People v. Perez-Vigil , 2020 IL App (2d) 180401-U ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (2d) 180401-UNo. 2-18-0401
Order filed December 23, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 17-CF-2357
)
EXSAUR PEREZ-VIRGIL, ) Honorable
) Daniel B. Shanes,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Jorgensen and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Reversed and remanded for Rule 604(d) compliance; postplea counsel’s Rule
604(d) certificate was deficient because it stated that defendant, rather than counsel,
made any necessary amendments to defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶2 Defendant, Exsaur Perez-Virgil, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. He contends that (1) defense counsel’s certificate failed to comply with Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), and (2)postplea counsel was ineffective for failing to produce
evidence in support of defendant’s claim that he was not advised of the adverse immigration
consequences of pleading guilty. We reverse and remand.
2020 IL App (2d) 180401-U¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS
646/60(b)(1) (West 2016)). On December 19, 2017, the parties presented the court with an
agreement in which defendant would plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of 24 months’
probation and 180 days in jail, which he had served. The State would nol-pros an unrelated charge
of driving under the influence.
¶5 No one asked defendant if he needed an interpreter, and he did not request one. Defendant
assured the court that he understood the agreement. The following colloquy then occurred:
“THE COURT: ***
What country are you a citizen of?
DEFENDANT: United States.
THE COURT: Okay. And you obviously can speak and understand English
without a problem, also.”
¶6 Defendant signed a “Waiver of Trial” form. The back of the form included a paragraph
advising of possible adverse immigration consequences for defendants who were not United States
citizens. The court concurred in the plea agreement and imposed the agreed sentences.
¶7 Defendant moved to withdraw his plea. In a motion prepared by the public defender,
defendant alleged that he “did not have an appropriate amount of time to make a fully informed
decision” on the proposed plea agreement and that he did not have a chance to review the discovery
with his attorney and discuss potential defenses.
¶8 On the next court date, a private attorney appearing for defendant told the court that
defendant was subject to deportation as a result of his plea. This attorney filed a new motion to
vacate the plea, in which he argued that neither the public defender nor the court had advised
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2020 IL App (2d) 180401-Udefendant of the plea’s possible immigration consequences and thus the plea was not knowing and
voluntary.
¶9 Defense counsel also filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff.
July 1, 2017) that stated in relevant part:
“2. That the attorney *** examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of
the plea of guilty,
3. That the defendant Exsaur Perez-Virgil has made amendments to the motion
necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”
¶ 10 The court pointed out that the certificate did not state that counsel had reviewed the court
file and report of proceedings for the sentencing hearing. Counsel filed an amended certificate
and a new motion to withdraw the plea.
¶ 11 At the hearing on the motion, counsel asserted primarily that no one advised defendant,
who was not a United States citizen, of the adverse immigration consequences of the plea;
defendant answered the court’s question about citizenship as he did because he did not understand
the question; and although defendant participated in the plea process in English, he “doesn’t speak
good English.”
¶ 12 Defendant testified through an interpreter that he had lived in the United States for 20 years.
His wife and children are American, but he did not have the money to seek citizenship. When
asked if he spoke English, he replied, “50 percent.” Defendant said that he told the judge he was
a United States citizen because he did not understand the question. Defendant said that he never
discussed with the public defender any “favorable facts” regarding his case. He saw some police
reports and part of a video but did not discuss the evidence with his attorney.
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2020 IL App (2d) 180401-U¶ 13 The trial court denied the motion. Recalling its prior discussions with defendant, the court
noted that he had “confidence in English.” The court had observed defendant through numerous
court appearances and engaged in colloquies with him to “determine whether the defendant is
actually conversant in the English language.” The court found that defendant “is 50 percent good
in English, and that was plenty good enough.” Further, the court noted that defendant had never
expressed the need for an interpreter.
¶ 14 The court admitted that it had not given the statutory admonishments about immigration
consequences. See 725 ILCS 5/113-8 (West 2018). However, by representing that he was an
American citizen, defendant waived that error. The court also noted that defendant signed the trial
waiver form, which included such an admonishment.
¶ 15 Defendant moved to reconsider. Counsel explained that he had “never filed anything
concerning ineffective assistance [of counsel] because the [public defender] must have had the
opportunity to talk to [defendant] and go through all the advisals,” but apparently “chose not to.”
The court denied the motion and defendant timely appeals.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Defendant first contends that counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate did not comply with the
rule. The rule requires that postplea counsel file a certificate stating that he or she has consulted
with the defendant, “has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea
of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing,” and has made the necessary
amendments to the postplea motion. Ill. S. Ct. Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). The filing of a
Rule 604(d) certificate is a condition precedent to an appeal, and strict compliance with the rule is
required. People v. Dismuke, 355 Ill. App. 3d 606, 608 (2005). Where no Rule 604(d) certificate,
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2020 IL App (2d) 180401-Uor a noncompliant certificate, is filed, a reviewing court must remand for new postplea proceedings
and compliance with the rule. People v. Hagerstrom, 2016 IL App (3d) 140559, ¶ 9.
¶ 18 Here, the certificate states that defendant, not counsel, made the necessary amendments.
In Dismuke, we held that a certificate that failed to state that counsel had made any necessary
amendments to the motion did not comply with the rule. Dismuke, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 608-09. The
certificate here, while mentioning amendments, does not state that counsel made any necessary
amendments, and thus does not comply with the rule. As compliance with the rule is a prerequisite
to a hearing on the motion, we must vacate the denial of the motion and remand for compliance
with the rule.
¶ 19 The State argues that the mistake is nothing more than a scrivener’s error and that the
record shows that counsel complied substantively with the rule. We rejected a similar argument
in Dismuke, holding that “a waste of judicial resources occurs when, as a result of an attorney’s
deficient certificate, an appellate court must scour through the record to determine whether that
attorney actually complied with Rule 604(d), even though strict compliance with that rule’s
certification requirements would prevent such waste.” Id. at 609.
¶ 20 The State quotes the following passage from People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998):
“Where, as here, the defendant was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion
for reduced sentencing, we see limited value in requiring a repeat of the exercise, absent a good
reason to do so.” However, in Shirley, the cause had already been remanded for Rule 604(d)
compliance. The court stated that it would not routinely order multiple remands for compliance
with the rule but reaffirmed its policy that strict compliance is required. Here, defendant has not
had a previous remand, so Shirley does not apply.
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2020 IL App (2d) 180401-U¶ 21 Defendant next contends that postplea counsel was ineffective for failing “to present any
evidence on whether [defendant] was correctly advised by his plea counsel as to the immigration
consequences of his plea.” We briefly discuss this contention, as it may arise on remand. A
challenge to a guilty plea alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is subject to the standard of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2005). Under
Strickland, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that the defendant was prejudiced by this substandard performance. Id.¶ 22 Defendant insists that postplea counsel should have offered evidence that defendant was
not correctly advised about the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty. But
defendant wrongly assumes that the trial court believed that he was entitled to such advisements.
The court held that defendant forfeited the issue by telling the court that he was a United States
citizen. Postplea counsel did ask defendant about that issue. However, based in large part on its
personal experience with defendant during the proceedings, the court, as a factual matter, did not
credit defendant’s explanation that he answered as he did because he did not understand the
question. In ruling as it did, the court seems to have assumed that defendant was not advised about
the immigration consequences of his plea, but found that, because defendant claimed to be a United
States citizen, neither the trial court nor defense counsel had any duty in that regard. Thus,
defendant suffered no prejudice because producing concrete evidence that defendant was not
advised about immigration consequences would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding.
¶ 23 Defendant claims that counsel has a duty to ask a defendant about his immigration status
in any event. He cites People v. Deltoro, 2015 IL App (3d) 130381, ¶ 18, for the proposition that
“it is at least arguable that [Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)] required the defendant’s
plea counsel to ask the defendant about his immigration status.” There, defense counsel was found
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2020 IL App (2d) 180401-Uineffective for failing to advise the defendant about possible deportation as a result of his plea
despite a lack of evidence that defense counsel was aware of the defendant’s immigration status.
The court rejected as “speculative and premature” the State’s argument that the defendant might
have lied about his status. Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 24 The State responds that this case is more like People v. Ramirez, 2018 IL App (1st) 152125.
There, the court held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to discuss with the
defendant possible immigration consequences of his plea because documents in the record
indicated that the defendant had been born in Illinois and was a lifelong Illinois resident. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 25 We agree with the State. Defendant affirmatively misrepresented on the record that he was
a United States citizen. Moreover, the trial court did not credit his explanation that he was
confused by the question. Thus, the trial court correctly held that, on the existing record, defendant
did not have to be admonished about possible immigration consequences given his affirmative
statement that he was a United States citizen. See Id.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 We reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County and remand the cause.
¶ 28 Reversed and remanded.
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