Webster House Associates v. Baines , 2021 IL App (1st) 190273-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 190273-UNo. 1-19-0273
Second Division
August 10, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the
WEBSTER HOUSE ASSOCIATES, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 18 M1 718282
)
LONNIE BAINES, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) David A. Skryd
) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment is affirmed where the court did not err in denying
counsel’s request for a continuance and proceeding to trial despite defendant’s
absence.
¶2 Plaintiff-appellee Webster House Associates (Webster House), the property management
company for the Webster House Apartments in Chicago, filed a verified complaint for forcible
entry and detainer in the circuit court against defendant-appellant Lonnie Baines. Following a
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bench trial, the circuit court entered an order granting immediate possession of the property to
Webster House. On appeal, Baines contends that in denying a motion for a continuance, the trial
court denied his counsel adequate time to prepare for trial and denied Baines the opportunity to be
present at his trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 As an initial matter, we note that Webster House has not filed a response brief in this
appeal. “Generally, we will not act as an advocate for an appellee who fails to file a brief.” First
Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). However,
because the record is straightforward and the issues on appeal can be decided without the aid of an
appellee’s brief, we will decide the case on the merits. See id.¶5 Additionally, we note that a court reporter was not present during any of the proceedings
below. However, the parties submitted bystander’s reports to the trial court, and, following a
conference with the parties, the trial court certified a report of proceedings. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323
(eff. July 1, 2017). The record also contains the parties’ pleadings and the court’s orders. The
following background has been gleaned from these documents.
¶6 On November 13, 2018, Webster House filed its complaint against Baines, alleging that it
was entitled to possession of 2150 North Lincoln Park West, Apartment 201, Chicago, Illinois,
because Baines had breached the terms of his rental lease. The accompanying summons listed the
trial date as November 27, 2018. Baines was served with the complaint and summons on
November 20, 2018.
¶7 On November 27, 2018, Baines and counsel for Webster House appeared in court. Baines
requested a continuance to obtain counsel, which the court granted. The court granted Baines seven
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days to obtain counsel and the matter was set for trial on December 4, 2018. The court advised
Baines to inform his counsel, once obtained, that trial was set for December 4.
¶8 On December 4, 2018, counsel for Webster House appeared in court with three witnesses
and answered ready for trial. Attorney Robert Hernandez of Caroline J. Smith & Associates, P.C.
also appeared and stated that he was representing Baines, who was not present in court. Hernandez
offered no explanation for Baines’s absence. The trial court, upon denying Hernandez’ request for
a continuance, informed the parties that the trial would be proceeding that day. The case was held
until the end of the court’s call for the defendant to appear for trial. There was no appearance for
Hernandez in the record.
¶9 At trial, Webster House called three witnesses who testified to Baines’s actions that
“amounted to materially [sic] violations of his Lease which were the basis of the case.” Hernandez
cross-examined each witness. The trial court ruled in Webster House’s favor and entered an order
of possession, directing Baines to move out of the property immediately.
¶ 10 On December 26, 2018, Baines filed a motion to reconsider. On January 10, 2019, the trial
court denied the motion. On February 7, 2019, attorney Caroline J. Smith filed her appearance on
behalf of Baines in this matter. Baines’s notice of appeal was also filed that day.
¶ 11 On February 20, 2019, Baines filed a motion to stay eviction, which was denied.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Baines asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance where
Baines was not present on the day of trial and counsel did not have time to adequately prepare for
trial. Baines requests that this court vacate the order of possession, reverse the denial of Baines’s
motion to reconsider, and remand to the trial court for a new trial to allow Baines to testify on his
own behalf.
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¶ 14 In his brief, Baines couches his arguments in terms of the trial court denying him the
opportunity to assert his defenses and denying counsel adequate time to prepare for trial.
Underlying Baines’s claims is the trial court’s denial of Hernandez’s request for a continuance.
Thus, the issue before us is whether the trial court erred in denying counsel’s request for a
continuance on the day of trial. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with a review of the principles
of law regarding continuances. Before doing so, we deem it appropriate to define the nature of the
proceeding below.
¶ 15 A forcible entry and detainer action is a limited statutory proceeding that determines who
is entitled to immediate possession of a property. Avenaim v. Lubecke, 347 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861
(2004); see 735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (West 2018). An action under the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (West 2018) “is a special statutory proceeding, summary in
its nature, and in derogation of the common law[.]” Avdich v. Kleinert, 69 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1977). The
purpose of the Act is to provide a speedy remedy to allow a person who is entitled to possession
of certain real property to be restored to possession without undue delay. Rosewood Corp. v.
Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 251 (1970) (per curiam); Yale Tavern, Inc. v. Cosmopolitan National Bank,
259 Ill. App. 3d 965, 967 (1994). Because of its summary nature, only matters that are germane to
the issue of possession may be raised in an action under the Act. Avenaim, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 861-
62.
¶ 16 Section 9-109 of the Act provides that if a defendant, having been duly summoned, does
not appear for trial, the trial may proceed ex parte. 735 ILCS 5/9-109 (West 2018). Rule 10.5 of
the Circuit Court of Cook County provides the form of summons in forcible entry and detainer
cases filed in the First Districts’ Municipal Division. Consistent with the Act, language in the body
of the circuit court’s form summons provides: “If you fail to appear for TRIAL, a Judgment by
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default may be taken against you for the relief asked in the complaint[.]” Cook County Cir. Ct. R.
10.5(b) (eff. June 1, 1979). Against this backdrop, we now consider the propriety of the trial court’s
denial of Baines’s motion for a continuance of trial.
¶ 17 “Litigants do not have an absolute right to a continuance[,]” and the decision to deny or
grant the request is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Somers v. Quinn, 373 Ill. App. 3d
87, 96 (2007). We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of LaRocque, 2018 IL App (2d) 160973, ¶ 94. A trial court abuses its
discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or fanciful or where no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the court. Id. Under this standard, the reviewing court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court or determine whether the trial court acted wisely.
In re Parentage of I.I., 2016 IL App (1st) 160071, ¶ 29.
¶ 18 Section 2-1007 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that the court has the discretion to
grant additional time for “the doing of any act or the taking of any step or proceeding prior to
judgment” on good cause shown. 735 ILCS 5/2-1007 (West 2020). Further, the “circumstances,
terms and conditions under which continuances may be granted, the time and manner in which
application therefor shall be made, and the effect thereof, shall be according to rules.” Id. Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 231 (eff. Jan. 1, 1970), which sets forth the requirements for motions for
continuances, provides that “[n]o motion for the continuance of a cause made after the cause has
been reached for trial shall be heard, unless a sufficient excuse is shown for the delay.” Once a
case has proceeded to the trial stage, “a party requesting a continuance must provide the court with
“ ‘especially grave reasons’ ” for needing the continuance due to the potential for inconvenience
to the witnesses, parties, and the court.” In re Parentage of I.I., 2016 IL App (1st) 160071. ¶ 29
(citing K&K Iron Works, Inc. v. Marc Realty, LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 133688, ¶ 23). Often, the
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decisive factor is whether the litigant has exercised due diligence in proceeding with the case.
Somers, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 96.
¶ 19 The case before us is devoid of facts demonstrating that unique circumstances prevented
Baines’s presence at trial or counsel’s preparation for trial. Additionally, from all appearances, this
was not a complex case requiring an inordinate amount of preparation for trial. We note again that
actions for forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, limited to matters germane to
possession. Though Baines states in his brief that Hernandez “was not given the opportunity to
call [Baines] on the phone so he could appear at trial[,]” this fact does not appear in the certified
report of proceedings. In fact, according to the bystander’s report, the case was held until the end
of the call to permit Baines’s appearance. Regardless, Baines was well aware of the date of trial,
and even in his brief, he does not provide any reason for his absence. Moreover, there is no affidavit
containing Baines’s allegations in his defense of the action, only a bare statement that he did not
initiate the altercation that was the basis of Webster House’s complaint. Conversely, Webster
House was present on the day of trial and had three witnesses who testified as to the issue.
Essentially, Baines requests that this court substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, which
as stated we cannot do. Rather, we cannot say that no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the court where Baines was expressly told by the court to inform his counsel of the
trial date and there was no reason, “grave” or otherwise, to excuse Baines’s absence.
¶ 20 Baines cites to Samek v. Newman, 164 Ill. App. 3d 967 (1987), Circle Management v.
Olivier, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601 (2007), and Chicago Motor Club v. Robinson, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1163(2000), as support of his arguments.
¶ 21 Both Samek and Circle Management interpret section 5/9-106 of the Act (735 ILCS 5/9-
106 (West 2018)) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181(b)(2) (eff. July 17, 2020), respectively.
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161 Ill. App. 3d at 968-69; 378 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11. Section 9-106 of the Act provides that a
“defendant may under a general denial of the allegations of the complaint offer into evidence any
matter in defense of this action. Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-120, no matters not
germane to the distinctive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim
or otherwise.” 735 ILCS 5/9-106 (West 2018). Rule 181(b)(2) provides that “in actions for eviction
(see Rule 101(b)), the defendant must appear at the time and place specified in the summons. If
defendant appears, he or she need not file an answer unless ordered by the court; and when no
answer is ordered, the allegations of the complaint will be deemed denied and any defense may be
proved as if it were specifically pleaded.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 181(b)(2) (eff. July 17, 2020). Baines asserts
that Samek and Circle Management stand for the proposition, based on those two provisions, that
he was not required to expressly assert his germane defenses in a pleading prior to the trial and
that he should have been permitted to present evidence on those defenses at trial. We would agree
that he was not required to plead his defenses pretrial. We disagree, however, that he was precluded
from presenting those defenses at trial. It is more accurately the case that he failed to appear at trial
to present his defenses. Even so, Samek and Circle Management are inapposite here.
¶ 22 In Samek, we reversed the trial court’s judgment on the pleadings because the trial court
failed to give the tenant an opportunity to raise a defense germane to the issue of possession and
to present evidence regarding such defense. 164 Ill. App. 3d at 969-70. Similarly, in Circle
Management, we found that the trial court did not conduct a hearing, did not give the tenant an
opportunity to prove her defense germane to possession, and the landlord obtained possession
without proving its right to possession. 378 Ill. App. 3d at 611-12. Baines contends that these cases
are analogous to the present case because in those cases the defendant was denied an opportunity
to present a germane defense. However, the situation here differs from Samek and Circle
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Management because Baines received a trial at which he had an opportunity to present a relevant
defense. The fact of the matter is that Baines was given an opportunity to raise a defense. His own
absence from the trial, the date of which he was well aware, prevented him from presenting his
evidence. He also had the opportunity to submit to his counsel the evidence to be presented on his
behalf. He failed to do that as well. But it simply cannot be said that he was not given an
opportunity to present evidence of a defense to possession.
¶ 23 We also find Chicago Motor Club distinguishable from the instant case. Chicago Motor
Club involved an insurance liability dispute with a convoluted procedural history. 316 Ill. App. 3d
at 1165-1169. The defendant’s original counsel was absent from court on multiple occasions and
requested several continuances, which ultimately resulted in a default judgment for the plaintiff.
Id. at 1166. The defendant proceeded to represent himself as the plaintiff sought to enforce its
judgment through a citation to discover assets. Id. at 1167. A week before the citation trial, new
counsel appeared on the defendant’s behalf. Id. According to the certified bystander’s report,
during questioning of the defendant, new counsel stated that she did not have adequate time to
prepare and she would not proceed further with the trial. Id. at 1167. However, the defendant
asserted on appeal that the bystander’s report was inaccurate in that counsel objected to the trial
proceedings prior to the start of trial due to inadequate time to prepare, the need to conduct
discovery, and the unavailability of a necessary court file. Id. In remanding to allow the citation
claim to be retried, this court stated the following:
“Through no particular fault of her own, [counsel] was put in the untenable position
of concluding a trial begun by her client in what had become a relatively complicated
insurance dispute, on very short notice. [Counsel] was handicapped by a lack of discovery,
and the record shows she was required to put on her case without access to either the prior
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testimony of witnesses or a missing court file which was needed to ascertain the nature of
the pleadings filed in the underlying liability action.” Id. at 1170.
¶ 24 The facts of Chicago Motor Club are easily distinguishable: first and foremost, this was
not an eviction case, but rather a proceeding to enforce a judgment; the case had been ongoing for
over three years; it was “relatively complicated”; the defendant “had a colorable theory” in her
defense; and there were missing documents and records in the file. Id. at 1170-71. We have none
of these facts in the record before us. By all appearances, this was a straightforward eviction case
based upon a physical altercation that occurred on the property and Baines now states that he
wished to dispute the trial witnesses’ accounts of the encounter but failed to appear at his own trial
to present this defense.
¶ 25 Of the few published cases finding an abuse of discretion for denial of a continuance, most
of them have strong facts showing good cause for the continuance, such as illness of counsel or
one of the parties or the unavailability of known witnesses. Reecy v. Reecy, 132 Ill. App. 2d 1024,
1027 (1971) (counsel’s physician submitted affidavit that counsel had the flu); Vollentine v.
Christoff, 24 Ill. App. 3d 92, 94-96 (essential expert witness was unavailable on the date that trial
was rescheduled); In re S.B., 2015 IL App (4th) 150260, ¶ 23 (Illinois Department of Corrections
was delayed in transporting the mother to the courthouse). We point out that there is also often an
affidavit supporting the cause for a continuance, which is lacking here. We acknowledge that there
is nothing in the record to suggest that counsel’s request for a continuance was a dilatory tactic.
Nonetheless, given the nature of the proceedings and based on the record before us, we cannot find
an abuse of discretion.
¶ 26 Finally, we reject Baines’s assertion that the actions of the trial court resulted in unfairness
and injustice and went against public policy due to his absence at trial. Though Baines does not
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explicitly claim a due process violation, we perceive the argument as such and outright reject this
claim. “If adequate notice has been given, a civil jury trial may proceed without the party or
counsel, and the present party may prove its claim as if the opposition had been there.” Doe v.
Parrillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 191286, ¶ 47; see also 735 ILCS 5/9-109 (West 2018). Although the
summons does not appear in the record, no claim has been raised to suggest any deficiency in the
notice. Thus, we conclude that Baines received proper notice of the proceeding, appeared on the
summons date, received a requested continuance for trial, yet failed to appear on the scheduled
trial date. His attorney, Hernandez, was present and, based on the record, appeared to have
represented his client to the best of his ability under the circumstances. Moreover, it is well
established that the denial of a motion for continuance does not present a due process issue. Benton
v. Marr, 364 Ill. 628, 630 (1936); see also In re S.B., 2015 IL App (4th) 150260, ¶ 21 (citing cases
holding that denial of continuance presents no due process issue). In his brief, Baines, quoting
Elmwood Park v. Keegan, 26 Ill. App .3d 925, 927 (1975), states “each party before the court must
be accorded a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.” Nevertheless, it remains true that a defendant’s
absence at trial and a denial of a motion for a continuance does not automatically result in a due
process violation or, similarly, in an unfair trial.
¶ 27 Though an eviction court, by its nature, must deal with its cases expeditiously, it must do
so in compliance with the Act and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. In this case, Baines was given
notice and the opportunity to exercise his rights and has not presented any reason, either in the trial
court or here on appeal, as to why he was unable to avail himself of that opportunity. We cannot
overlook that plaintiff was present, answered ready for trial, and had present in court three
witnesses prepared to testify. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion
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in denying the motion for a continuance. Because Baines’s arguments on appeal are without merit,
we have no basis to vacate the trial court’s order of possession and we must affirm.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
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