People v. Williams ( 2021 )

NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 180676-U April 15, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender
not precedent except in the NOS. 4-18-0676, 4-18-0678 cons. 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
CONTRELL D. WILLIAMS, ) Nos. 94CF833
Defendant-Appellant. ) 94CF835
)
) Honorable
) Jeffrey S. Geisler,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: As the State conceded, defendant was improperly denied the option to be
sentenced under the statutory scheme applicable on the date of the offenses or the
statutory scheme that existed at the time of resentencing; he is entitled to a new
resentencing hearing.
¶2 After defendant, Contrell D. Williams (born September 14, 1976), filed a
postconviction petition challenging the constitutionality of his life sentences, the trial court
resentenced defendant to life imprisonment for offenses he committed when he was under 18
years old. On appeal of his new life sentences, defendant argues he is entitled to resentencing
because (1) the trial court failed to find him permanently incorrigible and to properly weigh
sentencing factors before imposing life sentences and this court should thus mandate he be
sentenced to no more than 40 years’ imprisonment at resentencing; (2) the court failed to
admonish him of his right to choose to be resentenced under the first degree murder sentencing
statute in effect on the date of the offense or as it existed at resentencing; (3) his sentences
violate the holding of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), as the sentences were based
on a fact finding not found proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. The State concedes error on the second issue and argues we need
not consider the remaining issues. We agree to the concession and decline to address the
remaining issues. We vacate defendant’s sentences and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant’s life sentences followed two distinct trials involving three murders. In
December 1994, defendant was convicted of the murder of Sheri Ellis. In June 1995, defendant
was found guilty of the first degree murder of Cary Whitacre and Shane Storm.
¶5 A. The Trial for the Murder of Ellis
¶6 Defendant and a codefendant, Tyrone Humphrey, were charged with the first
degree murder of Ellis, a clerk at a Huck’s convenience store. Defendant and Humphrey were
tried separately.
¶7 At defendant’s trial, the State presented testimony Ellis’s body was found in a
pool of blood behind the store counter. The cash register was open and empty. The surveillance
tape was missing. Among the State’s evidence was testimony from Antonio Gray, who was
incarcerated in the Macon County jail when defendant was incarcerated there. Gray and
defendant conversed about Ellis’s murder. Defendant told Gray he and Humphrey, defendant’s
cousin, robbed the Huck’s store. Defendant, who was masked, took $30 from Ellis and then shot
her. Defendant went to the storeroom and took the security videocassette recorder (VCR). As he
was leaving the store, defendant shot Ellis twice more. After Gray asked defendant why he shot
Ellis when he was masked and she would not be able to identify him, defendant said he could not
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stop as it felt so good to him.
¶8 A neurosurgeon who treated Ellis testified she had two penetrating wounds in her
head and two additional wounds in her neck. She was alive when she was taken to the hospital.
However, Ellis had suffered a massive brain injury and was comatose. Ellis died of a gunshot
wound to her brain.
¶9 After the jury found defendant guilty of Ellis’s murder, the trial court sentenced
defendant to life imprisonment. The court agreed with the State’s argument Ellis’s murder “was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.”
¶ 10 B. The Trial for the Murders of Whitacre and Storm
¶ 11 On September 8, 1994, defendant and Humphrey were charged with the August
10, 1994, murders of Whitacre and Storm. According to the charges, both were shot in the head.
¶ 12 At defendant’s trial, the State elicited the testimony of two witnesses who stated
defendant admitted the murders. Gray testified defendant, while both were incarcerated together,
told him about the murders. According to Gray, defendant and Humphrey were walking when
they saw “two white guys” in a car. They asked for a ride. Humphrey then pulled out a gun and
robbed the two men of $50. Humphrey told defendant to drive somewhere and then shot the two
men. Gray testified defendant admitted being there but said he did not murder the two.
¶ 13 Larry Krause also testified defendant admitted to the murders. According to
Krause, defendant said he was involved with the two men found by the lake. Defendant reported
the two picked “them up” and gave “them” a ride. Defendant did not specify whom he was with.
Defendant told Krause “they” rode around and then took them by the lake and killed them.
Defendant provided no further detail regarding the murders but showed Krause a hat he took
from one of the victims.
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¶ 14 Other testimony established the bodies of Whitacre and Storm were found lying
face down with their hands behind their heads. The physician who conducted the autopsies of
Whitacre and Storm testified Storm had three gunshot wounds to his head, behind his right ear.
Whitacre had two bullet wounds to his head.
¶ 15 For the murders of Whitacre and Storm, the trial court agreed mandatory life
sentences were required under section 5-8-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections
Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(b) (West 1994)) and sentenced defendant to a term of natural life.
¶ 16 C. Postconviction Petitions
¶ 17 In June 2013, defendant filed pro se petitions for relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2012)), asserting his life sentences were
unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
¶ 18 In April 2016, the State filed, in both cases, a motion to schedule resentencing.
The State conceded defendant was entitled to resentencing and acknowledged defendant, a
juvenile at the time of the sentence, was sentenced to an automatic natural life sentence in
violation of Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016) (holding Miller
applies retroactively). We note here the automatic natural life term was applied only in the
Whitacre-Storm case. In the Ellis case, the life sentence was ordered after the trial court found it
did not believe rehabilitation was possible and the offense was exceptionally brutal and heinous.
Later, the State argued defendant was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing in the Ellis case,
contending the analysis of the trial court at the original sentencing complied with Miller. After a
February 2018 hearing, the trial court disagreed with the State. Although the sentencing court
mentioned defendant’s age during the 1994 sentencing, the court found the record did not show
the sentencing court considered the attendant circumstances of defendant’s age as required by
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Miller. The court concluded defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing in the Ellis case
as well.
¶ 19 D. Resentencing
¶ 20 The hearing on defendant’s resentencing was held in September 2018. The
presentence investigation report indicates defendant had been incarcerated since September 7,
1994. The report demonstrates, since his imprisonment, defendant had one conviction for armed
violence. The date of “08-16-99” is listed on the report, but the report fails to indicate if this is
the date of the offense or the conviction. For this offense, defendant was sentenced to 10 years’
imprisonment. The report provides no other charges or pending charges.
¶ 21 The State called Patrick McElroy to testify. McElroy, who had retired from the
Decatur Police Department, testified in 1994 he worked on the investigations of the murders of
Storm, Whitacre, and Ellis. He also worked on the “Massoud Aliabadi case.” On July 29, 1994,
Aliabadi was alone in Ali’s Market when three males entered the store. Defendant, identified as
the larger of the males, entered the store carrying a semiautomatic pistol. The males took the
cash drawer and demanded keys to Aliabadi’s truck. Aliabadi mistakenly handed them keys to
the business instead of to the truck. Defendant returned and shot defendant several times in his
arms. Defendant’s fingerprints were found on the cash drawer taken from Aliabadi’s store.
Humphrey was one of the other offenders.
¶ 22 McElroy testified, on August 10, 1994, he, while on duty, received the call two
bodies were found by the dam. When McElroy arrived, he observed Whitacre and Storm’s
bodies face down on the ground with their hands behind their heads. The vehicle the victims
were riding in had been burned. As part of the investigation, McElroy interviewed Humphrey.
According to Humphrey, on August 10, he and defendant were at a pay phone when two men
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pulled up in a car. Humphrey thought one of the two men wanted to use the phone, so they
started a conversation. Humphrey and defendant asked for a ride. Defendant and Humphrey got
into the car. One of the men said he had $50 and asked if Humphrey and defendant could get
them drugs. After Humphrey said he could, the driver moved to the backseat with Humphrey.
Defendant began driving the car. Humphrey pulled out a handgun and set it on his knee.
McElroy further testified:
“And [Humphrey] had given him the look—or [defendant]
had given him the look like—which Mr. Humphrey said it was,
let’s rip these dudes off. So [defendant] drove down a little lane
down by the dam, back down to the lane and told [Humphrey] to
do it. So he got the two males out of the car, walked them down
the lane, and they told them to lay down on their stomachs. I said,
‘Are you the one that directed the two white males to put their
hands behind their head[s]?’ He said, ‘If I do, I don’t recall saying
that.’ ”
Humphrey then shot Storm and Whitacre. Defendant burned the car.
¶ 23 McElroy next testified regarding the murder of Ellis, which occurred on
September 5, 1994. McElroy interviewed Humphrey regarding Ellis’s murder. Humphrey and
defendant, who was armed with a handgun, walked into Huck’s and demanded money.
Humphrey yanked the surveillance camera from the bracket. He and defendant took $34 and a
carton of cigarettes. As Humphrey was leaving the store, he heard four shots. The video revealed
defendant shot Ellis.
¶ 24 The State also presented victim impact statements from family members of the
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victims. The family members desired a life sentence for defendant.
¶ 25 Defendant presented evidence in mitigation. Deloris Williams, defendant’s
mother, testified defendant resided with her before his incarceration. Before the summer of 1994,
defendant began living with his girlfriend. Defendant’s biological father had no contact with
defendant. While defendant was a child, Deloris and defendant lived with Deloris’s boyfriend,
Myron Turner, in Indiana. Deloris and Turner had a child, defendant’s half-brother. In November
1989, Deloris and defendant moved to Decatur, where Deloris had some family. Defendant had
no disciplinary issues in Indiana or for some time while living in Decatur.
¶ 26 Deloris testified, after moving to Decatur, she was in a relationship with Onie
Davis, who cheated on her and used drugs and alcohol. When asked if he was violent with her,
Deloris testified “[n]o, not really but had on certain occasions.” The two would argue and
“grab[ ] ahold of each other.” These arguments occurred in defendant’s presence “several times.”
Defendant’s relationship with Davis “turned bad.” Defendant was angry because his dad was not
there and because Deloris would not allow him to play football. After defendant was expelled, he
went to a school called “Future.”
¶ 27 According to Deloris, defendant and Humphrey were cousins. They did not get
into trouble until they started hanging out with older people, which included defendant’s
girlfriend Holly and her brother Joey Krause.
¶ 28 Since defendant was imprisoned, Deloris and defendant maintained contact via
telephone. Over the last 23 or 24 years, Deloris noticed differences in defendant. Defendant was
a minister. He had become a grown man. He no longer acted angry or bitter. They talked about
God. He encouraged her to take care of herself. When they lived in Indiana, defendant attended
church, participating in choir. Around age 15 or 16, he started hanging out with the wrong crowd
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and stopped attending church.
¶ 29 Walter Williams, defendant’s uncle, testified when defendant was a child, “he was
a go-happy guy” who was picked on a lot because he was chubby. Defendant, however, did not
act out. After defendant and Deloris moved to Decatur, Walter visited defendant twice. The last
time was when defendant was 13 or 14. Defendant had physically changed a lot. He was no
longer a child. He started to act out. His mother “had to argue with him a lot, whop him a lot.”
On cross-examination, Walter testified defendant was responsible for the younger kids. He
helped his brothers and sisters and helped take care of the house.
¶ 30 Defendant testified on his own behalf. After his incarceration, defendant
continued working on his education. In 1996, defendant earned his high school diploma
certificate. Around 2000, defendant entered “a covenant contract with a prison” for a prison
ministry. Defendant continued to be involved with that ministry. Defendant also attended
seminars while imprisoned. He had a certificate for attending a two-day seminar at Menard
Correctional Center (Menard) for Transforming Incarcerated Dads. Although he did not have
children, defendant hoped the program would help him advise his brothers regarding his nieces
and nephews. Defendant attended a two-day program with Kairos, which helped Christians “to
better understand who they are as a Christian group.” Defendant attended another seminar
presented by a ministry to help inmates overcome their fears.
¶ 31 According to defendant, in 1994, he used cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. At that
time, defendant did not admit his substance use to the officer performing the presentence report.
Since imprisonment, he completed substance abuse education in Menard.
¶ 32 Defendant was remorseful for what happened in 1994. In 1994, defendant was
bitter and angry. As he aged, however, defendant learned “that was not only a twisted but
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somewhat crazy idea to have in your head to use as a road to walk down.” The Department of
Corrections (DOC) had a law preventing inmates from contacting families of victims. Defendant
could only try to make himself into a better person and, when able to see them again, apologize
for the murders he committed. As to his biological father, defendant felt like he was abandoned.
This led to anger and bitterness.
¶ 33 Regarding his 1998 offense, defendant stated, while in Joliet, he continued to
harbor feelings of anger and bitterness. Defendant described the prison environment as follows:
“You was either in the gang, or you was a victim. So join the gang, you’re protected.” In 1998,
defendant began to escape that cycle. He “caught a staff assault” and was sent to Tamms for
seven-and-a-half years. During that time, defendant was by himself and had the time to “reflect
and come to the understanding that [he] made another huge mistake in [his] life.” Defendant
testified he had no further disciplinary reports. Defendant left Tamms in 2005.
¶ 34 Before imprisonment, defendant began spending time with older people for free
alcohol, free drugs, and girls. Defendant believed he did so because he was in pain and he did not
“know how to deal with that was going on in [his] life.” Defendant said, “I took it out on
innocent people, and I regret that.”
¶ 35 On cross-examination, defendant testified he was not physically or sexually
abused. He had enough food to eat and a home. Defendant dropped out of school in the eleventh
grade. When the police came, defendant did not confess the crimes. Now, he admitted he killed
three people and almost killed a fourth. Defendant admitted shooting Ellis and Aliabadi.
Humphrey pulled the trigger on Storm and Whitacre. Before the initial sentencing, for the
presentence report, defendant said he drank once and never did drugs.
¶ 36 Defendant read a statement for the trial court. He apologized to the families for
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his crimes. Defendant stated he was “not the person [he] was 24 years ago, that 17-year-old
angry, rejected hurt boy who dropped out of high school because he didn’t care about life
anymore.” Defendant stated he was now a man with his GED.
¶ 37 The trial court held the following before sentencing defendant to terms of natural
life imprisonment:
“First of all, I’m going to turn to the sentence in 94-CF-833
which involved the murders of Matthew Whitacre and Shane
Storm. *** As I look at the other factors, about his impetuosity and
level of maturity, I do not find that there is anything in the record
that shows that he was immature at the time and was not able to
consider the risk and consequences of his behavior, although he
had dropped out of school. I do not find that he had any
developmental disability in this matter.
Then we get to whether the person was subject to outside
pressure, including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative
influences. The record has established that his father was not in the
picture, but his mother was in the picture. There were other
relatives who were in the picture in this matter. He did start
hanging around with different people when he came to Decatur,
including adults. That certainly does not explain the behavior in
this situation.
As I look at the person’s family and home environment, the
testimony here today was that the mother was a loving person who
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was a church going person, tried to get the defendant involved in
church. When they lived in Indiana, that was the situation, that he
was involved in church in Indiana. When he came to Illinois, he
only went a few times, but certainly the mother tried the best she
could.
When I look at his possibility of rehabilitation, first of all,
when he’s initially sent to the Department of Corrections, the
evidence is clear that there wasn’t much of a chance for
rehabilitation early on. He got in trouble in 98-CF-797 for armed
violence, sentenced to 10 years in the Department of Corrections.
So we do get to take a look at that. He was ultimately sent to
Tamms, was the evidence, for 7, 7 ½ years. I do look at the
exhibits that have been submitted at this time. He has went through
education here recently, that he also got his GED. He did go to
some of the classes that were available while in the [DOC]. Still,
24 years later, it’s hard to say that the defendant could be
rehabilitated.
As I look at the circumstances of the offense, first of all,
*** what we have is a situation—for $50 we have two young men
who were taken down by the lake, put their hands behind their
head[s], and were essentially assassinated at that stage, showing no
mercy whatsoever.
Whether or not the person was able to participate in his
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defense, there is no evidence at 17 years of age that he was not
able to participate in his defense in this matter. The only evidence
that I have is that he wasn’t sure that when he was interviewed by
the probation department, that they were a neutral party. He didn’t
know if they were working for the [S]tate or the police department.
That certainly does not show that he could not participate with his
defense in this case.
These acts of killing individuals is completely senseless. I
see no mercy was shown to them whatsoever. As I look at the
murder of the two individuals, Mr. Whitacre and Mr. Storm, it is
clear to the Court that these murders were accompanied by
exceptional[ly] brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty in this matter. I don’t see how the Court can consider
anything else in this situation for somebody who basically said go
ahead and shoot the two people. I think a term of natural life
imprisonment is the situation in this case. It is an appropriate
sentence based on what I have seen here today. There clearly is
wanton behavior in this matter. No mercy was shown to the
victims in this case. So I am going to sentence the defendant to a
term of natural life imprisonment on the 94-CF-833 case.
Then when we get to the 94-CF-835 case, that is the murder
of Sheri Ellis. Of course, I am not going to go through the factors
once again[,] but what we have is a situation where a young lady is
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working at a convenience store. The defendant came into the
convenience store, not only shot her once, but shot her multiple
times to get a carton of cigarettes and $35. I just can’t think of a
more senseless act in the Court’s experience. So as I look at that, I
clearly find that murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Once again, the
only sentence the Court sees available under these circumstances is
a natural life imprisonment on that sentence without the possibility
of parole.
*** I do find that two natural life sentences [are]
appropriate given the facts and circumstances that the Court has
seen here today.”
¶ 38 This appeal followed.
¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 40 We begin with the second argument in defendant’s appellant brief. Defendant
asserts he was denied due process as the trial court failed to admonish him of the right to choose
to be sentenced under the first degree murder sentencing statute as it existed on the dates of his
original offenses or under the statute as it existed on the date of resentencing. Defendant
contends the court failed to comply with the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2018)) that
affords him this right.
¶ 41 The State concedes the error and maintains remand is required for an election as
to the sentencing scheme. The State specifically points to the differences in the law as to the
availability of a natural life sentence, noting in 1995 convictions for the first degree murder of
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more than one person required sentences of natural life (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(c)(ii) (West 1994))
while the same sentences were no longer available for offenders under the age of 18 (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(c)(ii) (West 2018)).
¶ 42 We accept the State’s concession. Under the Statute on Statutes, “[i]f any penalty,
forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by
the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes
effect.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2018). In addition to the change identified by the State, the provision
that allowed defendant to be sentenced to a natural life sentence based on a finding by the trial
court the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 1994)) has been changed to allow such a
sentence only when a trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt the offense was accompanied
by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2018)). Moreover, since defendant’s 1995 sentencing, the statutory
scheme was changed to require courts to consider additional factors before sentencing an
offender who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West
Supp. 2017). These changes mitigated the sentences that could be imposed. Defendant is entitled
to choose the scheme by which he is sentenced on remand. See People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271,
¶ 12, 63 N.E.3d 884; see also People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 54, 104 N.E.3d 358 (citing
Reyes as establishing when a defendant’s sentence is vacated on appeal and the matter is
remanded for resentencing the Statute on Statues permits the defendant to elect to be sentenced
under the law in effect at the time of resentencing). We will not address any other issues until
defendant is resentenced.
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 44 We vacate defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing.
¶ 45 Vacated and remanded.
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