Rice v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board , 2024 IL App (1st) 240230-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 240230-UNo. 1-24-0230
Order filed February 23, 2024
Fifth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ASHONTA C. RICE, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Appeal from the
v. ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD, )
and its members; KAREN YARBROUGH, Cook County ) No. 24 COEL 7
Clerk; KIMBERLY FOXX, Cook County State’s )
Attorney; IRIS MARTINEZ, Clerk of the Circuit Court of ) Honorable
Cook County; CHARLES A. MORRIS, SR.; ASHLEY D. ) Maureen Ward Kirby,
SMITH; and CHICAGO BOARD OF ELECTION ) Judge presiding.
COMMISSIONERS, )
)
Respondents-Appellees. )
JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.
Justice Lyle specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the circuit court and the decision of the Cook
County Officers Electoral Board.
No. 1-24-0230
¶2 The Candidate, Ashonta C. Rice, filed a petition in the circuit court seeking judicial review
of a decision by the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Electoral Board) which allowed a
petition by the Objectors, Charles A. Morris, Sr. and Ashley D. Smith, to prevent the Candidate’s
name from appearing on the ballot for the March 19, 2024, general primary election as a candidate
for the office of Judge of the Circuit Court, Cook County Judicial Circuit. The Objectors objected
to the placement of the Candidate’s name on the ballot on the basis that the Candidate did not
comply with section 7-10.2 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10.2 (West 2022)), by failing to
include “formerly known as Akiwowo” on her nomination papers. The Electoral Board agreed
with the objection, finding that the Candidate’s nomination papers did not comply with section 7-
10.2 since she had changed her surname from “Akiwowo” to “Rice” within three years before the
last day for filing the petition for nomination for that office, and the name change was not resulting
from a dissolution of marriage. The Candidate sought judicial review of the Electoral Board’s
decision in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit court affirmed the Electoral Board’s
decision and ordered the Candidate’s name to be removed from the ballot for the general primary
election. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, and the decision
of the Electoral Board.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The Candidate filed her nomination papers to be included on the ballot for the March 19,
2024, general primary election for the office of Judge of the Circuit Court, Cook County Judicial
Circuit. The Candidate listed her name on her nomination papers as “Ashonta C. Rice.” The
Objectors filed an Objector’s Petition to the Candidate’s nomination papers on the basis that the
Candidate did not comply with section 7-10.2 of the Election Code because she failed to indicate,
by using the designation “formerly known as”, that she had changed her name within the last three
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years. The Objectors attached a variety of exhibits to the supporting memorandum outlining the
Candidate’s use of her married surname “Akiwowo” after her 2012 marriage. These documents
included: (1) an Articles of Incorporation for filing with the Illinois Secretary of State forming
Akiwowo Law Group, P.C., an Illinois professional corporation, on September 20, 2013; (2)
annual reports for the Akiwowo Law Group for the years 2014-2022 showing “Ashonta C.
Akiwowo” as President, Secretary, and Registered Agent; (3) registration documents for the
Akiwowo Law Group with the Illinois Supreme Court for the years 2014-2022, listing “Ashonta
C. Akiwowo” or “Ashonta Rice Akiwowo” as shareholder, director, and officer; (4) the
Candidate’s voter registration from 2017 that listed her surname as “Rice-Akiwowo”; (5) the
Candidate’s Illinois driver’s license stating her name as “Ashonta C. Akiwowo”; (6) the
Candidate’s social security card stating her name as “Ashonta C. Akiwowo”; and (7) the
Candidate’s petition for dissolution of marriage identifying her as “Ashonta C. Akiwowo.”
¶5 The Candidate filed a response, with exhibits outlining her use of “Ashonta C. Rice”
professionally since 2005. The exhibits included: (1) her admission to the Illinois Board of
Admissions to the Bar in January 2005 as “Ashonta Cherron Rice”; (2) her registration with the
Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) since 2005 as “Ashonta
Cherron Rice”; (3) her registration with the Illinois Supreme Court, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Northern District of Illinois, and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office as “Ashonta Cherron Rice” or
“Ashonta C. Rice”; (4) the biography page on her law firm’s website that listed her name as
“Ashonta C. Rice”; (5) recognition as an attorney by the name of “Ashonta C. Rice” by Forbes
Advisor in 2023; (6) judicial evaluations from the Alliance of Bar Associations in 2019 and 2023
with the name “Ashonta C. Rice”; (7) in 2023, “Ashonta C. Rice” received a rating of
“recommended” from the Arab American Bar Association, the Black Women Lawyers’
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Association of Greater Chicago, the Cook County Bar Association, the Hellenic Bar Association
of Illinois, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, the Puerto Rican Bar Association of
Illinois, and the Women’s Bar Association of Illinois; and (8) the Illinois State Bar Association
found “Ashonta Rice” qualified to serve as Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County in 2023.
¶6 An evidentiary hearing was held on December 18, 2023. The Objectors submitted more
than 20 exhibits including corporate annual reports for the Candidate’s law practice, and her voter
registration from 2017 until November 29, 2023. Evidence was presented that in July 2017, the
Candidate changed her voter registration name from “Ashonta Rice” to “Ashonta Rice-Akiwowo.”
The Candidate ran for office in 2018 as Ashonta C. Rice-Akiwowo.
¶7 The Candidate’s action for dissolution of marriage was filed in April of 2022 and was still
pending at the time of the hearing. An order was entered during the dissolution of marriage
proceeding on June 15, 2023, which stated, upon agreement of the parties, “Ashonta C. Akiwowo”
was “granted leave to resume the use of her maiden name of Rice.” Thereafter, she changed her
social security card to “Ashonta Cherron Rice” and her driver’s license to “Ashonta C. Rice.” She
also changed her voter registration card from “Ashonta Rice-Akiwowo” to “Ashonta C. Rice.”
¶8 The Hearing Officer assessed the credibility of the Candidate’s testimony, affidavits, and
documents submitted by both parties. The Hearing Officer found the evidence to be uncontroverted
that the Candidate “took steps to change her name prior to running for this office, including
obtaining a name change order, changing her voter registration, her driver’s license, and social
security card.” The Hearing Officer found: “These acts amount to an admission that the
[C]andidate did in fact believe that she needed to change these documents in order to change her
name. To argue otherwise is wholly contrary to the Candidate’s actions. The [C]andidate did in
fact take the steps outlined above to change her name back to her maiden name.” The Hearing
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Officer found that the interim name change order did not comply with the exception contained in
section 7-10.2 of the Election Code, and that the Candidate was required to provide the “formally
known as” language on her nomination papers.
¶9 The Electoral Board adopted the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Officer and
found that the Candidate’s “name change took place within the 3[-]year period where she would
be required to place the ‘formally known as’ name on her nomination petitions.” The Electoral
Board found that the exception for dissolution of marriages contained in section 7-10.2 “does not
apply here as the interim ‘Name Change’ order was not part of the final judgment of dissolution
of marriage. The caption of that June 15, 2023[,] order in fact acknowledges that it was a change
back to the Candidate’s former surname.” The objections to the nomination papers of the
Candidate were sustained.
¶ 10 The Candidate filed a petition in the circuit court for judicial review of the Electoral
Board’s decision. A hearing took place on January 29, 2024. The court affirmed the decision of
the Electoral Board and found that the name “Ashonta C. Rice” should have contained the
designation, “formerly known as Akiwowo,” and therefore should not appear on the ballot for the
primary election. The Candidate now appeals.
¶ 11 I. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 A. Standard of Review
¶ 13 Courts of review view an electoral board as an administrative agency. Cinkus v. Village of
Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 209 (2008). On appeal, this court
reviews the decision of the electoral board, not the decision of the circuit court. Jackson-Hicks v.
East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL 118929, ¶ 19. Our standard of review
depends on whether the dispute at issue involves questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact
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and law. Id. ¶ 20. The Electoral Board’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed
prima facie true and correct, and will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210. Where the historical facts are admitted or established,
but there is a dispute as to whether the governing legal provisions were correctly interpreted by
the Electoral Board, the case presents a purely legal question, which we review de novo. Jackson
v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 47. Finally, mixed
questions of fact and law are “questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard.”
American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. State Labor
Relations Board, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577 (2005). Mixed questions of law and fact will only be reversed
if the decision was clearly erroneous. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211. A decision is clearly erroneous if
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Id.¶ 14 B. Section 7-10.2 of the Election Code
¶ 15 Section 7-10.2 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10.2 (West 2022)) provides:
“In the designation of the name of a candidate on a petition for nomination
or certificate of nomination the candidate’s given name or names, initial or initials,
a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known, or a combination thereof,
may be used in addition to the candidate’s surname. If a candidate has changed his
or her name, whether by a statutory or common law procedure in Illinois or any
other jurisdiction, within 3 years before the last day for filing the petition or
certificate for that office, whichever is applicable, then (i) the candidate’s name on
the petition or certificate must be followed by ‘formerly known as (list all prior
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names during the 3-year period) until name changed on (list date of each such name
change)’ and (ii) the petition or certificate must be accompanied by the candidate’s
affidavit stating the candidate’s previous names during the period specified in (i)
and the date or dates each of those names was changed; failure to meet these
requirements shall be grounds for denying certification of the candidate’s name for
the ballot or removing the candidate’s name from the ballot, as appropriate, but
these requirements do not apply to name changes resulting from adoption to assume
an adoptive parent’s or parents’ surname, marriage or civil union to assume a
spouse’s surname, or dissolution of marriage or civil union or declaration of
invalidity of marriage or civil union to assume a former surname or a name change
that conforms the candidate’s name to his or her gender identity. No other
designation such as a political slogan, as defined by Section 7-17, title or degree,
or nickname suggesting or implying possession of a title, degree or professional
status, or similar information may be used in connection with the candidate’s
surname.”
¶ 16 This section first states that a candidate may use her “given name or names, initial or
initials, a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known, or a combination thereof” in
addition to “the candidate’s surname.” Id. The term “surname” is not defined by the Election Code.
Accordingly, we must give the word its “ordinary and popularly understood meaning.” Carrol v.
Paddock, 199 Ill. 2d 16, 25 (2002). In doing so, our supreme court has consistently looked to
Black’s Law Dictionary. See People v. Relwani, 2019 IL 123385, ¶ 18. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “surname” as, “[t]he family name automatically bestowed at birth, acquired by marriage,
or adopted by choice.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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¶ 17 There is no question here that “Rice” was the surname automatically bestowed on the
Candidate at birth, and “Akiwowo” was the surname she acquired by marriage. The Objectors,
however, were concerned with the second provision of the statute, namely, whether the Candidate
changed her name, “by a statutory or common law procedure,” from “Akiwowo” back to “Rice”
within the last three years, triggering the requirement to include the “formerly known as” language
on her nomination papers.
¶ 18 In order to find that the Candidate changed her surname, however, the Electoral Board
necessarily had to first determine what her surname was prior to her alleged name change in 2023.
Because the Electoral Board found that the Candidate was required to put, “formerly known as
Akiwowo,” on her nomination papers, it follows that the Electoral Board found that her last name
was Akiwowo prior to 2023. As stated above, the Electoral Board’s findings and conclusions on
questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct, and will not be reversed unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210. A finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding
itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d
342, 350 (2006).
¶ 19 The evidence presented shows that the Candidate was born with the surname “Rice.” She
was admitted to the Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar in 2005 as “Ashonta Cherron Rice,”
and has not changed her ARDC registration since that time. She is registered with the Illinois
Supreme Court, Circuit Court of Cook County, Northern District of Illinois, and the Cook County
Sheriff’s Office as “Ashonta Cherron Rice” or “Ashonta C. Rice.” The biography page on her law
firm’s website lists her name as “Ashonta C. Rice.” She was recognized as an attorney by the name
of “Ashonta C. Rice” by Forbes Advisor in 2023. “Ashonta C. Rice” sought judicial evaluations
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from the Alliance of Bar Associations in 2019 and 2023. In 2023, “Ashonta C. Rice” received a
rating of “recommended” from the Arab American Bar Association, the Black Women Lawyers’
Association of Greater Chicago, the Cook County Bar Association, the Hellenic Bar Association
of Illinois, the Lesbian and Gay Bar Association of Chicago, the Puerto Rican Bar Association of
Illinois, and the Women’s Bar Association of Illinois. The Illinois State Bar Association found
“Ashonta Rice” qualified to serve as Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County in 2023.
¶ 20 The Candidate got married in 2012. After that, the following documents reflected her
married surname: the Articles of Incorporation for filing with the Illinois Secretary of State
forming Akiwowo Law Group, P.C., an Illinois professional corporation; annual reports for the
Akiwowo Law Group for the years 2014-2022 showing “Ashonta C. Akiwowo” as president,
secretary, and registered agent; registration documents for the Akiwowo Law Group with the
Illinois Supreme Court for the years 2014-2022, listing “Ashonta C. Akiwowo” or “Ashonta Rice
Akiwowo” as shareholder, director, and officer; the Candidate’s voter registration from 2017 that
listed her surname as “Rice-Akiwowo”; the Candidate’s Illinois driver’s license stating her name
as “Ashonta C. Akiwowo”; the Candidate’s social security card stating her name as “Ashonta C.
Akiwowo”; and the Candidate’s petition for dissolution of marriage identifying her as “Ashonta
C. Akiwowo.” Further evidence showed that the Candidate ran for office under the name “Ashonta
C. Rice-Akiwowo” in 2018.
¶ 21 After reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the Electoral Board’s finding that the
Candidate’s last name was “Akiwowo” prior to 2023, and not “Rice,” was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. While we may have reached a different conclusion, a reviewing court may
not overturn a judgment merely because the reviewing court might disagree with the judgment, or,
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had the reviewing court been the trier of fact, might have come to a different conclusion. Eychaner
v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 270-71 (2002).
¶ 22 The Candidate maintains, relying on Oberholtzer v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board,
2020 IL App (1st) 200218-U, that her professional surname has always been “Rice,” not
“Akiwowo,” and therefore using the surname “Rice” on her nomination papers was valid. In
Oberholtzer, the candidate’s name on her nomination papers was listed as “Caroline Patricia
Jamieson.” The objector objected on the basis that the candidate failed to comply with section 7-
10.2 of the Election Code by failing to use the designation “formerly known as” on her nomination
papers. Id. ¶ 5. The objector argued that when the candidate got married, she assumed her married
surname of “Golden,” and “there was no evidence that the Candidate has used her maiden name
as her surname, either personally or professionally, since her marriage.” Id. ¶ 7.
¶ 23 The objector presented the following evidence of the candidate’s use of her married
surname of “Golden”: she petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court to change her name on the master
roll of attorneys from “Caroline Patricia Jamieson” to “Caroline P. Golden” 1 ; she was admitted to
the bar of United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois as “Caroline P. Golden”;
she was registered to vote as “Caroline Golden” 2 ; she filed nomination papers in 2017 as “Caroline
Jamieson Golden”; the Alliance of Bar Associations for Judicial Screening evaluated the candidate
in March 2018 as “Caroline Jamieson Golden”; in August 2018, the candidate applied for the office
1 The objector presumably could have objected on the basis that there was no one licensed to practice law in Illinois
with the name listed on her nomination papers. See 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2022) (each petition must include a
statement of candidacy indicating the candidate is qualified for the office specified).
2 The objector presumably could have objected on the basis that no one was registered to vote under the name on her
nomination papers. See 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2022) (each petition must include a statement of candidacy indicating
the candidate is a qualified voter); 10 ILCS 5/6-54 (West 2022) (“[a]ny registered voter who changes his or her
name by marriage or otherwise, shall be required to register anew and authorize cancellation of previous
registration”); Ruffin v. Feller, 2022 IL App (1st) 220692 (use of birth surname invalid where candidate did not
update her voter registration with her birth surname after her divorce).
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of associate judge as “Caroline Patricia Golden”; and she had been practicing law in Illinois under
the names “Carolien P. Golden” and “Caroline Jamieson Golden.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 24 The Electoral Board overruled the objector’s objection and ordered the candidate’s name
to be printed on the ballot for the general primary election. Id. ¶ 11. Upon judicial review, the
circuit court found the candidate had been consistently using her name as “Golden” for close to
the last 20 years, and there was no record of her changing her name to resume the use of her former
name, “Caroline Jamieson.” Id. ¶ 13. Because the candidate violated the Election Code, her
nomination papers were invalidated, necessitating her removal from the ballot. Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 25 On appeal, this court noted that the candidate’s use of her married surname “was consistent
following her marriage as evidenced by the exhibits attached to the Objector’s petition.” Id. ¶ 27.
Accordingly, the court found that the candidate was required to list her surname as “Golden,” and
her failure to do so violated the terms of section 7-10.2 of the Election Code. Id. ¶ 28. Her
nomination papers were found to be invalid, “necessitating her removal from the ballot.” Id.
¶ 26 We note that the Oberholtzer court did seem to suggest that had the candidate used her
birth surname professionally, that candidate may have met the requirements of section 7-10.2 when
it stated: “In order to find that the Candidate met all the requirements of section 7-10.2, this court
would have to turn a blind eye to the fact that for over a decade the Candidate has practiced law
under the name Golden.” However, this sentence was merely dictum, and thus is not binding on
this court. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 236 (2010) (dictum is a
remark or opinion that a court uttered as an aside; it is not essential to the outcome of the case, is
not an integral part of the opinion, and is generally not binding authority). We cannot say that if
the candidate in Oberholtzer had practiced law under her birth surname of “Jamieson,” that the
outcome in that case would have been different.
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¶ 27 Having found that the Electoral Board’s factual finding that the Candidate’s last name was
“Akiwowo” prior to 2023 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the next question
is whether it was clearly erroneous for the Electoral Board to find that the Candidate changed her
name by statutory or common law procedure to “Rice” less than three years before submitting her
petition for office. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211.
¶ 28 The evidence of a name change that was presented before the Hearing Officer was that on
June 15, 2023, an interim order was entered in her divorce proceedings entitled, “Agreed Name
Change Order,” which stated that upon agreement of the parties, “Ashonta Akiwowo” was granted
leave to resume the use of her maiden surname of “Rice.” The Candidate subsequently changed
her surname to “Rice” on her social security card, her driver’s license and her voter registration
card. Looking at this evidence, we cannot say that we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake was made when the Electoral Board found that the Candidate had changed her
surname by statutory or common law procedure in the last three years. Id. Accordingly, the
decision of the Electoral Board was not clearly erroneous, and we find that the Candidate was
required to include “formerly known as Akiwowo,” on her nomination papers. Because she did
not, her name shall be stricken from the ballot. See 10 ILCS 5/7-10.2 (West 2022) (failure to meet
these requirements shall be grounds for denying certification of the candidate’s name on the ballot
or removing the candidate’s name from the ballot, as appropriate.)
¶ 29 The Candidate maintains that even if she took steps with some governmental agencies to
change her name back to “Rice” from “Akiwowo,” this type of change has historically been
allowed by the Electoral Board, without the use of “formally known as.” See Harrison v. Orr,
2017 COEB JUD 18 (Jan. 9, 2018) (proper for candidate Erika Orr to use birth surname on petition
for office, and changing her voter registration from married surname to birth surname right before
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election was not a name change by a “statutory or common law procedure,” and thus candidate did
not violate section 7-10.2 of Election Code); Featherson v. Kowalski McDonald, 17 COEB CC 03
(Feb. 20, 2018) (candidate who changed her voter registration card from Kowalski to Kowalski
McDonald right before circulating her petitions for election did not violate section 7-10.2 even
though Kowalski had divorced McDonald in 2010, resumed the name of Kowalski thereafter, and
then changed her name back to Kowalski McDonald right before the election in 2016).
¶ 30 We also acknowledge the comments from Senator Harmon from the General Assembly
floor when passing the 2007 amendment to section 7-10.2 (Pub. Act 94-1090, § 5 (eff. June 1,
2007)), which added the “name change” portion of this statute. Senator Harmon stated the
amendment was intended to deal “with the mischief created by candidates for office who change
their legal names to more ballot friendly sounding names in order to take an advantage.” 94th Ill.
Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Nov. 29, 2006, at 16. Based on these comments, it does not
seem that this amendment was meant to penalize a married woman who takes steps to change her
married surname back to her birth surname with various governmental agencies, especially if she
had continuously used that birth surname professionally. However, we nevertheless cannot read
any conditions or exceptions into the statute that are not there. See Lawler v. University of Chicago
Medical Center, 2017 IL 120745, ¶ 12 (when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
we must adhere to its plain language and meaning; we cannot read into it exceptions, limitations
or conditions the legislature did not express). Until we hear otherwise from the legislature or our
supreme court, a candidate’s surname will continue to be a question of fact for the electoral board
to decide.
¶ 31 As a final matter, the Candidate contends that if we were to find, as we have done here,
that she changed her surname by statutory or common law procedure from “Akiwowo” to “Rice”
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within the meaning of the statute within the last three years, she would nevertheless be exempt
from using the “formerly known as designation” due to the exception listed in section 7-10.2 of
the Election Code. The exception states that the “formerly known as” designation requirements do
“not apply to name changes resulting from *** dissolution of marriage *** to assume a former
surname.” The Candidate contends that the name change order that was issued during her
dissolution of marriage proceedings, that granted her “leave to resume the use of her maiden name
of Rice,” was a name change resulting from dissolution of marriage to assume a former surname.
In the case at bar, the Candidate’s dissolution of marriage had not yet been finalized at the time
she filed her nomination papers, and therefore the exception does not apply. While the Candidate
urges us to find that “dissolution of marriage” means any dissolution of marriage proceeding, and
not a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, we reiterate that where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, we must adhere to its plain language and meaning, and cannot read into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. Lawler, 2017 IL 120745, ¶
12.
¶ 32 While frustrating, we note that the Candidate was not without recourse, and could have
requested a bifurcated judgment of dissolution of marriage on the name change issue when she
realized her divorce proceedings would not be finalized before she had to file her nomination
papers, thus bringing her within the exception of 7-10.2. See 750 ILCS 5/401(b) (West 2022); In
re Marriage of Tomlins and Glenn, 2013 IL App (3d) 120099, ¶ 28 (bifurcation can exist if
circumstances are of a caliber similar to a lack of jurisdiction over respondent, lack of an ability
to pay support, or concerns for children).
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and
affirm the decision of the Electoral Board.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
¶ 36 JUSTICE LYLE, specially concurring:
¶ 37 Clearly, the acts of the Candidate are not those sought to be prohibited by the legislature
as stated by Senator Harmon and quoted by the majority. Supra ¶ 30. It is also clear that this issue
is one particular to female candidates seeking nomination to elected office. Male candidates who
change their name within three years of circulating nomination petitions would more than likely
fall within the intention of this legislation. Nevertheless, only female candidates find themselves
in litigation about surnames. See Ruffin v. Feller, 2022 IL App (1st) 220692; see also Oberholtzer
v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 2020 IL App (1st) 200218-U. In this instance, the
Candidate took affirmative steps to resume the usage of her surname by obtaining a lawful court
order that remains in effect to this day, having never been modified or challenged. The majority
suggests that her failure to obtain a bifurcated judgment of dissolution was fatal to her attempt to
do so. Supra ¶ 32. While I disagree, I do agree with the majority that the Electoral Board was not
clearly erroneous in its ruling, which is the standard of review for this court.
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