In re L.W. ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (1st) 221048-UFIFTH DIVISION
September 1, 2023
Nos. 1-22-1048, 1-22-1167
Consolidated
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
In re L.W., ) Appeal from the
Minor-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
)
) No. 16 JA 240
)
) Appeal No. 1-22-1167
)
(Marc D. Smith, Director of the Department of ) Honorable
Children and Family Services, Contemnor-Appellant). ) Patrick Murphy
) Judge Presiding.
In re R.E., ) Appeal from the
Minor-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
)
) No. 21 JA 1068
)
) Appeal No. 1-22-1048
)
(Marc D. Smith, Director of the Department of ) Honorable
Children and Family Services, Contemnor-Appellant). ) Patrick Murphy
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Nos. 1-22-1048, 1-22-1167 (Consolidated)
¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgments in both of cases finding the Director of the Department
of Children and Family Services in indirect civil contempt was an abuse of
discretion.
¶2 This consolidated appeal of these two cases arises from the circuit court of Cook County’s
orders finding the appellant, Marc D. Smith, who is the director of the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS), in indirect civil contempt of court. The contempt finding was imposed
on Director Smith for not finding appropriate placements for the two minors in question as ordered
by the trial court. On September 16, 2022, this court consolidated these cases on appeal because
of the similar fact patterns and findings by the trial court. In both cases, the Office of the Public
Guardian of Cook County filed petitions for rules to show cause on behalf of the minors. After the
trial court issued the rules to show cause and subsequent hearings, the court entered indirect civil
contempt findings against Director Smith. In each case, the court fined Director Smith $1000 per
day and stated that the purge condition was to find appropriate placement for each minor.
¶3 On appeal, Director Smith argues that the circuit court erred by: (1) finding that he should
be held in indirect civil contempt in each case; and (2) alternatively finding that the consent decree
in B.H. v. Smith, 88-C-5599 (N.D. Ill. 1997), an unrelated case, did not bar the court from finding
him in contempt. For the following reasons, we reverse the finding in 1-22-1048 and dismiss the
appeal in 1-22-1167.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 We state only the facts necessary to resolve this consolidated matter. For a full recitation
of the background of the beyond medical necessity (BMN) call and the issue of youth in the care
of DCFS who remained in psychiatric hospitals and residential treatment facilities beyond their
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discharge date, see In re J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083. The relevant facts of each of the cases
involving the two minors are outlined below.
¶6 Appeal No. 1-22-1048: In re R.E.
¶7 On November 16, 2021, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office filed a petition for
adjudication and wardship and a motion for temporary custody of the minor, R.E., who was 15
years old at the time of the filing of the petition. Around September 4, 2021, R.E. was
psychiatrically hospitalized at Hartgrove Hospital due to aggressive behavior and suicidal
ideations. R.E. was previously hospitalized and diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. R.E.’s mother also disclosed that R.E.
was previously sexually abused by a family member and R.E. had witnessed domestic violence
between her mother and her mother’s paramours. On November 16, 2021, the trial court took
temporary custody of R.E. and appointed DCFS as the temporary guardian of the minor. In
November 2021, DCFS deemed that the recommended level of care for R.E. was a residential
treatment facility.
¶8 On January 14, 2022, Hartgrove Hospital determined R.E. was ready for discharge. Even
though the hospital determined she was ready for discharge, R.E. was still having psychotic
episodes. Based on the recommendation of a residential treatment facility, DCFS made referrals
to Lydia Home, Nexus Indian Oaks, Norman C. Sleezer Youth Home, Uhlich Children’s
Advantage Network (UCAN), and Pavilion. Each of the facilities declined R.E. for placement for
various reasons. Norman C. Sleezer Youth Home declined her for placement citing staffing
shortages, and Lydia Home and Nexus Indian Oaks declined her due to concerns about the level
of care she would require. Some residential treatment facilities requested that R.E. undergo
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additional testing to assess her Intelligence Quotient (IQ), concerned that it was lower than
originally documented.
¶9 On February 22, 2022, the GAL for R.E. filed a motion to compel DCFS to place R.E. in
a residential treatment facility. During the hearing on the motion, DCFS’s Central Area
Administrator, Yolanda Walton, stated that Pavilion and Nexus Indian Oaks declined her and
asked for additional psychological testing for R.E. based on her presentation during the interview
process. Ms. Walton stated that, due to that request, R.E. was scheduled for an updated
psychological examination on March 1, 2022. DCFS requested a continuance of the hearing to
wait for the psychological examination to be completed. Instead, on February 24, 2022, the trial
court granted the GAL’s motion and required DCFS to place R.E. “in a clinically appropriate
placement by March 5, 2022.”
¶ 10 On March 14, 2022, the GAL filed a petition for a rule to show cause, alleging that DCFS
violated the trial court’s February 24, 2022, order to place R.E., since R.E. remained hospitalized.
On March 17, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition for a rule to show cause.
R.E.’s caseworker testified that the updated testing showed that R.E. had cognitive delays and an
IQ of 48. Based on those results, DCFS referred R.E. to three additional residential treatment
facilities—Maryville Academy, Hoyleton Youth & Family Services (Hoyleton), and Allendale
Association. R.E.’s caseworker said she was in the process of setting up interviews with those
facilities. After the hearing, the trial court issued the rule to show cause.
¶ 11 On April 14, 2022, the trial court commenced a contempt hearing. Alicia Ozier, DCFS’s
Deputy Director of Clinical Practice, testified that DCFS had tried to assess R.E.’s needs in terms
of level of care and also medication regimen. Jacquelyn Dortch, DCFS’s Deputy Director of Child
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Services, explained DCFS’s efforts to place R.E. She testified that Hoyleton placed R.E. on a
waiting list with an anticipated wait time of 45 to 60 days, but DCFS was making efforts to shorten
that duration by transferring out youth, who had completed Hoyleton’s program, to less restrictive
placements. When Ms. Dortch tried to have Maryville Academy assess R.E. for placement,
Maryville Academy reported that she was going in and out of psychosis and that she needed to be
medically stabilized before they would consider her for placement. Like Maryville Academy, other
facilities expressed concern about her level of psychosis and the effectiveness of her medication
dosage. The trial court continued the hearing for a week.
¶ 12 After the continuance, DCFS stated that Maryville Academy completed its second
interview with R.E. and had accepted her for placement. Maryville Academy anticipated that she
would be placed on June 15, 2022. Ms. Dortch testified that Maryville Academy wanted to take a
slower approach to her transition to the residential treatment facility due to her history of
hospitalizations, suggesting that a more gradual stepdown would be beneficial for R.E. The trial
court continued the case to June 9, 2022, to monitor the progress of the transition. The day after
the court entered the continuance order, the GAL filed an emergency order to advance and reset
the contempt hearing, challenging DCFS’s representations to the court that R.E. was accepted into
Maryville Academy.
¶ 13 On May 12, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion order to advance and reset
the contempt hearing. Ms. Dortch testified that Maryville Academy conditioned its acceptance of
R.E. on five pre-placement criteria. Those criteria were that: (1) DCFS’s and Hartgrove Hospital’s
physicians would work collaboratively with Maryville Academy’s physicians to finalize a
medication plan for R.E.; (2) Maryville Academy’s clinical social worker would meet weekly with
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R.E. to facilitate her transition; (3) R.E.’s mother would participate in a preplacement child and
family meeting; (4) DCFS would engage with Maryville Academy weekly regarding R.E.’s
progress toward placement; and (5) DCFS would step down other youth who completed Maryville
Academy’s residential program to less restrictive placements to allow Maryville Academy to have
the allocation of staff and resources to safely meet R.E.’s needs. The court continued the case until
May 19, 2022, for a hearing on whether Director Smith of DCFS should be held in contempt of
court. On May 19, 2022, after briefly hearing testimony, the court determined it was not given
enough information to come to a decision and continued the hearing to June 2, 2022.
¶ 14 On June 2, 2022, Ms. Walton testified that it appeared that R.E.’s physicians found the
correct medication regiment for R.E. and she has been doing well. She stated that DCFS is making
great progress toward meeting the checklist that Maryville Academy put in place. The trial court
said the only question that mattered was “[h]as she been accepted or not.” DCFS stated that Ms.
Dortch would testify in response to that inquiry.
¶ 15 Ms. Dortch testified that while she was not “accepted,” DCFS had met all the preplacement
criteria for R.E. to be accepted into the program. DCFS planned on R.E. being admitted to
Maryville Academy on June 15, 2022. She acknowledged that the four children still needed to
move out of Maryville Academy to make room for R.E. but they had plans in place to move them
to step-down placements. One of those minors had a placement date of June 15, 2022, but they
were still awaiting dates for the other three. She testified that people were overly focused on the
word “accepted” but that every placement for minors has pre-placement conditions, implying that
R.E.’s situation was not out of the ordinary. She also disputed the representation that R.E. has been
in Hartgrove Hospital beyond medical necessity since January 2022, because the discharge was
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due to R.E.’s Medicaid benefits running out not that her level of psychiatric need had decreased.
She was still actively psychotic until a medication adjustment in April 2022. The court continued
the matter until June 23, 2022, eight days after R.E. was supposed to be placed. The record does
not contain a transcript of the proceedings on June 23, 2022, if any occurred. A continuance order,
entered on June 23, 2022, shows the case was continued to July 2, 2022.
¶ 16 On July 2, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether Director Smith should be
held in contempt. Ms. Dortch testified that all the criteria for placement had been met except for
moving the four minors out of Maryville Academy. She discussed the plans for each minor,
explaining that three of them were supposed to be placed by July 26, 2022. The other minor was
supposed to go to a foster placement but there was not a set date. She expected R.E. to be placed
at Maryville Academy the week of July 25, 2022. Ms. Dortch stated R.E.’s condition has been
stable since May 2022. She testified that at the time of the hearing, they were not concurrently
working on other placement plans for R.E. because DCFS believed that the Maryville Academy
placement was the most clinically appropriate placement for R.E. and other facilities had declined
her due to her clinical needs. She explained that no order entered by the trial court could expedite
the process for R.E. to be placed at Maryville Academy. When asked by the trial court when the
children, who were being stepped down from Maryville Academy, became ready for discharge to
a less restrictive environment, Ms. Dortch could not answer that question.
¶ 17 After arguments, the trial court held Director Smith in indirect civil contempt of court
fining DCFS $1,000 a day until R.E. was in her placement but staying the fine until July 28, 2022.
The trial court added that it would vacate the finding if R.E. was placed by July 28, 2022.
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Nos. 1-22-1048, 1-22-1167 (Consolidated)
¶ 18 In the trial court’s July 7, 2022, written order, the court noted the systemic issues with
DCFS, which affected minors across the state. However, it stated that the specific reason for the
indirect civil contempt finding against Director Smith was DCFS’s failure to comply with the
court’s direct order to facilitate an appropriate residential placement for R.E. and “ignoring the
court’s orders to place the child appropriately.” In its written order, the court noted that there were
many cases involving minors being held at psychiatric hospitals beyond medical necessity. The
court stated, “Director Smith can purge himself of the contempt by removing [R.E.] from the
psychiatric hospital and placing her appropriately.” The court reiterated that the fine was stayed
until July 28, 2022. On July 15, 2022, Director Smith filed his notice of appeal.
¶ 19 Appeal No. 1-22-1167: In re L.W.
¶ 20 On March 14, 2016, DCFS was appointed the temporary guardian of L.W., when she was
five years old. In the petition for adjudication of wardship, the State alleged that L.W. and her
sibling were physically abused by her mother’s paramour, and her mother and her mother’s
paramour had engaged in domestic violence between themselves.
¶ 21 On February 1, 2022, L.W. was admitted to Hartgrove Hospital after allegedly stabbing
her foster parent a couple of days prior. Prior to the alleged stabbing incident, L.W. lived with her
maternal grandmother but then ran away from the home for a few days and was subsequently put
in a nonrelative foster home. On February 24, 2022, Hartgrove Hospital determined that L.W. was
ready for discharge and the placement plan for her, at that time, was to return home to her maternal
grandmother. The clinical recommendation after each of the three clinical staffings was placement
at a residential treatment facility. Prior to her hospitalization in February 2022, L.W. was in 16
different “placements,” including multiple hospitalizations.
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Nos. 1-22-1048, 1-22-1167 (Consolidated)
¶ 22 On April 18, 2022, L.W.’s GAL filed a petition for a rule to show cause why Director
Smith should not be held in indirect civil contempt of court. In the petition for a rule to show cause,
the GAL alleged that, on April 12, 2022, L.W. was hospitalized after having suicidal ideations and
attempting to take her own life. On April 14, 2022, the trial court ordered L.W. to be placed in an
appropriate secure residential treatment facility or an appropriate psychiatric hospital. On April
16, 2022, she was sent back to Aunt Martha’s Integrated Care Center where she was living prior
to the suicide attempt. In the petition, it referred to prior testimony heard by the trial court that
psychiatric hospitals were nervous to take in DCFS youth because they often were not stepped
down from their hospitalization in a timely manner.
¶ 23 After a hearing on May 12, 2022, the trial court issued the rule to show cause. On May 19,
2022, the trial court held a contempt hearing. After the hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling
finding Director Smith in indirect civil contempt of court. On that date, the court entered a written
order fining Director Smith $1,000 per day and staying the fine accrual until June 2, 2022. The
written order in L.W.’s case mirrored the order in R.E.’s case, in that the trial court stated Director
Smith was being held in contempt for ignoring the trial court’s order to place L.W., which was
entered on April 14, 2022. On June 2, 2022, the court “continued the stay on the fines going in
effect” until June 23, 2022. On June 23, 2022, over the GAL’s objection, the court stayed the
imposition of the fines until July 14, 2022.
¶ 24 On July 14, 2022, the trial court entered an order modifying the fine from $1,000 per day
to $1 per day and imposing the fine on that date. However, the court stayed payment of the fine
until August 1, 2022. On July 22, 2022, Director Smith and DCFS filed a notice of appeal
challenging the May 19, 2022, order and the July 14, 2022, order.
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Nos. 1-22-1048, 1-22-1167 (Consolidated)
¶ 25 We also acknowledge Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018), which
provides that, for an appeal involving the custody of a minor, “[e]xcept for good cause shown, the
appellate court shall issue its decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.”
Director Smith filed his notice of appeal in the first case of these consolidated cases on July 15,
2022. Therefore, because this consolidated matter involves the custody of minors, our order in this
matter was due in December 2022. However, given the similarity of issues in these two cases, this
court granted a motion to consolidate the cases for a more efficient resolution of these two appeals.
Both parties requested extensions of time to file their opening briefs. Director Smith filed his reply
brief on February 28, 2023, and shortly thereafter, on March 9, 2023, the State’s Attorney’s Office
filed a letter of non-intent to file an appellee brief. Accordingly, there was good cause for the delay
in the resolution and issuance of our order in these consolidated cases.
¶ 26 ANALYSIS
¶ 27 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider these cases individually and as a consolidated
matter. “An order finding a person or entity in contempt of court which imposes a monetary or
other penalty” vests jurisdiction in the appellate court (Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)),
and Director Smith filed timely notices of appeal following the trial court’s judgment holding him
in indirect civil contempt in each case now before us. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 28 Director Smith argues that the trial court erred by finding him in indirect civil contempt.
Director Smith makes two central arguments. First, Director Smith argues that DCFS made a
concerted effort to find an appropriate placement for R.E. when ordered to do so by the court but
were unable to place her in a necessary and appropriate placement within the time parameters set
by the trial court. He asserts that he should not have been held in contempt given the obvious
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efforts made by DCFS to comply with the trial court’s orders. Alternatively, Director Smith argues
that the B.H. consent decree bars the trial court from entering a contempt finding in this case based
on the systemic failures of DCFS. Director Smith goes on to assert that the trial court’s order
addresses systemic issues. We first address the trial court’s contempt finding.
¶ 29 Contempt Finding
¶ 30 A court is vested with inherent power to enforce its orders and preserve its dignity by the
use of contempt proceedings.” People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 368 (1996). “The type of
contempt at issue in any given case determines the procedure that must be followed in a contempt
proceeding.” J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 70 (citing In re A.M., 2020 IL App (4th)
190645, ¶ 13). “Accordingly, contempt may be either direct or indirect and civil or criminal.” J.S.,
2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 70. “The existence of an order of the court and proof of willful
disobedience of that order are essential to any finding of indirect contempt.” In re Marriage of
Spent, 342 Ill. App. 3d 643, 653 (2003). Indirect contempt “covers the entire range of
[contumacious] conduct which does not occur in open court or in a constituent part of the court.”
In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 48 (1990).
¶ 31 The primary factor in determining whether a contempt finding is civil or criminal in nature
is “the purpose for which contempt sanctions are imposed.” Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 43. While
the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish past misconduct, civil contempt is designed to be
coercive in nature and “to compel the contemnor to perform a particular act.” Betts, 200 Ill. App.
3d at 43. “Civil contempt proceedings have two fundamental attributes: (1) the contemnor must be
capable of taking the action sought to be coerced, and (2) no further contempt sanctions are
imposed upon the contemnor’s compliance with the pertinent court order.” Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d
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at 44. A valid purge condition is a necessary part of an indirect civil contempt order, and “[a]
contemnor must be able to purge the civil contempt by doing that which the court has ordered him
to do.” Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 391 (2007).
¶ 32 “Initially, the burden falls on the petitioner in a rule to show cause to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged contemnor violated a court order and, therefore,
should be held in contempt.” J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 72. “Noncompliance with a court
order is prima facie evidence of contempt.” In re Marriage of Ray, 2014 IL App (4th) 130326,
¶ 15. “Once that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the contemnor, who has the burden of
showing that the violation was not willful and contumacious and that he or she had a valid excuse
for failing to follow the order.” J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 72. “Contumacious conduct
consists of conduct calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in its administration of
justice or lessening the authority and dignity of the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Marriage of Knoll, 2016 IL App (1st) 152494, ¶ 50. “ ‘Whether a party is guilty of contempt
is a question of fact for the trial court, and a reviewing court should not disturb the trial court’s
determination unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or the record reflects an abuse
of discretion.’ ” Knoll, 2016 IL App (1st) 152494, ¶ 50 (quoting In re Marriage of McCormick,
2013 IL App (2d) 120100, ¶ 17). “A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where
the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the court’s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary,
and not based on any of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knoll, 2016 IL App
(1st) 152494, ¶ 50.
¶ 33 This court reviewed a similar set of circumstances in J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083. In
J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, Director Smith was held in indirect civil contempt of court for
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“ignoring” the trial court’s orders to place several minors who were in “placements” beyond their
medical necessity. This court reversed the contempt judgments finding that the trial court abused
its discretion by holding Director Smith in contempt of court because while he failed to place the
minors, he and DCFS clearly made efforts to place the minors in question and did not ignore the
trial court’s orders. J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 83. The analysis in this case runs along the
same lines.
¶ 34 In the cases before us, there are no disputes amongst the parties that DCFS did not comply
with the trial court’s orders to place each of the minors in an appropriate residential treatment
center. Therefore, a prima facie case was made that Director Smith did not comply with the trial
court’s placement order. The parties dispute, however, whether Director Smith and DCFS were
unable, through no fault of their own, to place the minors in appropriate residential treatment
facilities in accordance with the court’s order. Thus, the parties disagree regarding whether
Director Smith met his burden of proving his inability to comply with the court’s placement orders
within the given time parameters.
¶ 35 Director Smith claims he made every possible effort to place the minors appropriately in
accordance with the trial court’s orders but circumstances beyond his and DCFS’s control
prevented their placement within the time mandated by the trial court’s order. For example, he
cites the fact that DCFS needed to complete an updated psychological assessment for R.E. and,
after the assessment was completed, she was accepted by Maryville Academy. On the other hand,
the GAL focuses its arguments on various methods that were not employed by DCFS to secure
appropriate placements the minors. in accordance with the trial court’s order. The GAL argues
vigorously that there were other avenues available to DCFS to secure appropriate placements for
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the minors or if necessary to create one, yet DCFS continued to employ methods which it should
have known would not comply with the court’s orders.
¶ 36 Since we believe R.E.’s situation is illustrative of the main issues and arguments regarding
whether DCFS and Director Smith’s actions were willful and disregarded the trial court’s order,
we focus our analysis of this issue on R.E.’s situation. Additionally, we note that the trial court
specifically found that Director Smith had “ignored” the trial court’s orders in both cases, where
the court found Director Smith in contempt.
¶ 37 As is appropriate to evaluate the accuracy of the trial court’s ruling, our review of the
court’s contempt finding focuses on the actions of DCFS and Director Smith after the date of entry
of the court’s order relating to appropriate placement of R.E. and before the date on which the trial
court found Director Smith in indirect civil contempt. See J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083, ¶ 72
(stating that unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt focuses only on actions taken after the order,
with which the party did not comply, is entered). The trial court entered a placement order on
February 22, 2022. At the contempt hearing, the court heard testimony from Ms. Dortch about
taking R.E.’s placement process to Maryville Academy slowly due to her history of
hospitalizations and opined that a gradual transition to a residential treatment facility was in R.E.’s
best interest. There was also testimony that Hoyleton put R.E. on its waitlist but DCFS made efforts
to secure her a placement faster with Maryville Academy though, in actuality, it took many months
for her to be placed. Although the GAL argues that DCFS should have created a placement for
R.E. pursuant to section 5(h) of the Children and Family Services Act (20 ILCS 505/5(h) (West
2020)), that is not the criteria upon which we must resolve this appeal (1-22-1048).
¶ 38 In both cases, the trial court stated the reason for its contempt finding was that Director
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Smith “ignored” the court’s orders to place the minors. While the GAL and the court clearly
disagreed with the methods used by DCFS to locate an appropriate placement, by the very
acknowledgement of DCFS’s ineffective methods, the GAL is acknowledging that DCFS did not
ignore the trial court’s orders. Thus, the question we must ask is not whether DCFS chose methods,
which would have yielded an appropriate placement within the time prescribed by the court, but
whether Director Smith “willfully ignored” the trial court’s order thereby engaging in
contumacious conduct. Had the trial court not based its reasoning for the contempt findings on
DCFS ignoring the court’s orders, the analysis would be different. J.S., 2022 IL App (1st) 220083,
¶ 77. However, it did not.
¶ 39 As explained, the record shows that while DCFS’s efforts were clearly ineffective, the trial
court’s orders were not ignored. Accordingly, the court’s ruling that its order was ignored, thereby
resulting in a finding of indirect civil contempt by Director Smith, was erroneous. We find that the
trial court abused its discretion in entering findings of indirect civil contempt against Director
Smith in both cases. See Knoll, 2016 IL App (1st) 152494, ¶ 50.
¶ 40 As we have found that the trial court abused its discretion by finding Director Smith in
indirect civil contempt in both cases, we need not address whether the consent decree in B.H.
applies in that case.
¶ 41 CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court of Cook County in
1-22-1048 and 1-22-1167.
¶ 43 No. 1-22-1048, Reversed.
¶ 44 No. 1-22-1167, Reversed.
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