People v. Woodson , 2024 IL App (1st) 221172 ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 221172FIFTH DIVISION
June 21, 2024
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
No. 1-22-1172
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
v. )
) No. 03 CR 22400
ANTONIO WOODSON, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Stanley J. Sacks,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Presiding Justice Mitchell dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In 2017, defendant Antonio Woodson filed a pro se postconviction petition challenging the
constitutionality of a 60-year sentence he received for convictions arising out of events occurring
when Mr. Woodson was a juvenile. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. This court
entered an agreed order, reversing and remanding for a new sentencing hearing in compliance with
People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, and section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code)
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)). People v. Woodson, No. 1-17-0887 (2019).
¶2 On remand, the circuit court gave Mr. Woodson the same sentence without the add-on for
use of a firearm, which has since become discretionary for persons convicted of crimes committed
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when they were juveniles (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(c) (West 2022)), for an aggregate sentence of 40
years. On appeal, Mr. Woodson argues the new sentence imposed is excessive and that the circuit
court failed to reasonably apply relevant mitigating factors associated with youth and required by
section 5-4.5-105. Mr. Woodson also argues the circuit court deprived him of his right to due
process by failing to provide a fair sentencing hearing. Because we agree that the circuit court
abused its discretion by failing to reasonably apply the relevant mitigating factors, we modify the
sentence imposed.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Trial
¶5 In April 2006, Mr. Woodson was sentenced to 60 years of imprisonment for vehicular
hijacking, personally discharging a firearm, and the first degree murder of Jimmy Patton, based on
events occurring on January 11, 2003. We summarize the facts of that day as presented at Mr.
Woodson’s trial only as necessary to understand the current appeal.
¶6 At trial, Arthur Newby testified that on January 11, 2003, he was with Robert Hughes (Mr.
Woodson’s cousin), Dante White, Joshua Council, and Mr. Woodson at a home that was “about a
couple of blocks away” from Garfield Park. Mr. Newby heard Mr. Woodson and Mr. Council
having a conversation about going to a park to “carjack somebody.” The two then left the home
with Mr. Hughes and Mr. White.
¶7 Steven Banks testified that, on the same day, he drove to Garfield Park to spend time with
his friends J.C. Parker and Jimmy Patton. Mr. Banks parked his car in an area of the park known
as “the circle.” The three men spent time “relaxing” in Mr. Parker’s parked car when several young
men wearing hoods over their heads approached. According to Mr. Banks, one tapped on the
window and asked for a light. Mr. Patton exited the vehicle and walked to his adjacent parked car.
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¶8 Two of the young men then began to wrestle Mr. Patton’s keys from him. Mr. Banks
noticed that a third young man had a gun. Mr. Banks asked Mr. Patton to return to the car, but Mr.
Patton did not. Mr. Parker and Mr. Banks then “peeled off.” When they were about 50 feet away,
Mr. Banks heard gunshots. The two men flagged down a police officer and returned to the area.
Upon returning, Mr. Banks saw that Mr. Patton was lying face up on the sidewalk.
¶9 According to Mr. Newby, Mr. Woodson and his three companions returned to the house
about an hour after they had departed. They appeared “scared” and “shook up.” Mr. Woodson told
Mr. Newby that he had shot someone “in the chest.” An autopsy established that Mr. Patton died
from a gunshot wound to the heart.
¶ 10 Detectives John Roberts and Greg Swiderek also testified. They stated that, after
interviewing Mr. White, Mr. Council, Mr. Newby, and Mr. Hughes in connection with Mr.
Patton’s death, they suspected Mr. Woodson and were looking for him.
¶ 11 On September 7, 2003, Mr. Woodson presented himself to a police station with his mother
and two grandparents. Detectives Swiderek and Roberts arrested Mr. Woodson and began to
question him about the shooting that had occurred on January 11.
¶ 12 Mr. Woodson initially admitted to being with Mr. Council, Mr. White, and Mr. Hughes in
Garfield Park on the night in question, but he claimed that Mr. Council had committed the shooting
and that he had not seen it because he ran away.
¶ 13 Detective Swiderek then told Mr. Woodson that he believed that he was lying. The
detective played two video recordings of statements made by Mr. Council and Mr. Hughes. After
watching their statements, Mr. Woodson admitted to shooting Mr. Patton.
¶ 14 Mr. Woodson then made a videotaped statement that was played for the jury at trial. In the
statement, Mr. Woodson admitted that he, Mr. Council, Mr. White, and Mr. Hughes were at a party
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at Mr. Woodson’s grandmother’s home when they agreed to steal a car from a park. On their way
to Garfield Park, Mr. Woodson sat on a bench while Mr. White and Mr. Council discussed which
car the boys were going to take. The two selected a gold vehicle parked next to a burgundy car. At
that point, Mr. Council “passed [Mr. Woodson] the gun.”
¶ 15 The four boys approached the parked cars. Mr. Council asked the men in the burgundy
vehicle “where is my uncle with his car.” A moment later Mr. Council changed his question and
asked for a cigarette.
¶ 16 A man seated in the back seat of the burgundy car exited the vehicle, walked to the
passenger door of the gold car, and removed the key from the ignition before responding. The man
stated, “what did you want. You don’t want no fucking cigarette so what do you want.”
¶ 17 At that point, Mr. Council looked at Mr. Woodson “like, do you got that, do you got me,”
by which he meant “do you got my back, do you have the gun?” Mr. Woodson pulled the gun out
of his hoodie pouch, pointed it at the man, and “clicked it,” but it did not go off. He then “clicked
it again,” and it fired.
¶ 18 After the shooting, Mr. Woodson just “stood there.” The transcript of his statement records
him saying “I was shocked. I was sorry what happened. It didn’t [sic] mean like that. I didn’t know
it was gonna go like that.” The shooting “was an accident.”
¶ 19 Mr. Woodson then ran with Mr. Hughes back in the direction of their grandmother’s house.
Mr. White and Mr. Council caught up with the two of them while driving Mr. Patton’s car.
According to his statement, Mr. Woodson got in the car “cause I was so scared, I just wanted to
go. I was shaking. I was nervous.”
¶ 20 When Mr. Woodson arrived back at his grandmother’s house, he wrapped the gun in a shirt
and Mr. Council came over soon after to retrieve it. Mr. Woodson said in his statement that he told
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Mr. Council, “you was wrong cause you did not tell me the gun was loaded.”
¶ 21 When asked if he told anyone about what had happened, Mr. Woodson replied, “[n]o sir.
That’s, that’s nothing to be bragging about. Cause that was a horrible thing what happened cause
it happened so fast. And it just—it ain’t, it ain’t nothing to be bragging about.” When asked why
he came to the police station that day, Mr. Woodson replied, “[t]o tell the truth.”
¶ 22 The jury found Mr. Woodson guilty of first degree murder and vehicular hijacking and that
he personally discharged a firearm.
¶ 23 B. Initial Sentencing Hearing
¶ 24 Mr. Woodson’s initial sentencing hearing was held on April 5, 2006.
¶ 25 In aggravation, the State called Officer Fred Bradley of the Riverdale Police Department
to describe the only criminal charge in Mr. Woodson’s background, which was a charge of
misdemeanor battery based on an incident that had occurred the day before Mr. Woodson turned
himself in to the police.
¶ 26 Suzette Patton, Mr. Patton’s wife, read a victim impact statement. She described the pain
of losing her husband, the financial difficulties she endured without his income, and the challenges
Mr. Patton’s granddaughter faced without her grandfather.
¶ 27 Mr. Woodson’s mother, Frances, spoke in mitigation. She described that Mr. Woodson had
a learning disability, was a “good kid,” and did not complete the eleventh grade. When Mr.
Woodson was still a child, she was diagnosed with a brain tumor and spent “27 days” out of the
average month in the hospital. She testified that she and Mr. Woodson’s maternal grandparents
ensured that he attended church.
¶ 28 The court imposed a sentence of 30 years for the murder of Jimmy Patton, an additional 20
years for personally discharging a firearm—which was a mandatory part of the sentence at that
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time (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2002))—and a consecutive 10-year term for vehicular
hijacking, for an aggregate sentence of 60 years.
¶ 29 C. Resentencing Proceedings
¶ 30 In 2017, Mr. Woodson filed a pro se postconviction petition challenging the
constitutionality of his de facto life sentence. The circuit court summarily dismissed that petition,
and Mr. Woodson appealed. On June 17, 2019, this court entered an agreed order reversing the
circuit court and remanding for a new sentencing hearing in compliance with Buffer, 2019 IL
122327, and section 5-4.5-105 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)). Woodson, No.
1-17-0887 (2019).
¶ 31 The circuit court received the following materials in advance of Mr. Woodson’s
resentencing hearing.
¶ 32 1. Presentence Investigation Report
¶ 33 A new presentence investigation report was given to the court. That report stated that Mr.
Woodson had no prior convictions or juvenile adjudications. A box was checked indicating that
Mr. Woodson had been charged with a misdemeanor, which his lawyer explained was the battery
that Officer Bradley had testified to at the initial hearing and that had never been prosecuted.
¶ 34 The report stated that Mr. Woodson acknowledged that he had been in the Black Disciples
but was no longer gang involved. Mr. Woodson had been in special education classes from first
grade on because he was a “slow learner.” He graduated from junior high school but only continued
in school through tenth grade. He enrolled in 2022 with Job Corps, a residential education and job
training program for young adults, but did not complete it. Mr. Woodson acknowledged that he
started drinking alcohol at age 11 and smoked marijuana every day.
¶ 35 Mr. Woodson’s mother remarried, and Mr. Woodson did not “like his stepfather.” His
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father was “in and out of [Mr. Woodson’s] life,” but in 1998 they “got a chance to develop a
relationship.” The report noted that Mr. Woodson had one son, Jaylan Alexander, whom he called
“often to maintain a good relationship.” His family was “disappointed with his trouble with the
law” but remained supportive.
¶ 36 2. Neuropsychological Evaluation
¶ 37 Dr. Robert Hanlon, Ph.D., is a professor of psychiatry and neurology and a board-certified
clinical neuropsychologist at Northwestern University’s Feinberg School of Medicine. He
performed a 10-hour neuropsychological evaluation of Mr. Woodson and submitted his findings.
¶ 38 According to Dr. Hanlon, the brain undergoes a series of changes during adolescence that
are not completed until the “mid-20s.” The most significant changes “occur in the frontal lobes,
particularly the prefrontal cortex,” which is crucial to the development of executive functions,
including “response inhibition, emotional control, and the understanding of the future
consequences of behavioral acts.” Adolescents consequently engage in “seemingly thoughtless
behaviors.” According to research Dr. Hanlon cites, “[o]nly a relatively small proportion of
adolescents who engage in criminal behavior develop chronic, antisocial criminal lifestyles into
adulthood.”
¶ 39 Dr. Hanlon then described Mr. Woodson specifically. He wrote that Mr. Woodson
sustained “[c]losed head trauma *** at age 5 when he was struck by a motor vehicle as a
pedestrian.” At age 10, Mr. Woodson spent most of his time “hanging out in the streets with [his]
friends.” He began smoking “3 blunts per day” and gradually increased the dose until he was
smoking “10-15 blunts per day” by age 15.
¶ 40 Dr. Hanlon wrote that Mr. Woodson’s “[c]ognitive functions *** were defective and
generally consistent with *** Borderline Intellectual Functioning.” Mr. Woodson’s intelligence
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quotient (IQ) was 74, corresponding to the fourth percentile.
¶ 41 Mr. Woodson scored a “6” on the “Psychopathy Checklist-Revised,” “which was in the
very low range and [did] not reflect psychopathy.” He demonstrated “insight regarding [his
adolescent] immaturity” and accepted “blame for his impulsive adolescent behavior that resulted
in the death of Jimmy Patton.” Dr. Hanlon wrote that, although prediction of future violence is
“extremely difficult,” “Antonio Woodson possesses very few behavioral factors”—like substance
use, a history of physical abuse, or an inability to maintain healthy relationships—“that are
associated with a high risk of recidivism.”
¶ 42 Dr. Hanlon received information from Mr. Woodson about the day of Mr. Patton’s death.
Mr. Woodson started smoking and drinking with his friends around 10 or 11 a.m. They drank two
bottles of brandy and smoked 10 blunts. Mr. Woodson pulled the gun “as a scare tactic.” He then
tried to shoot in the air, but it didn’t fire. Mr. Woodson only shot at Mr. Patton after Mr. Patton
“ran at [him],” and even then, he aimed to shoot past him but missed.
¶ 43 The neuropsychological evaluation included a statement of remorse. Mr. Woodson
reportedly said “I’m very sorry for the life that was taken. It was wrong. I was immature. I’m truly
sorry for what happened. I hope [the Patton family] can forgive me.”
¶ 44 3. Mitigation Report
¶ 45 Amanda Myers, a licensed clinical social worker, prepared a mitigation report for the
defense. The report’s citations indicate that Ms. Myers interviewed Mr. Woodson, multiple family
members, childhood friends, and associates. She also reviewed Dr. Hanlon’s report, documents
produced by Chicago Public Schools, the Department of Corrections (IDOC), support letters, and
victim impact statements.
¶ 46 Ms. Myers wrote that Mr. Woodson, as a child, showed signs of a “severe intellectual
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disability and learning delays.” A week after he was born, Mr. Woodson had difficulty breathing,
and an ambulance was called. Upon arrival, “they pronounced him dead, but they were able to
revive him soon after.” Mr. Woodson began to experience heart murmurs and was placed on a
monitor. Mr. Woodson’s mother later qualified for disability benefits for raising a disabled child.
¶ 47 A psychiatrist evaluated Mr. Woodson and wanted to prescribe Ritalin to treat attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder. Mr. Woodson’s mother, however, refused the treatment.
¶ 48 When Mr. Woodson was “about 12 years old, [his mother] was diagnosed with
cerebrovascular accidents due to tumors found in her brain.” The diagnosis forced her to enter the
hospital for about a year, and all five of her children were split up. She then suffered from
migraines, poor vision, and “numerous strokes.” Ms. Myers concluded that Mr. Woodson’s mother
“definitely did not have the time nor energy to supervise Antonio.”
¶ 49 As a child, Mr. Woodson never stayed in one residence for more than five months, after
which he would usually feel “trapped” and would leave. He lived with his mother, his grandmother,
his great aunt, and his godmother. Around 1999, Mr. Woodson also intermittently lived with his
father, who was a leader of the Gangster Disciples and was in “jail a lot.” Mr. Woodson had few
memories of his father besides the two of them smoking marijuana together.
¶ 50 Mr. Woodson tried to “straighten up his life after [his] son was born.” He enrolled in Job
Corps in the eleventh grade. Ms. Myers reported that Mr. Woodson “did not feel comfortable” and
“ended up leaving the program before completing it.”
¶ 51 Ms. Myers’s mitigation report included a reentry plan. The plan describes that Mr.
Woodson could gain employment through multiple channels, including his uncle who owned a
landscaping business, a childhood friend from church who offered to send Mr. Woodson to
trucking school, and a separate friend who said he would “absolutely be able to get Antonio a job
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at the steel mill where he [was] employed.”
¶ 52 Ms. Myers concluded her report by saying, “Antonio is a different person now than [who]
he was at 17.” She also emphasized, “[i]n the 15 years that this mitigation specialist has worked
on sentencing advocacy and mitigation cases, there has never been a case such as Antonio’s that
seemed so clear that a life—Antonio’s life—would be better spent for the greater good of society
at home with his family.” When defense counsel mentioned Ms. Myers’s report during his opening
statement, the court asked, “[w]hat’s the—what’s the—finest people [Ms. Myers] ever
interviewed?”
¶ 53 4. Testimony at Resentencing Hearing
¶ 54 On July 1, 2022, the circuit court conducted the resentencing hearing. The court reported
that it had read “every single line” of Mr. Woodson’s document file.
¶ 55 In aggravation, the State introduced the previously described victim impact statement of
Suzette Patton and read it into the record. Tina Patton, Mr. Patton’s niece, also read a victim impact
statement on behalf of the Patton family. Jimmy Patton Jr. identified himself in court and informed
the judge that he was Mr. Patton’s son and was 23 years old when his father was killed.
¶ 56 In mitigation, the defense called three witnesses, correctional officers Patricia Brown-
Conley and Henry Peaks, and the former director of the IDOC, Salvador Antonio Godinez.
¶ 57 Both officers testified that they met Mr. Woodson in 2019 when he was remanded to the
Cook County Department of Corrections for resentencing. Ms. Brown-Conley observed Mr.
Woodson “voluntarily doing work around the tier,” and she decided to ask him to work for her.
He cleaned the restroom and dayroom and worked in the barbershop, a trusted position because of
access to tools “like screwdrivers that people could be stabbed with *** [and] blades that people
can be cut with.” He was a “great” worker.
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¶ 58 Officer Peaks testified similarly. He stated that Mr. Woodson was his “number one barber”
and helped him with reports, inventory, and “that type of stuff” in addition to cutting hair. During
the pandemic, the barbershop was shut down, but Mr. Woodson continued to work in both
sanitation and in the kitchen. He sometimes worked from 4 a.m. to 8 p.m.
¶ 59 Mr. Woodson completed over 1500 hours of training in a prison-sponsored barber’s
college, earning a certificate. Ms. Brown-Conley explained that not everyone who fulfills the
hourly requirement qualifies. The certificate is “based on your skills. It’s based on your attitude.
It’s based on your professionalism and Antonio was one of the guys that exemplified it.”
¶ 60 Officer Brown-Conley stated that, in her approximately 15-year career, she had only
testified for one other individual in a sentencing hearing. In the 18 years that Officer Peaks worked
as a correctional officer, he too had only testified one other time on behalf of an inmate. When
Officer Peaks was asked if, other than the other inmate for whom he testified, had he ever
“encountered an inmate as trustworthy and hardworking and well-behaved as Antonio Woodson,”
he replied, “[a]bsolutely not.”
¶ 61 Ms. Brown-Conley testified to having the same experience. She added that she had selected
Mr. Woodson for a “special assignment” called “the dog run,” during which an inmate walks “on
the outside.” Ms. Brown-Conley selected Mr. Woodson because he “exemplified things that I
looked for in inmates. I don’t just pull an inmate or a detainee with me. They have to show me that
they’re a stand-up person.” The court asked if Officer Brown-Conley would expect people to “act
nice” while awaiting resentencing. Ms. Brown-Conley responded, “[w]ell we expect them to, but
on a daily basis, they don’t.”
¶ 62 Defense counsel next called Salvador Antonio Godinez, the former governor-appointed
director of the IDOC. To prepare for his testimony, Director Godinez interviewed Mr. Woodson,
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spoke with the warden at Stateville Correctional Center, interviewed the unit superintendent
overseeing Mr. Woodson’s division, and reviewed Mr. Woodson’s disciplinary record and transfer
history. Director Godinez testified as an expert retained on behalf of Mr. Woodson.
¶ 63 Director Godinez testified that, in 2006, after sentencing, Mr. Woodson was sent to Menard
Correctional Center in southern Illinois. At the time, Menard “had the highest rate of writing
disciplinary tickets.” During the roughly 12 years Mr. Woodson lived there, his disciplinary record
was “almost immaculate.” Director Godinez stated, “I was shocked. *** I looked very hard, and
in his entire stay in the [IDOC], he’s had *** four disciplinary tickets.” Three of those tickets were
at Menard, and none were for serious infractions. Director Godinez testified that a disciplinary
record like that was “extremely unusual” because younger inmates often “battle” staff before
adjusting to the prison’s regulated environment. The court asked “[i]s something wrong about
[Menard’s] strict policies,” and Director Godinez replied that there was not but that the strictness
provided context for understanding why Mr. Woodson’s behavioral record was surprising.
¶ 64 Director Godinez was similarly impressed with Mr. Woodson’s work history. He stated
that “the system” prioritized work opportunities for shorter-term inmates. It therefore required
“some initiative on the individual’s part, a lot of initiative,” to obtain work. Mr. Woodson,
however, began working his first day in the IDOC, eventually as a barber, and also in the officer’s
kitchen. The latter position was a “high honor” reserved for “minimum security classified inmates”
with lower sentences because of the access to weapons like knives and forks. Director Godinez
explained Mr. Woodson likely obtained that position because he developed a relationship with
someone who saw “the work that he was providing” and gave him a chance. The court asked, “if
he got those jobs, he was treated pretty well, correct?” Director Godinez replied, “I think it went
both ways. That he was doing very well and he was treated very well.” Director Godinez was
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impressed that, if he remembered correctly, Mr. Woodson earned 17 certificates while in prison.
¶ 65 Director Godinez further testified that it “very much surprise[d]” him that Mr. Woodson
was not affiliated with a gang. In Director Godinez’s words, “it almost behooves” an inmate to
remain in or else enter a gang to receive “special privileges” and protection. “I have to ask myself,
how does a 20-year-old get through Menard without that. I don’t know.”
¶ 66 According to Director Godinez, Mr. Woodson expressed remorse for the death of Mr.
Patton, saying “I did it, I regret I did it, I don’t understand why I did it, I was not mature.” Director
Godinez remarked that, if there were boxes to check to demonstrate rehabilitation, Mr. Woodson
“would check all the boxes.”
¶ 67 During his testimony, he mentioned that the IDOC made several policy changes as a result
of the imprisonment of Richard Speck, a convicted murderer of eight nurses “a long time ago,”
including prioritizing shorter-term inmates for work assignments. Before the State’s cross-
examination, the court interjected to ask if Director Godinez knew whether Mr. Speck had been
“turned around inside,” if Mr. Speck “became a queen,” and if Director Godinez had seen a video
about that subject. The director answered no to these questions, and the State then proceeded with
cross-examination.
¶ 68 5. Mr. Woodson’s Allocution Statement
¶ 69 Mr. Woodson read a statement in allocution. He described his former self, saying “[I]
wanted to hang in the streets with my friend[s] on the block. But because of [what happened] back
then, I realized that I had to change.” “My past help[ed me] to become mindful *** [of] who to
associate with and to help pull myself around.” In terms of remorse, he stated, “I have and will
always live with my actions for the rest of my life.” “I have prayed for God’s forgiveness,” and “I
am here today to apologize to the Patton family and ask [for their] forgiveness.” Mr. Woodson
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concluded that he found purpose in barbering and hoped to leave prison to “help young boys and
girls and urban communities to help them stay in school and mentor them through any adversities
they are having.”
¶ 70 6. Court’s Discussion of Parole
¶ 71 The court had a discussion with Mr. Woodson’s lawyer prior to the sentencing hearing and
then a later conversation with Mr. Woodson in which it appears that the court took the position
that Mr. Woodson would only be eligible for parole if he elected to be sentenced under current law
but that, because of the possibility of parole, Miller would also not bar a life sentence, allowing
the court to resentence Mr. Woodson to his original 60 years. Mr. Woodson, on the record, elected
to be sentenced under the “old law.”
¶ 72 7. Resentencing and Motion for Reconsideration
¶ 73 After hearing argument from both the State and defense, the court gave lengthy remarks
prior to imposing Mr. Woodson’s sentence.
¶ 74 The court first spoke in general about how it did not believe Mr. Woodson’s suggestion in
his statement to the police that the killing was a kind of accident. The court then noted that its
understanding was that the maximum sentence it could impose was 40 years. It stated that Mr.
Woodson “did well in prison” but asked “how does that mitigate a murder?” The court then found
that the crime did not involve peer pressure because Mr. Woodson “hardly knew” two of the guys
from the night in question.
¶ 75 Next, the court described its justification for its sentence saying, “I have no beef with
Antonio Woodson whatsoever. I don’t dislike Antonio Woodson. I dislike what he did however.”
The court added “[when you] do bad things you have bad consequences.” The court talked about
the victim’s family and contrasted Mr. Woodson’s behavior in prison with his behavior on the
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night of the crime, saying Mr. Woodson might be a “nice guy” but what the court saw was Mr.
Woodson with “a gun in his hand.”
¶ 76 The court asked the State if the Miller factors were what it had to consider in imposing a
sentence higher than 40 years or “just in general.” The State responded that the court was required
to consider all factors “in mitigation in crafting an appropriate sentence.” The State then handed
the court a list of the statutory factors, and the court turned to the statute. It went on to comment
on age, potential for rehabilitation, impetuosity, level of maturity, family history, and prior
criminal activity. The court found none of the factors were significantly mitigating. Mr. Woodson
was almost 18, the conduct was not impetuous because the boys went to the park intending to steal
a car, and Mr. Woodson “came from a family that wasn’t the greatest.”
¶ 77 In terms of rehabilitation, the court repeated the gist of what it said previously: “Doing well
in a custodial setting *** I’m not sure how that goes to rehabilitation or not.” Mr. Woodson’s
behavior “could just be a way to release [him from] boredom.” The court concluded: “we’ll give
him a little mark, half mark on that one.”
¶ 78 On remorse, the court concluded the following:
“I don’t see when a guy gives you all these different versions of what happened and gets
up years later [after] going back to prison, [and then says] [‘]oh, ma[n], I’m sorry I did it.[’]
I think Woodson may be sorry, not that he shot the man. He’s going to prison for a long
time. That’s what he may be sorry about.”
¶ 79 After listing and providing these comments on the statutory factors, the court remarked on
Mr. Patton’s family’s significant loss. The court then turned to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460(2012), noting that the United States Supreme Court remanded that case for a new sentencing but
the 14-year-old offender at issue there still received a life sentence.
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¶ 80 The court sentenced Mr. Woodson to 30 years of imprisonment for first degree murder
followed by a consecutive 11-year sentence for vehicular hijacking, for which Mr. Woodson could
earn good time credit. The court noted that the sentence would be followed by three years of
mandatory supervised release.
¶ 81 Mr. Woodson filed a motion to reconsider, pointing out that the court had increased the
sentence on vehicular hijacking from 10 to 11 years in violation of section 5-5-4 of the Code,
which prohibits imposing a more severe sentence on remand except where it is based on conduct
occurring after the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 2022). Mr. Woodson also argued that the
court improperly considered in aggravation matters implicit in the offense, failed to consider all of
the factors required by section 5-4.5-105 of the Code, handed down an improperly disparate
sentence compared to his codefendants, and penalized him for exercising his right to trial.
¶ 82 On July 14, 2022, the court agreed that it had improperly increased the sentence on
vehicular hijacking and reduced it to 10 years. In all other respects the circuit court denied the
motion to reconsider. Thus, the final sentence that Mr. Woodson received was identical to the one
he was given in 2006, except that it did not include the firearm enhancement, which is no longer
mandatory for defendants under the age of 21 at the time of the crime. Id. § 5-4.5-105(c).
¶ 83 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 84 The circuit court ruled on Mr. Woodson’s motion for reconsideration on July 14, 2022, and
Mr. Woodson timely filed his notice of appeal from that order the same day. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing
appeals from final judgments in criminal cases.
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¶ 85 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 86 On appeal, Mr. Woodson makes two claims: (1) that his sentence is excessive considering
the extensive mitigation evidence presented and (2) that the circuit court failed to provide a fair
sentencing hearing. In our view, these are in fact two arguments in support of Mr. Woodson’s
claim that the sentence is excessive, but we address each argument in turn.
¶ 87 A. Excessive Sentence
¶ 88 The question of whether a sentence is excessive is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v. Maldonado, 240 Ill. App. 3d 470, 485 (1992). Although courts have discretion in
imposing sentences within the applicable statutory limits, this discretion “ ‘is not unfettered.’ ”
People v. Haley, 2011 IL App (1st) 093585, ¶ 65 (quoting People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 297
(1988)). An abuse of discretion occurs where the circuit court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it (People v. McGath, 2017
IL App (4th) 150608, ¶ 55) or where a sentence greatly varies with the purpose and spirit of the
law (Haley, 2011 IL App (1st) 093585, ¶ 65).
¶ 89 The purpose and spirit of section 5-4.5-105 of the Code is to “rectify[ ] the core concerns
implicated when sentencing juvenile offenders” as addressed by Miller and its progeny. People v.
Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 42. Miller, in turn, made clear that courts must consider how
the inherent characteristics of youth diminish the usual “penological justifications for imposing
the harshest sentences.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-73. Section 5-4.5-105 of the Code adopts the
factors enunciated in that case and makes them applicable to all sentences for crimes committed
when the defendant is under 18. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022); People v. Morris, 2023 IL
App (1st) 220035, ¶¶ 57-59. While we accord great deference to any sentence that falls within the
statutory sentencing range, this court will find an abuse of discretion when that sentence does not
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reflect an adequate consideration of these mitigating factors. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d)
220066, ¶ 73; see People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 86 (“We are not meant to
merely be a rubber stamp for the sentencing decisions of the trial courts.”).
¶ 90 The statute requires that, in sentencing individuals who are under 18 at the time of the
commission of the offense, the court
“shall consider the following additional factors in mitigation in determining the appropriate
sentence:
(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense,
including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, the presence of
cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;
(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure,
familial pressure, or negative influences;
(3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background,
including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;
(4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;
(5) the circumstances of the offense;
(6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including
the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;
(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;
(8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and
(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an
expression of remorse, if appropriate.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022).
¶ 91 We find that the circuit court in this case abused its discretion by failing to fully apply these
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factors to the specific facts relevant here and impose a sentence within the purpose and spirit of
the law regarding sentencing juveniles. Of the nine listed factors, we find factors one and four
particularly important.
¶ 92 Concerning the first factor—the person’s age, impetuosity, capacity to consider the
consequences of his or her behavior, and the presence of a cognitive or developmental disability—
the court did not find the factor mitigating because the carjacking was planned and was therefore
not impetuous. The court, however, failed to consider, or even mention, the significant testimony
presented about Mr. Woodson’s cognitive deficits. Mr. Woodson’s mother received disability
benefits for raising a disabled child. Mr. Woodson was enrolled in special education classes, he
suffered from an untreated hyperactivity disorder and cannabis dependency, his IQ was considered
“borderline,” and he survived head trauma as a child. Moreover, Dr. Hanlon testified that the
adolescent brain has an inherently diminished capacity to consider consequences. We are unable
to find a place in the record where the circuit court considered the above testimony when
determining the mitigating effects of this factor. Instead, the court emphasized the fact that the
carjacking was planned. This factor, as enunciated in the statute, is broader. The court appears to
have given no consideration to Mr. Woodson’s particularly limited adolescent capacity to
understand the consequences of his actions.
¶ 93 Of the nine Miller factors, evidence concerning the fourth factor, Mr. Woodson’s
rehabilitation, was the most overwhelming. The statute specifically references both potential for
rehabilitation and “evidence of rehabilitation.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(4) (West 2022). Such
evidence is not always available, but it was here. Mr. Woodson earned 17 certificates in prison,
obtained his barber’s license, demonstrated a strong work ethic from his first day in the IDOC
through his second sentencing hearing, and was a model inmate. He received a total of four tickets,
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No. 1-22-1172
all for minor infractions, in his 16-plus years in the IDOC, which prison personnel viewed as
extraordinary. He avoided gang affiliation, worked in the staff kitchen, earned positions with
access to screwdrivers and blades, and was selected for special assignments. In his allocution
statement, Mr. Woodson articulated a strong sense of purpose and demonstrated self-awareness
about how his criminal conviction caused him to both change his life and avoid negative influences
in prison.
¶ 94 Despite the substantial rehabilitation evidence, the circuit court’s response was that none
of that “mitigate[s] a murder.” In the court’s words, “one would expect a guy in custody to try and
do well,” and “I’m not sure how [doing well in prison] goes to rehabilitation or not.” In the court’s
view, Mr. Woodson’s behavior “release[d] [him from] boredom” and only deserves “half a mark.”
The circuit court acknowledged, as it had to, given the extensive testimony and documentary
evidence, that Mr. Woodson “did well in prison.” The problem is not that the court ignored the
evidence but rather that it deliberately and unreasonably discounted it.
¶ 95 This court has recognized that unreasonably discounting evidence of rehabilitation can be
an abuse of discretion. In McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder as a 16-year-old and sentenced originally to 100 years’ imprisonment. During
a resentencing hearing pursuant to a postconviction petition, two correctional sergeants testified to
the defendant’s good character. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. One described how the defendant worked as a porter
in his cell house for at least a year and a half, “which was rare” and constituted evidence of a
special working relationship with staff. Id. ¶ 29. The defendant did not have any tickets from that
jail. Id. ¶ 36. He also did well in prison education programs, showing leadership potential in
programs sponsored by Northwestern University, DePaul University, and Northeastern Illinois
University. Id. ¶¶ 30-43.
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¶ 96 Despite all of this, the “only comments on [the] defendant’s rehabilitation” that the circuit
court made were that “ ‘he does have rehabilitative potential,’ ” his “ ‘conduct in the penitentiary
had been admirable,’ ” and he was “ ‘recognized for some leadership traits within the Illinois
Department of Corrections.’ ” Id. ¶ 78. The circuit court went on to sentence the defendant to 39
years. Id. ¶ 80.
¶ 97 In that case, we held that the “trial judge’s brief, general references to defendant’s
rehabilitation indicate that the trial judge disregarded the extent of defendant’s rehabilitation and
did not afford it adequate weight.” Id. ¶ 78. We recognized that the defendant was “the epitome of
an offender who ha[d] been restored to useful citizenship.” Id. ¶ 79. His sentence, however, “failed
to give proper weight to [the] defendant’s extensive rehabilitation evidence.” Id. ¶ 80. As our
comments demonstrate, a sentencing judge may make a specific reference to a statutory factor and
yet improperly discount it where the sentence does not “reflect” (id. ¶ 79) the “extensive ***
evidence” (id. ¶ 80) presented concerning that factor.
¶ 98 Here, the circuit court specifically afforded Mr. Woodson only “half a mark” on
rehabilitation, despite Mr. Woodson’s more than 16 years of continuous work in the IDOC. Like
the defendant in McKinley, Mr. Woodson pursued educational opportunities, earned special
privileges, and avoided antisocial influences. Moreover, Mr. Woodson was trained and worked as
a barber, overcoming not only prison life but any cognitive deficits with which he may struggle.
He earned the trust of two correctional officers who testified on his behalf, as well as a mitigation
specialist who stated that, in her 15 years of practice, she had never come across an individual
whose life would be better spent in society than Mr. Woodson’s. The former director of the IDOC
testified that, if boxes existed to demonstrate rehabilitation, Mr. Woodson would check them all.
Despite all of this, the circuit court sentenced Mr. Woodson to 40 years of imprisonment. As we
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No. 1-22-1172
did in McKinley, we believe the circuit court “disregarded the extent of defendant’s rehabilitation
and did not afford it adequate weight.” Id. ¶ 78.
¶ 99 The State notes that “[a] defendant’s rehabilitative potential *** is not entitled to greater
weight than the seriousness of the offense” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing People v.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010)) and that a reviewing court must not substitute its own
judgment for that of the circuit court just because the reviewing court would weigh the factors
differently (citing People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000)). We agree that few crimes are as
serious as murder and that the circuit court was therefore right to consider the gravity of the crime
and Mr. Woodson’s central role in it. But, as we have recognized, “ ‘murders vary in their gravity
and in the information they reveal concerning the likelihood of recidivism by the murderer.’ ”
McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 18 (quoting McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 913-14 (7th
Cir. 2016)).
¶ 100 The Illinois Constitution requires that all sentences “be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
(Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Undue emphasis on either aggravation or
mitigation may be an abuse of the court’s discretion in sentencing when, in its extreme application,
it amounts to disregard. As we recognized in McKinley, the inherent characteristics of youth
diminish a juvenile’s capacity to consider repercussions and therefore decrease the penological
justification for the harshest of sentences, even for the most serious of crimes. McKinley, 2020 IL
App (1st) 191907, ¶ 58 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). The circuit court’s failure to consider
multiple Miller factors does not therefore represent a situation in which we as the reviewing court
would simply weigh the factors differently. Like McKinley, it represents a situation in which the
circuit court failed to balance the seriousness of the offense with the constitutionally mandated
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No. 1-22-1172
requirement of rehabilitation.
¶ 101 The State distinguishes McKinley, pointing out that the court there improperly treated peer
pressure as aggravation, when the statute requires that it be considered in mitigation. Id. ¶¶ 88-89.
But the essence of McKinley, which is equally applicable here, is that the circuit court
“disregard[ed] evidence of defendant’s extensive rehabilitation and improperly consider[ed] [the]
sentencing factors during the resentencing hearing.” Id. ¶ 91. In Mr. Woodson’s case there is the
added consideration that Mr. Woodson had learning deficits that made him particularly unable to
appreciate the significance of his actions when he was still a juvenile.
¶ 102 The State points out that the circuit court gave Mr. Woodson a sentence significantly below
the 95 years that the law at the time of the crime would have allowed. The dissent also finds this
compelling. As our supreme court has recognized, however, a sentence longer than 40 years is a
de facto life sentence, which means the defendant is likely to die in prison. Buffer, 2019 IL
122327, ¶ 40. Thus, while a 95-year sentence may sound a great deal harsher than a 40-year
sentence, the reality is that, at the 40-year mark, any additional years are almost meaningless.
¶ 103 B. Failure to Provide Due Process at the Sentencing Hearing
¶ 104 Mr. Woodson makes an additional argument that the circuit court deprived him of due
process by failing to provide him with a fair sentencing hearing. Specifically, he contends that the
circuit court (1) prejudged his case and the sentence that should be imposed, (2) interjected its own
personal beliefs or facts not in evidence, and (3) wrongly admonished Mr. Woodson that, as long
as he was eligible for parole, a sentence of 40 years or more would not constitute a de facto life
sentence. We address the first two arguments together before turning to the third.
¶ 105 In support of these first two contentions, Mr. Woodson cites points in the record where the
court discussed irrelevant information or interjected one-sided questions. Examples include the
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No. 1-22-1172
court’s commentary on Mr. Speck’s sexuality and questions like “you’d expect [someone in
prison] to act nice while he was there,” “[i]s something wrong about [Menard’s] strict policies,”
“if [Mr. Woodson] got those jobs, he was treated pretty well, correct,” and “[w]hat’s the—what’s
the—finest people [Ms. Myers] ever interviewed?” Mr. Woodson also cites the court’s comment
that work in prison is merely a method to avoid boredom, that the brevity of time that Mr. Woodson
knew his peers must have eliminated any element of peer pressure that he may have experienced,
and that the defendant in Miller was resentenced to life in prison. The State counters that any due
process claim was forfeited since this claim was not made in the circuit court.
¶ 106 While we agree with Mr. Woodson that some of the court’s comments seem off point, we
do not find anything rising to the level of a constitutional violation. Thus, we reject Mr. Woodson’s
constitutional claim.
¶ 107 However, we do find that some of the court’s interjections offer additional support for the
claim that the court failed to properly apply the Miller factors. Because we view Mr. Woodson’s
reference to these comments only as support for the excessive sentence claim that he made to the
circuit court, we need not decide whether he forfeited his due process claim. See Brunton v.
Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76 (“We require parties to preserve issues or claims for appeal; we do
not require them to limit their arguments here to the same arguments that were made below.”).
¶ 108 In deciding the import of the court’s comments, McKinley is again instructive. There, the
circuit court stated, “ ‘I think expert witnesses in murder cases should read the police reports so
they understand what the facts are in the case’ ” (McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 51), the
gun used in the crime “ ‘made [the defendant] older’ ” (id. ¶ 52), and the defendant “ ‘was entitled
to more time in the penitentiary than even a 40-year sentence’ ” (id.). On review, we found that
the “trial court’s comments suggest[ed] a predisposition to punish certain types of offenders more
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No. 1-22-1172
harshly.” Id. ¶ 80. Similarly, in this case, the circuit court seemed predisposed to diminish the
significance of Mr. Woodson’s rehabilitation and his immaturity at the time of the offense. While
we agree with the State that a circuit court judge is not required to passively observe proceedings,
the tone of some of the court’s questions and comments provides additional evidence of the circuit
court’s abuse of discretion and failure to reasonably apply the sentencing factors.
¶ 109 The court’s comments further demonstrate an undue preoccupation with retribution.
Relevant comments include the court’s justification for its sentence—that Mr. Woodson may be a
“nice guy” but the court saw him with a “gun in his hand,” that when you “do bad things you have
bad consequences,” and “I don’t dislike Antonio Woodson. I dislike what he did however.” While,
standing alone, none of the court’s statements are inappropriate, when read together and considered
in the context of the additional comments and general tone described above, the court demonstrated
a departure from the spirit and purpose of section 5-4.5-105. As we cited, that purpose is to
“rectify[ ] the core concerns implicated when sentencing juvenile offenders” as addressed by
Miller and its progeny. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 42. Miller, in turn, held that “[t]he
heart of the retribution rationale relates to an offender’s blameworthiness, [and] the case for
retribution is [simply] not as strong with a minor as with an adult.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Miller, 567 U.S. at 472. Section 5-4.5-105 therefore makes clear that a circuit court is
not free to apply a similar retributive rationale to a child as to an adult. The circuit court’s
comments seem to forget that Mr. Woodson was, while 17, ultimately a child at the time of the
offense. These comments therefore add further support to our central holding that the circuit court
failed to engage in a reasonable application of the Miller factors.
¶ 110 Mr. Woodson’s third argument is that the court gave him improper admonitions on his right
to elect whether to be sentenced under the “old law” in effect at the time of the crime or the “new
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No. 1-22-1172
law” in effect when he was resentenced. In a hearing held prior to the resentencing hearing, the
court seemed to suggest that, if Mr. Woodson chose to be sentenced under current law, the court
could impose a 60-year sentence because his eligibility for parole eliminated any claim that he had
been given a life sentence under Buffer. During the sentencing hearing, the court again suggested—
this time to Mr. Woodson directly—that this election would impact what sentence he could be
given.
¶ 111 On appeal, Mr. Woodson argues that there are several issues raised by the court’s
comments. The first is that Mr. Woodson’s parole eligibility is decided by statute (730 ILCS 5/5-
4.5-115(b) (West 2022)) and has nothing to do with the law he elects. The second is that it seems
to imply that the judge would alter the sentence, including the impact of the Miller factors, based
on Mr. Woodson’s election.
¶ 112 However, as the State points out, “a trial court’s mistaken explanation” does not in itself
warrant vacating a defendant’s sentence. Mr. Woodson’s brief fails to explain how any error in
what the court said impacted the sentence that Mr. Woodson received. Thus, we reject the
argument that this is an additional basis on which we should vacate his sentence.
¶ 113 C. Sentence Reduction
¶ 114 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) empowers this court to reduce
excessive sentences. “Depending on the surrounding circumstances, we can choose to impose a
new sentence or remand the matter for resentencing by the trial court.” McKinley, 2020 IL App
(1st) 191907, ¶ 91.
¶ 115 The evidence presented to the circuit court during Mr. Woodson’s 2022 hearing was
extensive. We see no need to further exhaust judicial resources by ordering a new hearing and
recalling all of those witnesses. As we did in McKinley, we invoke our authority under Rule
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No. 1-22-1172
615(b)(4) to reduce the sentence imposed.
¶ 116 In McKinley, we had before us statistical information about the average length of prison
time juveniles received upon resentencing, pursuant to Miller, for convictions for murder. Id. ¶ 47.
In that case, we reduced the defendant’s sentence to 25 years followed by three years of mandatory
supervised release. Id. ¶ 93. That seems like the right outcome in this case as well.
¶ 117 We accordingly reduce Mr. Woodson’s 30-year sentence for murder by 5 years to 25 years
and his 10-year sentence for vehicular hijacking also by 5 years, for an aggregate sentence of 30
years. As the circuit court noted, Mr. Woodson may earn good time credit for the vehicular
hijacking sentence, and the total sentence would be followed by a term of mandatory supervised
release.
¶ 118 The dissent points out that our supreme court has cautioned that Rule 615(b) is to be used
sparingly. We agree. However, our supreme court has continued to utilize the power of 615(b)(4)
where the circuit court has imposed a sentence that is an abuse of discretion because it is “greatly
at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law.” Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210. In resentencing Mr.
Woodson to a sentence of 40 years, the circuit court in this case imposed a sentence that was
greatly at variance with the spirit, purpose, and mandate of the criminal code regarding juvenile
sentences. In this unusual circumstance, we use the limited authority to reduce sentences granted
to a reviewing court by this supreme court rule.
¶ 119 The dissent decries a “recent” trend on this court to ignore People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13(1991) and reduce sentences that are not infected by specific legal error such as improper
enhancement or an improper consecutive sentence. But recent cases, including this one, rest on the
fact that the post-Miller juvenile sentencing statute now mandates that all sentences for juveniles
give specific consideration to the defendant’s lack of maturity at the time of the crime and, if such
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No. 1-22-1172
evidence is available, rehabilitation subsequent to that time. See McKinley, 2020 Ill. App. (1st)
191907, ¶ 91.
¶ 120 The dissent also points out that it is not our job to substitute our judgment for that of the
circuit court or to reweigh the sentencing factors. We agree again. But, as we recognized in
McKinley, it is our job to ensure that the specific concerns that underlie the Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller and are codified in section 5-4.5-105 are reflected in the sentence. Key to the
statute and the case law are the realities that defendants like Mr. Woodson have both “diminished
culpability and heightened capacity for change.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. Where, as in this case,
those realities are confirmed by extensive evidence regarding the individual defendant’s
diminished capacity at the time of the crime and dramatic rehabilitation since that time, the failure
to reflect those factors in the sentence is an abuse of discretion that we are not free to “rubber
stamp” with approval. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 86; People v. Williams, 2019 IL
App (1st) 173131, ¶ 20.
¶ 121 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 122 For the foregoing reasons, we reduce Mr. Woodson’s sentence to 25 years for murder and
5 years for vehicular hijacking, with a mandatory supervised release term to follow, to the extent
required by statute.
¶ 123 Sentence modified.
¶ 124 PRESIDING JUSTICE MITCHELL, dissenting:
¶ 125 It is commonly said that, among the most solemn duties entrusted to a trial judge, none is
more sobering than sentencing a convicted criminal defendant. In that moment, the sentencing
judge alone must fashion a sentence within the parameters set by statute that reflects the
seriousness of the offense, vindicates the rule of law, and imposes a fair and just punishment. No
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No. 1-22-1172
small task. Having heard the evidence at trial, the sentencing judge must weigh, among other
factors, the harm to the victim and his family and the mitigating (and aggravating) factors
surrounding the defendant’s conduct. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a) (West 2022). It is for this reason—the
trial judge’s superior position to weigh evidence and to make credibility determinations—that his
sentencing determination is afforded great deference. People v. Webster, 2023 IL 128428, ¶ 29. A
reviewing court should not do as the majority has done in this case: substitute its judgment for that
of the trial judge and simply reweigh the sentencing factors.
¶ 126 Here, the defendant was subject on resentencing to a maximum aggregate sentence of 95
years’ imprisonment: 20 to 60 years for first degree murder (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West
2002)), a 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm (id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii)), and
4 to 15 years for vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3(c) (West 2002)). In 2006, the trial judge
originally sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of 60 years, and on resentencing in 2022,
the trial judge dropped the 20-year firearm enhancement. The trial judge sentenced the defendant
to an aggregate term of 40 years: 30 years for the murder and 10 years for the vehicular hijacking.
That sentence, within the statutory range, is presumed proper. Webster, 2023 IL 128428, ¶ 21. A
40-year aggregate sentence is less than half the potential maximum and represents a 33% reduction
of the defendant’s original sentence.
¶ 127 Despite this significant reduction in the defendant’s sentence, the majority concludes that
the trial judge did not consider all of the statutory mitigation factors required when sentencing an
individual under age 18. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022). (Remember our defendant was 17
years and 10 months old at the time he murdered his victim.) But the record does not support such
a conclusion. A trial judge is presumed to have considered all the evidence placed before it. People
v. Garcia, 2023 IL App (1st) 172005, ¶ 67; see People v. Lopez, 2019 IL App (3d) 170798, ¶ 23
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No. 1-22-1172
(“ ‘Where relevant mitigating evidence is before the court, it is presumed that the court considered
it absent some indication in the record to the contrary other than the sentence itself.’ ” (quoting
People v. Dominguez, 255 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004 (1994))). Further, the trial judge need not make
an express finding on each factor that it considers, and an omission does not mean that the trial
judge did not consider all the factors. People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31.
Here, the trial judge stated more than once on the record that he had reviewed the defendant’s
submission in its entirety, and his colloquy with defense counsel demonstrates as much. The trial
judge considered the defendant’s arguments in mitigation; he just did not necessarily credit them.
The law requires that the trial judge consider the mitigating factors; it does not require that the trial
judge find each factor to be mitigating, let alone that the trial judge accept or credit each argument
in mitigation. Id. Indeed, the General Assembly has mandated that the trial judge make an
“independent assessment” of all the factors implicated at sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(b) (West
2022).
¶ 128 On the potential for rehabilitation (id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(4)), the trial judge expressly
acknowledged the defendant’s exemplary conduct in prison. The majority concedes this, as it must
(supra ¶ 94), but finds that the trial judge did not attach enough weight to it. But, of course, it is
not our job to reweigh the sentencing factors. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213. A defendant’s potential
for rehabilitation is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 214.
The defendant’s mitigation expert noted in her report that defendant’s success in prison is due at
least in part to the structure of prison life, a structure that was absent from the defendant’s life on
the outside. The trial judge expressed appropriate skepticism as to some defense claims. For
example, the defense elicited testimony from a prison guard that the defendant had access to sharp
instruments as a prison barber and yet had never harmed anyone with them. This failure to foment
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No. 1-22-1172
mayhem is hardly compelling proof of good character.
¶ 129 It is undisputed that the defendant murdered a man, and yet the defense case in mitigation
curiously sought to minimize that fact at the cost of its own credibility. If the trial court had a
“preoccupation” with the defendant’s absence of remorse (supra ¶ 109) it is because an imprudent
defense strategy invited it. The record is replete with examples. In her opening statement, defense
counsel blamed the defendant’s friend, Joshua Council, for the crime. In her closing argument, she
repeatedly referred to the shooting as “an accident” in flagrant denial of the jury’s verdict. A
defense mitigation expert found in a hopelessly fawning report that the defendant was “the perfect
scapegoat.” Further, she opined that the defendant “felt great remorse instantly” and then, in the
next sentence, described the defendant’s flight from the jurisdiction after the murder as an effort
to “start fresh.” Suffice it to say, a trial judge does not abuse his discretion when he rejects claims
that defy reality—even when those claims are made in mitigation.
¶ 130 Finally, a word on the majority’s decision to invoke Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4)
(eff. Jan. 1, 1967) to resentence the defendant to an aggregate term of 30 years. The rule provides
that the reviewing court may “reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court” (id.), and research
suggests that this case is the forty-ninth time the appellate court has done so since the rule’s
inception in 1967. The power has been used sparingly. In 1991, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
an appellate decision to modify a sentence on appeal where, like here, the reviewing court
reweighed sentencing factors and substituted its judgment for that of the trial judge. See People v.
Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 20-21 (1991). After Streit, appellate decisions for more than a quarter of a
century only reduced sentences where a legal error required it, such as an improper enhancement
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No. 1-22-1172
or consecutive sentence. 1 That is, until this court’s recent decisions where it has set about
reweighing sentencing factors and substituting its judgment for that of the trial judge. See People
v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 91; People v. Bruce, 2022 IL App (1st) 210811, ¶ 42.
¶ 131 This trend is in clear tension with Streit and the well-established standards requiring
deference to a trial judge’s sentencing determination. 2
¶ 132 For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
1
See People v. Manning, 2017 IL App (1st) 152159-U, ¶ 34 (sentence classification); People v.
McDowell, 2016 IL App (1st) 131081-U, ¶ 38 (sentence enhancement); People v. Key, 2014 IL App (1st)
120329-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (statutory maximum); People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL App (2d) 120892-U, ¶ 10
(extended term sentence); People v. Brown, 2013 IL App (1st) 102527-U, ¶ 31 (concurrent sentence);
People v. Guerrero, 2011 IL App (2d) 090972, ¶ 99 (sentence reversed); People v. Ramey, 393 Ill. App. 3d
661, 671 (2009) (concurrent sentence); People v. Reeves, 385 Ill. App. 3d 716, 735 (2008) (same); People
v. Williams, 385 Ill. App. 3d 359, 371 (2008) (same); People v. Battle, 378 Ill. App. 3d 817, 832-33 (2008)
(same); People v. Waldron, 375 Ill. App. 3d 159, 161 (2007) (same); People v. Smith, 372 Ill. App. 3d 762,
772 (2007) (same); People v. Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1008-09 (2007) (same); People v. Dixon, 366
Ill. App. 3d 848, 856 (2006) (same); People v. Span, 337 Ill. App. 3d 239, 241-42 (2003) (same); People v.
Townsell, 336 Ill. App. 3d 340, 346 (2003) (statutory maximum); People v. Townsell, 328 Ill. App. 3d 616,
620 (2002) (same); People v. Lee, 326 Ill. App. 3d 882, 889 (2001) (Apprendi); People v. Reiner, 251 Ill.
App. 3d 1065, 1067-68 (1993) (extended term sentence).
2Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210, scarcely justifies the majority’s decision to reweigh sentencing factors:
while the Illinois Supreme Court reduced a trial court’s sentence, it specifically noted that, “[i]n so holding,
we are not reweighing any aggravating or mitigating factors.”
32
No. 1-22-1172
People v. Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 03-CR-
22400; the Hon. Stanley J. Sacks, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Yasaman Hannah Navai,
for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique
for Abraham, David H. Iskowich, and Su Wang, Assistant State’s
Appellee: Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
33