great deference to
and uphold the factual findings and witness credibility determinations of the circuit court unless
those findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231,
240 (2003). However, we review the ultimate legal question of whether suppression of evidence
is warranted de novo. Id.¶ 12 The federal and state constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Vehicle stops are subject to the fourth
amendment’s reasonableness requirement and are analyzed under the principles outlined in Terry,
392 U.S. at 21-22. Under Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory traffic stop
when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe “that the person has committed,
or is about to, commit a crime.” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2010).
¶ 13 At the outset we note that, for the first time on appeal, both parties support their arguments
with testimony elicited at trial that was not presented to the circuit court during the motion to
suppress hearing. “When reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we may
consider evidence both from the trial and the suppression hearing.” People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL
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123525, ¶ 61. We may use trial testimony to affirm the circuit court’s denial of a motion to
suppress. People v. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 36. However, this reasoning does not “ ‘appl[y]
equally when a defendant is asking us to rely upon trial evidence to reverse a trial court’s decision
on a pretrial suppression ruling.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 127-28 (1999)).
To the extent specific testimony was not presented at the hearing, we do not consider it in support
of defendant’s appeal. Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 14 A. Initial Entry
¶ 15 Defendant first contends that officers created exigent circumstances by stopping
defendant’s car in a manner that did not allow him to park his car safely, manufacturing an
opportunity to enter defendant’s car and conduct a search.
¶ 16 Here, officers reasonably stopped defendant’s car when it was already stopped in the left
turn lane of an intersection with another lane remaining open for traffic. Corbett decided to move
defendant’s car and the investigation to a safer location after the truck led a high-speed chase
directly past the investigation. This unforeseen occurrence, in combination with the two schools
letting out at the time of the stop, caused an unsafe environment for an investigation. See cf. People
v. Buffo, 202 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242 (1990). There was no evidence that Corbett used these events
as a ruse to move the investigation to a different location. While Corbett was familiar with the
area, it is unlikely that Corbett could have predicted that a high-speed chase would occur at the
same time as the schools letting out to manufacture an opportunity to enter defendant’s car.
¶ 17 We reject defendant’s assertion that we should “infer[ ] that Corbett *** had the
opportunity to at least pat down the coat to determine if it concealed weapons or contraband outside
the view of any witnesses,” and conclude that Corbett conducted an improper search, which
compelled Corbett to manufacture the second set of exigent circumstances. This conclusion is not
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supported by Corbett’s testimony where he specifically stated that he did not search or “pat
anything down while inside” the car, only touched “[t]he steering wheel” and “gearshift,” did not
notice the jacket until after he observed defendant shaking, and did not touch the jacket until he
retrieved it from the car. Defendant failed to present any evidence that the initial entry into
defendant’s car resulted in an improper search or the discovery of contraband. See cf. id. at 240-
42 (following defendant’s arrest, the officer entered defendant’s vehicle to move it to a legal
parking space and discovered a firearm by the gas pedal). Importantly, the court denied defendant’s
motion, implicitly finding Corbett’s testimony credible. See People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51
(the circuit court, as the finder of fact at a hearing, makes credibility determinations and weighs
the evidence). Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, we defer to the court’s credibility
determination as we cannot find the determination against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 240. The officer’s initial entry into defendant’s car was not an improper
search in violation of the fourth amendment.
¶ 18 B. Second Entry
¶ 19 Next, defendant contends that the officers contrived circumstances to enter defendant’s car
a second time. Specifically, he states that the officers removed defendant from the van and made
him “stand in the cold for an indeterminate time,” which led defendant to be “vulnerable to
consenting.” Defendant essentially argues that he was “under duress” when he answered he would
like his jacket from the car.
¶ 20 Consent to search must be voluntary, in that “ ‘the consentor must have been under no
duress or coercion, actual or implied, and the consent must have been unequivocal, specific, and
freely and intelligently given.’ ” People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, 586 (1992) (quoting
People v. Purchase, 214 Ill. App. 3d 152, 155 (1991)). “ ‘[T]o determine if in fact the consent to
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search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.’ ” People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d
194, 202 (2001) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973)).
¶ 21 Here, Corbett observed that defendant was cold and asked defendant if he wanted his
jacket. Defendant responded “yes,” indicating that Corbett could retrieve his jacket from the car.
If defendant did not want Corbett to retrieve his jacket, he easily could have responded “no.” The
court found credible Corbett’s testimony that he had not touched the jacket before retrieving it
from the car and that he did not reach into the pocket of the jacket. Supra ¶¶ 5, 17. Given the record
before us, we cannot say that the court’s credibility finding was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. See Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d at 240. Where the officer was credible, and in the absence of
evidence that circumstances leading to defendant’s removal from the police van were maliciously
manufactured, we find that the officer did not contrive a situation to coerce defendant to accept his
offer to retrieve defendant’s jacket. Therefore, the officer’s second entry into defendant’s car was
not an improper search in violation of the fourth amendment. 2
¶ 22 We reject defendant’s contention that defendant’s removal from the van created less
restrictive circumstances. First, we note that defendant failed to provide any support for his
contention that less restrictive circumstances is a factor to be considered in the analysis of consent.
See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 29. Second, even if we considered less
restrictive circumstances as a factor, we cannot say that, under these circumstances, leaving
defendant in the van would have created less restrictive circumstances than removing him.
2
Because “ ‘[t]he question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the
lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached,’ ” we may affirm
for any basis in the record. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101
(1994) (abrogated on other grounds by People v. Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d 353 (2006))). Therefore, we need not
address the court’s finding that the circumstances warranted a Terry search of defendant’s jacket when it
denied defendant’s motion.
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¶ 23 C. Length of Stop
¶ 24 Lastly, defendant argues that the officers unduly prolonged the stop. We find that the
evidence shows that the officers “acted diligently in pursuing their investigation” given the
circumstances. People v. Smith, 208 Ill. App. 3d 44, 50 (1991). A lawful seizure “can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.”
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (a
seizure remains lawful only so long as unrelated inquiries do not “measurably extend” the duration
of the stop). Here, defendant does not contest the propriety of the initial stop of his car. The
remaining testimony showed that, at the time of the high-speed chase and two schools letting out,
officers were in the process of confirming whether defendant had a valid license and insurance.
Moreover, defendant failed to meet his burden to show that officers improperly prolonged the
traffic stop by failing to present any evidence of the duration of the stop or a clear timeline of
events to support his claim. See Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 27. While there was no video
recording to either support or refute defendant’s contention, it was defendant’s burden to elicit
approximations for the duration of the stop, in whole and in part. That defendant became cold
during the stop, alone, is insufficient to show that the officers unduly prolonged the stop. Defendant
failed to show that the length of the stop was unreasonable under the circumstances, and thus, an
unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
¶ 25 Based on the foregoing, we find that the court properly denied the motion to suppress.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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