People v. Trinka , 2024 IL App (3d) 240211-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 240211-UOrder filed July 1, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-24-0211
v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-1301
)
MICHAEL TRINKA, ) Honorable
) Carmen Goodman,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Hettel concurred in the judgment.
Presiding Justice McDade dissented.
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ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition to
detain.
¶2 Defendant, Michael Trinka, was indicted on July 27, 2023, with 12 counts of aggravated
driving under the influence (DUI) (Class 2 and Class 4) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2022))
and two counts of reckless homicide (Class 3) (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a), (d)(2) (West 2022)). His bail
was set at $3 million, but he remained in custody. On November 2, 2023, defendant filed a motion
seeking pretrial release. In response, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release,
alleging, inter alia, that defendant was charged with an enumerated offense and his release posed
a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community under section 110-
6.1(a)(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6) (West 2022)).
¶3 The factual basis provided that on June 27, 2023, at 9:48 p.m. Illinois State Police received
a call regarding a Ford pickup truck traveling northbound in the southbound lanes of I-55. At
approximately 9:50 p.m., officers responded to the report of a crash which occurred in the I-55
southbound lanes. The crash involved a Ford F-150 and a GMC Yukon. Witnesses at the scene
indicated that the Ford had been traveling northbound in the southbound lanes of I-55 prior to the
crash and struck the GMC head-on. Defendant was identified as the driver of the Ford. He was the
only occupant of the vehicle and had to be extricated by the fire department. A blood test
determined that he had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.266. There were five occupants in the
GMC. The driver and front seat passenger were both pronounced dead at the scene. Three children
were also in the vehicle and sustained serious injuries. Defendant had previously committed the
offense of DUI.
¶4 An initial hearing was held on the petition on November 8, 2023. Defense counsel argued
that defendant was hurt in the accident and could not be adequately treated while incarcerated.
Counsel further indicated that revoking defendant’s driving privileges would be a sufficient
condition. The court asked, “how would we be able to monitor that he would not get behind the
wheel of a car?” Counsel stated that other conditions could be used like GPS monitoring or home
detention. The State provided that a cell phone extraction was done on defendant’s cell phone from
that night, within an hour of the crash, and stated, “From that night, the defendant was texting
friends that he wanted to kill himself. He texted friends that he wanted to die; that he was going to
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end it that night; and that he wanted to go out with a bang.” The State said, “it isn’t just driving”
but,
“The texts reveal that when the defendant is posed with adverse consequences and
even though he wants to harm himself, he is willing to harm hundreds of motorists
on I-55. Every single motorist he drove by that night, he posed a threat to them, and
it didn’t bother him one bit dangering [sic] the entire community.”
Further, the State indicated,
“There is nothing a GPS monitor, a SCRAM device is not going to stop this
defendant to engage in the same type of conduct. Yes, was his weapon of choice
that night a motor vehicle, but a GPS doesn’t stop him from getting another weapon.
A SCRAM device doesn’t stop him from getting a different type of weapon. What
happened that night wasn’t just drinking alcohol. It was willing to harm everyone
else on the roadway and ultimately killing two people and injuring three other
individuals just for their own benefit.”
¶5 The court granted the State’s petition finding the State met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence. In doing so, the court noted that it had listened to the arguments and reviewed
the petition in determining that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the
community at large and no conditions could mitigate such a real and present threat.
¶6 Subsequent detention hearings were held on December 7, 2023, January 18, 2024, and
March 11, 2024. After each hearing, the court found that continued detention was necessary.
¶7 On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in granting the petition
to detain. Specifically, he argues that he is not dangerous and that there were conditions to mitigate
any dangerousness he posed. We consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence,
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but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered for an abuse
of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under either standard, we
consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.; see also People v.
Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19.
¶8 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied
in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified
petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that
defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any
person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this
threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the
conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id.
§§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.
¶9 We find the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition. First, the evidence
showed that the defendant was upset, had a blood alcohol concentration of more than three times
the legal limit, drove the wrong direction on the road, and killed two individuals, injuring three
more. The evidence presented indicated that defendant was a danger to the community. Second,
we cannot say that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to find that there
were no conditions to mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. The State presented evidence as to the
statutory factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of the evidence,
and the history and character of the defendant (see id. § 110-5). It was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence for the court to believe that no conditions could mitigate defendant’s
dangerousness. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition.
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¶ 10 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 11 Affirmed.
¶ 12 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:
¶ 13 I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s order granting the State’s
verified petition to deny pretrial release.
¶ 14 As the majority recites, section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states
that “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release. . . .” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)
(West 2022). To rebut that presumption in this case, the State must prove the following three
elements, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great
that the defendant has committed a detainable offense; (2) that the defendant poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community; and (3) that no conditions
can mitigate that threat. Id. The second and third elements expressly require that their proof be
“based on the specific and articulable facts of the case.” Id.
¶ 15 I agree with the majority’s finding that the State satisfied the second of the above elements.
Relevant to the third element, however, the State argued during the detention hearing that
defendant’s alleged conduct demonstrates that he is willing to harm both himself and others in
response to experiencing adverse life events, and that neither a GPS monitor nor a SCRAM device
is able to stop defendant from again engaging in this type of conduct. In support of this latter
argument, the State injected extraneous conjecture that, although a vehicle was the specific weapon
that defendant elected to use during the events giving rise to this case, there is nothing to foreclose
the possibility of defendant choosing to use other weapons to harm others upon experiencing future
adverse life events. In turn, defendant identified a prohibition against him driving, home
confinement, or both, as potential mitigating conditions.
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¶ 16 Although the State attempted to illustrate the ineffectiveness of a driving prohibition by
pointing out that defendant could elect to use a weapon other than a vehicle in the future, the State
did not so much as address the possibility of home confinement. Moreover, the circuit court itself
acknowledged that home detention “could be a condition,” and I see no evidence in the record to
support a contrary finding.
¶ 17 There is also no evidence of record to support the State’s assertion that defendant might
employ weapons other than a vehicle to harm others in the future. During the detention hearing,
the State identified only one prior offense by defendant, which was a DUI, and did not present
facts regarding any past situations in which defendant harmed others using something other than
a vehicle. Thus, the State’s argument that defendant might use other weapons in the future was
based on mere speculation. Accordingly, I find that the State failed to meet its burden of proof
under the third statutory element, and would reverse the circuit court’s judgment for an abuse of
discretion.
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