People v. Jackson , 2020 IL App (1st) 191690-U ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 191690-UNo. 1-19-1690
Order filed December 31, 2020
Sixth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 16 CR 12131
)
DELVIN JACKSON, ) Honorable
) James B. Linn,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s 12-year sentence for aggravated battery of a peace officer is affirmed
over his claim that the sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of his offense.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Delvin Jackson was found guilty of aggravated battery
of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West Supp. 2015)) and sentenced to 12 years’
imprisonment. He appeals, arguing that his sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of his
offense. We affirm.
No. 1-19-1690
¶3 At trial, Sergeant Troy Smith of the Cook County Sheriff’s Department testified that on
March 23, 2016, he conducted a sweep of inmate cells for contraband at the Division 11 jail. Later,
defendant, an inmate, approached Smith and Lieutenant James Holmes, who was also in the area,
and said something was missing from his cell. Defendant was “irritated” and refused to reenter his
cell. Instead, he “grabbed” a broom and “attempted to swing” it at Holmes, who deployed “OC
Spray.” Defendant then “charged towards” Holmes, and several officers and a supervisor assisted
by taking defendant to the ground and handcuffing him.
¶4 Holmes testified that he noticed defendant arguing with Smith, told them to “stop,” and
instructed defendant to enter his cell. Defendant refused, and instead swore at Holmes and grabbed
the broom. Holmes deployed OC Spray towards defendant, but he still attacked Holmes with the
broom, striking him in the upper arm and shoulder. Holmes did not suffer any visible injuries, but
was sore the next day. The State introduced video of the incident at trial, which is included in the
record on appeal and consistent with Holmes’s testimony.
¶5 On cross-examination, Holmes stated that he grabbed the broom after defendant’s third
swing and snapped it. Holmes did not swing the broom at defendant. Other inmates had
complained about Holmes using excessive force in previous incidents.
¶6 Defendant testified that he returned to his cell from recreation and found it in “disarray.”
He exited the cell and asked to speak with Holmes, who turned and asked defendant “what the F”
he wanted. Defendant then asked Holmes to speak with the sergeant, but Holmes refused and told
defendant to return to his cell. When defendant did not reenter his cell and again asked if he could
speak to a sergeant, Holmes sprayed defendant with mace. Defendant responded by picking up
“the stick” and swinging it at Holmes. On cross-examination, defendant denied that he was upset
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No. 1-19-1690
prior to the incident. He admitted he did not comply when Holmes told him to reenter his cell, but
denied speaking to Smith prior to the incident.
¶7 In rebuttal, the State entered a stipulation that defendant had prior convictions for
manslaughter and attempt murder.
¶8 After argument, the court found defendant guilty. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was
denied.
¶9 Defendant’s presentence investigation (PSI) report showed he was 50 years old on the date
of the offense. He had multiple prior convictions, including for burglary, aggravated battery of a
peace officer, armed violence, involuntary manslaughter, possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver, domestic battery, and attempt murder. He earned a GED while incarcerated in
1988. He worked as an exterminator in 2009, and in maintenance from July 2013 to February 2014.
At the time of the instant offense, defendant was serving a 10-year sentence for attempt murder.
¶ 10 At sentencing, the State referenced in aggravation defendant’s convictions for attempt
murder, aggravated battery of a peace officer, manslaughter, and burglary, argued that defendant
had a “very violent background,” and asked for a “substantial period” of imprisonment. The court
inquired regarding the details of defendant’s attempt murder conviction, and the State relayed that
defendant beat, stabbed, and threatened to kill the victim after she refused to have sex with him.
The State added that defendant stabbed the victim in her shoulder, puncturing her lung. The court
also asked about the circumstances of defendant’s manslaughter conviction, and the prosecutor
explained that defendant stabbed and killed a victim following a game of cards, and also stabbed
the victim’s mother during the incident.
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No. 1-19-1690
¶ 11 In mitigation, defense counsel argued that defendant worked in maintenance while not
incarcerated, and that the facts of this case differed from defendant’s previous crimes. In
allocution, defendant maintained that he only defended himself from an attack Holmes initiated.
¶ 12 The court sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to
his sentence for attempt murder, and observed that “multiple” convictions in defendant’s
background, including burglary and aggravated battery to a peace officer, qualified him for Class
X sentencing. In so doing, the court stated defendant “led a criminal life and a violent life,” and
was “constantly getting himself in trouble” through “extreme acts of violence.” According to the
court, defendant was “violent,” “incorrigible,” and posed “a danger to everybody.” The court
denied defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence.
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argues that his sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of his
offense and overlooks his rehabilitative potential.
¶ 14 At sentencing, the court must consider both the seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s
rehabilitative potential. Ill. Const. 1970, art I, § 11. The seriousness of the crime is the most
important factor. People v. Branch, 2018 IL App (1st) 150026, ¶ 39. The sentencing court’s
decision is entitled to significant deference, and the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the sentencing court because it may have weighed aggravating and mitigating factors
differently. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 213 (2010). This is because the sentencing court
was better positioned to consider the “ ‘defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character,
mentality, social environment, habits, and age.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203,
209 (2000)). The sentencing court need not weigh mitigating factors over the seriousness of an
offense. People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345, ¶ 123.
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No. 1-19-1690
¶ 15 The sentencing court’s decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212. When the sentence is within the applicable sentencing range, a
reviewing court will not reverse unless the sentence is “greatly at variance with the spirt and
purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d
at 210.
¶ 16 Aggravated battery of a peace officer is typically a Class 2 felony with a sentencing range
of three to seven years. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4), (h) (West Supp. 2015); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a)
(West 2016). Here, however, defendant was subject to the Class X sentencing range of 6 to 30
years because of his qualifying felony convictions. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016); 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2016).
¶ 17 The record shows that defendant, while an inmate in jail, struck Lieutenant Holmes with a
broom. Holmes had to use OC Spray on defendant, and multiple officers were needed to subdue
him. At sentencing, the State described defendant’s substantial history of violent convictions,
including for attempt murder, aggravated battery of a peace officer, and manslaughter. The court
inquired into the factual details of defendant’s manslaughter and attempt murder convictions
before rendering the sentence.
¶ 18 On this record, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant
to 12 years’ imprisonment. The sentence was within the sentencing range and thus defendant must
show that the sentence “varies greatly from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Contursi, 2019 IL App (1st) 162894, ¶ 23.
Defendant contends that the sentence is disproportionate because his physical contact with Holmes
was brief and Holmes was not seriously injured. We disagree. Aggravated battery of a corrections
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No. 1-19-1690
officer is an inherently serious offense because of the risk it poses not only to the officer involved,
but also to other officers and inmates should the situation escalate. Additionally, the court here
was within its discretion to consider defendant’s criminal history and conclude therefrom that his
conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence above the Class X minimum because he
evidenced a lack of rehabilitation from his previous violent acts, and posed a significant danger of
committing violent acts in the future. See People v. Himber, 2020 IL App (1st) 162182, ¶ 59 (a
defendant’s criminal history is an appropriate aggravating factor for consideration at sentencing).
¶ 19 Defendant also argues that the court “was more focused” on the facts underlying his prior
convictions than the instant offense, and that “much of [defendant’s] serious background already
factored into the elevation of his sentencing from a Class 2 felony to the Class X sentencing
range.” 1
¶ 20 Initially, we note that “the trial judge is to consider all matters reflecting upon the
defendant’s personality, propensities, purposes, tendencies, and indeed every aspect of his life
relevant to the sentencing proceeding.” People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 281 (1989). To the
extent, however, that defendant can be understood to argue that the court improperly considered
the mere existence of his qualifying convictions in aggravation, we disagree. In People v. Thomas,
171 Ill. 2d 207 (1996), the supreme court explained that “while the fact of a defendant’s prior
convictions” determines Class X eligibility, “it is the nature and circumstances of these prior
convictions which, along with other factors in aggravation and mitigation, determine the exact
length of that sentence.” (Emphasis in original.) Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 227-28 (citing People v.
1
Defendant asserts that he qualified for Class X sentencing specifically because of his convictions
for burglary, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and armed violence. As noted,
however, the trial court mentioned other offenses in explaining why Class X sentencing applied.
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No. 1-19-1690
Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 269 (1986)). Here, the court inquired into the underlying facts of one of
defendant’s qualifying convictions, namely, attempt murder, and acknowledged the violent
conduct underlying defendant’s convictions for both attempt murder and involuntary manslaughter
at sentencing in light of the information the State relayed. On this record, we find that the court
appropriately considered the nature and circumstances of defendant’s previous criminal conduct
in arriving at its sentence.
¶ 21 Based on the above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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