People v. Williams ( 2021 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 190119-UOrder filed February 16, 2021
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
) Fulton County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-19-0119
v. ) Circuit No. 87-CF-109
)
DAVID R. WILLIAMS, ) Honorable
) Anthony William Vaupel
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment.
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ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court did not err when it dismissed defendant’s 2018 motion to vacate a 1988
judgment and when it denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the dismissal.
¶2 Defendant David R. Williams moved in 2018 to vacate a 1988 judgment finding him to be
a sexually dangerous person. The trial court found the motion barred by the two-year statute of
limitations applicable to motions filed under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)). We affirm.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 Defendant David R. Williams was charged in October 1987 with aggravated criminal
sexual abuse. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 12-16(c)(1). In November 1987, the State filed a
sexually dangerous person petition based on three incidents where Williams engaged in the offense
of sexual abuse. Williams underwent two independent psychiatric evaluations, both of which
concluded he was likely to commit further sexual acts on children in the foreseeable future. Both
evaluators noted that Williams suffered from borderline mental retardation. The reports also
revealed Williams had been found unfit in 1983 before standing trial in 1984 after his fitness was
restored.
¶5 In June 1988, Williams entered a negotiated plea, admitting to the allegations in the State’s
petition and that he was a sexually dangerous person, and agreeing to confinement in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) in its sexually dangerous offenders’ program until he was
“rehabilitated” or “cured.” In exchange, the State agreed to drop the criminal charge against him.
The trial court entered a commitment order, the State nol-prossed the criminal charge, and
Williams was committed to the IDOC.
¶6 Throughout his commitment, Williams has filed multiple applications for recovery, all of
which have been denied. See 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2018). In December 2001, he filed a section
2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)), alleging the State violated his due process rights
and IDOC falsified a report concerning his discharge. It is unclear in the record what happened
with this petition. In 2005, the court appointed Chuck Colburn of the State’s Attorney’s Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office as special prosecutor due to a conflict of interest with the Fulton County State’s
Attorney’s Office. Colburn appeared three times for the State in 2005. Apparently, no further
actions took place.
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¶7 In May 2018, Williams filed a second section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West
2018)) in which he sought to vacate the June 1988 judgment. In August 2018, the trial court noted
that confusion existed regarding representation by the State. It stated that Colburn was appointed
as special prosecutor in August 2005 but there was no order releasing the special prosecutor nor
had the special prosecutor asked for release from the appointment. The court found a conflict of
interest continued to exist with the Fulton County State’s Attorney’s Office and ordered a
representative from the appellate prosecutor’s office to appear. Charles Zalar filed an entry of
appearance as special prosecutor on August 20, 2018.
¶8 Also, in August 2018, the State filed a motion to dismiss Williams’s motion to vacate,
arguing, in part, that the statute of limitations barred the motion. At a hearing, Williams agreed
that the void judgment argument he presented as a basis for his motion was hindered by the
decision in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, which abolished the void judgment rule. Per
agreement of the parties, the trial court granted the State’s motion and dismissed Williams’s
motion. It stated Williams could refile or appeal. The trial court also granted the special
prosecutor’s motion to withdraw, finding no ongoing conflict of interest existed requiring the
special prosecutor to handle the case. Williams subsequently moved for reconsideration of the
dismissal order, which the trial court heard and denied. Williams timely appealed the denial of his
section 2-1401 petition and his motion to reconsider the denial.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to vacate and
in denying his motion to reconsider the dismissal. He asserts his motion should not have been
dismissed as time barred, arguing exceptions apply which allow him to challenge the judgment
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beyond the two-year limitations period. He further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to seek a fitness hearing.
¶ 11 Section 2-1401 provides that a party may receive relief from a final judgment or order more
than 30 days after its entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2018). The petition must be filed within
two years of entry of the judgment or order. Id. § 2-1401(c). To obtain relief under section 2-1401,
a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his defense or claim would
have precluded judgment against him and that he was diligent in discovering and presenting his
section 2-1401 petition. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 7-8 (2007). A 2-1401 petition may be
used to assert a legal challenge to a final judgment. Paul v. Gerald Adelman & Associates, Ltd.,
223 Ill. 2d 85, 94 (2006). Our review of a legal challenge to the dismissal of a section 2-1401
petition is de novo. People v. Cathey, 2019 IL App (1st) 153118, ¶ 22.
¶ 12 It is a “ ‘question of jurisdiction’ ” as to whether a judgment is void or voidable.
Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 11 (quoting People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993). Where
the court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment it enters is void but where a court has jurisdiction and
enters an erroneous judgment, the judgment is voidable and not subject to collateral attack. Id.(citing Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155-56). In Castleberry, the supreme court abolished the void judgment
rule, finding that jurisdiction was constitutionally conferred, and a statutory deficiency did not
void a judgment where the court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 13 On appeal, Williams does not dispute that the trial court had both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction over him when it entered judgment in 1988. Rather, he argues that the judgment
was voidable and exceptions to the statute of limitations allow him to maintain this action. At the
hearing on his section 2-1401 petition, Williams acknowledged that Castleberry negated his claim
that the 1988 judgment was void. He agreed that dismissal of the petition was the appropriate
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procedural step to allow his counsel to investigate other bases, if any, to refile the petition. The
petition was not refiled. Rather, Williams filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his petition
and then appealed.
¶ 14 Because more than two years have passed since judgment was entered, Williams’s petition
is barred unless an exception to the limitations period applies. He asserts that because of his
intellectual challenges, he was under legal disability or duress when he entered the plea resulting
in the 1988 judgment, thus the limitations period was tolled. He also states without argument that
a fraudulent concealment of the grounds for relief tolls the statutory period.
¶ 15 Williams offers no evidence in support of his assertions other than implication and
conclusion. He does not present any facts indicating he was unable to understand the plea. He
points to his prior finding of unfitness as support but omits that he was later restored to fitness after
treatment and able to stand trial. His borderline intellectual ability, without more, does not establish
he could not understand the plea. There is no indication in the record of the plea hearing that
Williams could not understand the plea. At the hearing, defense counsel stated he had reviewed
the two psychiatric evaluations with Williams and discussed how Williams wanted to proceed.
Williams was informed and acknowledged that he could change his mind about the plea. The trial
court questioned Williams about the plea. It was aware Williams had been in special education
starting in third grade and he was on medication for his epilepsy.
¶ 16 The court found Williams understood the nature and extent of the allegations against him
and the consequences of the plea. It further found that Williams’s admission was voluntary.
Williams advances no evidence or argument to defeat those facts. Cavitt v. Repel, 2015 IL App
(1st) 133382, ¶ 45 (it is the petitioner’s burden to allege and prove facts sufficient to justify relief
under section 2-1401). As Williams concedes, the 1988 judgment was voidable. Because the 1988
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judgment was voidable, Williams was required to bring his section 2-1401 petition within two
years of entry of the judgment order. He did not do so. Nor did he prove that the two-year
limitations period was tolled. Accordingly, we find the two-year statute of limitations applies and
bars his claim. The trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to dismiss was not in error.
¶ 17 Williams also asserts on appeal that his original trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the issue of his fitness to enter the plea agreement and to request a fitness hearing.
¶ 18 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the defective
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). An
attorney provides deficient representation when he fails to ensure that the defendant entered his
plea voluntarily and intelligently. People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2005). To establish
prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that absent his counsel’s
deficient performance, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have proceeded to trial. Id.¶ 19 Williams does not present any argument regarding this issue other than to claim that trial
counsel should have requested a fitness hearing and failed to follow the proper statutory
procedures. He looks to his prior finding of unfitness for trial in 1983 and the 1988 psychiatric
reports evaluating his sexual dangerousness as support for his assertion that his plea could not have
been willingly and intelligently made due to his intellectual disabilities. As discussed above, there
was no indication at the plea hearing that Williams could not understand the proceedings. The
court expressly found he could and that his plea was voluntary. Williams does not demonstrate
how counsel’s failure to seek a fitness hearing amounted to deficient performance or how he was
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient representation. Williams also complains generally that trial
counsel failed to follow the statutory procedures under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725
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ILCS 205/0.01 (West 2018)). These conclusory allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim of
ineffective assistance. We find Williams did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 20 Williams next complains the trial court erred when it denied his motion to reconsider the
dismissal. In the motion, he argued that the dismissal order would prevent him from challenging a
void judgment that was entered before Castleberry. He asserts this bar would be against the
interests of justice. He did not advance any specific argument on this claim on appeal.
¶ 21 “The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court’s attention (1) newly
discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the first hearing, (2) changes in the law,
or (3) errors in the court’s application of existing law. People v. Teran, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4-5
(2007). A motion to reconsider should not be used to present the same arguments again or reargue
the case. Id.¶ 22 Williams does not present new evidence, changes in the law or errors by the court in
applying existing law in seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of his motion to vacate the 1988
judgment. The information about his intellectual disabilities and absence of a fitness hearing were
known at the time of the plea hearing and is not new evidence. He did not submit any legal
authority changing Castleberry’s abolition of the void judgment rule. He did not describe any
errors the court made in applying the existing law. Williams merely surmises that the trial court’s
order prevents him and other movants from challenging void judgments. The trial court recognized
Williams’s argument but stated he failed to offer any new information, changes in the law or a
specific allegation of trial court error. We find the trial court did not err in denying the motion to
reconsider.
¶ 23 We briefly address the trial court’s pronouncement that this court must resolve Williams’s
argument that because he was unfit, he could not also be held responsible for meeting statutory
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guidelines or deadlines and to hold him responsible would create an injustice. Under the instant
set of facts, there is no support for Williams’s claim of unfitness. Moreover, he was not without
an avenue to pursue relief under section 2-1401, and had he been unfit, the statutory limitations
period would have tolled.
¶ 24 CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Fulton County is affirmed.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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