In re C.V. , 2024 IL App (1st) 230752-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 230752-USECOND DIVISION
February 13, 2024
No. 1-23-0752
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re C.V., a Minor, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 18 JA 0718
)
Crystal V., )
) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Sybil C. Thomas,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s order terminating respondent mother Crystal V.’s parental rights
as to C.V. is affirmed where the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent Crystal V. appeals the trial court’s order finding her to be unfit under
sections 50/1(D)(b) and (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2018)) and
terminating her parental rights over C.V., her minor daughter. She argues that the trial court’s
No. 1-23-0752
finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence because: (1) she continually showed
interest, concern, and responsibility for C.V. throughout the proceedings as required under
section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)) and section 2-29 of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2018)); and (2) she
had made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of
C.V. and reasonable progress toward the return of C.V. within the specified nine-month statutory
period under section 1(D)(m) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2018)) and section 2-29 (705 ILCS
405/2-29 (West 2018)).
¶3 Respondent is the natural mother of the minor C.V., born on June 9, 2018.1 On August 1,
2018, the State filed a petition for the adjudication of wardship of C.V. naming both parents. The
petition alleged that C.V. was neglected under the Juvenile Court Act because she was not
receiving the proper and necessary support for her well-being and due to an injurious
environment (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a), (b) (West 2018)) and abused under the Juvenile Court Act
because her parents created a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other than
accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of emotional
health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The supporting facts for
both allegations stated:
“Mother has one prior indicated report for burns by neglect, cuts, bruises, welts,
abrasions, oral injuries by neglect, environmental neglect and substantial risk of
physical injury/environment injurious to health/welfare by neglect. Mother has
1
C.V.’s natural father D.C. is not a party to this appeal. In September 2023, this court granted his
counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and affirmed the
trial court’s termination of his parental rights. See In re C.V., No. 1-23-0759 (summary order
filed pursuant Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2), (4) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)).
2
No. 1-23-0752
five other minors who are in DCFS custody with findings of abuse, neglect and/or
physical abuse having been entered. *** Mother has been inconsistent ***with
offered and recommended reunification services.”
¶4 On October 18, 2019, following a hearing, the court entered an adjudication order
finding C.V. neglected due to an injurious environment and abused due to a substantial risk of
physical injury. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b), (2)(ii) (West 2018). The order noted that respondent
“has 1 prior indicated report [and] 5 other minors in care. Mother had not completed
reunification services for this minor’s siblings. Father was found guilty of aggravated battery to
this minor’s sibling.” On November 8, 2019, the court entered a disposition order adjudging C.V.
a ward of the court and finding respondent unable, for some reason other than financial
circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline C.V. The permanency order entered
on November 8, 2019, had a goal of return home within 12 months and stated that respondent
had made “some” progress toward the return home of C.V. The order also noted that respondent
had been engaged in services since August 2019.
¶5 The permanency order entered on May 27, 2021, changed the goal to substitute care
pending court determination on termination of parental rights. The order stated that the goal was
changed because “both parents still have reunification services they have not completed.”
¶6 The service plan from March 18, 2022, detailed why the case was opened.
“The case was opened because the biological mother [respondent] and her
paramour [D.C.] were intoxicated, belligerent, and [D.C.] had barricaded
[respondent] and her three youngest children *** in his home. The police were
called and they have [sic] to force their way into [D.C.’s] apartment where they
found knives in the door and broken glass on the floor. [C.V.’s brother J.R.] was
3
No. 1-23-0752
found with the letter ‘M’ carved in the back of his head. [Respondent] could not
identify how the carved ‘M’ on the back of [J.R.’s] head happened. There is a
long history of domestic violence between [respondent] and [D.C.] Other family
members have stated that a couple of days prior to the case opening [C.V.’s sister
Ja. R.] had a black eye in which they believed was caused by [D.C.]”
¶7 The service plan stated that respondent visited her children and had completed the
following services: domestic violence, parenting classes, substance abuse, and parenting capacity
assessment. She was then participating in individual therapy and needed a psychological
evaluation but failed to attend her appointment in March 2022. Respondent also failed to appear
at some random drops and was not in Alcoholics Anonymous and did not have a sponsor.
¶8 The permanency order entered August 22, 2022, continued the goal for C.V. of substitute
care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. The reasons stated for this
goal were: “[C.V.] is 4 and has been in care since she was born. She is in a two parent, pre
adoptive home where all of her needs are being met. Her father was convicted of aggravated
battery of her sibling. Both parents have outstanding reunification services.”
¶9 Also on August 22, 2022, the State filed its petition for the termination of parental rights
for both parents and alleged they were unfit under grounds (b) and (m) of the Adoption Act. 750
ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m) (West 2018). The petition further alleged that D.C. was unfit because he
behaved in a depraved manner pursuant to ground (i) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i)
(West 2018). In April 2023, the State also filed a pleading specifying multiple nine-month time
periods for ground (m) under the Adoption Act: October 19, 2019 to July 19, 2020; July 19, 2020
to April 19, 2021; April 19, 2021 to January 19, 2022; January 19, 2022, to October 19, 2022;
and July 3, 2022 to April 3, 2022. Id. §1(D)(m).
4
No. 1-23-0752
¶ 10 On April 26, 2023, the trial court conducted the termination hearing via video conference.
The following evidence was adduced at the hearing.
¶ 11 Angelica Gervacio testified that she was employed by Association House of Chicago as a
case worker for open Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) cases. She was
assigned to C.V.’s case in January 2020. She was tasked with reviewing the recommended
services and “link” the parents to the services as soon as possible, request reports, and provide
the reports about the parents’ progress to the trial court. According to Gervacio, there was an
open case for C.V.’s siblings when C.V. was born. D.C. had carved “a symbol or some sort of
letter or sign in the back of [C.V.’s brother’s] head, carving it and leaving him with a permanent
mark till this day.” Respondent was convicted of “putting the children at risk, at safety risk, and
environmental risk.” Gervacio testified that an order of protection for respondent and all of the
minor children had been entered against D.C.
¶ 12 C.V. has been in a traditional foster home. She was moved to her current placement in
May 2020, and it is a preadoptive home.
¶ 13 Gervacio testified that respondent had been assessed as needing the following services:
“substance abuse, individual therapy, family therapy, parenting classes. Upon
completing the individual therapy, she would have moved onto family therapy
***. And there was a psychological evaluation there as well, and then we added –
*** and she also had domestic violence, and then we added the parenting capacity
assessment.”
Respondent was also assessed as needing parenting coaching and for random substance drops.
When Gervacio was assigned the case in January 2020, respondent had not completed any of the
services.
5
No. 1-23-0752
¶ 14 Gervacio testified that in January 2020, respondent was engaged in individual therapy at
Association House of Chicago, but she did not complete the service. In early 2021, respondent
told Gervacio that she was going to stop individual therapy because she did not like the therapist,
and she needed a new therapist. Gervacio referred respondent to Sankofa and also Pilsen
Wellness Center. Respondent did not engage in therapy at Sankofa because she said no one had
called her, but she began the intake process at Pilsen Wellness center and then she did not engage
in the service. Gervacio did not make any additional referrals for individual therapy because the
permanency goal had changed to the termination of parental rights. Gervacio told respondent that
she could locate the service herself within the community and bring Gervacio the reports upon
completion. Respondent never provided a report indicating the completion of individual therapy
and the service remained outstanding. Respondent was never referred to family therapy because
it required the completion of individual therapy. Respondent told Gervacio that she had
completed a psychological evaluation, but the evaluation was then outdated. Respondent was
referred for a new evaluation in November 2022.
¶ 15 Because there were still incidents of communication with D.C., Gervacio referred
respondent to domestic violence services again even though respondent had completed some
previously. Respondent told Gervacio that she was afraid of D.C., and he was harassing her.
Respondent had completed some of the substance abuse services and Gervacio told respondent to
continue with after care, including AA meetings and a sponsor. Gervacio did not have any
documentation that respondent attended AA meetings or had engaged with a sponsor. Gervacio’s
agency considered respondent’s substance abuse treatment to be unsuccessful and remained
outstanding. Respondent was also referred for 14 random drops in 2020 and respondent attended
4 of those drops. The results from those four drops were negative. The agency considered a
6
No. 1-23-0752
missed drop to be a positive result. Respondent was referred to 15 drops in 2021 and 9 in 2022,
but she attended 4 in 2021 and 2 in 2022. Those six drops were negative. Gervacio had referred
respondent to two drops in 2023, but respondent did not attend either of those drops. The
substance abuse concern for respondent was strictly for alcohol.
¶ 16 When Gervacio was assigned the case, respondent had already completed one parenting
class prior to January 2020. However, Gervacio did not consider it a successful completion
because she did not see proper engagement with C.V. during visitation and Gervacio had to
redirect respondent several times. Gervacio then rereferred respondent to parenting classes in
March 2021 and respondent completed the classes. While the parenting class recommended
parent-child psychotherapy, Gervacio did not refer respondent to psychotherapy because the
permanency goal had changed to the termination of parental rights. Gervacio continued to see the
same lack of proper engagement during visits. Respondent was not referred to parenting
coaching because of the change in the permanency goal. Gervacio referred respondent to a
parenting capacity assessment in October 2021 because respondent was not demonstrating “the
learned change” in her engagement with C.V. Respondent completed this assessment.
¶ 17 Gervacio supervised the weekly visits between respondent and C.V. The visits lasted one
hour and were held at the agency. Gervacio testified that respondent was not participating
consistently in the visitation. She estimated that respondent participated 70 to 80% of the time
but missed numerous visits. Respondent was required to confirm the visitation 24 hours in
advance. At the April 12, 2023 visitation, the last visit prior to the hearing, Gervacio observed
that respondent was not engaged and interacting with C.V. but rather respondent was often on
her phone. When the permanency goal changed to termination of parental rights, respondent’s
visitation was reduced to once a month. Respondent then asked Gervacio to combine C.V.’s
7
No. 1-23-0752
visitation time with her five siblings. Gervacio explained that respondent would no longer have
one-on-one time with C.V., but respondent told her that she preferred to have “them all
together.”
¶ 18 The parties rested after Gervacio’s testimony. Following closing arguments, the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit under grounds (b) and
(m) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m), (n) (West 2020). The court made the
following findings on the record.
“This court finds that the mother by clear and convincing evidence is unfit
pursuant to [705 ILCS 405/2-29], on the following grounds, on specifically
Grounds B, and M, noting that mother has failed to maintain a reasonable degree
of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child’s welfare and that she has
failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis
for the removal of the child from her care. And has failed to make that progress of
return within a reasonable period of time; specifically, within nine months after
the adjudication of abuse and/or neglect.
***
The court finds not only was the testimony credible to make this -- come
to this determination, but also the documents that have been admitted into
evidence, which outlines specifically those time frames between the time of
adjudication and now as to why the -- what services were required, what services
were performed and what services were completed within the nine-month period.
In fact, between the time of April 13th of 2020 when -- this is People’s
Exhibit No. 8, which is the case service plan that was admitted into evidence, it
8
No. 1-23-0752
was an entire almost two years before there was a goal change in this matter. The
goal did not change until the case service plan dated that is April 9 of 2022, was
created that changed the goal from return home to termination of substitute care
pending termination of parental rights.”
¶ 19 The court then proceeded to the best interest portion of the hearing. Gervacio testified to
the best interest of C.V. She stated that C.V. was in a traditional foster home and she had visited
C.V. in her placement and found it to be safe and appropriate with no signs of abuse, neglect, or
corporal punishment. C.V.’s medical, dental, and vision records were up to date. C.V. did not
need any services and did not have any special needs. C.V.’s foster family consisted of a mother,
father, and a 16-year-old female sibling.
¶ 20 At the most recent visit, Gervacio observed C.V. playing with her foster father. He was
attentive and “looking at what she was saying.” Her foster mother was preparing a hot meal. The
foster family also has a dog and Gervacio observed C.V. interact with the dog. C.V. calls her
foster mother “mommy” and her foster father “daddy.” Gervacio has not seen any inappropriate
or unsafe interactions. C.V. was engaged in extracurricular activities, including swimming and
gymnastics. C.V. has been accepted into the family, including the extended family. She was
engaged in family activities, such as vacations. The foster family wished to adopt C.V.
¶ 21 Gervacio and her agency recommended the termination of parental rights. C.V. is
attached to the foster family and is loved and protected by the entire family. C.V. vocalized to
Gervacio that she wanted to see her mommy, daddy, and big sister. She recognized home when
they arrived there.
¶ 22 C.V.’s foster mother E.R. testified that C.V. had been with her family since May 12,
2020. They want to adopt C.V. because they love her and are ready to “grow” their family. C.V.
9
No. 1-23-0752
has a relationship with E.R.’s sisters, nieces, and mother. They have included C.V. in family
vacations, including trips to Florida and Cancun. E.R. testified that if she was able to adopt C.V.,
she would continue sibling visitations as well as supervised visitation with respondent.
¶ 23 Following E.R.’s testimony, the parties rested in the best interest hearing. After the
parties’ arguments, the trial court found it was C.V.’s best interest to terminate the parental rights
for both parents.
¶ 24 This appeal followed. Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal on April 26, 2023,
listing the order terminating her parental rights for C.V. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 25 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, she contends that: (1) she continually showed
interest, concern or responsibility in C.V. throughout the pendency of the case pursuant to
ground (b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)); and (2) she made
reasonable efforts or progress toward reunification from October 19, 2019 through July 19, 2020,
the only time period specified in the trial court’s findings, pursuant to ground (m) of the
Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)).
¶ 26 Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding at the termination
hearing. Accordingly, respondent has forfeited any argument that the trial court’s best interest
ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence and we will not discuss that finding any
further. See In re M.R., 2020 IL App (1st) 191716, ¶ 26; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct.
1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral
argument, or on petition for rehearing.”)
10
No. 1-23-0752
¶ 27 “ ‘In Illinois, the authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is purely statutory
and the scope of the court’s authority is defined by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption
Act.’ ” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 19 (quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 463 (2008)).
“Illinois policy ‘favors parents’ superior right to the custody of their own children.’ ” Id.(quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d at 464).
¶ 28 The termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit” as defined by section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020); 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). “Parental
unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Adoption of K.B.D., 2012 IL
App (1st) 121558, ¶ 196. “ ‘A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground
for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Gwynne P., 215
Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2005)). Second, “[a]ssuming the parent is found unfit, the circuit court must
then consider whether it is in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights.” In re
J.B., 2014 IL App (1st) 140773, ¶ 49. “ ‘When ruling on parental unfitness, a court is not to
consider the child’s “best interests.” ’ ” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20 (quoting In re Adoption
of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276 (1990)). Each case concerning parental unfitness is considered sui
generis and is decided on its own facts and circumstances presented. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d
340, 354 (2005). “A court may not terminate a parent’s rights on grounds not charged in the
petition. At the same time, however, the State is not required to prove every ground it has alleged
for finding a parent unfit.” Id. at 349. “A trial court’s finding of unfitness will stand if supported
by any one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act.” In re Je. A.,
2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 47 (citing In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006)).
¶ 29 This court will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is contrary to the manifest
11
No. 1-23-0752
weight of the evidence and the record clearly demonstrates that the opposite result was proper. In
re Faith S., 2019 IL App (1st) 182290, ¶ 78. We give great deference to the trial court’s finding
of unfitness, defer to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility assessments, and will not re-
weigh the evidence anew on appeal. Id.¶ 30 We first review the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit pursuant to section
1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act for her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to C.V.’s welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020). Because the language
of section 1(D)(b) is in the disjunctive, any of the three elements may be considered on its own
as a sufficient basis for unfitness. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 49. A finding of
unfitness under ground (b) is based on a subjective analysis. In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st)
162101, ¶ 24. This ground does not focus on the parent’s success but, rather, the reasonableness
of his or her efforts and takes into account the parent’s difficulties and circumstances. Id.However, simply because a parent demonstrates some interest or affection toward his or her
child does not render his or her fit under this ground; rather, his or her interest, concern, and/or
responsibility must be reasonable. Id. “ ‘[N]oncompliance with an imposed service plan, a
continued addiction to drugs, a repeated failure to obtain treatment for an addiction, and
infrequent or irregular visitation with the child have all been held to be sufficient evidence
warranting a finding of unfitness under [ground] (b).’ ” Id. (quoting Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d
239, 259 (2004)). Unlike ground (m), ground (b) has no time constraint that limits our
consideration of respondent’s fitness. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 50.
¶ 31 Respondent contends that she “continually showed interest, concern and responsibility in
her daughter, from the time custody was taken until the time of the parental fitness hearing.”
Respondent focuses primarily on her visitation history to demonstrate her interest, concern, and
12
No. 1-23-0752
responsibility toward C.V. According to respondent, she “displayed appropriate behavior during
visits by caring for her daughter, holding her, and bringing her food and gifts.” She also noted
that she completed the service requirements that “directly related to her relationship with her
child,” including a parenting program and a parenting capacity assessment.
¶ 32 Contrary to respondent’s contentions, the record supports the trial court’s finding by clear
and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit to be a parent based on her failure to
“maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility” as to her daughter’s
welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020). As the Guardian contended in its brief, respondent
did not complete the required services to progress toward reunification with C.V. The record
disclosed that while respondent engaged in some of the required services, she did not
successfully complete them. Nearly three years passed from when the case was first opened in
August 2018, when C.V. was approximately two months old, to when the goal was changed to
the termination of parental rights on May 27, 2021. Additionally, nearly two years passed from
when the permanency goal changed to the date of the unfitness hearing on April 26, 2023.
Respondent, thus, had more than four and a half years to complete the required services, but she
failed to do so. We also point out that her older children were already in care when C.V. was
born. It is well established that a failure to comply with an imposed service plan and infrequent
or irregular visitation with the child may support a finding of unfitness under section (b). In re
Jeanette L., 2017 IL App (1st) 161944, ¶ 18.
¶ 33 The service plan from April 2020 indicated that respondent was making satisfactory
progress and was consistently attending supervised visitation, attending individual therapy,
completed substance abuse service, her drops were negative, and she was attending AA. At that
time, the permanency goal was return home.
13
No. 1-23-0752
¶ 34 In the October 2020 service plan, the evaluation indicated an unsatisfactory outcome. It
reported that respondent had poor attendance with visits with respondent stating that she had a
damaged phone or no battery to confirm the visits. The evaluation also observed that respondent
had continued contact with her abuser, D.C., despite having completed the domestic violence,
and noted police incident reports from June 2020 and August 2020. Respondent “dropped”
individual therapy and was not able to proceed with family therapy. Respondent failed to
complete the after care for substance abuse by failing to appear at random drops, not attending
AA, and not having an AA sponsor.
¶ 35 The April 2021 service plan updated respondent’s progress and continued with the goal
of return home. The evaluation detailed that respondent was attending supervised visits with
C.V. and respondent retook parenting classes, was participating in new substance abuse
treatment, and her drops were negative. Respondent had not completed individual therapy, a
psychological evaluation, and her after care attendance at AA meetings. The plan stated that
respondent: (1) would continue to participate in the retaking of parenting classes and the
following child parenting psychotherapy; (2) would participate in a psychological evaluation; (3)
would restart individual therapy sessions and when appropriate proceed to family therapy; (4)
would continue to participate in the retaking of substance abuse and follow the after care to
attend AA meetings and have an AA sponsor; and (5) would continue to attend random drops.
¶ 36 In May 2021, the permanency goal for C.V. had changed to substitute care pending the
termination of parental rights. The April 2022 service plan observed that respondent had made
unsatisfactory progress. She still needed to restart individual therapy after she failed to complete
the intake appointments. Respondent also had not completed her substance abuse after care by
failing to attend AA meetings, obtain an AA sponsor, and failed to appear at most of the random
14
No. 1-23-0752
drops. Regarding respondent’s domestic violence service, the plan noted that she completed the
service, but failed to “demonstrate learned growth.” Respondent was provided with a referral for
a psychological evaluation, but she failed to attend the appointment. The October 2022 service
plan detailed the same lack of progress with respondent’s failure to restart individual therapy,
attend AA meetings, obtain an AA sponsor, and attend random drops.
¶ 37 In contending that she demonstrated interest, concern, and responsibility toward C.V., as
required under section (b), respondent focuses primarily on her history of complying with
visitation. Gervacio testified that respondent attended 70-80% of the scheduled visits.
Respondent then contends that the March 2022 parenting capacity assessment “would consider
75% engagement in services a reasonable goal or ‘benchmark.’ ” However, the parenting
capacity assessment reference to a benchmark of 75% was in relation to engaging and
cooperating with all services, and specifically discussed psychotherapy and parenting coaching.
Respondent did not complete either of these services. “[T]he plain meaning of the phrase
‘[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child’s
welfare’ in subsection (b) includes all situations in which a parent’s attempts at maintaining a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility are inadequate, regardless of whether
that inadequacy seems to stem from unwillingness or an inability to comply.” In re M.I., 2016 IL
120232, ¶ 26. “Subsection (b) contains no state of mind requirement, nor does it carve out an
exception for faultless failure.” Id.¶ 38 Additionally, respondent seeks to distinguish Gervacio’s testimony that respondent did
not display “proper engagement as far as nurturing appropriateness,” by referencing a portion of
the parenting capacity assessment. Respondent noted that “other personnel reported that the
mother desired to hold the child, picked her up gently, maintained constant eye contact, and
15
No. 1-23-0752
spoke with her.” However, the full context of that report supports Gervacio’s testimony. The
following answer was provided in response to this question, “What is the strength and quality of
the attachment bond [respondent] has with her minor child?”
“[Respondent’s] strength and quality attachment bond toward her daughter,
[C.V.], has several factors to overcome. [Respondent] has expressed feeling guilty
that ‘C.V. was born into this, and she didn’t deserve it.’ Integrated Assessment
reports dated 09/08/2016 and 09/20/2018 reported that [respondent’s] first
response to seeing [C.V.] was ‘joy.’ During a visit, Permanency worker, Ms. Elisa
Fabian, observed [respondent] desiring to hold [C.V.] According to Ms. Fabian’s
report, [respondent] ‘gently picked up the baby, had constant eye contact, spoke
to her, and held the baby upright so she could look around.’ However, according
to [the foster mother], during [respondent’s] visitations with [C.V.], she often
observes [respondent] giving [C.V.] the phone to keep her occupied.
[Respondent] may desire to build a healthy attachment toward her daughter but
struggles to implement healthy parental knowledge or build a healthy attachment
bond to her children, including [C.V.] [Respondent’s] challenge in implementing
healthy attachment bonds to her children may be impeded by symptoms of mood
dysregulation/depression, which is compounded by [respondent’s] history of
trauma, substance use as well as her decision-making process in choosing
romantic paramours. A significant barrier to [respondent’s] healthy attachment is
her belief that her substance use and domestic violence no longer affect her
children.”
¶ 39 The parenting capacity assessment also discussed how respondent’s noncompliance with
16
No. 1-23-0752
services affected her ability to parent successfully.
“[Respondent’s] non-compliance with services severely affects her ability to
parent successfully. This finding is predicated on [respondent’s] chronic history
of abuse and neglect across her development. Unstable family dynamics, sexual
abuse, chronic history of substance use, school disengagement, early pregnancy at
age 16, as well as the pressures of raising six children suggest interventions are
necessary to reduce the risk of future child maltreatment. Moreover, [respondent]
has engaged in romantic relationships with partners who have a history of gang
affiliation, chronic substance use, and have a history of criminal behaviors.
Without proper treatment to address the sexual abuse trauma, symptoms of
depression, history of substance use, and improvement in her romantic
relationship choices, any child under her care is at an increased risk for physical,
emotional, and psychological abuse, leading to DCFS involvement.”
¶ 40 In a summary, the parenting capacity assessment observed: “[Respondent’s] parenting
competency and skills are ambiguous. Meaning, that [respondent] is inconsistent in her care for
her children. The symptoms of depression, history of substance use, and engagement in chaotic
romantic relationships are significant factors that impede [respondent’s] healthy parental
approach.”
¶ 41 Respondent also seeks to excuse her failure to confirm visitation and participating in
parenting coaching and psychotherapy by speculating beyond what the record supports.
Regarding her failure to confirm visitation 24 hours in advance, she suggests without any
evidence in support that it “might be a sign of financial instability rather than a lack of
reasonable interest, concern or responsibility.” In discussing Gervacio’s testimony that
17
No. 1-23-0752
respondent was referred for parent coaching and parent-child psychotherapy, respondent
speculates that “the feasibility of the mother’s participation was not expanded upon in terms of
wait lists, eligibility, and the availability of” C.V. No evidence was presented that respondent
was unable to comply with these referred services due to issues with a wait list or eligibility.
Absent any evidence in the record to support these claims, we will disregard them as speculation.
¶ 42 Although respondent expressed some degree of care and interest in C.V., the State proved
by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of concern and
responsibility for C.V.’s welfare. The unrebutted evidence presented at the unfitness hearing
established that while respondent showed some consistency in visitation, she failed to
successfully complete most of the required services to correct the reasons why C.V. was placed
in care. Respondent had more than four year years from when the case was opened to comply,
but she failed to do so. Based upon our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial
court’s decision finding respondent unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 43 Because we have found that the trial court’s finding under ground (b) was supported by
clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we need not
reach the court’s additional finding under ground (m). As previously observed, a trial court’s
finding of unfitness will stand if supported by any one of the statutory grounds set forth in
section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 47. Since respondent
has not challenged the court’s best interest finding, we find that the trial court’s order terminating
respondent’s parental right to C.V. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 44 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook
County.
18
No. 1-23-0752
¶ 45 Affirmed.
19