People v. Tripp , 2024 IL App (4th) 231479-U ( 2024 )


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  •              NOTICE                
    2024 IL App (4th) 231479-U
    This Order was filed under
    FILED
    NO. 4-23-1479                  February 16, 2024
    Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
    Carla Bender
    not precedent except in the                                            4th District Appellate
    limited circumstances allowed    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
    Court, IL
    under Rule 23(e)(1).
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
    v.                                                )      Winnebago County
    JAYSON TRIPP,                                                )      No. 23CF2448
    Defendant-Appellant.                              )
    )      Honorable
    )      Scott Paccagnini,
    )      Judge Presiding.
    JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1      Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
    in denying defendant pretrial release.
    ¶2              Defendant, Jayson Tripp, appeals the circuit court’s order denying him pretrial
    release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS
    5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),
    commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1,
    2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 
    2023 IL 129248
    , ¶ 52, 
    223 N.E.3d 1010
     (setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023).
    ¶3              On appeal, defendant argues this court should overturn the circuit court’s decision
    because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof was evident or
    the presumption great defendant committed a detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a) of the
    Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)), (2) defendant was dangerous and thereby posed a
    threat, and (3) no condition of release or combination thereof could mitigate the threat defendant
    posed if granted pretrial release. We affirm.
    ¶4                                       I. BACKGROUND
    ¶5             On October 18, 2023, the State charged defendant with one count of domestic
    battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022)), alleging defendant grabbed Tabitha Hawkins by
    the back of the head and headbutted her with his own head.
    ¶6             On November 20, 2023, defendant’s arrest warrant was served, and defendant was
    detained. The next day, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial release under section
    110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State alleged defendant was
    charged with a qualifying offense, and defendant’s pretrial release posed a real and present threat
    to the safety of persons or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)). In support of
    its petition, the State provided the following factual basis:
    “On the 3rd of September, 2023, Machesney Park Deputies ***
    were dispatched to 7415 Rogers Street, Machesney Park, Illinois,
    61115 in response to call for Domestic Battery. Deputies met with
    Tabitha Hawkins who stated that she and her boyfriend,
    [defendant], had been involved in a heated argument throughout
    the evening of the 2nd of September into the early morning hours
    of the 3rd of September, 2023. Tabitha stated that she attempted
    multiple times to remove herself from the argument by going into
    separate rooms from [defendant] but he kept following her. Tabitha
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    said that at one point [defendant] grabbed [her] by the back of the
    head and he pulled her head into hers [sic] violently and
    headbutted her. [Defendant] left the residence shortly afterward.”
    The State’s factual summary further provided defendant had numerous arrests for domestic
    battery, two prior convictions for domestic battery, and one conviction for battery.
    ¶7             At the detention hearing, the State emphasized defendant’s penchant and prior
    convictions for domestic violence and proffered what evidence would be presented. This proffer
    was consistent with the factual basis for the State’s petition. The State further informed the
    circuit court defendant had another pending felony case against him (Winnebago County case
    No. 23-CF-2132) for aggravated fleeing, where police pursued defendant at speeds in excess of
    90 miles per hour in a 40-mile-per-hour zone after attempting to speak with defendant shortly
    after the instant domestic battery. The State also noted defendant scored an 18 on the Domestic
    Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI), which placed defendant in the “high risk” category.
    ¶8             Defense counsel countered that since defendant’s alleged battery of Tabitha on
    September 3, 2023, defendant had appeared “numerous times for other cases” and “turned
    himself in *** when he found out about the warrant on the aggravated fleeing charge.” Counsel
    emphasized defendant had been “a lifelong Rockford resident,” with significant ties to the
    community. Counsel further asserted defendant had been self-employed for 10 years “doing the
    same type of work.”
    ¶9             In determining whether defendant should be released from pretrial detention, the
    circuit court stated it considered the parties’ arguments, the factual basis, and the information
    contained in the pretrial services report. The court then held the following before granting the
    State’s petition. First, the court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the
    -3-
    proof was evident or the presumption great defendant committed a detainable offense, noting
    defendant “grabbed the alleged victim by the back of the head and headbutted her after the
    alleged victim attempted to leave.” Next, the court pointed out defendant’s “two prior
    convictions for domestic battery and prior convictions for resisting[,] battery[,] and criminal
    damage to property that are spanning at least two decades.” The court further observed defendant
    was “on pretrial release for aggravated fleeing *** which offense allegedly occurred after the
    defendant left the residence” in the instant case. Defendant also scored an 8 out of 14 on the
    Virginia Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI), “which is moderate to high, and [defendant] has
    a DVSI of 18, which is high.” Finally, the court noted:
    “Given the nature and circumstances of the offense, but primarily
    the history and characteristics of the defendant ***, the Court finds
    that there are no conditions or combinations of conditions that
    reasonably assure the safety of the alleged victim or the
    community for that matter, as it appears that the defendant’s priors
    involved different individuals.”
    ¶ 10           The circuit court then entered a written order summarizing its reasons for denying
    pretrial release and finding (1) defendant was charged with a detainable offense and the proof
    was evident or presumption great that defendant committed the offense, (2) defendant posed a
    real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, (3) no conditions or
    combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat, and (4) pretrial release
    should be denied because less restrictive conditions would not avoid that threat. After the court
    entered its written order denying defendant pretrial release, defendant filed his notice of appeal
    under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023).
    -4-
    ¶ 11           This appeal followed.
    ¶ 12                                       II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 13           On December 5, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois
    Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). The notice of appeal indicated three relevant
    bases for vacating the circuit court’s detention order: the State failed to prove by clear and
    convincing evidence (1) the proof was evident or the presumption great defendant committed a
    detainable offense under section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)),
    (2) defendant was dangerous and thereby posed a threat, and (3) no condition of release or
    combination thereof could mitigate the threat defendant posed if granted pretrial release. The
    Office of the State Appellate Defender, defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal, filed a
    supporting memorandum laying out the reasons for reversing the court’s decision.
    ¶ 14           All criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS
    5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Before denying pretrial release, the State must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
    committed an offense listed in subsection (a),” (2) “the defendant poses a real and present threat
    to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of
    the case,” and (3) “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of
    Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any
    person or persons or the community.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1), (2), (3)(i) (West 2022). Section
    110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) of the Code instructs the circuit court to consider “the specific articulable facts
    of the case” and provides nine factors the court may consider when assessing the real and present
    threat allegation. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2022). If the court determines the
    defendant should be denied pretrial release, the court must make written findings summarizing
    -5-
    the reasons for denying pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid
    the danger posed by the defendant to any person or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1)
    (West 2022).
    ¶ 15           We have held the determination of whether pretrial release should be granted or
    denied is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See People v. Jones, 
    2023 IL App (4th) 230837
    , ¶¶ 27, 30. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s decision is
    arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would agree with the position
    adopted by the [circuit] court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Simmons, 
    2019 IL App (1st) 191253
    , ¶ 9, 
    143 N.E.3d 833
    . Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute
    its own judgment for that of the circuit court simply because it would have analyzed the proper
    factors differently. People v. Inman, 
    2023 IL App (4th) 230864
    , ¶ 11. Likewise, “we will not
    substitute our own judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence or
    the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Vega, 
    2018 IL App (1st) 160619
    , ¶ 44, 
    123 N.E.3d 393
    .
    ¶ 16           Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The record demonstrates the circuit court
    weighed the statutory factors and considered the parties’ arguments, the factual basis, and the
    information contained in the pretrial services report. Not only did the court determine defendant
    committed a detainable offense based on the State’s proffered evidence, but defendant
    acknowledged in his accompanying memorandum “defense counsel agreed that the charged
    offense was detainable under the [Act].” See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022); 725 ILCS
    5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022). The court then found defendant presented an ongoing threat to not
    only the victim of this case, but to the community as well, and it concluded no conditions of
    pretrial release could mitigate defendant’s threat to the victim or the community given
    -6-
    defendant’s repeated domestic-violence convictions against multiple individuals. Specifically,
    the court noted the circumstances of the offense and the pending case against defendant for
    aggravated fleeing, which stemmed from the instant domestic battery. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
    6.1(g)(1) (West 2022). The court also pointed out defendant’s “two prior convictions for
    domestic battery and prior convictions for resisting[,] battery[,] and criminal damage to property
    *** spanning at least two decades.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2) (West 2022). The court also
    noted defendant was on pretrial release in the aggravated fleeing and driving on a suspended
    license case when he was arrested for this offense. Further, the court noted defendant scored an 8
    out of 14 on the VPRAI, which indicated defendant presented a “moderate to high” risk, as well
    as an 18 on the DVSI, “which is high.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(9) (West 2022).
    ¶ 17           Accordingly, because the circuit court complied with the requirements of the
    Code and made all the necessary findings, based on this record, we find no reason to conclude
    the court’s decision was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Simmons, 
    2019 IL App (1st) 191253
    , ¶ 9.
    ¶ 18                                   III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 19           For all these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
    ¶ 20           Affirmed.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4-23-1479

Citation Numbers: 2024 IL App (4th) 231479-U

Filed Date: 2/16/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/16/2024