People v. Andrews , 2024 IL App (4th) 240636-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240636-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0636 July 2, 2024
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Livingston County
DAEQUAN T. ANDREWS, ) No. 24CF72
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Randy A. Yedinak,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Harris and Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant, Daequan T. Andrews, appeals the trial court’s order denying him
pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725
ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255 and
102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 5, 2024, the State charged defendant with two counts of domestic
battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), (2) (West 2022)) (Class 4 felonies) and one count each of
violation of conditions of pretrial release (id. § 32-10(b)), criminal damage to property (id. § 21-
1), and obstructing a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)).
¶5 That same day, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release
under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)), alleging
defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community.
¶6 Also that day, the trial court held a detention hearing. The court observed, in
addition to the petition to detain filed in this case, the State filed a petition to revoke in an earlier
case, Livingston County case No. 23-CF-431. The State proffered the following, initially offered
on the issue of probable cause, in support of its petition:
“This is for 24-CF-72, the new one. *** On April 4th, 2024,
officers responded to a 911 hang up at 516 West Main Street in
Cornell. On arrival, officers observed the defendant arguing with a
woman who identified herself as Dorella Chestnutt. The argument
was over, determined to have been over an altercation between the
defendant and Gabriella Chestnutt, the alleged victim. Dorella is
the mother of Gabriella Chestnutt.
The defendant admitted to officers that he had been staying
at 516 West Main Street. The defendant is currently under
conditions of pretrial release for 23-CF-431 prescribing no entry to
516 West Main Street and no contact with Gabriella Chestnutt.
The defendant admitted to punching the window of
Gabriella’s car and officers did observe damage to the windshield.
The defendant admitted that he had gotten into an argument with
Gabriella Chestnutt. Officers spoke to Dorella Chestnutt and she
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explained that she came to the residence to help her daughter,
Gabriella Chestnutt, leave whereupon she ended up in an argument
with the defendant as well after she had observed a bruise on
Gabriella Chestnut. Dorella explained that defendant began
threatening to hit her and yell at her and then police arrived.
Officers told the defendant to have a seat in the police car
whereupon the defendant fled. Officers ultimately lost track of
him. Officers then went to speak with Gabriella Chestnutt. She
explained that there was an argument between her and the
defendant. She explained that the argument started about
Gabriella’s use of TikTok. The argument escalated whereupon the
defendant kicked her in the face and then punched the windshield
of her car. Officers did observe the bruise to Gabriella’s eye that
Dorella Chestnutt had mentioned.”
The State added defendant and Gabriella had been dating and resided together.
¶7 The State further proffered the pretrial investigation report. According to that
report, defendant had worked full-time at Burger King for approximately one month. Before that,
he worked at McDonald’s. The Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA) rated
defendant’s risk as 6 out of 13. That assessment “predicts that 53% of individuals who score this
level are predicted to commit an act of domestic violence within 5 years.” The State noted this
assessment does not include defendant’s prior domestic-violence convictions. Defendant
received a score of 7 out of 14 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised
(VPRAI), indicating he had a 21.4% failure rate. Defendant was on pretrial supervision in
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Livingston County case No. 23-CF-431 when charged with the offenses. In that case, he was
charged with domestic battery with one to two previous convictions and unlawful restraint. The
pretrial report reveals multiple South Carolina convictions. For example, in May 2023, defendant
was convicted and sentenced to 90 days or a $500 fine for “DUS LICENSE NOT SUSP FOR
DUI 3RD OR SUB.” In July 2021, he was convicted for second degree harassment and
“Telephone/Unlawful Communication.” In February 2021, defendant was convicted of
possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person convicted of a violent felony. In July 2019,
defendant was convicted of second degree assault and battery.
¶8 Defense counsel proffered defendant denied making physical contact with
Gabriella. He emphasized he had permission from both Gabriella and her mother to stay at the
residence. Defendant reported, in the past, Gabriella and her mother threatened to inflict injuries
on themselves and to falsely accuse defendant as the perpetrator of those injuries. Defendant, a
South Carolina resident, stated he would agree to abide by pretrial release conditions, including
attending court hearings.
¶9 After the parties presented argument on the matter of defendant’s alleged
dangerousness, the trial court ordered defendant detained. The court summarized the factors the
State must prove by clear and convincing evidence and the statutory factors it may weigh in
determining whether to grant the State’s petition to deny pretrial release. The court found the
proof evident and the presumption great defendant committed a qualifying offense, poses a real
and present threat to Gabriella’s safety, and no conditions of pretrial release would mitigate that
threat. The court observed it had ordered defendant not to return to the residence and yet he did
so. The court emphasized defendant’s criminal history, finding it “not good.” The court found no
conditions that could mitigate the threat to Gabriella. The court noted any conditions it could
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impose were imposed in case No. 23-CF-431, and defendant violated those conditions.
¶ 10 At this same hearing, the trial court ruled on the petition to revoke filed in case
No. 23-CF-431 and ordered pretrial release revoked. This appeal is not consolidated with case
No. 23-CF-431. In addition, defendant’s notice of appeal does not include a challenge to the
order revoking his release in case No. 23-CF-431.
¶ 11 The trial court entered a written detention order finding the State proved the
factors of the dangerousness standard by clear and convincing evidence. This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On April 9, 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the order denying
him pretrial release under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). Defendant’s
notice of appeal is a completed form from the Article VI Forms Appendix to the Illinois Supreme
Court rules (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023)), by which he asks this court to reverse
the detention order. The form lists several possible grounds for appellate relief and directs
appellants to “check all that apply and describe in detail.” Defendant checked two boxes and
provided additional support on the lines beneath the preprinted text of those grounds. Defendant
did not file a supporting memorandum.
¶ 14 The first ground for relief checked by defendant in his notice of appeal is the State
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident or the presumption great he
committed the offenses charged. In support, defendant argued the following on the preprinted
lines:
“The Defendant denied making physical contact with the
victim and that the victim and her mother have threatened to inflict
injuries upon themselves and call the police blaming the
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Defendant. The Defendant also proffered that he would abide by
any pretrial conditions including no contact with the alleged victim
or her residence, be subject to GPS monitoring and any other
conditions the court felt appropriate. The Defendant scored a 7 on
the VPRAI assessment tool and a 6 on the ODARA assessment
tool. The Defendant works full time.”
¶ 15 Under the Code, all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release.
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Before the State may overcome that presumption and secure
the pretrial detention of a criminal defendant under section 110-6.1, the State must prove
multiple factors. One is to prove by clear and convincing evidence “the proof is evident or the
presumption great that the defendant has committed” an offense described in section 110-6.1(a)
(id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)). We review the trial court’s decisions and findings on issues of pretrial
detention under the abuse of discretion standard. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864,
¶ 10. We will find an abuse of discretion if the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful, or
if we find no reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s decision. Id.¶ 16 In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the State proved
by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident and the presumption is great defendant
committed domestic battery. Gabriella reported defendant kicked her in the face, and she had
visible injuries on her face. Defendant fled the scene when police officers arrived, and defendant
admitted striking her vehicle. The court plainly did not find defendant’s denial credible.
¶ 17 While defendant did not check the box on the preprinted form challenging the
trial court’s determination the State proved by clear and convincing evidence no condition or
combination of conditions can mitigate the threat, defendant mentioned “conditions” and
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identified specific conditions he maintains should have been imposed. His notice of appeal raises
a challenge to the court’s finding.
¶ 18 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no condition or combination
of conditions can mitigate the threat defendant poses to the community. Defendant was on
pretrial release with conditions when the alleged offenses were committed. The court weighed
statutory factors, considered the proffers, and made its findings. Those findings were not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful.
¶ 19 The next checked box on defendant’s notice of appeal alleges he “was denied an
opportunity for a fair hearing prior to the entry of the order denying or revoking pretrial release.”
Under the preprinted text, defendant wrote the following:
“The State filed both a Petition to Detain in 2024 CF 72 and a Petition to Revoke
Pretrial Release in 2023 CF 431. A Detention Order was entered in 2024 CF 72
but no order revoking Pretrial Release was entered in 2023 CF 431. A Petition to
Detain has different considerations than a Petition to Revoke Pretrial Release.”
¶ 20 This argument fails. Defendant has not shown how, even if true, he was denied a
fair hearing on the petition to detain because an order on the petition to revoke was not entered.
As the appellant, defendant bears the burden of proving the trial court erred. See, e.g., Insurance
Benefit Group, Inc. v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162808, ¶ 44. We
fail to see how the different considerations affected defendant’s hearing, as the proper
considerations for a petition to detain under section 110-6.1(a) of the Code were argued and
weighed here before an order to detain was entered.
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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¶ 23 Affirmed.
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