In re J.P. , 2021 IL App (4th) 210185-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 210185-U FILED
This Order was filed under July 28, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender
not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0185
4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re J.P., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) McLean County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA63
v. )
Christi P., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) J. Brian Goldrick,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court’s termination of respondent’s
parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In September 2020, the State filed a motion for termination of parental rights as to
J.P. against respondent, Christi P., and J.P.’s father. The latter is not part of this appeal. The trial
court granted the State’s petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights in February
2021.
¶3 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s best-interests decision was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In September 2020, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights,
seeking a finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights of respondent. The State alleged
respondent (1) was either suffering from habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs, other than
those prescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of
the unfitness proceeding; (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which
were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent; and (3) failed to make reasonable
progress toward the return of the child within a specified nine-month time period after an
adjudication of neglect under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West
2018)). The State’s petition asked that termination be found to be in the best interests of the
minor and requested the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) retain
custody and guardianship over the minor with the authority to consent to adoption.
¶6 At the fitness hearing in February 2021, respondent agreed to admit paragraph
10C of the petition, alleging she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of J.P.
within the specified time period pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Illinois Adoption Act (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)). The State dismissed the remaining counts. The trial court
informed respondent of her rights, admonished her regarding the effects of admitting the
allegations, and ascertained from respondent that she fully understood her rights and the
proceedings and was entering her admission voluntarily. The trial court found respondent unfit
and set the best-interests hearing for later that month.
¶7 At the hearing, the trial court first noted it received best-interests reports from
DCFS and the court-appointed special advocate and reviewed them prior to the hearing. None of
the parties objected to the court considering the reports before proceeding with the hearing. The
State’s lone witness, Mary Rich, was J.P.’s great-aunt and foster mother. J.P. has been in her care
since April 2019 and is Rich’s only foster child. She testified J.P. is very bonded to her and to
her extended family and interacts with all of them. She expressed concern if J.P. was prevented
from associating with any of them and expressed her opinion that termination of respondent’s
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parental rights was in the child’s best interests. She believed termination was in J.P.’s best
interests because of respondent mother’s and father’s substance abuse issues, lack of stable
housing, and poor decision-making. Rich had signed permanency commitment forms and
intended to adopt J.P. if permitted.
¶8 Respondent was called to the stand and read a letter into the record admitting she
had made mistakes, but she asked for another opportunity to be a parent to J.P. She implored the
trial court not to terminate her parental rights. Respondent testified and acknowledged she was
not currently capable of providing a safe or stable environment for J.P., but that she understands
her “triggers” and “stresses,” has a support system in place, is currently receiving therapy, and is
taking her prescription medication. She stated she thought it would take approximately one year
for her to be in a position to adequately care for J.P. After noting it considered all of the statutory
factors, including J.P.’s age and developmental needs, her physical safety, sense of attachment,
permanence, and continuity of affection, the trial court found it was in J.P.’s best interests to
terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶9 This appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s decision terminating her parental
rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 12 Once a trial court finds a parent an “unfit person,” it must next consider whether
terminating that person’s parental rights serves the child’s best interests. “[A]t a best-interests
hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s
interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227
(2004); see also In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80, 966 N.E.2d 1107 (stating once
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the trial court finds the parent unfit, “all considerations, including the parent’s rights, yield to the
best interests of the child”). When considering whether termination of parental rights serves a
child’s best interests, the trial court must consider a number of statutory factors within “the
context of the child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).
These factors include:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of
the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious
background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including
love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least
disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and
long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s
need for permanence, including the need for stability and
continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the
uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to
substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to
care for the child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072,
859 N.E.2d 123, 141 (2006).
See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a) to (j) (West 2018).
¶ 13 A trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best
interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53, 74 N.E.3d 1185. The court’s decision will be
found to be “against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is
clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re
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Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16, 73 N.E.3d 616.
¶ 14 At the outset of the best-interests hearing, the trial court noted the change in focus
mentioned above. Further, the court correctly pointed out how, at the outset of the case, the focus
was on the parents and their participation and completion of services in an effort to facilitate
reunification. It is evident from this record the court fully recognized and understood the nature
of the proceedings before and after a finding of parental unfitness. The trial court took great
pains to outline respondent’s progression throughout the life of the case. The trial court
considered all the statutory factors and indicated so for the record. The trial court noted that
respondent made some progress, but that she still had work to do and there was no way to
ascertain how long it might take her to fully address her own issues before she could adequately
care for J.P. The trial court agreed with respondent’s assessment that it might take another year.
With that in mind, the court noted J.P. was 2 years and 8 months old at the time of the hearing,
had been in foster care for over 30 of those 32 months, and was in need of permanency.
Additionally, the current foster parent was able to provide J.P. with safety, food, shelter, and
clothing. The court acknowledged respondent undoubtedly loved J.P. but also noted that J.P. was
bonded to the foster parent and integrated into the household, where she is provided with love
and affection. The court found continued placement with the foster mother to be the least
disruptive, particularly due to respondent’s substance abuse issues and her own admission she
would need at least one year before being able to take care of J.P. The court found J.P.’s age, her
need for permanence, the age of the case, and the fact that issues responsible for the minor being
placed in care were still present and favored termination as being in J.P.’s best interests.
¶ 15 Based on this evidence, the trial court agreed it was in the minor’s best interests to
terminate respondent’s parental rights. Accordingly, we cannot find the trial court’s decision
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terminating respondent’s parental rights to be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence.” Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
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