O'Malley v. Adams , 2024 IL App (5th) 240094 ( 2024 )

NOTICE
2024 IL App (5th) 240094Decision filed 07/01/24. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0094
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for IN THE
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
PATRICK J. O’MALLEY JR., as Trustee Under ) Appeal from the
Trust Agreement Dated January 1, 2006, ) Circuit Court of
) Crawford County.
Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 16-CH-9
)
MARCIA P. ADAMS, as Successor Trustee of the )
Almyra M. Prather Revocable Trust Agreement Dated )
December 15, 1967, and Individually, and )
LAWRENCE P. LUBY, Executor of the Estate of )
Betty P. Luby, Deceased, )
) Honorable
Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellees. ) Sonja L. Ligon,
) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The plaintiff and counterdefendant, Patrick J. O’Malley Jr., as Trustee Under Trust
Agreement Dated January 1, 2006 (the O’Malley Trust), appeals from the trial court’s order
denying the O’Malley Trust’s motion to dissolve two orders granting injunctive relief. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to dissolve the
injunctions, dissolve the orders granting injunctive relief, and remand the case for further
proceedings.
1
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 This case began in March 2016, and it is now in its ninth year of litigation. This is the third
time that one or more of the parties have been before this court in regard to the case. An overview
of the factual background and procedural history of the case has been set out in our prior decisions.
See O’Malley v. Adams, 2023 IL App (5th) 220206; O’Malley v. Adams, 2023 IL App (5th)
210381. Accordingly, we provide only the facts and the procedural history necessary to address
the issues raised in this appeal.
¶4 On March 18, 2016, the O’Malley Trust filed a complaint for adverse possession against
the defendants, Marcia P. Adams, individually and as successor trustee of the Almyra M. Prather
Revocable Trust Agreement, dated December 15, 1967, and Lawrence P. Luby, executor of the
estate of Betty P. Luby, deceased (collectively, the Prather Trust). At that time, the O’Malley Trust
held title to the surface rights of farmland located in Crawford County, Illinois (the Farm), and the
O’Malley Trust and the Prather Trust each held a 50% interest in the underlying mineral estate.1
In the complaint, the O’Malley Trust claimed it had acquired the Prather Trust’s interest in the
mineral estate by adverse possession.
¶5 On March 20, 2016, the Prather Trust filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the
complaint, and it eventually obtained a summary judgment in its favor on the adverse possession
claim. The Prather Trust also filed a counterclaim against the O’Malley Trust and third-party
claims against other defendants. The Prather Trust alleged that beginning in 2008, its cotenant, the
O’Malley Trust, contracted with third-party defendant Putnam Energy, LLC, to remove and sell
oil and natural gas from the mineral estate, including the Prather Trust’s share of those minerals,
1
“Mineral estate” is a generic term used herein to describe the oil, gas, and other minerals available
for extraction from the land.
2
without the knowledge or consent of the Prather Trust. The Prather Trust also alleged that another
third-party defendant, Chicago Title Insurance Company, conspired to slander title to and convert
the Prather Trust’s interest in the mineral estate by issuing a title policy that falsely declared that
the O’Malley Trust had merchantable title to 100% of the minerals in the mineral estate underlying
the Farm. In terms of relief, the Prather Trust sought an accounting and damages against the
O’Malley Trust and damages against the third-party defendants.
¶6 By way of background, the O’Malley Trust was established in January 2006. Under the
terms of the 2006 trust agreement, Patrick J. O’Malley, individually, was the sole beneficiary of
any income, earnings, and proceeds related to the surface rights of the Farm, and the Patrick
O’Malley Savings Plan (Savings Plan) was the sole beneficiary of any income, earnings, and
proceeds derived from the O’Malley Trust’s 50% interest in the mineral estate underlying the
Farm.
¶7 On March 19, 2019, the O’Malley Trust was amended. 2 Under the terms of the amended
agreement, Mary Judith O’Malley, spouse of Patrick J. O’Malley, became the sole beneficiary of
any income, earnings, and proceeds related to the surface rights of the Farm. The Savings Plan
remained the sole beneficiary of any income, earnings, and proceeds derived from the O’Malley
Trust’s 50% share of the mineral estate underlying the Farm.
¶8 On April 29, 2022, the O’Malley Trust transferred the surface rights of the Farm to Jenna
Bree, LLC, through a trustee’s deed. The trustee’s deed was recorded in Crawford County on May
6, 2022. At the time of the real estate transaction, the O’Malley Trust and Jenna Bree, LLC, agreed
that the sales agreement and purchase price would be kept confidential.
2
The 2006 trust agreement was amended while this litigation was proceeding. Based upon the
record, there appear to be disputes regarding when the parties learned of the amended trust agreement and
whether or when the amended agreement was produced in discovery.
3
¶9 On May 19, 2022, the Prather Trust filed a motion regarding the proceeds of the sale of the
Farm’s surface rights. The Prather Trust argued that the sale of the surface rights occurred while
the litigation was pending, that it expected to receive a money judgment in its litigation against the
O’Malley Trust, and that funds from the sale of the surface rights to the Farm (surface proceeds)
could be used to satisfy that judgment. The Prather Trust further argued that the transfer of the
surface proceeds from the O’Malley Trust to another person or entity while the litigation was
pending would constitute a fraudulent transfer. The Prather Trust sought an order directing the
Trustee of the O’Malley Trust to hold the surface proceeds in a separate account until the O’Malley
Trust provided information about the purchase agreement and the terms of the sale.
¶ 10 On June 1, 2022, the O’Malley Trust and the Savings Plan (collectively, the O’Malley
Parties) filed a response in opposition to the Prather Trust’s motion. The O’Malley Parties argued
that the surface proceeds arose from the sale of land in which the Prather Trust had no right or
interest and that those funds belonged to Mary Judith O’Malley, a nonparty to the litigation. The
O’Malley Parties further argued that the Prather Trust failed to cite any authority to support its
allegation that the transfer of the surface proceeds to the designated beneficiary would constitute
a “fraudulent transaction.” The O’Malley Parties also questioned the trial court’s authority to order
them to place the surface proceeds into a separate account indefinitely and for the potential future
benefit of the Prather Trust. In a separate motion, the O’Malley Parties asked the trial court to
quash the Prather Trust’s subpoena for the confidential sales documents, including the purchase
agreement. In the alternative, the O’Malley Parties asked for an in camera review of those
documents and a protective order.
¶ 11 In reply, the Prather Trust argued that it had a “claim” against the O’Malley Parties within
the meaning of section 2(c) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Act) (740 ILCS 160/2(c)
4
(West 2022)) and, therefore, had an interest in any asset of the O’Malley Trust from which that
claim could be satisfied. The Prather Trust reiterated its request for an order directing that the
surface proceeds be held in an account until the O’Malley Parties provided additional information
about the real estate transaction between the O’Malley Trust and Jenna Bree LLC.
¶ 12 On August 9, 2022, the trial court heard arguments on the Prather Trust’s motion regarding
the surface proceeds and the O’Malley Parties’ motion to quash. There is no transcript or
bystander’s report from that hearing in the record on appeal. On August 10, 2022, the court entered
written rulings on the pending motions. The court found that the Prather Trust had a “claim”
against the O’Malley Trust within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. The court ordered the
Trustee of the O’Malley Trust to open an account, to deposit and hold all of the surface proceeds
in that account until further order, and to certify in writing, within 14 days of the order, that the
surface proceeds had been deposited into that account. The court denied the O’Malley Parties’
motion to quash and ordered the O’Malley Parties to provide the court and the parties with a
complete copy of the confidential purchase agreement, subject to an order of protection.
¶ 13 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, the O’Malley Parties produced documents related to the
real estate transaction and revealed that Jenna Bree LLC paid $2,685,000 for the surface of the
Farm. One of the documents produced was entitled “Preferential Right to Purchase and Right of
First Refusal.” The preferential rights agreement was entered on May 6, 2022, by and between
Patrick J. O’Malley Jr., Trustee of the O’Malley Trust, on behalf of the Savings Plan (grantor),
and Jenna Aldrich, as Manager of Jenna Bree LLC (grantee). Under the terms of the agreement,
the Trustee, acting on behalf of the Savings Plan, granted to Jenna Bree LLC, both a preferential
right to purchase its 50% interest in the mineral estate underlying the Farm, should the O’Malley
5
Trust decide to sell its interest, and a right of first refusal should a third-party make an offer to
purchase its interest.
¶ 14 On September 9, 2022, the Prather Trust filed a motion for miscellaneous relief. The
Prather Trust claimed that, beginning in 2008 and for years thereafter, all of the income and
proceeds derived from the extraction and sale of minerals underlying the Farm, including income
and proceeds from the sale of minerals belonging to the Prather Trust, was paid to the Savings
Plan. The Prather Trust asked the trial court to sequester the funds in the Savings Plan account and
stay the operation of the preferential rights agreement during the pendency of the case.
¶ 15 In response, the O’Malley Parties argued that the preferential rights agreement merely
granted Jenna Bree LLC the preferential right to purchase or to refuse to purchase the O’Malley
Trust’s 50% interest in the mineral estate. They advised the court that the grantor and grantee had
agreed that the O’Malley Trust would not sell its mineral interest while the litigation was pending.
The O’Malley Parties stated they had no objection to a stay of the preferential rights agreement
until the conclusion of the litigation. They did, however, object to an order sequestering the funds
in the Savings Plan account.
¶ 16 On October 5, 2022, the trial court heard arguments on the Prather Trust’s motion for
miscellaneous relief. Again, there is no transcript or bystander’s report from that hearing in the
record on appeal. On October 14, 2022, the court issued a written order granting the Prather Trust’s
motion. The court found that the Prather Trust had a “claim” against the O’Malley Trust within
the meaning of section 2(c) of the Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court further found that “beginning
in 2008 and for years thereafter, all income and proceeds from the sale of the minerals underlying
the [Farm], including income and proceeds from the sale of minerals belonging to [the Prather
Trust], were paid to the Patrick J. O’Malley Savings Plan.” The court ordered the Trustee of the
6
O’Malley Trust to hold all monies deposited in the Saving Plan, with the exception of mandatory
administration fees, and to provide copies of the Saving Plan account statements to the court. The
court also ordered that the O’Malley Trust’s 50% interest in the mineral estate underlying the Farm
“shall not be transferred or otherwise encumbered” during the pendency of the litigation or until
further order of the court. The court stayed the operation of the preferential rights agreement,
specifically noting that the O’Malley Parties had no objection to a stay.
¶ 17 On March 29, 2023, pursuant to the Prather Trust’s supplemental motion for miscellaneous
relief, the trial court ordered the Savings Plan to produce copies of its account statements from
2008 to the present. In partial compliance with that order, the Savings Plan produced statements
from December 2015, through February 2023, noting that this was as far back as “the bank kept
those records.”
¶ 18 On May 3, 2023, the Prather Trust filed a second supplemental motion for miscellaneous
relief. Therein, the Prather Trust indicated that a review of the Saving Plan account statements
revealed that the Savings Plan transferred $317,719.71 to “Patrick J. O’Malley, Escrowee” on July
26, 2017, and $34,950.12 to “Patrick J. O’Malley, Escrowee” on October 5, 2017. Copies of the
checks, reflecting those transactions, were appended to the motion as supporting exhibits. The
memo line on each check contained a notation, “UBS Reconciliation.” The Prather Trust sought
an order directing that all funds transferred to Patrick J. O’Malley, Escrowee, on July 26, 2017,
and October 5, 2017, and all other funds transferred from the Savings Plan account during the
period from 2008 through the present, except attorney fees and administrative fees, be immediately
returned to the Savings Plan account and held in accordance with the order entered October 14,
2022. Additionally, the Prather Trust sought an order directing the Savings Plan to produce all
7
account statements from 2008 through November 15, 2015, and to provide proof that said funds
had been returned to the Saving Plan account.
¶ 19 On June 7, 2023, the O’Malley Trust filed a “Motion to Dissolve Injunctions And Vacate
Orders Of Attachment Entered On August 10, 2022 and October 14, 2022.” Initially, the O’Malley
Trust claimed that the order of August 10, 2022, constituted an improper prejudgment attachment
and improperly “enjoined” the distribution of the surface proceeds to Mary Judith O’Malley. In
support, the O’Malley Trust argued that the surface rights to the Farm and the rights to the
underlying mineral estate were separate assets, that the Prather Trust had no legal or equitable
interest in the surface rights, and that any funds derived from the use or sale of the surface rights
belonged to Mary Judith O’Malley. Next, the O’Malley Trust claimed that the order of October
14, 2022, constituted an improper order of attachment and wrongly prohibited the transfer of funds
out of the Savings Plan account, even though those funds were retirement funds and therefore
statutorily exempt from attachment under section 12-1006(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/12-1006(a) (West 2022)). In support, the O’Malley Trust argued the Savings Plan was the
sole beneficiary of the royalties derived from the sale of minerals extracted from the mineral estate,
that the sum of the mineral royalties paid to the Savings Plan between 2008 and 2017 totaled
$280,687, and that this sum represented a fraction of the net value of the Savings Plan. The
O’Malley Trust concluded that the Prather Trust presented no evidence or arguments in support of
its request for preliminary injunctive relief and that the trial court granted injunctive relief without
identifying the facts and the legal basis for that relief.
¶ 20 In a supporting affidavit, Patrick J. O’Malley averred that he was the administrator of the
Savings Plan, that the Savings Plan was a defined contribution retirement plan, and that most of
the assets in the Savings Plan were contributed from his law firm. He expressed his belief, based
8
on an accounting performed by his brother, that between 2008 and 2017, the royalties paid to the
Savings Plan from leasing the mineral estate underlying the Farm totaled $280,687.31, that no
other proceeds from the mineral estate had been paid into the Savings Plan since 2017, and that
the net asset value of the Savings Plan was “significantly more” than $280,687.31.
¶ 21 The O’Malley Trust also filed a response to the Prather Trust’s second supplemental
motion for miscellaneous relief. The O’Malley Trust argued that the motion should be denied for
the reasons stated in its motion to dissolve the injunctions.
¶ 22 The Prather Trust filed a response in opposition to the O’Malley Trust’s motion to dissolve
the injunctions. The Prather Trust argued that the O’Malley Trust mischaracterized the trial court’s
orders as prejudgment attachments. It claimed that, pursuant to section 8(a)(3)(C) of the Act (740
ILCS 160/8(a)(3)(C) (West 2022)), the trial court had the authority to sequester the surface
proceeds and the funds in the Savings Plan account as a form of “other relief” to preserve the status
quo.
¶ 23 In reply, the O’Malley Trust argued that the Prather Trust could not invoke section 8 of the
Act because it had not filed a cause of action or count for relief under the statue. The O’Malley
Trust reasserted its arguments that the surface proceeds could not be attached as a matter of law
because those proceeds belonged to Mary Judith O’Malley, who was not a party to the proceedings,
and that the funds in the Savings Plan were exempt from attachment. It also claimed the October
14, 2022, order was improper because it sequestered all of the funds in the Savings Plan and was
not limited to funds derived from the mineral estate.
¶ 24 The trial court heard arguments from the parties on August 8, 2023, and December 5, 2023.
On December 21, 2023, the court denied the O’Malley Trust’s motion to dissolve the injunctions
and vacate the orders entered August 10, 2022, and October 14, 2022. The court also granted the
9
Prather Trust leave to amend its counterclaim and third-party complaint to add counts alleging
fraudulent transfer. 3 On January 16, 2024, the O’Malley Trust appealed the order of December 21,
2023, denying its motion to dissolve the injunctions.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 At the outset, we will consider whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The Prather
Trust argues that we lack jurisdiction because the underlying orders entered August 10, 2022, and
October 14, 2022, are not injunctive orders, and therefore, the order denying the O’Malley Trust’s
motion to dissolve and vacate those underlying orders is not appealable under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 27 Rule 307(a)(1) provides that an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order “granting,
modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). To determine whether a trial court’s order constitutes an injunctive
order for purposes of Rule 307(a)(1), the reviewing court looks to the substance of the order, rather
than its form. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260 (1989). Actions of the trial court that have the
force and effect of injunctions are appealable under Rule 307(a)(1), even if called something else.
In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 260. An injunctive order requires a party to do a particular thing or to
refrain from doing a particular thing, the most common sort of which operates as a restraint upon
the party in the exercise of his real or supposed rights. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 261. That said,
not every nonfinal order is appealable, even if it compels a party to do or not do a particular thing.
In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 261-62. Ministerial and administrative orders that regulate only the
procedural aspects of the litigation are not considered to be injunctive rulings and are not
3
On January 12, 2024, the Prather Trust filed its sixth amended counterclaim and third-party
complaint and added a count against the Savings Plan and Patrick J. O’Malley Jr., individually, alleging
violations of the Fraudulent Transfer Act (count X).
10
appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262. Such orders do not affect the
relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation and are therefore
distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262.
¶ 28 After reviewing the substance of the orders entered on August 10, 2022, and October 14,
2022, we conclude that they are injunctive in nature. The orders direct the O’Malley Parties to
sequester both the surface proceeds and all funds in the Savings Plan until the Prather Trust’s
claims are resolved or until further order of the court. The effect of these orders is to restrict the
transfer of the surface proceeds to the sole beneficiary, who is not a party to the litigation, and to
deprive the Savings Plan of access to funds that are unrelated to the sale of minerals extracted from
the mineral estate. Consequently, we conclude that the order of December 21, 2023, denying the
motion to dissolve those injunctive orders, is appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). Accordingly, we
have jurisdiction over this appeal.
¶ 29 In this appeal, the O’Malley Trust claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion to
dissolve the injunctions, and it raises several arguments in support of that claim. The decision to
deny a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. McHenry
County Sheriff v. McHenry County Department of Health, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 22. When
reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction, substantive issues
are to be considered only as necessary to resolve whether the trial court abused its discretion.
McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 22. Arguments concerning the issuance of
an injunctive order that are unnecessary to resolving the question of whether the court abused its
discretion in denying a motion to dissolve the injunctive order are irrelevant. McHenry County
Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 22. Conversely, arguments concerning the issuance of the
injunctive order that are necessary to resolving the question of the court’s exercise of discretion in
11
ruling on the motion to dissolve are relevant. McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339,
¶ 22. The standard governing the trial court’s judgment on a motion to dissolve the injunctive order
is whether the party in whose favor the order was issued has demonstrated a fair question as to the
existence of its rights. McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 23. For purposes of
our review under Rule 307(a)(1), the O’Malley Trust’s argument pertaining to whether the trial
court erred in granting preliminary injunctive relief is both relevant and dispositive. As to that
issue, the O’Malley Trust claims that the trial court erred when it entered injunctive orders that
effectively froze access to and use of the surface proceeds and the funds in the Savings Plan
account indefinitely, without conducting an evidentiary hearing and without making any findings
as to the required elements for injunctive relief. In response, the Prather Trust claims that the
challenged orders were properly entered as “other relief” under section 8 of the Fraudulent Transfer
Act (740 ILCS 160/8 (West 2022)).
¶ 30 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary provisional remedy that is granted to preserve
the status quo until the case can be decided on the merits. Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C.
v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2001). Its purpose is not to determine
controverted rights, controverted facts, or the merits of a case. Buzz Barton & Associates, Inc. v.
Giannone, 108 Ill. 2d 373, 386 (1985). To establish entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief,
the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate (1) a clearly ascertainable right in need of
protection, (2) irreparable harm to that right without the injunction, (3) the lack of an adequate
remedy at law, and (4) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Callis, 195 Ill. 2d at 365-
66. On appeal, a reviewing court considers whether the party seeking a preliminary injunction has
made a prima facie showing that there is a fair question concerning the existence of the rights
claimed. Callis, 195 Ill. 2d at 366. The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests
12
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that
discretion. Callis, 195 Ill. 2d at 366. The question before the reviewing court is whether there was
a sufficient showing to sustain the trial court’s order. Callis, 195 Ill. 2d at 366.
¶ 31 The Act was enacted to enable a creditor to defeat a debtor’s transfer of assets to which the
creditor was entitled. See 740 ILCS 160/5, 6 (West 2022); Northwestern Memorial Hospital v.
Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008, ¶ 16. In Illinois, the Act recognizes two categories of fraudulent
transfers: fraud in fact and fraud in law. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008, ¶ 18; Apollo Real Estate
Investment Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 403 Ill. App. 3d 179, 193 (2010). To prevail on a claim based
upon fraud in fact, a party must show that a transfer was made with an actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud the creditors. Apollo Real Estate Investment Fund, IV, L.P., 403 Ill. App. 3d at
193. To prevail on a claim based upon fraud in law, a party must show that a transfer was made
for inadequate consideration and that the debtor retained insufficient assets to meet its obligation.
Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008, ¶ 18. Where a transfer is made for inadequate consideration, the
fraud is presumed and the intent of the parties to the transaction is immaterial. Sharif, 2014 IL App
(1st) 130008, ¶ 18. Section 8 of the Act identifies the types of relief that may be obtained by a
creditor. 740 ILCS 160/8 (West 2022). Subsection (a)(3)(A) provides in pertinent part that a
creditor may obtain, “subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable
rules of civil procedure,” “an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee,
or both, of the asset transferred or of other property.” 740 ILCS 160/8(a)(3)(A) (West 2022).
¶ 32 In its motion and supplemental motions for relief, the Prather Trust asserted that it had a
claim for fraudulent transfer within the meaning of the Act, and it requested an order sequestering
funds under section 8(a)(3)(A) of the Act (740 ILCS 160/8(a)(3)(A) (West 2020)). At the time
these motions were filed, the Prather Trust’s counterclaim and third-party complaint did not
13
include a count alleging a cause of action under the Act. In opposing the Prather Trust’s motions,
the O’Malley Trust disputed the Prather Trust’s right to any relief under the Act. Contrary to the
Prather Trust’s assertions, the relief it requested was injunctive in nature. Thus, the trial court was
required to determine whether the Prather Trust showed that it had a clearly defined right that
required protection, that there would be an immediate and irreparable harm if an injunction was
denied, that there was no adequate remedy at law, and that there was a probability of ultimate
success on the merits. Here, however, there was no evidentiary hearing, and there is no report of
proceedings or bystander’s report recounting the arguments made to the trial court during the
hearings on the Prather Trust’s motions. The trial court entered the orders of August 10, 2022, and
October 14, 2022, granting injunctive relief, without making the necessary findings after an
evidentiary hearing. Based on the record before us, we cannot find that the Prather Trust
demonstrated that there is a fair question as to the existence of its asserted rights.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
O’Malley Trust’s motion to dissolve the injunctive orders, where those orders were entered
without the required procedural safeguards. Consequently, the trial court’s order of December 21,
2023, denying the O’Malley Trust’s motion to dissolve the injunctions, is reversed, and the
injunctive relief (i.e., the orders restricting the use and transfer of the surface funds and the funds
in the Savings Plan account, issued within the orders of August 10, 2022, and October 14, 2022)
are hereby vacated. The cause is remanded for further proceedings. In remanding the case, we are
mindful that this case had been pending for more than eight years and that the parties’ claims and
defenses are well known, and we find it necessary to admonish the parties that the trial court would
be within its authority to reject any further delay in bringing this case to trial, without just cause.
14
¶ 35 Reversed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.
15
O’Malley v. Adams, 2024 IL App (5th) 240094Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Crawford County, No. 16-CH-
9; the Hon. Sonja L. Ligon, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Robert D. Carroll and Richard A. Saldinger, of Landsman
for Saldinger Carroll, PLLC, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys A. Courtney Cox and Benjamin R. Wesselschmidt, of Sandberg
for Phoenix & von Gontard P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellees.
Appellee:
16