People v. Richmond ( 2023 )


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  •             NOTICE                 
    2023 IL App (4th) 230045-U
    This Order was filed under Su-
    FILED
    preme Court Rule 23 and is not           NO. 4-23-0045                          August 1, 2023
    precedent except in the limited                                                  Carla Bender
    circumstances allowed under                                                 4th District Appellate
    Rule 23(e)(1).
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT                          Court, IL
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
    v.                                                )      McLean County
    JARROD RK RICHMOND,                                          )      No. 21CF757
    Defendant-Appellant.                              )
    )      Honorable
    )      William G. Workman,
    )      Judge Presiding.
    JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
    Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1     Held: Defendant forfeited his contention the circuit court’s resentence was a
    punishment for his actions on probation, and his sentence was not excessive.
    ¶2              In August 2021, a grand jury indicted defendant, Jarrod RK Richmond, with one
    count of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2020)). At an October 2021 hearing, defendant
    pleaded guilty to the charge pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and the McLean County
    circuit court sentenced him to 24 months’ probation in a recovery court program. In April 2022,
    the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation. At a June 2022 hearing, defendant
    admitted he violated the terms of his probation. After an October 2022 hearing, the court
    resentenced defendant to eight years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his
    sentence, which the court denied in January 2023.
    ¶3              Defendant appeals, contending (1) the circuit court abused its discretion when it
    sentenced defendant for the probation violation instead of the offense for which he was convicted
    and (2) his sentence was excessive. We affirm.
    ¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND
    ¶5             Defendant and the State entered into a negotiated plea agreement, under which
    defendant would plead guilty to the burglary charge and receive a sentence of 24 months of
    probation in the recovery court program, which had numerous conditions. He was also to serve
    180 days in jail, which was to be stayed.
    ¶6             On October 12, 2021, the circuit court held a plea hearing. The court admonished
    defendant and heard the following factual basis for the plea. On July 24, 2021, at around 12:30
    a.m., a male opened the serving window of Carl’s Ice Cream, entered the building, and stole ice
    cream. The store’s video surveillance captured images of the male, who had distinctive tattoos
    on his arms and neck and a distinctive hairstyle. After the images of the male suspect were
    shared within the police department, an officer encountered defendant and identified him as the
    suspect captured in the surveillance video. The court accepted defendant’s plea and sentenced
    him to 24 months’ probation in the recovery court program.
    ¶7             In April 2022, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation, alleging
    defendant did not complete or submit verification of self-help meetings as sanctioned by the
    recovery court team and judge for the period of March 3 to 24, 2022. At a June 2022 hearing,
    defendant admitted the allegation in the petition to revoke his probation. The factual basis for
    the admission was as follows: the terms of defendant’s probation required him to successfully
    complete the recovery court program, obey all the rules and regulations of the program, and
    comply with all treatment plans set by the circuit court and the recovery court officer, as well as
    other terms. He violated those terms and conditions by not completing or submitting verification
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    of self-help meetings, which was sanctioned by the recovery court team and the recovery court
    judge for the period of March 3 to 24, 2022. The court accepted defendant’s admission.
    ¶8             On October 28, 2022, the circuit court held defendant’s resentencing hearing.
    The State presented the October 25, 2022, presentence investigation report and the testimony of
    Edie Cervantes, a McLean County probation officer.
    ¶9             The presentence investigation report set forth the language of the burglary
    indictment, which stated defendant knowingly entered the building of Carl’s Ice Cream without
    authority and with the intent to commit therein a theft. The presentence investigation report
    further showed defendant had two pending unlawful possession of a controlled substance charges
    and six prior felony convictions. He was raised by his mother, whom he described as “ ‘an
    addict, neglectful, and verbally and physically abusive.’ ” Additionally, defendant reported he
    suffered from bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression.
    Defendant also had substance abuse issues with cannabis, opioids, stimulants, hallucinogens, and
    sedatives.
    ¶ 10           Cervantes testified she was defendant’s recovery court probation officer.
    Defendant had been in recovery court for a year and was in phase two of a five phase program.
    Cervantes testified it generally took a person 30 to 45 days to complete a phase. According to
    Cervantes, defendant had not progressed in the program due to his substance use,
    tetrahydrocannabinol levels, inconsistency in complying with program rules, dishonesty, and
    triangulation. As to substance use, Cervantes explained defendant had only one month of actual
    negative drug screens since he had been in the program. Cervantes also explained defendant had
    been ordered to participate in self-help meetings. Earlier in the program, defendant had been
    inconsistent in attending those meetings. Beginning in September 2022, defendant began to
    -3-
    regularly attend the self-help meetings. Defendant had “buckled down” as his resentencing date
    approached and had begun participating in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Cervantes
    described defendant as doing the recovery court program his way. In her opinion, defendant
    would not successfully complete the program if he was allowed to remain in it. Cervantes also
    had concerns about the successfulness of other clients if defendant was allowed to remain in the
    program. However, Cervantes acknowledged she had received reports defendant was an
    encouragement to others in group activities.
    ¶ 11           Defendant presented two letters, one from Rodney Wilson, his friend, and one
    from Katarzyna Zalewska-Richmond, defendant’s wife. Wilson noted defendant had been sober
    for over a month, which had led to defendant being “much calmer, more thoughtful, and devoted
    to his wife, loved ones, and the [Alcoholics Anonymous] program.” Defendant’s wife explained
    defendant had become a different man and wanted to be a better person. He had shown honesty
    and accountability in his recovery program. In his statement in allocution, defendant recognized
    he had not been perfect in the recovery program but noted he would be extremely grateful for
    another opportunity to participate in the program.
    ¶ 12           In their arguments, both the State and defense counsel focused on whether
    defendant should again be sentenced to the recovery court program and did not address the facts
    underlying the burglary conviction. The State asserted defendant should not be resentenced to
    recovery court and should receive a prison sentence of 10 years. Defense counsel argued
    defendant should be resentenced to recovery court and, if not, defendant should receive the
    minimum prison term of three years.
    ¶ 13           The circuit court sentenced defendant to eight years’ imprisonment. The court
    first noted it had reviewed the presentence investigation report. It found in aggravation
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    defendant’s long criminal history and the need to deter others in the recovery court program.
    The court found another sentence of probation in the recovery court program would not be
    appropriate. It did find the offense was the result of defendant’s “use of, or abuse of, or
    addiction to either a controlled substance or alcohol,” so the Department of Corrections could
    assist defendant with a treatment program.
    ¶ 14            Defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider his resentence, asserting his eight-
    year prison sentence was excessive. After a January 4, 2023, hearing, the circuit court denied
    defendant’s motion to reconsider his resentence.
    ¶ 15            Defendant first filed a notice of appeal on January 11, 2023, which listed the
    wrong date for the order from which defendant appealed. On January 30, 2023, defendant filed a
    timely amended notice of appeal in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606
    (eff. March 12, 2021). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021); R. 303(b)(5) (July 1, 2017).
    Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction of defendant’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
    603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
    ¶ 16                                        II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 17                                    A. Probation Actions
    ¶ 18            Defendant asserts the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him because
    the court’s resentence was based on his actions while on probation and not for the original
    offense. Defendant recognizes he did not raise this issue in the circuit court and asserts we
    should review the claim under the plain-error doctrine (Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)).
    The State contends the court did not err, and if it did, the error did not rise to the level of plain
    error.
    ¶ 19            In the sentencing context, the plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to
    -5-
    consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: “(1) the evidence at the
    sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the
    defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” People v. Hillier, 
    237 Ill. 2d 539
    , 545, 
    931 N.E.2d 1184
    ,
    1187 (2010). We begin a plain-error analysis by first determining whether any error occurred at
    all. People v. Sargent, 
    239 Ill. 2d 166
    , 189, 
    940 N.E.2d 1045
    , 1059 (2010). If error did occur,
    this court then considers whether either of the two prongs of the plain-error doctrine has been
    satisfied. Sargent, 
    239 Ill. 2d at 189-90
    , 
    940 N.E.2d at 1059
    . “Under both prongs of the plain-
    error doctrine, the defendant has the burden of persuasion.” Hillier, 
    237 Ill. 2d at 545
    , 
    931 N.E.2d at 1187
    . If the defendant fails to meet his or her burden of persuasion, the reviewing
    court applies the procedural default. Hillier, 
    237 Ill. 2d at 545
    , 
    931 N.E.2d at 1188
    .
    ¶ 20             After revoking a defendant’s probation, the circuit court may resentence a
    defendant to any sentence that would have been appropriate for the original offense. People v.
    Young, 
    138 Ill. App. 3d 130
    , 134-35, 
    485 N.E.2d 443
    , 445 (1985); 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(e) (West
    2020). The court may consider the defendant’s conduct while on probation in reassessing
    rehabilitative potential. Young, 
    138 Ill. App. 3d at 135
    , 
    485 N.E.2d at 445
    . As such, the court
    may impose a more severe sentence than the one initially imposed if the defendant’s conduct on
    probation reflected poorly on his or her rehabilitative potential. People v. Turner, 
    233 Ill. App. 3d 449
    , 456-57, 
    599 N.E.2d 104
    , 110 (1992). However, the sentence imposed must not be
    punishment for the probation violation. Young, 
    138 Ill. App. 3d at 135
    , 
    485 N.E.2d at 445
    . This
    court will not find a sentence within the statutory range for the offense was an abuse of the
    sentencing court’s discretion unless we are “strongly persuaded” the circuit court intended to
    penalize the defendant for violating his or her probation. Young, 
    138 Ill. App. 3d at 142
    , 
    485 N.E.2d at 450
    .
    -6-
    ¶ 21           Burglary is a Class 2 felony with a sentencing range of three to seven years in
    prison. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020). Due to his
    criminal record, defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence under section 5-5-
    3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2020)). The
    sentencing range for an extended-term Class 2 felony is 7 to 14 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-
    4.5-35(a) (West 2020). Thus, defendant’s eight-year sentence was well within the extended-term
    sentencing range.
    ¶ 22           In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Varghese, 
    391 Ill. App. 3d 866
    , 877, 
    909 N.E.2d 939
    , 949 (2009), where the reviewing court was convinced the trial court
    punished the defendant for his conduct while on probation and held the trial court abused its
    discretion in resentencing the defendant. There, on resentence, the trial court had resentenced
    the defendant to the maximum term of seven years’ imprisonment, and evidence had been
    presented defendant had attempted to meet up with a 16-year-old girl while he was on sex-
    offender probation. Varghese, 
    391 Ill. App. 3d at 869, 875
    , 
    909 N.E.2d at 942, 947
    . In
    explaining its decision to reverse the trial court’s resentence, the reviewing court stated the
    following:
    “Here, the remarks of the trial court in their totality clearly indicate that it never
    expressly considered defendant’s original offense when fashioning his sentence.
    Rather, the trial court’s concluding comments, by focusing on defendant’s
    conduct while on probation, demonstrate that it improperly commingled
    uncharged conduct with his original offense. Immediately prior to imposing
    sentence, the trial court chastised defendant for the reprehensible nature of his
    conduct while on probation. It stated in summation: ‘This conduct is intolerable.
    -7-
    This conduct is dangerous.’ Read in context, the phrase ‘this conduct’ clearly
    referred to defendant’s conduct while on probation. That the trial court’s final
    sentencing determination immediately followed this statement and a lengthy
    discussion about the certainty of the uncharged conduct strongly indicates that
    defendant was sentenced for such particular ‘dangerous’ and ‘intolerable’
    uncharged conduct. If this conduct constitutes another offense, defendant should
    be tried, convicted, and sentenced ‘under orderly criminal processes.’ [Citation.]
    With only a passing reference to defendant’s original offense, it is apparent that
    the trial court improperly commingled defendant’s conduct while on probation
    with his original offense.” Varghese, 
    391 Ill. App. 3d at 877
    , 
    909 N.E.2d at 949
    .
    ¶ 23           Defendant argues the circuit court here similarly focused its comments on
    defendant’s behavior while on probation. In this case, the court made a brief reference to the
    burglary offense at the sentencing hearing. However, we disagree that reference means the
    circuit court abused its discretion.
    ¶ 24           The facts underlying the burglary offense in this case were simple and neither
    party addressed them during arguments. The focus of each parties’ arguments was on whether
    defendant should be sentenced to another term of probation in the recovery court program. As to
    that issue, defendant’s actions on probation were relevant, as they showed his rehabilitative
    potential in the recovery court probation program. At the very end of their respective arguments,
    each counsel gave a recommendation on the length of a prison term. The circuit court’s
    sentencing comments mirrored the format of the parties’ arguments. Its focus was also on
    whether defendant should be resentenced to recovery court probation. The court did consider the
    statutory factors in mitigation (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1 (West 2020)) and aggravation (730 ILCS 5/5-
    -8-
    5-3.2 (West 2020)) and found few applied. With regard to one of the aggravating factors, we
    acknowledge the court did mention defendant’s behavior on probation. However, it was
    certainly not the overall focus of the court’s weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
    As noted by the court, defendant had a lengthy criminal history. The court expressly considered
    the underlying facts of the burglary, as it made the finding the offense was the result of
    defendant’s addiction or use of either alcohol or a controlled substance. Accordingly, we find
    the circuit court’s sentence was not punishment for his actions on probation and thus not an
    abuse of discretion.
    ¶ 25           Since we have found no error, we do not address defendant’s plain-error
    arguments and apply the forfeiture doctrine.
    ¶ 26                                  B. Excessive Sentence
    ¶ 27           Defendant also contends his eight-year sentence was excessive. The State
    disagrees.
    ¶ 28           With excessive sentence claims, this court has explained appellate review of a
    defendant’s sentence as follows:
    “A trial court’s sentencing determination must be based on the particular
    circumstances of each case, including factors such as the defendant’s credibility,
    demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and
    age. [Citations.] Generally, the trial court is in a better position than a court of
    review to determine an appropriate sentence based upon the particular facts and
    circumstances of each individual case. [Citation.] Thus, the trial court is the
    proper forum for the determination of a defendant’s sentence, and the trial court’s
    decisions in regard to sentencing are entitled to great deference and weight.
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    [Citation.] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, a sentence may not be
    altered upon review. [Citation.] If the sentence imposed is within the statutory
    range, it will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the
    spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the
    offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Price, 
    2011 IL App (4th) 100311
    , ¶ 36, 
    958 N.E.2d 341
    .
    See also People v. Alexander, 
    239 Ill. 2d 205
    , 212, 
    940 N.E.2d 1062
    , 1066 (2010). As
    previously noted, defendant’s eight-year sentence falls within the extended-term sentencing
    range for a Class 2 felony.
    ¶ 29           In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Allen, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151540
    , ¶ 2, 
    95 N.E.3d 1162
    , where the reviewing court reduced the defendant’s prison sentence
    of 10½ years to 6 years, which was the minimum sentence for a Class X felony. The defendant
    had been convicted of burglary, a Class 2 felony, but was subject to Class X sentencing based on
    his prior criminal record. Allen, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151540
    , ¶ 11. The reviewing court found the
    most important factor in its reduction was the offense’s trivial nature and the fact the 10½-year
    sentence did not reflect the offense’s low level of seriousness. Allen, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151540
    ,
    ¶ 15. The reviewing court explained six years was sufficient “to punish an offender for breaking
    a truck window and stealing two packs of cigarettes and a cap (which were promptly returned to
    the owner).” Allen, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151540
    , ¶ 15. Another reason for the reduction was the
    following: “Class X sentencing takes into consideration criminal history and reflects the
    legislature’s judgment that repeat offenders deserve longer sentences.” Allen, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151540
    , ¶ 16. Additionally, the court noted the defendant’s criminal history was nonviolent,
    nonserious, and posed no risk of harm to any individuals. Allen, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151540
    , ¶ 17.
    - 10 -
    ¶ 30           In this case, defendant’s criminal history subjects him to a possible extended-term
    sentencing range of 7 to 14 years. His sentence of eight years in prison is only one year above
    the minimum extended-term sentence. Unlike the defendant in Allen, defendant had committed
    crimes that posed a risk of harm to others, such as driving under the influence and robbery.
    Moreover, the evidence showed defendant’s lack of rehabilitative potential. While defendant
    broke into an ice cream store and took ice cream, an eight-year prison term is not excessive when
    the relevant sentencing factors are weighed.
    ¶ 31                                   III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 32           For the reasons stated, we affirm the McLean County circuit court’s judgment.
    ¶ 33           Affirmed.
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4-23-0045

Filed Date: 8/1/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/1/2023