Young v. Department of Corrections , 2020 IL App (4th) 190404-U ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (4th) 190404-UNOTICE FILED
This order was filed under Supreme December 23, 2020
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-19-0404
as precedent by any party except in
Carla Bender
the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CLINTON YOUNG, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Sangamon County
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ) No. 18MR568
and JOHN BALDWIN, in His Official Capacity as )
Director of Corrections, ) Honorable
Defendants-Appellees. ) Rudolph M. Braud Jr.,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s mandamus complaint was proper.
¶2 Plaintiff, Clinton Young, appeals from the dismissal of his pro se complaint
seeking an order of mandamus under section 14-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure
Code) (735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq. (West 2016)) against defendants, the Illinois Department of
Corrections (DOC) and John Baldwin, Director of Corrections. We affirm the Sangamon County
circuit court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Plaintiff is an individual who was formerly incarcerated at the Dixon Correctional
Center (Dixon) in Dixon, Illinois, where he was serving concurrent 60-year sentences following
his 1993 convictions for armed robbery and murder. Inmate Search, Illinois Department of
Corrections, https://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/pages/inmatesearch.aspx (last visited
October 28, 2020). According to the DOC website, plaintiff was ostensibly released from Dixon
in January 2020 and is currently serving a three-year term of mandatory supervised release
(MSR). Id. While incarcerated at Dixon, plaintiff completed several programs, including (1) the
requirements of the High School Level Tests of General Education Development (i.e., his
“GED”), (2) an associate’s degree in general studies from Lincoln Trail College, (3) Lifestyle
Redirection, and (4) a certificate program in construction occupations from Lakeland College.
¶5 In July 2018, plaintiff filed pro se a complaint for mandamus under section
14-101 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/14-101 (West 2016)), seeking an order compelling
defendants to (1) award him 36 months of sentencing credit for his participation in the previously
mentioned programs while in the custody of DOC, (2) credit him toward his MSR term for every
day past his self-imposed January 1, 2018, release date, and (3) compensate him for “every day
he does after [January 1, 2018,] for false imprisonment.”
¶6 In January 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section
2-619 of the Procedure Code (id. § 2-619). In their memorandum in support of their motion,
defendants argued (1) plaintiff was statutorily barred from receiving the requested relief because
he was serving a sentence for murder and (2) plaintiff’s request for sentencing credit involved
the exercise of discretion and therefore mandamus was not an appropriate avenue for relief.
Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion, arguing (1) he was not statutorily barred from
relief based on his conviction for murder because he was convicted prior to June 19, 1998, and
(2) the nature of the relief he requested was mandatory rather than discretionary.
¶7 According to a docket entry by the Sangamon County circuit court, the court
granted defendants’ motion in May 2019 following a telephonic hearing. An additional docket
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entry states the court entered a written order dismissing the complaint in June 2019; we note,
however, the order does not appear in the record on appeal. Additionally, the record contains no
report of proceedings or bystander’s report from the hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss.
¶8 This appeal followed.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiff argues (1) the Sangamon County circuit court “erroneously
dismissed Plaintiff’s [complaint for] Mandamus for Non-Retroactive reasons never argued,
explained, or presented by the Defendant[s]” until the May 2019 hearing and (2) “the plain
language of the Illinois Statutory Provisions regarding Earned Program Sentence Credit is clearly
Mandatory,” and therefore mandamus was an appropriate avenue for relief. We affirm.
¶ 11 A. Standard of Review
¶ 12 Defendants’ motion sought to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for mandamus under
section 2-169 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016)). “With a section 2-619
motion to dismiss, the movant admits the sufficiency of the complaint but asserts an affirmative
matter that defeats the claim.” Tolbert v. Godinez, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 18, 142 N.E.3d
415. A motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Procedure Code allows for the
involuntary dismissal of a cause of action on the ground “the claim asserted against defendant is
barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016). We review the grant of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss de novo.
Tolbert, 2020 IL App (4th) 180587, ¶ 18. We additionally note that we may affirm the circuit
court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record. O’Callaghan v. Satherlie, 2015 IL App
(1st) 142152, ¶ 17, 36 N.E.3d 999.
¶ 13 B. Mandamus Relief
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¶ 14 “ ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public official to
perform a purely ministerial duty where no exercise of discretion is involved.’ ” Sharp v.
Baldwin, 2020 IL App (2d) 181004, ¶ 9, 151 N.E.3d 725 (quoting People ex rel. Alvarez v.
Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 38, 944 N.E.2d 337, 341 (2011)). “A writ of mandamus will issue only if
the petitioner establishes (1) a clear right to the relief requested, (2) a clear duty of the public
official to act, and (3) clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ.” Id.¶ 15 C. Sentencing Credit
¶ 16 Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to 36 months of additional sentence credit under
section 3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 2018)). To aid in understanding the application of section 3-6-3(a)(4) to
plaintiff’s mandamus complaint, we outline, below, the history regarding amendments to the
statute and the statute’s current language.
¶ 17 Public Act 86-1373, which was effective September 10, 1990, added subsection
(a)(4) to section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code. The new section provided the good conduct credit
accumulated under section 3-6-3(a)(2) for each day of service in prison should be multiplied by
1.25 when the inmate engaged in certain programs. Pub. Act 86-1373 (eff. Sept. 10, 1990)
(adding 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)). However, the provision excluded individuals who were
convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder, or a Class X felony from receiving the
additional sentence credit. Pub. Act 86-1373 (eff. Sept. 10, 1990) (adding 730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(4)). Later, Public Act 88-311, which was effective August 11, 1993, amended section
3-6-3(a)(4) and changed the multiplier to provide programs satisfactorily completed before the
effective date of the amendment shall be multiplied by a factor of 1.25 and 1.50 for program
participation on or after the effective date of the amendment. Public Act 88-311 also added more
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offenses that were excluded from receiving the additional sentence credit. Pub. Act 88-311 (eff.
Aug. 11, 1993) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)). Public Act 90-592, which was effective on
June 19, 1998, made significant changes to section 3-6-3 in its entirety but neither changed the
multiplier nor the Class X exclusion related to the additional sentence credit. Subsequent
amendments added more offenses excluded from the additional sentence credit.
¶ 18 In 2017, the legislature passed Public Act 100-3, which was effective January 1,
2018, and made the sweeping changes to section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code that are at issue in
this appeal. Section 3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code as amended by Public Act 100-3 provided,
in pertinent part, as follows:
“Except as provided in paragraph (4.7) of this subsection (a), the rules and
regulations shall also provide that the sentence credit accumulated and retained
under paragraph (2.1) of subsection (a) of this Section by any inmate during
specific periods of time in which such inmate is engaged full-time in substance
abuse programs, correctional industry assignments, educational programs,
behavior modification programs, life skills courses, or re-entry planning provided
by the Department under this paragraph (4) and satisfactorily completes the
assigned program as determined by the standards of the Department, shall be
multiplied by a factor of 1.25 for program participation before August 11, 1993
and 1.50 for program participation on or after that date.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)
(West 2018).
¶ 19 Section 3-6-3(a) (4.7) of the Unified Code provided as follows:
“On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General
Assembly, sentence credit under paragraph (3), (4), or (4.1) of this subsection (a)
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may be awarded to a prisoner who is serving a sentence for an offense described
in paragraph (2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), or (2.6) for credit earned on or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly; provided,
the award of the credits under this paragraph (4.7) shall not reduce the sentence of
the prisoner to less than the following amounts:
(i) 85% of his or her sentence if the prisoner is required to serve 85% of
his or her sentence; or
(ii) 60% of his or her sentence if the prisoner is required to serve 75% of
his or her sentence, except if the prisoner is serving a sentence for gunrunning his
or her sentence shall not be reduced to less than 75%.
This paragraph (4.7) shall not apply to a prisoner serving a sentence for an
offense described in subparagraph (i) of paragraph (2) of this subsection (a).” 730
ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4.7) (West 2018).
Public Act 100-3 additionally removed the restriction preventing Class X offenders from
receiving credits provided by section 3-6-3(a)(4). Pub. Act 100-3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018)
(amending 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)).
¶ 20 In August 2019, the legislature amended section 3-6-3(a)(4) again by adding the
following language:
“(B) The Department shall award sentence credit under this paragraph (4)
accumulated prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 101st
General Assembly in an amount specified in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph
(4) to an inmate serving a sentence for an offense committed prior to June 19,
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1998, if the Department determines that the inmate is entitled to this sentence
credit, based upon:
(i) documentation provided by the Department that the inmate engaged in
any full-time substance abuse programs, correctional industry assignments,
educational programs, behavior modification programs, life skills courses, or
re-entry planning provided by the Department under this paragraph (4) and
satisfactorily completed the assigned program as determined by the standards of
the Department during the inmate’s current term of incarceration; or
(ii) the inmate’s own testimony in the form of an affidavit or
documentation, or a third party’s documentation or testimony in the form of an
affidavit that the inmate likely engaged in any full-time substance abuse
programs, correctional industry assignments, educational programs, behavior
modification programs, life skills courses, or re-entry planning provided by the
Department under paragraph (4) and satisfactorily completed the assigned
program as determined by the standards of the Department during the inmate’s
current term of incarceration.
(C) If the inmate can provide documentation that he or she is entitled to
sentence credit under subparagraph (B) in excess of 45 days of participation in
those programs, the inmate shall receive 90 days of sentence credit. If the inmate
cannot provide documentation of more than 45 days of participation [in] those
programs, the inmate shall receive 45 days of sentence credit. In the event of a
disagreement between the Department and the inmate as to the amount of credit
accumulated under subparagraph (B), if the Department provides documented
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proof of a lesser amount of days of participation in those programs, that proof
shall control. If the Department provides no documentary proof, the inmate’s
proof as set forth in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall control as to the amount
of sentence credit provided.” Pub. Act 101-440 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (amending 730
ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)).
¶ 21 1. Retroactivity
¶ 22 Plaintiff contends the amendment made by Public Act 100-3 applies to him
retroactively, and thus, he was entitled to the application of the appropriate multiplier to all
eligible programs that he had already satisfactorily completed. In support of his argument,
plaintiff noted the following language from section 3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 2018)): “multiplied by a factor of 1.25 for program participation before
August 11, 1993 and 1.50 for program participation on or after that date.” Defendants disagree,
asserting the amendment made by Public Act 100-3 is prospective.
¶ 23 The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the two-part analysis for determining
retroactivity established by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
511 U.S. 244 (1994). People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19, 72 N.E.3d 346.
Under the Landgraf test, we first ask whether the legislature clearly indicated the temporal reach
of the amended statute. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19. “If so, then that expression of legislative
intent must be given effect, absent a constitutional prohibition. [Citation.] If not, then the court
proceeds to step two and determines whether the statute would have a retroactive impact.” Id.However, an Illinois court does not need to go beyond step one of the Landgraf test because the
legislature has clearly set forth the temporal reach of every amended statute in section 4 of the
Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)). Id. ¶ 20. Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes is a
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general savings clause, which the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted as meaning “procedural
changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective
only.” Id.
¶ 24 The only temporal reference in the amendment made by Public Act 100-3 is
contained in section 3-6-3(a)(4.7), which states, in pertinent part, the following:
“On or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General
Assembly, sentence credit under paragraph (3), (4), or (4.1) of this subsection (a)
may be awarded to a prisoner who is serving a sentence for an offense described
in paragraph (2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), or (2.6) for credit earned on or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 100th General Assembly ***.”
(Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 100-3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) (adding 730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(4.7)).
¶ 25 Within the section’s plain language, the amendment has a prospective application.
We note the Second District recently reached the same conclusion in Sharp, 2020 IL App (2d)
181004, ¶ 12. Even in the absence of that language in Public Act 100-3, the amendment makes
substantive changes, which are prospective only. See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2018). We note the
language cited by plaintiff in support of his argument was included in Public Act 88-311 (eff.
Aug. 11, 1993) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)), and not Public Act 100-3, which removed
the Class X exclusion. Thus, we find the amendment made by Public Act 100-3 applies
prospectively only.
¶ 26 We find support for our conclusion in the language of the amendment made by
Public Act 101-440 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (adding 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)(B)), which expressly
provides for sentence credit under section 3-6-3(a)(4) accumulated prior to the effective date of
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the amendment to an individual serving a sentence for an offense committed prior to June 19,
1998. Public Act 101-440 also discusses the necessary evidence for determining the sentence
credit and the amount of the sentence credit, which is different from the multipliers. Pub. Act
101-440 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (adding 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4)(B), (C)); see also People v.
Washington, 2019 IL App (1st) 172372, ¶ 9, 130 N.E.3d 77 (concluding Public Act 100-3 did not
apply to a petitioner’s request for sentence credit for programs completed prior to the effective
date of the amendment).
¶ 27 Thus, plaintiff is only entitled to additional sentence credit under section
3-6-3(a)(4) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(4) (West 2018)) for programs
completed after January 1, 2018. As of January 1, 2020, petitioner may also be entitled to
additional sentence credit under section 3-6-3(a)(4)(B) for his completion of programs before
January 1, 2018. See Pub. Act 101-440 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (adding section 730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(4)(B)).
¶ 28 2. Exhaustion
¶ 29 Finally, defendants contend the aforementioned possible avenues for additional
sentence credit being awarded to plaintiff do not require reversal of the circuit court’s dismissal
because plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies. We agree with defendants.
¶ 30 This court has recognized “ ‘[t]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies to grievances filed by inmates.’ ” Montes v. Taylor, 2013 IL App (4th) 120082,
¶ 12, 985 N.E.2d 1037 (quoting Ford v. Walker, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1124, 888 N.E.2d 123,
127 (2007)). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides “ ‘[a] party
aggrieved by an administrative decision cannot seek judicial review unless he has first pursued
all available administrative remedies.’ ” Id. (quoting Ford, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1124). Where an
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inmate fails to show his or her grievance had administrative finality, the inmate does not meet his
or her burden of showing exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. Here, the record shows the
January 24, 2018, grievance filed by plaintiff was based on his completion of programs before
January 1, 2018. Accordingly, plaintiff has not shown he pursued all administrative remedies
available to him as to sentence credit under section 3-6-3(a)(4) for programs completed under
sections 3-6-3(a)(4)(B) and 3-6-3(a)(4)(C) for his completion of programs before January 1,
2018, as provided by Public Act 101-440 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (adding section 730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(4)(B), (C)). Here, petitioner may have in fact already received such additional
sentence credit as it appears he was released from Dixon in January 2020 and is serving his
three-year term of MSR.
¶ 31 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint
for mandamus relief was proper.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (eff.
Apr. 1, 2018), we affirm the Sangamon County circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
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