People v. Ternoir ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 180617-UNo. 1-18-0617
Order filed February 3, 2021
Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 16 CR 12806
)
CHARLES TERNOIR, ) Honorable
) James B. Linn,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder over his contention that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain other crimes evidence.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Charles Ternoir was found guilty of first-degree murder
during which he personally discharged a firearm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)) and
sentenced to 70 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting
No. 1-18-0617
certain other crimes evidence that had no relevance to show his motive or intent to commit the
offense. We affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with six counts of first-degree murder following the June 29, 2016
shooting death of Larry “Rico” Lawrence.
¶4 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit other crimes evidence,
specifically, that defendant and Lawrence both sold narcotics in the area of Clark Street and
Division Street in Chicago. Defendant filed a response alleging that the proposed evidence was
neither intrinsic to, nor part of, the continuing narrative of the case and arguing that although
certain witnesses could testify that they knew defendant as a drug dealer, that knowledge was
neither reliable nor substantiated by other facts. Defendant concluded that the prejudice of this
evidence far outweighed its probative value.
¶5 At the hearing on the motion, the State explained that the fact that defendant and Lawrence
were drug dealers on the same block was the motive for the offense. The trial court asked how this
evidence would come before the jury, and the State replied through the testimony of witnesses
who purchased drugs from both defendant and Lawrence. The trial court then asked whether the
State expected these witnesses to testify that they knew defendant and Lawrence as drug dealers
in the same location, and the State answered yes.
¶6 The defense stated that it had not been tendered any statements by witnesses Serita Woods
or Michael Coleman stating they had purchased narcotics from defendant or Lawrence. 1 Moreover,
“statements regarding buying narcotics [were] not in any of the reports tendered” to the defense.
1
Serita Woods and another woman who was present at the shooting, Antoinette Woods, are not
related. For clarity, each woman will be referred to by her first name.
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Counsel further stated that Serita did not identify defendant by name, although she recognized
defendant from seeing him in the area. According to counsel, “no evidence” tendered to the defense
stated that “they observed” either Lawrence or defendant “selling drugs on any particular time and
day,” and therefore, there was no “direct observation” of narcotics sales.
¶7 The trial court concluded that this was a question of fact for the jury, and that defendant
might be able to impeach by omission “down the line” by arguing that the witnesses “never said it
before or police didn’t write it down.” However, the trial court stated that it could not stop the
witnesses from testifying “in context how they know the people and how they are able to make
identifications and giving some context as to what may have preceded any dispute or animus
between the deceased and the defendant should there have been some.” The trial court therefore
found the other crimes evidence admissible. The matter proceeded to a jury trial.
¶8 Coleman testified that he was about to be released from prison after completing a sentence
for retail theft and had two prior convictions for aggravated robbery. In 2016, he visited a CVS
parking lot each day to purchase and use heroin, and to “hustle.” On June 29, 2016, he used heroin
in the afternoon, but was not impaired by 8 p.m. when he went to the parking lot with drugs to sell.
¶9 When Coleman arrived at the parking lot, he saw Lawrence and Serita, who both
“hustle[d]” in the area. Coleman explained that “hustle” meant to sell drugs. He had known
Lawrence for four years. Serita, whom he had known his entire life, was also a drug user.
Coleman’s girlfriend at the time, Antoinette Woods, was also present.
¶ 10 Coleman walked into the parking lot to make a narcotics transaction. At one point, a four-
doored black vehicle arrived and a passenger exited. Coleman identified defendant, whom he
referred to as “CJ,” in court as the passenger. He knew defendant from “the neighborhood
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hustling,” that is, selling drugs. Coleman had known defendant for four or five months and saw
him three to four times a week. Coleman purchased drugs from a “few” people at Clark and
Division. He “might” have purchased drugs from defendant, but did not remember.
¶ 11 After speaking to a few people, defendant walked past Coleman and Antoinette, and onto
Clark. There, defendant “encountered” Lawrence and “upped his gun.” Coleman explained that
“to up a gun” meant to “pull a gun somewhere from his waist.” Coleman did not hear defendant
say anything, but Lawrence said, “man, you up that motherf***, you got a blow that motherf***.”
Defendant then fired “a lot of times” at Lawrence. Lawrence, who did not have a firearm, ran
across Clark, and collapsed in the southbound lane. As defendant turned to leave, Lawrence
“hollered” that “you going to shoot me in front of everybody like this.” Defendant stopped, turned
around, and fired again. After more than 10 shots, defendant returned to the parking lot, dropped
the firearm in a garbage can, and ran away.
¶ 12 Coleman spoke to police and identified defendant in a photographic array as the shooter.
He was also shown a video of the shooting. At trial, Coleman identified himself, defendant, and
Lawrence in photographic stills taken from the videos and in the videos. These videos were then
published.
¶ 13 A video from the CVS parking lot shows defendant exit a black vehicle from the passenger
side. Defendant, who has a hand in his pants or waistband, passes a woman in a hooded sweatshirt
and walks out of the frame. The driver of the black vehicle also exits and stands near the vehicle.
The woman interacts with Coleman, who then walks past the woman and out of the frame. After a
few seconds, everyone scatters. Defendant reenters the parking lot, interacts with the driver of the
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black vehicle, and then runs away. The driver of the black vehicle enters the vehicle and exits the
parking lot going the opposite direction from defendant.
¶ 14 A video of the street outside the CVS parking lot shows defendant exit the parking lot and
approach Lawrence, who is standing near the curb in the street. Coleman is also present. After
defendant and Lawrence interact, defendant shoots him. As Lawrence staggers away, defendant
follows with his arm outstretched and shoots again, including when Lawrence is on the ground.
Defendant then goes back toward the CVS parking lot. Several people approach Lawrence, who is
lying in the middle of the street. Coleman leaves.
¶ 15 During cross-examination, Coleman acknowledged that there were “a lot” of drug dealers
around Clark and Division, and that he sold and used drugs. He then testified that Serita did not
sell narcotics, but only used them. When trial counsel noted that Coleman testified on direct
examination that Serita “was also out there hustling,” Coleman clarified that “hustling” meant
“[a]nything to get money,” and explained that Serita panhandled and did other things. He did not
know if he told the police how long he knew defendant before the shooting and did not think they
asked that question. However, he admitted telling the grand jury that he knew defendant for five
months. The police did not ask him if defendant dropped a firearm in a garbage can.
¶ 16 Serita, who acknowledged previous narcotics convictions, testified that she had an
addiction to heroin and crack cocaine, but at the time of trial had been “clean” for 4½ months.
Serita and Lawrence were close friends and referred to each other as “Auntie” and “nephew.”
Lawrence was one of many drug dealers in the area.
¶ 17 Around 8 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Serita was panhandling at Clark and Division when she
saw Lawrence come around the corner. She had used heroin that afternoon but was not high at that
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time. As they were speaking, a person approached and said, “you got to get the f*** down from
there.” Serita identified defendant in court as this person. While Lawrence responded, defendant
drew a firearm. As Lawrence turned to run away, defendant shot him in the back. Lawrence tried
to run again, but defendant shot him twice more and he fell to the ground. Defendant then
“emptied” the firearm into Lawrence. Defendant went back into the parking lot “where he came
from.” Serita later spoke to police and identified defendant in a photographic array.
¶ 18 During cross-examination, Serita testified that Lawrence wanted to give her his phone
number, as he would not be in the area anymore because “there were a lot of drug dealers that had
problems with him.”
¶ 19 Chastity Williams, who had two children with Lawrence, testified that she was on the
phone with him about 8 p.m. and heard six gunshots. On cross-examination, she testified that she
knew Lawrence had been in a fight with a drug dealer named “E-Dub” and that she had fought
with E-Dub’s girlfriend earlier in the week of the shooting. On redirect, Williams confirmed that
she had seen E-Dub before and described him as being skinny with braids.
¶ 20 Orlando Verzannon testified that he was on bond, had a pending case at the time of trial,
and had previous convictions for possession and delivery of a controlled substance. He denied
knowing Lawrence or defendant. On June 29, 2016, he “might” have driven his vehicle into the
CVS parking lot. The State asked the trial court to declare Verzannon a hostile witness, and the
court agreed.
¶ 21 Verzannon denied knowing defendant as “B.D.” Although Verzannon acknowledged
parking in the CVS lot and “guess[ed]” there were other black vehicles, he did not know whether
defendant was in one of those vehicles. He “guess[ed]” that he saw defendant exit the passenger
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No. 1-18-0617
seat of another vehicle, and “assume[d]” that defendant walked around the corner of the CVS.
Verzannon did not see Lawrence and denied knowing Lawrence as a drug dealer in the area.
Although he did not see defendant with a firearm, he heard gunshots. Verzannon denied seeing
defendant shoot at Lawrence, denied seeing defendant approach Lawrence where he had collapsed
on a parked vehicle, denied seeing defendant shoot Lawrence several more times, denied seeing
defendant return to the parking lot, and denied seeing defendant toss a firearm into a garbage can.
He explained that either his view was blocked or he was not paying attention. Verzannon drove
away and did not speak to officers that day.
¶ 22 Verzannon stated that he was later forced to speak to the police and make a video statement,
which was “all coached.” He did not consent to video or audio recording. He acknowledged
making the video statement but disputed the veracity of its contents. When Verzannon viewed a
photographic array, he put his initials next to a photograph and wrote “saw him shoot the other
guy.” He “assume[d]” that defendant was the subject of that photograph.
¶ 23 The State played the video statement, which is included in the record on appeal. Therein,
Verzannon stated that he chose and consented to make a videotaped statement. He identified B.D.
in a photographic array, and stated that he saw B.D. shoot Rico. Verzannon knew B.D. and Rico
as drug dealers who sold crack cocaine in the same neighborhood. Verzannon also sold crack
cocaine. Verzannon further stated that on the day of the shooting, he drove into the CVS parking
lot, parked, and exited the vehicle. He then saw B.D. arrive in the CVS parking lot and “tried to
say hi.” B.D., who seemed “focused on something,” went around the corner. Verzannon next saw
Rico try to run, but B.D. “upped a gun” and shot Rico. Rico fell down. B.D. then stood over Rico
and fired three more times. B.D. walked off, then turned back and shot Rico “some more.” B.D.
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threw the firearm into a garbage can in the CVS parking lot and left on foot. Verzannon did not
initially speak to the police because he was afraid. However, when he saw Rico’s children’s faces,
he knew he had to speak to the police.
¶ 24 During cross-examination, Verzannon testified that he did not speak to police on the day
of the shooting because he did not see the shooter. He spoke to the police after he was pulled over
in his girlfriend’s vehicle, detained, and placed in a holding cell. After three or four hours in the
cell, an officer entered and told Verzannon “to tell him what happened” or he would make
Verzannon’s life “a living hell” by towing the vehicle, charging Verzannon with a drug offense,
and having Verzannon’s girlfriend evicted. The officer knew the identity of the offender, showed
Verzannon a cell phone photograph of the alleged offender, and “needed” more witnesses. He
testified that he “guess[ed]” that the photograph was of defendant. Verzannon was told what to say
and made the statement to avoid going to jail.
¶ 25 During redirect, Verzannon admitted that some of the details in the statement were true,
including that he was present in the CVS parking lot, but that others, such as the shooter walking
past him, were “coached.”
¶ 26 Chicago police officer Peter Stevens testified that Verzannon was arrested on August 10,
2016, as part of a “narcotics roundup” following an undercover narcotics operation. During a
subsequent conversation, Verzannon talked about an incident at the CVS on Clark and Division.
After Stevens spoke with his superiors, a decision was made to release Verzannon without any
charges and Stevens transported him to meet with detectives.
¶ 27 Assistant State’s Attorney Dan Piwowarzyk testified that he spoke with Verzannon on the
night of August 10, 2016, at a police station, and was present when Verzannon made a video
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statement. He denied threatening or making a deal with Verzannon in order to obtain a statement.
He did not tell Verzannon what to say and Verzannon made the statement voluntarily.
¶ 28 Chicago police detective Jorge Lopez testified that during the course of the investigation,
he spoke with Verzannon, who was not under arrest at the time, and made no promises or threats
in order to obtain Verzannon’s statement.
¶ 29 Chicago police detective Abdalla Abuzanat testified that he responded to the shooting. He
recovered a firearm from a garbage can, and nine fired cartridge casings and one bullet from the
scene. The State entered a stipulation that a fired bullet recovered from Lawrence’s body was fired
from the firearm discovered in the garbage can.
¶ 30 Chicago police officer Matthew Savage, an evidence technician, testified that he did not
find ridge impressions on the firearm or cartridges.
¶ 31 Chicago police officer Benny Pambuku testified that around 8:14 p.m. on June 29, 2016,
he observed a vehicle matching the description of a vehicle that left the scene of a shooting. The
vehicle double parked, and a person ran up and entered the vehicle through the passenger side.
Pambuku and his partner curbed the vehicle and detained the occupants. Defendant and another
man were inside the vehicle. Defendant did not match the initial description of the shooter and
Pambuku only detained the men for 5 to 10 minutes. Pambuku documented the interaction with
investigatory stop reports which contained both men’s names. He gave a description of defendant
to other officers. Although Pambuku later went to the address defendant gave during the stop, he
did not locate defendant.
¶ 32 The State entered a stipulation that on July 1, 2016 Dr. Jon Gates, an assistant medical
examiner, performed an autopsy on Lawrence which revealed gunshot wounds to the back, right
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arm, abdomen, and left hand, and that in Gates’s opinion Lawrence’s death was due to multiple
gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide.
¶ 33 The State presentenced evidence that defendant was arrested on July 22, 2016, following a
traffic stop. The State admitted its exhibits into evidence and rested.
¶ 34 During the instruction conference, the defense objected to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal, No. 3.14 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.14), that defendant had been
involved in other crimes. The trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to give the
instruction and to limit the jury’s “taking of the evidence” to the issues of intent and motive only
and not to consider that evidence for any other reason.
¶ 35 After the defense rested and closing arguments were presented, the trial court instructed
the jury, in relevant part, that
“Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in an offense
other than that charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received on the issue of
defendant’s intent and motive and may be considered by you only for that limited purpose.
It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in that offense and, if so,
what weight should be given to this evidence on the issue of intent and motive.”
¶ 36 The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and that during the commission of
the offense, he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused another person’s death.
¶ 37 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging, in pertinent part, that he was not proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in
limine to permit proof of other crimes, specifically, “drug dealing.” The trial court denied the
motion. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 45 years in prison for first-degree
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murder and to an additional 25 years because a firearm was used in the commission of the offense.
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.
¶ 38 On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it admitted other crimes evidence
that he was a drug dealer when that evidence had no relevance to his motive or intent to commit
the charged offense. He notes that no witness testified that there was a dispute between himself
and Lawrence over the sale of drugs, and concludes that this prejudicial evidence could have
affected the trial’s outcome.
¶ 39 The State responds that the other crimes evidence was “highly relevant” to explain
defendant’s motive and intent for the shooting. The State further argues that defendant was not
prejudiced because the jury received a limiting instruction.
¶ 40 To be admissible, evidence must be relevant for a proper purpose. See People v. Lehman,
5 Ill. 2d 337, 342-43 (1955). Evidence proving a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes is not a
proper purpose, and generally, it is excluded from criminal trials as it tends to be overly persuasive
to a jury, which may “ ‘convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person
deserving punishment.’ ” People v. Ward, 2011 IL 108690, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Lindgren, 79
Ill. 2d 129, 137 (1980)). Other crimes evidence, however, may be relevant for any purpose other
than to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes such as a defendant’s intent, modus
operandi, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 11. Other
crimes evidence is admissible if it is part of a continuing narrative of the events giving rise to the
offense and helps to explain the circumstance of the offense. People v. Ware, 2019 IL App (1st)
160989, ¶ 40.
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¶ 41 However, even in those cases where other crimes evidence is relevant for a proper purpose,
it may be excluded if its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Pikes, 2013
IL 115171, ¶ 11. We review a trial court’s decision to admit other crimes evidence for “a clear
abuse of discretion.” People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 136 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs
if the trial court’s determination is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or if no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991).
¶ 42 Here, Coleman’s testimony and Verzannon’s video statement explaining that they knew
defendant to be a drug dealer in the area was not introduced to show defendant’s bad character.
Rather, the evidence was necessary to explain to the jury the circumstances of the offense. Ware,
2019 IL (1st) 160989, ¶ 40 (“Other crimes evidence is admissible if it is part of a continuing
narrative of the events giving rise to the offense and helps explain the circumstances of the
crime.”). Further context for the offense appeared in Serita’s and Williams’s testimony that
Lawrence, who also sold drugs in the area, was being threatened by other drug dealers and was
planning to leave the area, and Coleman’s testimony that he had known Lawrence for four years
but defendant for only four or five months. Without the context that defendant and Lawrence were
both drug dealers in the same neighborhood, but defendant was a newer addition, there was no
explanation for the confrontation between defendant and Lawrence and the shooting was otherwise
unexplained. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the fact that defendant
was a drug dealer in the same area as Lawrence.
¶ 43 Moreover, even if the evidence that defendant was a drug dealer were improperly admitted,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The improper introduction of other crimes evidence is
harmless error where the defendant is neither prejudiced nor denied a fair trial due to its admission.
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People v. Sims, 2019 IL App (3d) 170417, ¶ 30. Moreover, even if the other crimes evidence is
erroneously admitted, it is harmless when there is substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id.Additionally, a jury instruction admonishing the jurors about the limited purpose for which they
may use the other crimes evidence substantially reduces the prejudicial effect of the admission of
the challenged evidence. Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 44 In the case at bar, Serita and Coleman both identified defendant as the shooter at trial.
Although Verzannon testified at trial that the content of his videotaped statement was false, in that
statement he identified defendant as the shooter. Additionally, the shooting was captured on
videotape, admitted into evidence, and published at trial. Coleman identified himself, defendant,
and Lawrence in the video. This video, which shows defendant shoot Lawrence multiple times, is
consistent with Serita’s and Coleman’s testimony and Verzannon’s statement.
¶ 45 Even if this court were to accept as true defendant’s assertion that the other crimes evidence
was erroneously admitted, the fact remains that three eyewitnesses stated that defendant
approached Lawrence and shot him multiple times, including while he was on the ground. People
v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009) (the credible and positive testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to convict); see also People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 356 (1995) (“[a] single
witness’[s] identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed
the accused under circumstances permitting positive identification”). Moreover, the State
presented a videotape of the shooting which was consistent with those identifications and
descriptions of the shooting and permitted the jury to observe the offense, and which provided
substantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. See Sims, 2019 IL App (3d) 170417, ¶ 30.
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¶ 46 Finally, the trial court addressed any danger that the other crimes evidence might be
improperly considered by the jury by giving a limiting instruction when instructing the jury. See
Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 376 (when the trial court specifically instructed the jury as to how other crimes
evidence could be considered, the instruction “limited and substantially reduced any prejudicial
effect created by the admission” of the evidence). Thus, even if the evidence that defendant was a
drug dealer were improperly admitted, its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder.
¶ 47 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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