People v. McConnell ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 191694-UNo. 1-19-1694
Order filed April 9, 2021
SIXTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 18 CR 14752
)
LAVETTA MCCONNELL, ) Honorable
) Timothy J. Joyce,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for aggravated driving under the influence is affirmed over
her argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove she was under the
influence of alcohol.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Lavetta McConnell was found guilty of aggravated
driving under the influence (aggravated DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(g) (West 2018)),
and driving on a revoked or suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West Supp. 2017)) and
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sentenced to concurrent 18-month prison terms for each offense. She appeals, arguing that the
State’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate she drove under the influence of alcohol. We
affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged by information with two counts of aggravated DUI predicated on
consumption of alcohol (counts I and II) and driving on a revoked or suspended license (count III)
following an incident on September 7, 2018. Prior to trial, the State nol-prossed count II.
¶4 At trial, Chicago police officer Segovia1 testified that on September 7, 2018, at
approximately 1:37 p.m., he was in a marked vehicle on the 1200 block of South Damen Avenue
in Chicago when he noticed four to five vehicles stopped ahead of him. He drove to the front of
the traffic jam and observed a female driver alone in a running vehicle, which was “stopped in the
middle of traffic.” Segovia identified defendant in court as the driver. Her head moved forward
and snapped back, and she “appeared incoherent.”
¶5 Segovia attempted to speak to defendant, but she was nonresponsive, so he exited his
vehicle and approached her. As he did so, he observed an open container of alcohol, a Bud Light
Margarita, in the center console cup holder. Defendant’s vehicle was still running at this point.
Segovia again attempted to speak to defendant, who started to move the vehicle. He told her to
stop, and she obeyed. Segovia believed defendant might be impaired after seeing the alcohol, and
removed defendant’s keys from the ignition. He examined the alcohol container, which was
“almost full.”
¶6 Segovia positioned his vehicle immediately behind defendant’s, activated his body camera,
and returned on foot to the driver’s side of defendant’s vehicle. Defendant again could not respond
1
Officer Segovia’s first name does not appear in the report of proceedings.
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to questions. She had “droopy” and “watery” eyes, “constricted” pupils, and “slurred” speech.
Based on her constricted eyes, Segovia believed defendant could have “been on some type of
narcotic,” and called an ambulance. When it arrived, Segovia and the paramedics helped defendant
exit her vehicle and placed her on a gurney. During the traffic stop, Segovia could not administer
field sobriety tests or a breathalyzer because defendant was incoherent.
¶7 The State published Segovia’s body camera footage to the court. The footage, included in
the record on appeal, depicts Segovia approach defendant’s vehicle from the passenger side and
remove her keys from the ignition. The alcohol can is visible in the cup holder. He returns to his
vehicle, then approaches the driver’s side and attempts to speak with defendant. She is unable to
respond to any questions and repeats “what’s wrong?” and “what’s going on?” Other police
officers and paramedics arrive and help Segovia place defendant on a gurney. Defendant remains
nonresponsive to questions throughout the incident.
¶8 On cross-examination, Segovia testified that he did not smell alcohol on defendant’s
breath, and that in his experience, constricted pupils result from drug use.
¶9 The State entered a stipulation that defendant’s certified driving abstract would show that
her license was revoked “for a DUI” as of September 7, 2018.
¶ 10 The State rested, and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the
evidence did not prove defendant guilty of the charged statutory section (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)
(West 2018)), because it did not establish that she drove under the influence of alcohol. Instead,
defense counsel argued, the evidence showed defendant was “under the influence of some sort of
drugs.” Counsel emphasized Segovia’s testimony that he did not smell alcohol on defendant’s
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breath and that her pupils were constricted. The court denied the motion without argument from
the State, and the defense rested.
¶ 11 During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that while there were “drugs in play” in
this situation, there was also an open container of alcohol in defendant’s vehicle, which would not
“emit the typical smell of alcohol,” and, when “you combine drugs with any form of alcohol, it’s
going to get worse.” Defense counsel reiterated his argument from the directed verdict motion,
and contended that besides the open container, no other evidence suggested defendant was under
the influence of alcohol.
¶ 12 The court found defendant guilty of both counts, stating it “listened carefully” to the
evidence and “believe[d]” Segovia.
¶ 13 At a later proceeding, the court heard argument on defendant’s motion for a new trial,
during which defense counsel referenced People v. Jacquith, 129 Ill. App. 3d 107 (1984), for the
proposition that defendant should have been charged under a different statutory section.
¶ 14 The court denied the motion, stating that Jacquith provided that a defendant can be found
guilty of DUI under the statutory section at issue here on a police officer’s testimony alone. The
court believed that while defendant may have been under the influence of both drugs and alcohol,
it was “the presence of an open alcohol container” that was not full that was important, not the
amount of alcohol defendant consumed, as it showed defendant “utilized” some amount of alcohol.
Thus, whether defendant’s intoxication was “exacerbated or heightened” by a drug was
inconsequential because the evidence showed she was driving under the influence of alcohol.
¶ 15 Following a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to two concurrent 18-month prison
terms and denied her motion to reconsider sentence.
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¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that she was
under the influence of alcohol during the incident.
¶ 17 On sufficiency of the evidence review, the reviewing court construes all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State and determines whether a rational factfinder could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37. The
reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder respecting the weight of
the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
State. People v. Gonzalez, 239 Ill. 2d 471, 478 (2011). A finding of guilt should not be reversed
unless the evidence “is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable
doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24.
¶ 18 Defendant was charged with aggravated DUI under section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)), which required the State to prove that she
drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant
specifically challenges whether she was under the influence of alcohol. To prove this element, the
State must show that as a result of consuming any amount of alcohol, a person’s faculties were so
impaired that it diminished his ability to act or think with ordinary care. People v. Gordon, 378 Ill.
App. 3d 626, 631 (2007). Whether the defendant drove under the influence of alcohol is an issue
of fact. People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512, ¶ 20. The testimony of a qualified police
officer alone can suffice to make this showing. Jacquith, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 113.
¶ 19 At trial, Segovia testified that he drove up to defendant’s vehicle while it was stopped at
the head of a traffic jam. Defendant appeared incoherent, her head moved back and forth, and she
did not respond to his questions. An open container of alcohol, almost full, was in her vehicle.
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Segovia did not smell alcohol on defendant’s breath, but she had slurred speech, glassy and watery
eyes with constricted pupils, and could not respond coherently to his questions. He called an
ambulance, and he and the paramedics assisted defendant onto a gurney. Due to her incoherent
state, Segovia could not conduct field sobriety tests or administer a breathalyzer test. The State
offered no additional evidence regarding potential causes of defendant’s impaired condition or
alcohol consumption.
¶ 20 Both parties argued that drug use likely accounted for the severity of defendant’s
impairment. Defense counsel contended that this fact demonstrated the State charged her under
the wrong section of the DUI statute, while the State maintained that it was a reasonable inference
that alcohol contributed to defendant’s impairment in light of the open container not being full.
The trial court agreed with the State, and later, in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial,
explained that the degree to which potential drug use “exacerbated” defendant’s condition and the
amount of alcohol she consumed was irrelevant because the evidence showed defendant “utilized”
alcohol in some way.
¶ 21 On this record, we find that a rational factfinder could have found that defendant drove
while under the influence of alcohol. Segovia found defendant alone in a vehicle, sitting close to
an open container of alcohol that was not full. The logical inference from this evidence is that
defendant consumed alcohol. Defendant was also in a severely impaired condition. The degree to
which the alcohol caused her condition is unclear, but on sufficiency of the evidence review, we
must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the State. Here, a rational factfinder could infer that defendant drove under
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the influence of alcohol from the evidence that she drove the vehicle while in an impaired
condition, and had consumed some amount of alcohol.
¶ 22 Defendant argues that no rational factfinder could find alcohol was the only cause of her
impairment, and thus the State was required to prove what the other contributing factor or factors
were so as to demonstrate that the alcohol had some exacerbating effect in combination therewith.
We disagree. Whether defendant could have exercised ordinary care without the alcohol is not an
element the State had to prove. Instead, the State’s burden was to prove that defendant’s impaired
condition resulted from drinking any amount of alcohol. The court ruled that it did, and this is an
issue of fact on which we must defer to the factfinder. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512, ¶ 20.
Additionally, we note that scientific evidence of intoxication is not required to show that a
defendant is under the influence of alcohol, and any amount of alcohol can satisfy the statute,
meaning the absence of blood or breathalyzer test results did not limit the trial court’s ability to
find defendant guilty. See Gordon, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 632. Consequently, a rational factfinder
could still infer that whatever amount of alcohol defendant consumed combined with other factors
to result in the specific impaired condition in which Segovia found defendant.
¶ 23 Defendant also cites Jacquith for the proposition that the State must charge a defendant
under the correct statutory section. In Jacquith, under the charged section, the State had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was under the influence of both alcohol and drugs.
See Jacquith, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 112-13. The court found that the police officers’ testimony could
have sufficed to establish alcohol use, but not both alcohol and drugs, and therefore the evidence
was insufficient. Id. at 114-15. While this fact caused the State’s evidence to fall short in Jacquith,
the same does not apply here; defendant was not charged with driving under the influence of drugs,
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either on their own or combined with another substance, and thus the State was not required to
prove anything about defendant’s alleged drug use. The issue for the trial court was whether the
evidence showed defendant was under the influence of alcohol, and whether other statutory
sections could have applied to the case is irrelevant to that consideration.
¶ 24 Finally, we note that defendant cites materials respecting alcohol’s effects on the eyes, and
other potential causes of her condition apart from alcohol use. These materials were not part of the
record at trial, and therefore we may not consider them on appeal. See People v. Moore, 2015 IL
App (1st) 140051, ¶ 20.
¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the court’s finding of guilt is affirmed.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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