People v. Wyrick , 2020 IL App (1st) 181606-U ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 181606-UNo. 1-18-1606
December 21, 2020
FIRST DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) Of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 16 CR 7195
v. )
) The Honorable
CORNELL WYRICK, ) Joseph M. Claps,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendant-Appellant. )
PRESIDING JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hyman and Pierce concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where no evidence corroborates a defendant’s claim that he needed to shoot the
victim to defend himself, proof that the defendant shot the unarmed victim in the stomach
sufficiently supports a conviction for attempted murder. In a bench trial, a prosecutor’s
remark does not require reversal unless the record shows that the remark led the court to
misapply the law.
¶2 Following a bench trial, the trial court found Cornell Wyrick guilty of attempted
murder. On appeal Wyrick claims that the evidence does not prove he intended to murder
the victim, and the prosecutor’s allusion to his post-arrest silence made the trial unfair.
No. 1-18-1606
We find the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, and Wyrick did not show that
the prosecutor’s comment had a prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On April 17, 2016, Jajuan Nunn visited Nikya Ford at Nikya’s home. As Nunn
prepared to leave, Nikya’s sister, Alyssa Ford, came home, accompanied by Wyrick, her
boyfriend. Alyssa offered to drive Nunn home. Nikya, Nunn, and Wyrick piled into the
back seat of Alyssa’s car. Wyrick and Nunn, who just met, got into an argument. Nikya
told Wyrick to get out of the car. Both Nunn and Wyrick got out of the car as Alyssa and
her mother, Chaunte, approached. Nikya and Chaunte held Nunn while Alyssa took
Wyrick away to prevent a fight. Wyrick pulled out a gun and fired four shots at Nunn,
hitting Nunn in the stomach and the leg. Wyrick walked away. Police arrested Wyrick a
few minutes after the shooting about a block away from Nikya’s home. A grand jury
indicted Wyrick for attempted murder.
¶5 At the bench trial, Nikya and Chaunte both testified that Nunn had no gun. Chaunte
testified that Nunn did not threaten Wyrick, but Wyrick said he would smack Nunn. Nunn
testified that as they sat in the car Wyrick called Nunn a “bitch” and showed Nunn
Wyrick’s gun. Nunn and Wyrick were preparing to fight outside the car when Nikya,
Alyssa, and Chaunte intervened. Nunn, too, testified that he did not have a gun.
¶6 Wyrick testified that he did not show Nunn his gun. Wyrick tried to make a joke and
Nunn “took it the wrong way.” They exited the car, preparing to fight, when the women
restrained them. Wyrick claimed that Nunn stepped out of Chaunte’s grasp and reached
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for a gun under his shirt. Wyrick fired the shots because he feared Nunn would shoot him.
The transcript of cross-examination of Wyrick shows the following:
“STATE: So, what you’re telling us today is what happened?
WYRICK: That’s exactly what happened.
STATE: And when you had the opportunity to tell the detective what
happened, you didn’t tell the detectives that?
THE COURT: Hold on a second. What’s the purpose of that question? To point
out that he invoked his 5th Amendment right to remain silent?
State: No, Judge, I’ll withdraw that question.
THE COURT: Good idea.”
¶7 A Chicago police officer testified that after the arrest Wyrick told police he did not
shoot Nunn, and he left the Fords when he heard shots.
¶8 In closing, the prosecutor argued,
“The defendant spoke with [the detective]. At that time if the defendant had
truly acted in self-defense, he had an opportunity to tell the police what
happened. He had the opportunity to tell the police the victim had a gun.
***
He didn’t tell the police it was self-defense.”
¶9 Defense counsel did not object to the remarks.
¶ 10 The trial court found Wyrick guilty of attempted first degree murder and sentenced
him to 32 years in prison.
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¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, Wyrick argues the evidence did not prove him guilty and prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument made the trial unfair.
¶ 13 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 14 Wyrick contends the State did not prove he intended to kill Nunn. First, he argues
there was ample opportunity to make sure Nunn died, but instead he walked away leaving
Nunn alive. Second, he contends no evidence refutes his testimony that he believed Nunn
had a gun. Wyrick claims the court had to find that he believed, perhaps unreasonably,
that he needed to shoot Nunn to defend himself. We must decide whether any rational
trier of fact could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyrick
intended to murder Nunn. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 26.
¶ 15 “Because intent is a state of mind, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. As a
result, this court has recognized that where intent is not admitted by the defendant, it can
be shown by surrounding circumstances.” People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 64 (1995).
“[S]ince every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable consequences
flowing from his own deliberate act, it follows that if one willfully does an act the direct
and natural tendency of which is to destroy another’s life, the natural and irresistible
conclusion, in the absence of qualifying facts, is that the destruction of such other person’s
life was intended.” People v. Coolidge, 26 Ill. 2d 533, 537 (1963).
¶ 16 Wyrick fired four shots at Nunn, hitting his stomach once and his leg once. Shots fired
into a person’s stomach frequently cause great bodily harm and show an intent to kill.
People v. Velasco, 184 Ill. App. 3d 618, 634 (1989). A rational trier of fact could infer
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from the circumstances that Wyrick intended to kill Nunn. See People v. Ephraim, 323 Ill.
App. 3d 1097, 1110 (2001).
¶ 17 Wyrick argues the evidence shows he did not intend to kill because he did not seize
his opportunity to make sure Nunn died. He compares this case to People v. Thomas, 127
Ill. App. 2d 444 (1970). In reversing Thomas’s conviction for attempted murder, the
appellate court in Thomas noted that Thomas inflicted several wounds, picking at the
victim’s face with a knife and stabbing the victim in the shoulder while threatening to kill
her. The court said that Thomas’s acts “demonstrated a sadistic intention to inflict physical
injury,” but the court found that “the opportunity for murder was such that there was
insufficient proof that defendant intended or attempted to commit that crime.” Thomas,
127 Ill. App. 2d at 455-56.
¶ 18 No one intervened to stop Thomas from killing his victim after he stabbed her. Here,
Chaunte and Nyika immediately came to Nunn’s aid after Wyrick shot him. To complete
the murder, Wyrick would have shot him again, prone, with Chaunte, Nakia, and Alyssa
watching. The initial wound, a gunshot to the stomach, unlike a stab wound to the
shoulder, severely threatened Nunn’s life. Wyrick’s failure to fire more shots after Nunn
fell, under the circumstances of this case, does not overcome evidence that he intended to
kill Nunn with the shots he fired. See Velasco, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 634.
¶ 19 Wyrick argued his testimony that he feared for his life creates reasonable doubt as to
his intention to murder Nunn. He claims the evidence proves he believed, perhaps
unreasonably, that he needed to shoot Nunn to defend himself.
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¶ 20 Only Wyrick’s testimony supports the claim that he acted in self-defense. No other
witness saw Nunn reach for any object, no other witness saw Nunn with a gun, and no
evidence at the scene supports Wyrick’s testimony that Nunn had a gun. No other witness
saw Nunn free himself from Chaunte and Nyika. A rational trier of fact could reject
Wyrick’s testimony and find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyrick did not act in the
belief that he needed to shoot Nunn to protect himself. See People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d
184, 201 (1988). The evidence supports the conviction for attempted murder.
¶ 21 B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 22 Next, Wyrick contends that in closing argument the prosecutor twice alluded to
Wyrick’s post-arrest silence. Wyrick admits his attorney failed to object, and he asks this
court to address the issue as plain error. See People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476
(2003). This court may consider forfeited error when “(1) the evidence is close, regardless
of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the
evidence.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005). Wyrick does not claim the
comments undermined the integrity of the judicial process. The remarks do not justify
review under the second prong of plain error analysis. See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187.
¶ 23 For the first prong, the defendant must show the improper remarks substantially
prejudiced him. People v. Clark, 335 Ill. App. 3d 758, 764 (2002). Wyrick cites a number
of cases in which the appellate court held remarks in jury trials prejudicial. E.g., People v.
Simmons, 293 Ill. App. 3d 806 (1998); People v. Quinonez, 2011 IL App (1st) 092333.
Here, the court held a bench trial. “[A] trial judge is presumed to know the law, and on
review, the appellate court presumes that the trial judge followed applicable law unless
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the record indicates otherwise.” People v. Refer, 2019 IL App (5th) 150439, ¶ 85.
Especially because the trial court explicitly recognized that it could not rely on post-arrest
silence as indicating guilt, we cannot find Wyrick suffered any prejudice from the
prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument.
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 The trier of fact could infer Wyrick intended to murder Nunn from the evidence that
Wyrick shot Nunn in the stomach while Chaunte and Nakia held Nunn back from fighting
Wyrick. Wyrick has not shown the prosecutor’s allusion to Wyrick’s post-arrest silence
had prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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