People v. Wilcoxson , 2024 IL App (4th) 231373-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (4th) 231373-UNOS. 4-23-1373, 4-23-1374, 4-23-1375 cons.
NOTICE
This Order was filed under IN THE APPELLATE COURT FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 13, 2024
not precedent except in the OF ILLINOIS Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Tazewell County
BLAKE T. WILCOXSON, ) Nos. 23CF155
Defendant-Appellant. ) 23CF490
) 23CF574
)
) Honorable
) Christopher R. Doscotch,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Steigmann and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The trial court’s pretrial detention order is vacated in part where the court
lacked the authority to order defendant detained in a case that involved a pending
petition to revoke his probation and his alleged violations of his probation were not
criminal offenses.
(2) The trial court’s detention order is reversed in part and the matter remanded
where the court erred by ordering defendant detained in the absence of a verified
petition filed by the State to deny his pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant, Blake T. Wilcoxson, appeals the trial court’s decision in three
underlying criminal cases to deny him pretrial release under article 110 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public
Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). Defendant’s
appeals have been consolidated on review. For the reasons that follow, we vacate in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 6, 2023, the State charged defendant—in Tazewell County case No. 23-
CF-155—with two counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2022)), both of which
were Class 4 felony offenses. Defendant was arrested and the trial court set his bond at $3000,
with 10% to apply. On March 7, 2023, defendant posted bond and was released from custody. On
March 23, 2023, he failed to appear for his arraignment in the case. The court issued a warrant for
defendant’s arrest and ordered his bond forfeited.
¶5 On April 25, 2023, the warrant was executed, and defendant was arrested and held
without bond. On May 8, 2023, he pleaded guilty to his retail theft charges and was sentenced to
24 months of high-risk probation. Defendant was also ordered to serve a total of 105 days in jail,
with credit for 15 days served. The remaining 90 days in jail were “stayed pending a remission
hearing” set for November 9, 2023, to determine whether defendant was in full compliance with
the conditions of his probation.
¶6 On July 3, 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation. It alleged
he violated his probation by failing to (1) report as directed to the adult probation department on
May 8, 2023, and June 7, 2023; (2) keep his probation officer informed of his current address; and
(3) respond truthfully when a probation officer asked his name on June 6, 2023.
¶7 Also on July 3, 2023, the State charged defendant in a separate case—Tazewell
County case No. 23-CF-490—with unlawful possession of less than five grams of a substance
containing methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2022)), a Class 3 felony. Defendant was
arrested and bond was set in both of his cases at $7500, with 10% to apply. On July 28, 2023,
defendant posted bond and was released from custody.
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¶8 On August 7, 2023, the State filed a third criminal case against defendant—
Tazewell County case No. 23-CF-574. It charged him with (1) unlawful possession of a stolen or
converted vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2022)), a Class 2 felony; (2) burglary (720 ILCS
5/19-1(a) (West 2022)), a Class 3 felony; and (3) unlawful possession of less than five grams of a
substance containing methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2022)), a Class 3 felony.
¶9 On August 10, 2023, defendant failed to appear in court for a review in case No.
23-CF-155 and for a pretrial scheduling conference in case No. 23-CF-490. Again, a warrant was
issued for his arrest and his bond was forfeited. On August 24, 2023, defendant was arrested. He
appeared in court on all three cases the following day and was ordered to be held in custody without
bond.
¶ 10 On September 18, 2023, the Act’s provisions became effective. See Rowe v. Raoul,
2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52, 223 N.E.3d 1010. On September 19, 2023, defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration of his pretrial release conditions in case No. 23-CF-155, citing section 110-7.5 of
the Code, as amended by the Act (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5 (West 2022)). Defendant asked the trial
court to set the matter for a hearing and “reconsider the conditions of pretrial release.”
¶ 11 On November 9, 2023, defendant filed a motion to reinstate bond and release him
from custody in all three of his cases. Citing section 110-7.5(b) of the Code (id. § 110-7.5(b)), he,
again, asked the trial court to “reconsider the conditions of pretrial release.” No responsive
pleading was filed by the State to either of defendant’s motions.
¶ 12 On November 14, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing relative to all three
cases. Defendant’s counsel asked the court to consider defendant’s November 9, 2023, motion and
proceeded first, “[by] way of proffer.” Counsel represented to the court that defendant failed to
appear in court on August 10, 2023, “because he had just confused his court date.” Counsel also
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asserted that defendant’s mother, who was present in court, was prepared to sign an affidavit
“accepting responsibility to provide supervision for [defendant] and to report violations.”
According to counsel, defendant’s mother resided “in the Pekin area,” and she would allow
defendant to reside in her home while his cases were pending. Counsel asked the court to either
reinstate defendant’s originally posted bond or, alternatively, release him from custody.
¶ 13 In response, the State noted defendant had a pending petition to revoke in case No.
23-CF-155, was placed on high-risk probation in that case, and “completely failed to do anything”
relative to his probation, including to “report” after his release from custody. The State represented
that defendant gave a false name to a probation officer who recognized him before he “basically
ran away.” It maintained that defendant had a substantial criminal history, as well as ties to
Arkansas and Missouri. In addition to defendant’s Tazewell County cases, he was arrested in
Peoria County while on bond and high-risk probation. The State further asserted that defendant
had prior failures to appear in two 2023 Peoria County misdemeanor cases, and that he faced 90
days’ jail time in case No. 23-CF-155, which had been stayed pending a remission hearing that
had not yet been conducted. It argued defendant presented a flight risk and asked the trial court to
deny him release from custody.
¶ 14 Following the State’s response, the trial court noted its confusion regarding how
the matter should be analyzed. It inquired whether the parties were asking it “to evaluate per the
*** Act,” and both responded in the affirmative. The court then stated it did not “see a petition for
detention from the State.” The State asserted that was accurate and when defendant’s motion was
filed, “it was not indicated *** that the defendant was electing under the new *** Act.” The court,
however, noted that defendant’s November 9, 2023, motion referenced section 110-7.5 of the
Code. The court further stated as follows:
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“So I’m just trying to figure out how I’m analyzing the case, whether it’s willful
flight or detention for the offense. Because I don’t even know what the underlying
offenses were on the—on the petitions to revoke. One was meth. What was [case
No. 4-23-]155?”
The parties responded that case No. 23-CF-155 involved two Class 4 counts of retail theft.
¶ 15 The trial court next inquired as to the State’s basis for objecting to pretrial release
in case No. 23-CF-574. The State reiterated the arguments previously made based on defendant’s
criminal history and failures to appear. The court then stated as follows:
“Yeah because I—and I don’t have the answer to this question, but I’m just
putting it out there, is—once [defendant] files a motion, what does the State need
to file or not file in response beforehand to—for me to detain? Because I—so I
know what we’re proceeding under, whether it’s—I think willful flight is clear here
because it was a no bond warrant and we had that issue. But it’s just food for thought
on that issue because I don’t know the answer to that question.
*** So I’m going to treat it as willful flight for today. It’s not going to
change—change the outcome though. All right. And I need to know that because
Mr.—your proffer seemed like it was under the *** Act as well with his mother
watching.”
¶ 16 The trial court next clarified with the parties defendant’s age of 32 and the number
of his prior failures to appear, which the State represented was four. The court went on to state that
it was treating the case “as a willful flight only because [it did not] have a detention petition on
[case No. 23-CF-574] right now.” In finding defendant should be detained, the court noted that he
had been on high-risk probation and “didn’t turn [himself] in,” and that he was alleged to have
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committed additional offenses, including a Class 2 felony, while on probation. Noting that the
burden of proof in the case was clear and convincing evidence, it stated the presumption was great
that the probation violations occurred. Finally, the court concluded as follows:
“So for those reasons, I’m going to continue to detain you, but on the willful flight
basis only.
And again, I don’t know the answer to that question without a
counterpetition, but the way I just read the statute, I believe that this is within the
Court’s purview without the State filing anything, since [case Nos. 23-CF-155 and
23-CF-490] were no bond and they were a no flight. But I’m not detaining you for
danger to the community purposes on the [23-CF-]574 case. So all three you’ll be
detained.”
¶ 17 The same day as the hearing, the trial court entered a written detention order in all
three cases. The record shows the court utilized a check-the-box style form order, which stated
both that a hearing was conducted based “on the State’s Petition to Detain” and “defendant’s
petition for release pursuant to” subsection 110-7.5 of the Code. The court checked boxes stating
defendant had “a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution” and that he was charged
with committing a felony listed in subsections 110-6.1(a)(1) through (7) of the Code (725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7) (West 2022)). The court checked a box indicating defendant had been on
probation and also made a finding that his risk of flight could not be mitigated by any release
condition or combination of conditions, stating as follows:
“Based upon facts of the case and reasons stated on the record to include but not
limited to histories of failing to appear, never showing to probation on the 2 [sic]
[petition to revoke] cases, recency of the last failure to appear on [August 10, 2023,]
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and new charges while on high[-]risk probation.”
¶ 18 On November 27, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal in each of his three cases
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). Defendant sought reversal of
the trial court’s detention order based on the following grounds (1) the State failed to prove that
the proof was evident or the presumption great that he committed the charged offenses, (2) the
State failed to prove that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate his risk of
willful flight, and (3) the court erred in finding that no condition or combination of conditions
would reasonably ensure his appearance for later hearings or prevent him from being charged with
a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor offense.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant has filed a Rule 604(h) memorandum in support of his request
for reversal of the trial court’s detention order. Defendant argues (1) the court erred by detaining
him in connection with case No. 23-CF-155 because he had already pleaded guilty and been
sentenced to probation in that case and, as a result, the Act did not apply; (2) the court erred by
holding a detention hearing when the State had not filed a verified petition to detain; and (3) the
State failed to prove he was eligible for detention because it did not show he committed any
qualifying offense “and did not allege any specific articulable facts about the alleged offenses.”
¶ 21 A. Detention in Case No. 23-CF-155
¶ 22 The first issue raised by defendant on appeal in his Rule 604(h) memorandum
concerns the trial court’s authority to order detention in case No. 23-CF-155. According to
defendant, the Act only applies “pretrial,” and because he had already pleaded guilty and been
sentenced in case No. 23-CF-155, the court lacked the authority to order his detention under the
Act in that case. Defendant maintains the court’s detention order should be vacated as it applies to
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case No. 23-CF-155.
¶ 23 Initially, we note defendant did not raise this issue either before the trial court or in
his notice of appeal. Under such circumstances, the issue may be deemed forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023) (“The Notice of Appeal shall describe the relief requested and the
grounds for the relief requested.”); People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 19 (finding an
issue raised for the first time in a defendant’s Rule 604(h) memorandum was forfeited). Notably,
however, the State does not argue that forfeiture precludes review of the issue and, instead, it
concedes that error occurred. We note that “forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not the court,
and we may exercise our discretion to review an otherwise forfeited issue.” See People v. Curry,
2018 IL App (1st) 152616, ¶ 36, 100 N.E.3d 482. Also, a defendant’s forfeiture may be overlooked
“when necessary to obtain a just result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Raney, 2014
IL App (4th) 130551, ¶ 33, 8 N.E.3d 633. Under the circumstances presented, we decline to find
the issue forfeited in this instance and consider its merits.
¶ 24 The trial court’s decision to deny a defendant pretrial release is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. A court abuses its
discretion when its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person
would agree with the position it has adopted. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 25 Additionally, we note that this issue presents a matter of statutory construction,
which we review de novo. People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 13. “A court’s
fundamental objective in addressing issues of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect
to the legislature’s intent.” People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45, 220 N.E.3d 1034. “The most
reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain
and ordinary meaning.” People v. Kastman, 2022 IL 127681, ¶ 30, 211 N.E.3d 459. Additionally,
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“[a] statute is viewed as a whole.” Id.¶ 26 In this instance, the parties agree that, under the Act, defendant could not be
detained in case No. 23-CF-155 because he had already pleaded guilty and been sentenced to
probation in that case. While we agree that detention was not authorized under the Act, we agree
for a different reason. Specifically, both parties overlook the pending petition to revoke
defendant’s probation in case No. 23-CF-155. When a defendant has been accused of a probation
violation, there are circumstances under which the Code’s pretrial release procedures apply.
¶ 27 Relevant to this issue, section 5-6-4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified
Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(b) (West 2022)) provides that when the State has filed a petition charging
a violation of probation, conditional discharge, or supervision, the trial court must conduct a
hearing of the alleged violation. Additionally, it states “[t]he court shall admit the offender to
pretrial release pending the hearing unless the alleged violation is itself a criminal offense in which
case the offender shall be admitted to pretrial release on such terms as are provided in the Code
***, as amended.” Id. Under the plain language of section 5-6-4(b), a defendant alleged to have
violated his or her probation by committing a criminal offense may be subject to detention under
article 110 of the Code. See People v. Singleton, 2024 IL App (4th) 231104-U, ¶ 19 (holding that
where the defendant was accused of violating the terms of his conditional discharge by committing
a criminal offense, under the plain language of section 5-6-4(b) of the Unified Code, he was
entitled to pretrial release on such terms as provided in article 110 of the Code).
¶ 28 Here, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation in case No. 23-CF-
155, alleging he violated the conditions of his probation by failing to (1) report to the probation
department on two specific dates, (2) keep his probation officer informed of his current address,
and (3) respond truthfully when a probation officer asked him his name. Because the State did not
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charge defendant with violating his probation by committing a criminal offense, the provision in
section 5-6-4(b) that states pretrial release shall be “on such terms as are provided in the Code”
was not applicable to defendant’s specific circumstances. Instead, he was entitled to “pretrial
release pending the hearing” on his violations. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(b) (West 2022). Accordingly, we
agree with the parties that the trial court was not authorized to detain defendant under the Act in
case No. 23-CF-155. The court abused its discretion by ordering detention in that case, and its
order as it pertains to case No. 23-CF-155 must be vacated.
¶ 29 B. Authority for Detention Hearing
¶ 30 On appeal, defendant next argues that the trial court erred by holding a detention
hearing in his two remaining cases—case Nos. 23-CF-490 and 23-CF-574—when the State had
not filed a verified petition to deny him pretrial release. Defendant contends his motion to be
released from custody was filed pursuant to subsection 110-7.5(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-
7.5(b) (West 2022)), entitling him to a hearing for the reconsideration of his pretrial release
conditions. Defendant maintains that, instead, the court improperly conducted a detention hearing
under section 110-6.1 of the Code (id. § 110-6.1), which it was not authorized to do in the absence
of the State’s filing of a verified petition to deny him pretrial release.
¶ 31 Again, the record reflects defendant forfeited this issue by raising it for the first
time in his Rule 604(h) memorandum. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023); Martin,
2023 IL App (4th) 230826, ¶ 19. However, defendant asks this court to overlook his forfeiture on
the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Additionally, he suggests that (1) the plain-error doctrine may be applied to excuse
his forfeiture or (2) we overlook his forfeiture “[d]ue to the irregularity of the proceeding in the
trial court and in the interest of obtaining a just result” as we did in a previous case under similar
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factual circumstances. See People v. White, 2023 IL App (4th) 230858-U, ¶ 15 (noting forfeiture
is a limitation on the parties but not the court and that forfeiture of an issue may be overlooked
when necessary to obtain a just result).
¶ 32 We note that the challenged proceedings below occurred shortly after the effective
date of the Act, and the record reflects confusion by both the trial court and the parties regarding
the procedures applicable to defendant in light of his motion to reconsider the conditions of his
release. Further, the State does not argue on appeal that forfeiture should bar this court’s
consideration of defendant’s claim of error. Given these specific circumstances, we find it
appropriate to overlook defendant’s forfeiture and consider the merits of his claim in order to arrive
at a just result.
¶ 33 As noted above, the trial court’s decision to deny pretrial release is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. Further, statutory construction
issues are subject to de novo review. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 13.
¶ 34 Section 110-7.5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5 (West 2022)) “takes into
consideration those persons who were arrested prior to the effective date of the Act, and separates
them into three categories.” People v. Lippert, 2023 IL App (5th) 230723, ¶ 9.
“The first category consists of any person who was released subject to pretrial
conditions prior to the effective date of the Act. [Citation.] The second category
consists of any person who remains in pretrial detention after being ordered
released with pretrial conditions, including the depositing of monetary security.
[Citation.] The third category consists of any person who remains in pretrial
detention and whose bond was previously set as ‘no bail.’ [Citation.]” Id.¶ 35 Defendants who fall into the second category are entitled to a hearing under section
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110-5(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022)), while defendants who fall into the third
category are entitled to a hearing “for reconsideration of pretrial conditions.” 725 ILCS 5/110-
7.5(b) (West 2022). The portion of section 110-7.5(b) that is relevant to the third category of
offenders provides as follows:
“On or after [the effective date of the Act], any person *** who remains in
pretrial detention and is eligible for detention under Section 110-6.1 shall be
entitled to a hearing according to the following schedule:
(1) For persons charged with offenses under paragraphs (1) through (7) of
subsection (a) of Section 110-6.1, the hearing shall be held within 90 days of the
person’s motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions.
(2) For persons charged with offenses under paragraph (8) of subsection (a)
of Section 110-6.1, the hearing shall be held within 60 days of the person’s motion
for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions.
(3) For persons charged with all other offenses not listed in subsection (a)
of Section 110-6.1, the hearing shall be held within 7 days of the person’s motion
for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions.” Id.¶ 36 Additionally, we note that, under the Code, all defendants are presumed eligible for
and entitled to pretrial release. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e). Although the Act authorizes a trial court
to order pretrial detention, such may only occur following a hearing under section 110-6.1 of the
Code, which must be initiated by the State’s filing of a verified petition to deny pretrial release.
Id. §§ 110-2(e), 110-6.1(a). Further, the Code permits the State to file a petition for pretrial
detention in response to a defendant’s motion made pursuant to section 110-7.5(b). Jones, 2023 IL
App (4th) 230837, ¶ 24.
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¶ 37 In the present case, defendant was arrested and held without bail prior to the
effective date of the Act. Once the Act became effective, he filed a motion in which he requested
the trial court “reconsider the conditions of pretrial release” under section 110-7.5(b). The State
did not file a petition seeking pretrial detention; however, it did argue at the hearing on defendant’s
motion that he should remain in custody. Although the court acknowledged the lack of a petition
filed by the State and expressed confusion over the correct statutory analysis to employ, it
ultimately entered an order denying defendant pretrial release. We agree with defendant that such
an action was not authorized by the Code in the absence of a verified petition filed by the State.
¶ 38 This court’s recent decision in White, 2023 IL App (4th) 230858-U, is instructive.
There, like in this case, the defendant was arrested prior to the effective date of the Act. Id. ¶ 4.
The trial court set the defendant’s bond at $300,000, but he was unable to pay and remained in
custody. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. After the Act became effective, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration
of his pretrial release conditions. Id. ¶ 7. The State did not file a verified petition for detention, but
it did request at a hearing on the motion that the trial court hold the defendant in custody. Id. ¶¶ 7-
8. The trial court indicated it was considering the matter as if the State had filed a petition for
detention and ordered the defendant detained. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 39 On review, we reversed the trial court’s detention order. Id. ¶ 23. We stated,
because the “defendant was previously ordered released on the condition of depositing monetary
security but remained in pretrial custody due to his inability to pay,” section 110-7.5(b) entitled
him “to a hearing under section 110-5(e) when he filed his motion for reconsideration of the
conditions of his pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 17. We held the trial court was not permitted to sua sponte
hold a detention hearing upon a defendant’s motion for reconsideration. Id. ¶ 18. We further stated
as follows:
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“[The Act] sets forth specific circumstances in which release may be denied and
specific procedures that must be followed before release may be denied. Such
procedures are initiated by the State, not the trial court, by the filing of a verified
petition to deny pretrial release. [Citation.] As the State did not file a verified
petition in the instant case, it was improper for the court to hold a detention hearing
***.
*** [S]ection 110-2(a) of the Code provides that pretrial release may be denied
only after the court has held a hearing under section 110-6.1, which must be
initiated by the State filing a verified petition. [Citation.] Thus, in the absence of a
verified petition seeking the defendant’s pretrial detention, the trial court does not
have the discretion to hold a detention hearing when a defendant who has
previously been ordered released on the condition of depositing monetary security
seeks a hearing under sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5(e).” Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 40 A similar result is warranted in the present case. The State did not file a verified
petition for pretrial detention, which would have triggered proceedings under section 110-6.1 of
the Code and allowed the trial court to deny defendant pretrial release. We note that, on appeal,
the State contends that although it did not “physically” file a verified petition to detain, its petition
“was made orally by the prosecutor at the hearing,” and both parties informed the court that they
were proceeding with a detention hearing under the Act. Initially, we find that the plain language
of the Act requires a verified written petition, and the State fails to present any authority or
reasoned analysis to support its contention that orally moving to detain a defendant meets the Act’s
requirements. Further, although the parties both responded in the affirmative when the court
questioned whether they were asking it “to evaluate per the *** Act,” such does not amount to an
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agreement or acquiescence to proceeding specifically under section 110-6.1 of the Code with a
detention hearing.
¶ 41 In this instance, the trial court’s comments were confusing regarding the precise
analysis it employed at the hearing. However, the record clearly shows it ordered defendant
detained on willful flight grounds, which may only be done following a section 110-6.1 detention
hearing. Such was not permissible in the absence of the State’s filing of a written verified petition
to deny defendant pretrial release. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s detention order as it pertains
to case Nos. 23-CF-490 and 23-CF-574, and we remand for a hearing on defendant’s section 110-
7.5(b) motion to reconsider the conditions of his pretrial release. In so holding, we note “section
110-5(a) of the Code [(725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022))] sets forth the matters the court is to
consider when determining what conditions to impose, and section 110-10 [(id. § 110-10)] sets
forth both mandatory conditions of pretrial release and additional conditions that may be imposed
when necessary.” Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 42 C. Alternative Argument
¶ 43 On appeal, defendant raises the alternative argument that error occurred because
the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was eligible for detention.
However, given our resolution of the other issues in the case, we find it unnecessary to address
this additional claim.
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the reasons stated, we vacate in part and reverse in part the trial court’s
judgment, and we remand for further proceedings.
¶ 46 Vacated in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
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