In re S.E. , 2021 IL App (3d) 210084-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 210084-UOrder filed August 3, 2021
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2021
In re S.E., M.E., T.W., and C.R., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
Minors ) Rock Island County, Illinois.
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Appeal Nos. 3-21-0084, 3-21-0085,
) 3-21-0086, and 3-21-0087
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) Circuit Nos. 15-JA-33, 15-JA-34,
v. ) 15-JA-61, and 18-JA-77
)
Tikesha W., ) The Honorable
) Theodore G. Kutsunis,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAUGHERITY delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices O’Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment.
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: In an appeal in a termination of parental rights case, the appellate court held that
the trial court's determination of parental unfitness and best interest were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court, therefore,
affirmed the trial court's judgment, terminating the biological mother's parental
rights to her minor children.
¶2 In the context of a juvenile-neglect proceeding, the State filed petitions to involuntarily
terminate the parental rights of respondent mother, Tikesha W., to her minor children, S.E.,
M.E., T.W., and C.R. After hearings on the matter, the trial court found that respondent was an
unfit parent/person and that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate respondent's
parental rights. Respondent appeals, challenging both the determination of parental unfitness
and best interest. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Respondent was the biological mother of the minor children, T.W. (born in October
2005), S.E. (born in April 2013), M.E. (born in April 2014), and C.R. (born in October 2018).
The children had different fathers. Timothy T. was the father of T.W.; Andre E. was, or was
believed to be, the father of S.E. and M.E.; and Christian R. was the father of C.R. In June 2015,
three years before C.R. was born, the family came to the attention of the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) after the police discovered during a welfare check that respondent
had left S.E. (age two at the time) and M.E. (age one at the time) alone in her apartment. A
neighbor had reported that the children had been crying in the apartment for over an hour. The
children were not wearing any clothes, except for heavily soiled diapers. The police took the
children to the police station and did not hear from any member of the children’s family for
several hours. Protective custody of S.E. and M.E. was subsequently taken.
¶5 A few days later, the State filed juvenile petitions, alleging that S.E. and M.E. were
neglected minors based upon the above incident. Respondent was given a court-appointed
attorney to represent her in the juvenile court proceedings.
¶6 When the above incident occurred, respondent’s oldest child, T.W., was living with
T.W.’s father, Timothy T. About three months after the incident, respondent picked T.W. up
from Timothy’s residence for a visit but had no intention of returning T.W. DCFS later learned
that T.W. was in respondent’s care and assigned an investigator to look into the situation to
2
determine if there were any potential safety issues since respondent already had other children in
DCFS care. Respondent, however, refused to produce T.W. for the DCFS investigator and,
instead, hid T.W. with a friend. DCFS was eventually able to obtain protective custody of T.W.
after respondent enrolled T.W. in school. After DCFS did so, T.W. disclosed to DCFS that her
father had sexually abused her; had exposed her to alcohol, drugs, and guns in the home; had
been leaving her at home unattended and without a phone until 2 or 3 a.m.; and had been
physically abusing her with a belt for discipline.
¶7 The following month, the State filed a juvenile petition, alleging that T.W. was an abused
and neglected minor based upon the above incidents. The same attorney was again appointed to
represent respondent in the juvenile court proceedings.
¶8 In December 2015, a pretrial conference was held on respondent’s cases regarding her
three children. Respondent was present in court for the pretrial conference and was represented
by her attorney. Respondent stipulated to the facts alleged in the juvenile neglect petitions,
except for the allegations regarding the abuse of T.W. by T.W.’s father, and the State agreed to
dismiss those allegations.
¶9 On January 8, 2016, a dispositional hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial court found that all three children were neglected and that respondent was unable to care
for the children because she had stipulated to the facts alleged in the neglect petitions and had
not yet completed the services that were necessary to have the children returned to her care. The
trial court made the children wards of the court and named DCFS as the children’s guardian.
The permanency goal was set at that time for the children to be returned home within 12 months.
In the dispositional orders, respondent was instructed that she was required to comply with the
service plan that was implemented and to correct the conditions that caused the children to be in
3
care or that she would risk the termination of her parental rights. As part of the service plan and
through a separate court order, respondent was given the following tasks to complete to correct
the conditions that led to the adjudication and removal of the children: (1) cooperate with
services and service providers and follow the service plan; (2) obtain and maintain appropriate
housing; (3) obtain and maintain appropriate income; (4) complete a mental health evaluation
and comply with the recommendations contained therein; (5) attend and successfully complete
parenting classes; (6) attend family and individual counseling; and (7) complete domestic
violence services.
¶ 10 Over the next several years, numerous permanency review hearings were held in this
case. The first permanency review hearing took place in June 2016. Respondent was present in
court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A report had been prepared for the
hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s performance during the
period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had been attending individual and family
counseling sessions; (2) respondent had participated in a parenting-capacity assessment; (3)
respondent had participated in counseling in her home (presumably parenting training); (4)
respondent was currently working full time at a fast food restaurant; and (5) respondent was
attending scheduled visits with the children. As for the negative aspects of respondent’s
performance, the report indicated that: (1) respondent would often deny the statements that T.W.
had made in counseling but later, after more information was given, would end up admitting that
what T.W. had stated was true; (2) the care team was often concerned about respondent’s ability
to bond with the children, to provide ongoing safety for the children, and to be able to manage
life and responsibilities; (3) although respondent participated in counseling in her home
(presumably parenting training), she did not seem to be able to utilize the skills she had been
4
taught; (4) respondent continued to have a fear of the children being sexually abused by their
current caregivers even though there was no evidence supporting that concern; (5) the team had
to limit the number of diaper changes that respondent would perform during her visits with the
children as it was promoting a fear within the children; (6) although respondent was participating
in services, the team continued to have ongoing concerns with her ability to parent the children,
provide safety, and meet the children’s needs on a consistent basis; and (7) although respondent
was cooperative with service providers, she continued to exhibit behaviors that were of a concern
for the team to be comfortable with her parenting the children full time. After considering the
service plan, the caseworker’s report, and any testimony and arguments presented, the trial court
found that respondent had made reasonable efforts toward return of the children home but had
only made minimal progress in that regard. The trial court kept the permanency goal at returning
the children home within 12 months.
¶ 11 A second permanency review hearing was held in March 2017 (continued from January
2017). Respondent was present in court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A
report had been prepared for the hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of
respondent’s performance during the period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had
satisfactorily completed the mental health evaluations that had been requested, although
respondent did not believe what the evaluations stated; (2) respondent had cooperated to some
extent with her goals and services; (3) respondent had obtained or been provided with a new
apartment after she had lost her previous apartment; and (4) respondent was looking for new
employment after she had lost her previous employment. As for the negative aspects of
respondent’s performance, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had been unstable during the
reporting period; (2) respondent had lost her housing and had ended up in a shelter; (3)
5
respondent was unemployed; (4) respondent was not fully cooperating with the expectations of
counseling and visits; (5) respondent had not been able to demonstrate on an ongoing basis some
of the parenting skills she had been taught; (6) respondent had missed the last two child and
family team meetings for no apparent reason; (7) respondent provided dishonest or embellished
information to her service providers or caseworker; (8) respondent was late to visits with the
children for no reason but would often make excuses; (9) respondent had a lack of understanding
as to her children’s needs, would insist on going into the restroom with S.E., and would often ask
the children if anyone was touching or hurting them; (10) although respondent attended
counseling, her progress was unsatisfactory as she was not implementing what she had learned
and continued to do things that were against the team’s recommendations; and (11) respondent
continued to exhibit behaviors that were of concern to the team. The caseworker recommended
in her report that the permanency goal for the children be changed to substitute care pending a
court determination on termination of parental rights (a court ruling on termination). After
considering the service plan, the caseworker’s report, and any testimony and arguments
presented, the trial court found that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable
progress. The trial court elected, however, not to change the permanency goal at that time and
kept the permanency goal at returning the children home within 12 months.
¶ 12 A third permanency review hearing was held in July 2017. Respondent was present in
court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A report had been prepared for the
hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s performance during the
period, the report indicated, although somewhat implicitly at times, that: (1) respondent had
maintained an apartment (housing); (2) respondent had obtained employment, but only for a
short period; and (3) respondent was making a better effort during visits to get the children to
6
listen to her, although her efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. As for the negative aspects of
respondent’s performance, the report indicated that: (1) respondent’s mental health had
deteriorated to the point where the counselor did not think that respondent was mentally stable
(respondent was talking about the devil in one visiting session and had accused the caseworker
of being evil); (2) respondent had refused to attend individual or family counseling because she
did not agree with the feedback the counselor was giving her; (3) respondent had lost her job
after being employed for only a short period; (4) respondent had missed several visits with the
children; and (5) although respondent had maintained an apartment, she did not have adequate
furniture. After considering the service plan, the caseworker’s report, and any testimony and
arguments presented, the trial court found that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or
reasonable progress, although respondent had made minimal efforts. The trial court again,
however, declined to change the permanency goal and kept it at returning the children home
within 12 months.
¶ 13 A fourth permanency review hearing was held in November 2017 (continued from
October 2017). Respondent was present in court for the hearing and was represented by her
attorney. A report had been prepared for the hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive
aspects of respondent’s performance during the period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent
had maintained the same residence; (2) respondent had obtained some furniture for her
residence; (3) respondent had maintained stable part-time employment for a portion of the
period; (4) respondent had seen the doctor, had been prescribed medication for bipolar disorder,
and had been consistent with her medication; (5) respondent had attended all of her visits with
the children; (6) respondent had started counseling with a new service provider and had been
attending her counseling sessions; and (7) respondent had been seeing a community support
7
worker and an employment worker. As for the negative aspects of respondent’s performance,
the report indicated that: (1) respondent was unemployed for a portion of the period; (2)
respondent still needed to obtain furniture for the bedrooms of her residence; (3) respondent
often embellished her reporting of her progress on services; (4) respondent missed two child and
family meetings with DCFS and providers; (5) the staff members that monitored respondent’s
visits with the children were still concerned at times with safety issues and had to give
respondent consistent prompts to that effect; (6) respondent had difficulty getting the children to
listen to her during visits; and (7) although respondent loved the children, she was still unable to
demonstrate effective parenting with all three children at one time to ensure their safety. The
caseworker recommended in her report that the permanency goal for the children be changed to
substitute care pending a court ruling on termination. After considering the service plan, the
caseworker’s report, and any testimony and arguments presented, the trial court found that
respondent had made reasonable efforts and reasonable progress and kept the permanency goal
the same (returning the children home within 12 months).
¶ 14 A fifth permanency review hearing was held in May 2018. Respondent was present in
court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A report had been prepared for the
hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s performance during the
period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had maintained her housing (implicit in the
report); (2) respondent had maintained her part-time employment (implicit in the report); and (3)
respondent had consistently attended visits with her children and the visits, which were
supervised, had generally gone well. As for the negative aspects of respondent’s performance,
the report indicated that: (1) respondent had been involved in another dating relationship where
domestic violence was present (respondent’s relationship with Christian R.) and had lied about
8
that relationship to her caseworker; (2) although respondent’s visits with the children went well,
respondent’s conversations with T.W. were, at times, inappropriate; (3) respondent had not been
able to consistently demonstrate that she was able to keep her environment safe for her children
as evidenced by her ongoing domestic violence relationship with Christian; (4) although
respondent had obtained an order of protection against Christian, she had later dropped the order
of protection and had continued her relationship with Christian; (5) respondent had not been able
to consistently provide her children with basic items for visits, such as food and toilet paper; (6)
respondent had not consistently attended her mental health appointments or followed through
with the therapy component of her treatment; (7) overall, respondent had not shown an
improvement in parental choices or decisions to lead to a safer and healthier environment for her
children; (8) respondent had not been able to build an ongoing support network for herself; and
(9) although respondent clearly loved her children, she had not been able to demonstrate her
ability to parent the children safely full time. The report also indicated that respondent was
currently pregnant with Christian’s child. The caseworker recommended in her report that the
permanency goal for the children be changed to substitute care pending a court ruling on
termination. After considering the service plan, the caseworker’s report, and any testimony and
arguments presented, the trial court found that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or
reasonable progress but had made minimal efforts. Due to the lack of efforts and progress by the
children’s parents, the trial court changed the permanency goal to that recommended by the
caseworker.
¶ 15 As noted above, in October 2018, respondent gave birth to C.R. At the time of delivery,
respondent admitted that she had an open DCFS case. The DCFS hotline was called, and a
DCFS investigator visited respondent and C.R. at the hospital. Respondent was reported to have
9
acted appropriately with C.R. and no concerns were noted within the hospital. DCFS, therefore,
decided to allow respondent to take C.R. home and to care for C.R. with various agencies
providing services and support to the family. About three weeks later, however, DCFS removed
C.R. from respondent’s care after it was reported that respondent appeared to be highly
intoxicated while acting as C.R.’s caregiver. The child’s father, Christian, took C.R. from
respondent’s apartment at that time because he was concerned for C.R.’s safety. Although the
police responded to respondent’s apartment and observed that respondent appeared intoxicated,
had slurred speech, and was swaying, respondent denied to her caseworker that the incident had
occurred and stated that Christian had kidnapped C.R. from her apartment. The State later filed a
neglect petition as to C.R. based upon that incident and certain other matters.
¶ 16 A sixth permanency review hearing was held in November 2018. Respondent was
present in court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A report had been prepared
for the hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s performance
during the period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had maintained her housing; (2)
respondent had attended her visits with the children and the majority of those visits had gone
well; (3) respondent had initially been allowed additional visits with her children with less
supervision; (4) respondent had initially been allowed to take C.R. (the new baby) home and to
care for C.R. in her home; (5) respondent had reached out to different agencies for assistance
with her electric bill after she had received a shut-off notice; and (6) respondent worked well
with service providers at times. With regard to respondent’s employment for the period, the
report noted that respondent had been unable to work due to her high-risk pregnancy. As for the
negative aspects of respondent’s performance, the report indicated that: (1) DCFS had removed
C.R. from respondent’s care after the incident where it was reported that respondent was
10
intoxicated while caring for the child; (2) the level of supervision for respondent’s visits with the
children was increased after the incident with C.R.; (3) although the majority of visits went well,
respondent had a couple of visits that caused staff to have concerns when she tried to physically
discipline the children by slapping M.E.’s hand and by pulling T.W.’s hair; (4) respondent was
still having inappropriate conversations with T.W. during visits; (5) respondent was accusing
T.W. of sexually abusing the younger children, despite there being no evidence thereof; (6)
respondent had still not been able to consistently demonstrate that she was able to keep her
environment safe for her children; (7) although respondent worked well with service providers,
she only did so if her tasks were not challenging and did not go against what she wanted to do;
(8) respondent had still not been able to consistently provide her children with basic items
without help from agencies; (9) overall, respondent had not shown an improvement in parental
choices or decisions to lead to a safe and healthy environment for her children; (10) although
respondent stated that she was taking responsibility for her actions, she had continued to make
the same poor choices; (11) respondent had still been unable to build an ongoing support
network for herself; and (12) although respondent clearly loved her children, she still had not
been able to demonstrate her ability to parent them safely full time. The caseworker
recommended in her report that the permanency goal for the children be kept at substitute care
pending a court ruling on termination. After considering the service plan, the caseworker’s
report, and any testimony and arguments presented, the trial court found that respondent had not
made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress and kept the permanency goal the same
(substitute care pending a court ruling on termination).
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¶ 17 In May 2019, the State filed its initial petitions to terminate respondent’s parental rights
as to three of the four of children: TW, S.E., and M.E.1 The petitions were later amended. In the
amended petitions, the State alleged that respondent was an unfit parent/person as defined in the
Adoption Act because: (1) she had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
and responsibility as to the children’s welfare (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018)); (2) she
had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal
of the children from her during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglect (see
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2018)); and (3) she had failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return home of the children during any nine-month period following the adjudication
of neglect (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)) in that she had failed to consistently
engage in counseling, had failed to consistently engage in mental health services or comply with
recommendations, had failed to consistently ensure safety or implement skills learned from
parenting and counseling during her visits with the children, and had failed to maintain
employment. In the amended petitions, five nine-month periods were specified as to the second
and third allegations: January 9, 2016, through October 9, 2016; October 10, 2016, through July
10, 2017; February 28, 2018, through November 28, 2018; November 29, 2018, through August
28, 2019; and August 29, 2019, through May 29, 2020.
¶ 18 In July 2019, a partial adjudicatory hearing was held on the neglect petition that had been
filed as to C.R. Respondent was present in court for the hearing and was represented by her
attorney. C.R.’s father, Christian, stipulated to the facts alleged in the petition. Based upon
Christian’s stipulation, the trial court granted the petition and continued the case for actual
adjudication of C.R. and for disposition.
1
The petitions were labeled “SUPPLEMENTAL” petitions.
12
¶ 19 The following month, Christian filed a motion to vacate his stipulation to the facts
forming the basis of the neglect petition as to C.R. The trial court later denied Christian’s
request.
¶ 20 A seventh permanency review hearing was held in November 2019. Neither respondent
nor the attorneys were present in court for the hearing. A report had been prepared for the
hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s performance during the
period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had maintained her housing; (2) respondent had
participated in an employment program through her counseling provider; (3) respondent had
obtained employment; (4) respondent had participated in a community support program through
her counseling provider; and (5) although respondent had missed numerous visits with the
children for various reasons, she was able to make up those visits. As for the negative aspects of
respondent’s performance, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had difficulty paying her
electric bill and had her electricity shut off for a period of time; (2) although respondent had
obtained employment, she had difficulty maintaining a job for more than a few months; (3)
respondent was still involved in her relationship with Christian, despite periods of domestic
violence; (4) respondent’s mental health problems had intensified after her children’s cases had
moved toward termination; (5) respondent had left a voicemail on T.W.’s phone stating that she
was going to harm herself; (6) respondent had been hospitalized and had received a psychiatric
evaluation during the period for believing that her children were dead and that someone was
trying to kill her; (7) although respondent had participated in a community support program, she
had missed several appointments; (8) after C.R. was taken into DCFS care, respondent began to
display unpredictable behavior; (9) respondent’s visits had been reduced due to her behavior;
(10) respondent had missed numerous visits due to weather conditions, being ill, the children
13
being ill, and respondent being in jail; and (11) respondent had failed to consistently attend
mental health counseling appointments. The caseworker recommended in her report that the
permanency goal for T.W., S.E., and M.E. be kept at substitute care pending a court ruling on
termination. After considering the service plan and the caseworker’s report, the trial court kept
the permanency goals for the children consistent with the caseworker’s recommendations. The
trial court made no findings as to whether respondent had made reasonable efforts or reasonable
progress for the period.
¶ 21 In January 2020, a dispositional hearing was held on the neglect petition pertaining to
C.R. Respondent was present in court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that C.R. was neglected and that respondent
was unable to care for C.R. based upon the allegations in the neglect petition. The trial court
made C.R. a ward of the court and named DCFS as C.R.’s guardian. The permanency goal was
set at that time for C.R. to be returned home within 12 months. In the dispositional order,
respondent was instructed that she was required to comply with the service plan that was
implemented and to correct the conditions that caused C.R. to be in care or that she would risk
the termination of her parental rights. As part of the service plan and through a separate court
order, respondent was given the following tasks to complete to correct the conditions that led to
the adjudication and removal of C.R.: (1) cooperate with services and service providers and
follow the service plan; (2) obtain a substance abuse evaluation and follow any recommendations
contained therein; (3) obtain a psychiatric evaluation and follow and any recommendations
contained therein, including taking medication as prescribed; (4) cooperate with mental health
counseling; (5) obtain and maintain appropriate housing; (6) obtain and maintain appropriate
14
income; (7) obtain a domestic violence assessment and follow any recommendations contained
therein; and (8) attend and successfully complete parenting classes/parenting training.
¶ 22 An eighth permanency review hearing was held in April 2020. Presumably due to the
pandemic, neither respondent nor the attorneys were present in court for the hearing. A report
had been prepared for the hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s
performance during the period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had maintained housing
and had obtained assistance in paying her utility bills; (2) respondent had maintained the same
employment for six months; (3) respondent had consistently attended and participated in
counseling to address her mental health and had consistently taken the medications she had been
prescribed; (4) respondent had participated in a community support program through her
counseling provider; (5) respondent had completed domestic violence classes and had been
working with her counseling provider to understand the cycle of abuse; (6) respondent had
consistently worked with a parenting coach; (7) respondent had attended her visits with the
children (or made up visits she had missed) and her visits had generally gone well; and (8)
respondent had made some progress in her parenting. As for the negative aspects of
respondent’s performance, the report indicated that: (1) although respondent had denied that she
was in a romantic relationship with Christian (C.R.’s father), DCFS had received information
that respondent had been dishonest about her interaction with Christian; and (2) although
respondent had a loving relationship with her children and her visits had generally gone well, she
had still struggled with disciplining the children and did not discipline the children during visits
unless she was prompted to do so. The caseworker recommended in her report that the
permanency goal for T.W., S.E., and M.E. be kept at substitute care pending a court ruling on
termination and that the permanency goal for C.R. be kept at return home within 12 months.
15
After considering the service plan and the caseworker’s report, the trial court found that
respondent had not made reasonable efforts or reasonable progress and kept the same
permanency goals in place as recommended by the caseworker.
¶ 23 A ninth permanency review hearing was held in September 2020. Respondent was
present in court for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A report had been prepared
for the hearing by the caseworker. As for the positive aspects of respondent’s performance
during the period, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had maintained housing; (2)
respondent had attended her counseling sessions to address her mental health; (3) respondent had
participated in a community support program and an employment program at her counseling
provider; (4) respondent had continued to work with a parenting coach; and (5) respondent had
attended all of her visits with the children (either in person or through Facetime), except for one
visit that was cancelled due to respondent’s mental health issues. As for the negative aspects of
respondent’s performance, the report indicated that: (1) respondent had been acting strangely at
her work and had eventually lost her job; (2) respondent had displayed bizarre behavior at one of
her visits with the children; (3) respondent eventually had to be hospitalized for her mental
health; (4) respondent had admitted to interactions with Christian, although there had not been
any altercations between the two for the past six months; and (5) although respondent had the
desire to change her parenting style and her relationship with the children, she had only made
minimal progress with her parenting coach and had still struggled with the basic techniques of
parenting. The caseworker recommended in her report that the permanency goals for the
children be kept the same. After considering the service plan, the caseworker’s report, and any
testimony and arguments presented, the trial court found that respondent had not made
16
reasonable efforts or reasonable progress and kept the children’s permanency goals the same, as
the caseworker had recommended.
¶ 24 In November 2020, at the trial court’s request, T.W. submitted a letter to the court to
provide her feedback and wishes regarding the progress of the case, her future visits with
respondent, and her future relationship with respondent. In the letter, T.W. expressed concern
over respondent’s ability to take care of T.W. and her siblings. According to T.W., from the
time that she was six years old, she had observed a repeating pattern of behavior in respondent
whereby respondent would be doing well for a couple of months and then everything would
come “crashing down.” T.W. stated in her letter that she loved respondent, but that she did not
think it was good idea for her and the other children to be returned to respondent’s care. T.W.
believed that she and her siblings had found a stable home with a family that accepted and loved
them and asked the trial court to bring an end to the chaos and court process that she and her
siblings had been living through for the last several years. A report filed by the guardian ad
litem that had been appointed for the children echoed T.W.’s concerns.
¶ 25 In December 2020, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights to
C.R. 2 The petition for C.R. generally mirrored the petitions (and amended petitions) that had
been filed as to the other three children with the same three bases of parental unfitness alleged.
The only nine-month period specified in C.R.’s petition, however, was the period from January
18, 2020, through October 18, 2020.
¶ 26 In January 2021, an evidentiary hearing was held on the parental fitness portion of the
termination petitions (the amended petitions as to S.E., M.E., and T.W. and the original petition
as to C.R.). Respondent was not present in court for the hearing due to mental health issues, but
2
The petition was labeled a “SUPPLEMENTAL” petition.
17
her attorney was present in court to represent her interests. At the hearing, the State asked the
trial court to take judicial notice of the children’s birth certificates, which had been submitted
previously, and all of the prior reports that had been filed in the case.
¶ 27 During its portion of the hearing, the State called the caseworker, Lela Donaldson, to
testify as its only witness. Donaldson testified that she had been the caseworker for the
children’s cases since September 2018 and was familiar with the history of the children’s cases.
According to Donaldson, the services that respondent was initially expected to comply with were
to: (1) complete an integrated assessment; (2) maintain housing; (3) maintain income; (4)
participate in therapy; (5) complete a mental health assessment; and (6) complete parenting
education.
¶ 28 As for housing, when Donaldson became the caseworker, respondent was living in an
apartment complex where the amount of rent she paid was based upon her income. The
apartment had two bedrooms and had enough space for the children if the children were ever
returned to respondent. Since respondent was not working at the time, she did not have to pay
any rent. In addition, respondent was given a stipend to pay for her utilities. Respondent had
performed well in maintaining her housing and utilities while Donaldson had been the
caseworker, although respondent needed assistance paying her electric bill on a few occasions
when she had used the utility stipend incorrectly.
¶ 29 About a month before the current hearing, however, respondent had been asked to move
out of the apartment complex because all of the chaos she had been causing with emergency
personnel (police, fire, and/or ambulance personnel) having to respond and because of the
possible danger that she posed to neighbors. During one particular incident, which Donaldson
described, respondent had tried to light her cigarette using her stove and had left her stove on
18
with a pot on top that had started to smoke very badly. Respondent had apparently fallen asleep
at the time. The fire department was called to the complex and had to bust respondent’s door
down to get into the apartment. With Donaldson’s assistance, respondent had since moved to a
residential facility that helped clients with medication management. At the residential facility,
respondent was not currently cooperating, was not taking her medications as directed, was not
following-up with group sessions, was yelling and argumentative, and was isolating herself by
staying in her room. Donaldson did not believe that respondent would be stable enough to be
discharged from the residential facility any time soon. Despite that testimony, Donaldson later
acknowledged on cross-examination that during all of the nine-month periods specified and the
case as a whole, respondent had maintained satisfactory housing.
¶ 30 With regard to employment, during Donaldson’s time as the caseworker, respondent’s
employment had been sporadic. About four months before the current hearing, respondent lost
her job at McDonald’s where she had worked for about a year, which was the longest time that
respondent had worked at the same place since Donaldson had been the caseworker. Respondent
lost the McDonald’s job because she had too many absences and appeared to be drunk at times at
work. Prior to the McDonald’s job, respondent was usually at a job for only a brief period of
time (two or three weeks) or was in-between jobs.
¶ 31 Donaldson acknowledged in cross-examination, however, that despite respondent’s
sporadic employment, respondent had sufficient income, either through her own employment or
through assistance from the State or County, to support herself during all of the nine-month
periods specified and during the case as a whole. Respondent may have also had sufficient
income to support the children (meet the children’s needs financially) during the time period
when she was able to hold onto her job for a year.
19
¶ 32 As for respondent’s parenting training and parenting ability, Donaldson indicated that
respondent was initially referred to a group parenting class but was eventually switched to
individual parenting instruction at Monarch Trauma Counseling Center. In about December
2018, the individual parenting counselor at Monarch reported that respondent was not making
any progress. The counselor and the visitation supervisors tried to get respondent to understand
how her mental health affected her children, how to have appropriate conversations with her
children, effective parenting, and effective disciplining. It was always very argumentative
between respondent and the individual counselor at Monarch because respondent did not agree
that she had an issue as far as her parenting was concerned. In addition, respondent had
previously been discharged by her parenting coach due to problems the coach had trying to get
respondent to engage in coaching time but had started working with a new parenting coach in
February 2020.
¶ 33 Donaldson acknowledged in cross-examination, however, that despite any problems with
respondent’s parenting training, respondent continued with the parenting training throughout the
entire duration of the case. The only time respondent was not engaging in parenting training as
well as DCFS would have liked was when respondent was doing one-on-one parenting through
Monarch and was not being consistent in going to her appointments. In Donaldson’s opinion,
though, respondent did not meet minimum parenting standards, even during the time periods
when respondent did well, because the length of time that respondent was stable was very short-
lived and only lasted about two months.
¶ 34 As for respondent’s visits with the children, Donaldson indicated, although somewhat
implicitly, that the quality of those visits varied greatly depending upon whether respondent was
taking her medications. If respondent was on her medicine, the visits went very well—
20
respondent would have dinner ready for the children, activities planned, the house clean, and
would not make any negative statements during the visits. If respondent was not taking her
medications, however, the visits did not go so well and would have to be cut short at times for
such reasons as respondent appearing to be drunk; respondent falling in front of, and scaring, the
children; and respondent pulling T.W.’s hair in effort to discipline T.W. On other such
occasions, respondent was not prepared for her visits—her apartment was messy and she did not
have any food or activities planned for the children—or she was argumentative with visit
supervisors.
¶ 35 In October 2018, respondent was doing so well that her visits were changed from
supervised to unsupervised, the length or number of her visits was extended, and she was
allowed to take C.R. home from the hospital after he was born. Unfortunately, however,
respondent’s progress suffered a setback shortly thereafter when the police were called to her
apartment because she appeared to be highly intoxicated while acting as C.R.’s caregiver. After
that point, respondent’s visits were changed back to supervised and had remained that way ever
since. Following DCFS taking C.R. into care, respondent missed multiple visits with the
children because she was either sick or just would not show up. Eventually, respondent was told
that if she did not give 24 hours advance notice of a cancelation, the visits would not be
rescheduled. When respondent was doing well (before C.R. was taken into care), she was
allowed three visits per week unsupervised. Visits were later reduced to two supervised visits
per week. After additional problems occurred, the visits were moved from respondent’s
apartment to the visit supervisors’ location.
¶ 36 With regard to respondent’s mental health, initially it was recommended that respondent
obtain a mental health assessment. Respondent did so, and it was recommended that she obtain a
21
psychological evaluation with medication management and therapy services. Respondent
complied. In 2016, respondent started therapy and medication management at the Robert Young
Center. She eventually left Robert Young and started participating in therapy and medication
management at Transitions. Respondent had been with Transitions for the entire time that
Donaldson had been the caseworker. According to Donaldson, respondent’s follow-through with
therapy at Transitions was sporadic and there were a few six-month periods where respondent
had missed half of the appointments that were scheduled, saying that she was sick, did not feel
well, did not have transportation, or that she forgot about the appointment. Despite those
absences, however, respondent was never discharged from Transitions.
¶ 37 In addition to the missed appointments, respondent had been hospitalized for various
mental health issues on a few occasions during the existence of the case. Donaldson stated that
at times, emergency personnel had to be called to respondent’s apartment complex because
respondent was acting aggressively toward others or was engaging in strange behavior, such as
yelling, stating that someone was trying to kill her, or thinking that her children had been killed.
In May 2019, respondent was hospitalized after she had claimed that she had seen on television
and had heard from her neighbors that her children had been killed. In addition, a few months
before the current hearing, respondent was hospitalized again because she thought that
something had happened to her children. Respondent did well for a few months at one point, and
Donaldson thought that maybe respondent had been taking her medications and was starting to
attain the stability that was needed to change the direction of the case. Unfortunately,
“something else” would always happen, and respondent would become unstable again.
¶ 38 As to respondent’s mental-health diagnoses and medications, Donaldson testified that
respondent had initially been diagnosed with anxiety disorder and was later diagnosed with
22
bipolar and schizoaffective disorder. More recently, respondent had been diagnosed again with
bipolar and with psychosis. Donaldson stated further that respondent’s mental-health
medications had been changed over the years as different diagnoses had been made. Although
Transitions would test respondent to determine if she was taking the prescribed medications, they
would not share those results with Donaldson because respondent had not signed the appropriate
consent form. Thus, Donaldson could never truly verify whether respondent had been compliant
with her medications. Donaldson would check respondent’s medications during home visits and
would question respondent about when she was supposed to take the medications, and
respondent would always know when the medications were supposed to be taken.
¶ 39 In addition to or as part of respondent’s mental health issues, Donaldson noticed during
the course of the case that respondent would frequently have difficulty retaining information that
she had just been given a few days or a week earlier. Respondent’s inability to retain
information caused Donaldson and the visitation supervisors to have concerns over respondent’s
ability to safely parent the children.
¶ 40 With regard to respondent’s relationship with Christian, C.R.’s father, Donaldson stated
that there were domestic violence concerns before she was involved in the case. In September
2018, when Donaldson became the caseworker, respondent already had an active order of
protection against Christian. Despite having the order of protection, respondent started asking
Donaldson questions about whether Christian could be involved with C.R. and whether Christian
could come to respondent’s apartment to see C.R. Donaldson explained to respondent that
Christian was not allowed to be at respondent’s apartment during visits and that Christian would
have to contact DCFS with any questions he had about his involvement with C.R. Months later,
in summer 2019, respondent dropped her order of protection against Christian, saying that she
23
and Christian were going to co-parent, that they were going to be a family, that Christian was
doing well, and that they wanted to be together.
¶ 41 According to Donaldson, about every two weeks, the status changed as to whether
respondent and Christian were in a relationship. Respondent was expected to, and did,
satisfactorily engage in domestic violence services. Despite having done so, respondent
continued to have domestic violence incidents with Christian. Donaldson received numerous
reports from the police regarding fights between respondent and Christian or incidents where the
police were called to respondent’s apartment. In February 2019, respondent came to
Donaldson’s office with a black eye and told Donaldson that Christian had hit her with a phone.
During the meeting, Christian called respondent on the phone and respondent and Christian were
yelling and screaming at each other. A couple of weeks later, respondent and Christian got back
together. Respondent would tell Donaldson that things were better between she and Christian;
then she would call and say that they had gotten into another argument. Christian was banned
from the apartment complex where respondent lived because of the various incidents between
them and was also asked not to come to respondent’s work. In about April 2020, respondent
reported to Donaldson that Christian had videotaped her while at his apartment and said that if
she did not do what he wanted, he was going to show the tape to Donaldson to prove that they
were still in a relationship and had been around each other. In all of the incidents, respondent
reported that Christian was the aggressor.
¶ 42 Finally, with regard to respondent’s performance as a whole during the course of the
case, it was Donaldson’s opinion, based upon her own experience with the case and her review
of respondent’s case file, that respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts toward correcting
the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children from the home and had failed to
24
make reasonable progress toward returning the children to the home during any of the nine-
month periods listed in the termination petitions (the amended petitions as to T.W., S.E., and
M.E. and the original petition as to C.R.). According to Donaldson, respondent loved and
showed affection for her children and had a bond with her three older children but never got to
the point where her children felt safe enough to be in her presence full time. Donaldson did not
observe a strong bond, however, between respondent and C.R. since C.R. was put into foster care
at such a young age. C.R. had more of a bond with the other three children than with respondent.
¶ 43 At the conclusion of the parental fitness hearing, after all of the evidence and arguments
had been presented, the trial court found that all three grounds of parental unfitness had been
proven by the State by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court concluded, therefore, that
respondent was an unfit parent/person. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court commented
that: (1) as to responsibilities and efforts, respondent had failed to live up to her responsibilities
in the case in that she had missed several therapy appointments, had been inconsistent with her
medications, had started drinking and having numerous domestic violence issues, had failed to
follow her therapist’s advice, and could barely function to take care of herself when she was off
of her medication; (2) respondent’s progress in the case throughout the time periods specified
had been sporadic as respondent would make some progress and then would fall back; (3)
respondent was no better off now than she was when she started this case, nor was she fit to be a
parent, and had not attained the level of competency necessary to be a parent.
¶ 44 A best interest hearing was held the following month. Respondent was present in court
for the hearing and was represented by her attorney. A best interest report had been prepared by
the caseworker in preparation for the hearing and had been filed with the court. In her report, the
caseworker discussed the history of the case and the current status of the children. The
25
caseworker noted in her report that respondent’s mental health had been of great concern during
the entirety of the case, that respondent did not fully understand her mental and therapeutic
needs, that respondent had struggled to follow through with recommendations, and that
respondent had not been able to demonstrate that she could parent her children on a full-time
basis.
¶ 45 With regard to the children, the caseworker indicated in the report that T.W. was 14 years
old, 3 had been in foster care for approximately 5 years, and had been in the same foster home
since August 2020. The foster parents had been meeting T.W.’s basic needs of food, clothing,
shelter, and safety and were committed to providing permanency for T.W. The foster parents
were supportive of T.W.’s needs and assured that T.W. attended therapy as scheduled, advocated
for T.W.’s educational needs, kept T.W. active in the extracurricular activities that T.W. enjoyed,
and provided the structure and consistency that T.W. required. T.W. had adjusted well to her
foster home and had bonded to her foster parents. T.W. attended school, was doing well
academically, was active in sports, and wished to continue pursuing her talents beyond high
school.
¶ 46 As for S.E., the caseworker stated in the report, that S.E. was 7 years old, had been in
foster care for approximately 5½ years, and had been in the same foster home since August
2020. The foster parents had been meeting S.E.’s basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, and
safety and were committed to providing permanency for S.E. S.E. had adjusted well to her foster
placement, seemed to be a happy child, was very comfortable with her foster parents, and easily
approached her foster parents when she wanted her needs met. S.E. appeared to be very attached
3
From the date of birth provided, it appears that T.W. was actually 15 years old at the time the
best interest report was prepared.
26
to her foster parents, and her foster parents appeared to be very attached to S.E. S.E. attended
school and was doing well.
¶ 47 With regard to M.E., the caseworker noted in her report, that M.E. was 6 years old, had
been in foster care for approximately 5½ years, and had been in the same foster home since
August 2020. The foster parents had been meeting M.E.’s basic needs of food, clothing, shelter,
and safety and were committed to providing permanency for M.E. The foster parents were
supportive of M.E.’s needs and ensured that M.E. attended therapy as scheduled, advocated for
M.E.’s educational needs, kept M.E. active in functions that M.E. enjoyed, and provided M.E.
with the structure and consistency that she required. M.E. had adjusted well to her foster
placement and had bonded to her foster parents. M.E. attended school and was doing well.
¶ 48 As for C.R., the caseworker indicated in her report that C.R. was two years old, had been
in foster care since he was three weeks old, and had been placed with his paternal grandmother
the entire time. C.R.’s grandmother had been meeting C.R.’s basic needs of food, clothing,
shelter, and safety and was committed to providing permanency for C.R. C.R. thought of his
grandmother as his parent and had adjusted well in his grandmother’s care. C.R. appeared to be
very attached to his grandmother, and his grandmother appeared to be very attached to him. C.R.
was in good health and was a very active and curious child.
¶ 49 Based upon the best interest of the children, the caseworker recommended in her report
that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
¶ 50 During its portion of the hearing, the State called the caseworker, Lela Donaldson, to
testify as its only witness. In addition to the information provided in the report, Donaldson stated
that T.W., S.E., and M.E. were together in the same foster home. The foster mother was a stay-
at-home mom, and the foster father worked in a warehouse. The foster parents had children of
27
their own and another foster child as well. The foster parents lived in a four-bedroom home that
had two bathrooms. T.W. had her own room in the foster home, and S.E. and M.E. shared a
room. The foster home was in a nice neighborhood and had a big yard where the children could
play when the weather was nice. The foster parents were involved with the children and took the
children on several vacations. The foster parents were family oriented, and the children had a lot
of family support. Although the children had not been in that particular placement for very long,
they had transitioned very well into the family. The foster parents had four older children: two
that they adopted and two that were their biological children. The older children understood how
important it was to have the type of supportive family that they had, despite any type of
differences. The extended family had accepted the inclusion of the children in various family
activities. The children had become very close to the foster parents in a short time and referred
to the foster parents as “Mom” and “Dad.” The foster parents did not currently have a
relationship with respondent, but respondent continued to talk to the children on T.W.’s phone,
and Donaldson anticipated that the children would continue to do so, even if the foster parents
adopted the children. The foster mother felt that it was important for the children to continue to
have a relationship with respondent, and the foster parents allowed the children to spend time
with respondent’s extended family (respondent’s cousins).
¶ 51 As for C.R., the caseworker testified that C.R.’s grandmother had just recently purchased
a five-bedroom home and had plenty of space. The grandmother had three children of her own
in the home, in addition to C.R. C.R. has his own room, which had been decorated to his liking.
C.R. was very cheerful and happy and had the support of extended family. The older children in
the home helped out by watching C.R. when the grandmother had to work. The extended family
had accepted C.R. being in the home and had also accepted that C.R. might become a permanent
28
member of the home. Donaldson had no concerns about the grandmother’s ability to provide for
C.R. and to meet C.R.’s needs. The grandmother had maintained a relationship with C.R.’s
father (the grandmother’s son), who was currently incarcerated, and also had a “pretty good”
relationship with respondent. The grandmother and respondent would talk on the phone and
over Facetime. Respondent also talked to C.R.’s aunts as well. Through those conversations,
respondent kept informed as to how C.R. was doing. Donaldson anticipated that the
grandmother’s contact with respondent would continue if the grandmother adopted C.R.
¶ 52 When Donaldson was asked during her testimony why she believed it was in the
children’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights, she responded that it had been
5½ years (since S.E. and M.E. were taken into care) and respondent had not been able to correct
the issues that brought the children into care. In addition, respondent’s mental health issues had
continued to affect the case as time went on. Donaldson acknowledged in cross-examination,
however, that the children were bonded to their mother and that respondent’s parenting during
the majority of the visits as a whole was appropriate.
¶ 53 During her portion of the hearing, respondent called two witnesses to testify and also
testified in her own behalf. Christian’s aunt, Jennifer Aquirre, testified for respondent that she
had known respondent for about three years and had briefly observed respondent with C.R.
shortly after C.R. was born. In Aquirre’s opinion, respondent had bonded very well with, and
was very protective of, C.R. Respondent had interacted appropriately with C.R. and had all of
the necessary supplies to care for C.R. Respondent had tried to maintain contact with C.R. since
that time and had visits, calls, or video chats with C.R. Aquirre never doubted that respondent
loved her children very much.
29
¶ 54 Renee Samuel testified for respondent that she had dated respondent’s uncle and was like
an aunt to respondent. Samuel had known respondent for many years (more than 10), from the
time that respondent was 12 years old. Over the years, Samuel had seen respondent interact with
her children. The last time was about eight years ago. Respondent’s parenting was appropriate,
and the children were bonded to respondent. Samuel believed that respondent loved her children
very much.
¶ 55 Respondent testified at the best interest hearing that she loved her children and that her
children loved her and were bonded to her. During the course of her case, respondent was scared
to stand up for herself and to voice her opinion because when she did so, the visitation
supervisors and the parenting coach would threaten to cancel her visits. Respondent felt that the
parenting coach and the visit supervisors put ideas into the children’s heads against respondent.
Respondent believed that her children wanted to come home and to live with her. According to
respondent, her children had always told her that. Respondent stated that she was ready to have
the children returned to her. Respondent believed that she would be able to raise the children in
a culturally sensitive way, showing them their past history and their future.
¶ 56 Following the presentation of the evidence, the trial court heard the arguments of the
parties’ attorneys and of the GAL. The State argued for termination of respondent's parental
rights. Respondent’s attorney argued against termination, stating that the evidence showed that
respondent loved the children and that the children were bonded with respondent. The GAL
indicated that she believed it was in the best interest of the children to terminate respondent's
parental rights and commented upon the strength of the children’s current placements.
¶ 57 After considering the evidence presented and the arguments, the trial court made its
ruling. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent’s
30
parental rights was in the best interest of the children. In so finding, the trial court noted, among
other things, that it did not think after 5½ years in care, another change in placement would do
well for the emotional and psychological well-being of the children. The trial court terminated
respondent's parental rights to the children, set the children’s permanency goal to adoption, and
named DCFS as the guardian of the children with the right to consent to adoption.4 Respondent
appealed.
¶ 58 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 59 A. Parental Unfitness
¶ 60 As her first point of contention on appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in
finding her to be an unfit parent/person. More specifically, respondent asserts that the State
failed to sufficiently prove any one of the three alleged bases of parental unfitness and that the
trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
focus solely upon the allegation that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
responsibility toward the children’s welfare since it is dispositive of our issue here. As to that
allegation, respondent asserts that under the circumstances she was operating (mental health
difficulties, violent relationships, and financial problems), she maintained a reasonable degree of
responsibility toward the welfare of the children. In making that assertion, respondent notes that
she found employment where and when she could to maintain a source of income, that she
continued to address perceived deficits in her parenting skills by utilizing the services offered to
her and by implementing the lessons she had learned in those services during her visits with the
children, and that she made significant improvement in how she dealt with her mental health
4
During the course of the proceedings in this case, the parental rights of all three of the fathers
involved were terminated, either based upon a finding of parental unfitness or a surrender of parental
rights.
31
issues and in the areas of housing and employment. Thus, respondent contends that she made a
good-faith effort to maintain a sense of responsibility toward the welfare of the children.
According to respondent, the trial court reached the wrong conclusion because it focused upon
the things that remained for respondent to complete instead of focusing upon respondent’s efforts
to address the issues in front of her. For all of the reasons stated, respondent asks that we reverse
the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness and remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 61 The State argues that the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness was proper and should
be upheld. The State asserts that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
responsibility for the children’s welfare by refusing to consistently address her mental health
issues, which she had since the beginning of the case; by failing to consistently take her
medications; and by failing to consistently attend her mental health counseling sessions. In
making that assertion, the State points out that respondent was capable of taking her medications
and stabilizing her mental health and that her refusal to do so cost respondent her employment,
her housing, and the custody of her children. The State asks, therefore, that we affirm the trial
court’s finding of parental unfitness.
¶ 62 The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by the provisions of both the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)) and the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)). See In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352
(2004). In the first stage of termination proceedings in the trial court, the State has the burden to
prove the alleged ground of parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. See 705 ILCS
405/2-29(2) (West 2018); In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002). The proof of any single
statutory ground will suffice. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018); C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 210. A trial
court's finding of parental unfitness is given great deference and will not be reversed on appeal
32
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence; that is, unless it is clearly apparent from
the record that the trial court should have reached the opposite conclusion or that the conclusion
itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d
181, 208 (2001); In re A.M., 358 Ill. App. 3d 247, 252-53 (2005); In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App.
3d 883, 889-90 (2004).
¶ 63 Under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, a parent may be found unfit if he or she fails
to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare.
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018). Because the language of the statute is written in the
disjunctive, any one of the three grounds listed—interest or concern or responsibility—may by
itself constitute a basis for unfitness. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018); In re B'yata I., 2014 IL
App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. In determining whether a parent has shown a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility for a child’s welfare, the trial court will consider the parent's
efforts to visit and maintain contact with the child, along with other indicia, such as inquiries into
the child's welfare. Id. Whether the parent has completed service plans may also be considered
as evidence of a parent's interest, concern, or responsibility. Id. In making its determination, the
trial court must focus on a parent's efforts, not on whether the parent’s efforts were successful.
Id. In addition, the trial court must examine the parent's conduct with regard to the child in the
context of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred. Id. Thus, problems that the parent
faces, such as difficulty in obtaining transportation, poverty, actions and statements of others that
hinder visitation, and the need to resolve other life issues, are relevant. Id. It must be
remembered, however, that a parent is not fit merely because he or she has demonstrated some
interest or affection toward the child. Id. To the contrary, the interest, concern, or responsibility
must be objectively reasonable. Id. In determining whether a parent has failed to maintain a
33
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility for a child, the trial court will consider
the parent's conduct during the entire postadjudication period, not just the parent’s conduct
during the service plan. See In re Jason U., 214 Ill. App. 3d 545, 552 (1991).
¶ 64 After having reviewed the record in the present case, we find that the trial court’s
determination—that respondent was an unfit parent/person because she had failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of responsibility for the welfare of the children—was well supported by the
evidence. There can be no dispute that the heart of this case was respondent’s ability to maintain
her mental health. The evidence presented at the parental fitness hearing showed that respondent
clearly had the ability to do so, and at times did so, by consistently taking her medications and by
attending mental health counseling sessions on a regular and consistent basis. Unfortunately for
respondent, those periods were relatively short in duration. Indeed, the record in this case shows
that as a whole, over the 5½ year lifespan of this case, respondent failed to consistently take her
medications and failed to consistently attend counseling sessions and, as a direct result, went
back and forth between periods of mental stability and mental instability. During the periods of
instability, respondent’s efforts as to other requirements of the service plan suffered as well, as
respondent frequently lost her job, acted strangely at visits with her children, and struggled
during parenting training. Respondent’s assertions to the contrary are simply not supported by
the record. We, therefore, agree with the State that by failing to consistently address her mental
health issues, respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility for the welfare
of her children. The evidence presented at the parental fitness hearing in this case amply
supported the trial court’s finding in that regard. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2018); B'yata
I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s
34
determination of parental unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See C.N.,
196 Ill. 2d at 208; A.M., 358 Ill. App. 3d at 252-53; Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90.
¶ 65 B. Best Interest
¶ 66 As her second point of contention on appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred
in finding that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Respondent
asserts that the trial court’s finding in that regard was against the manifest weight of the evidence
as the evidence in this case showed that respondent and her children shared a strong bond; that
respondent loved her children; and that as recently as April 2020, respondent had made
satisfactory progress in the areas of mental health/therapy, housing, employment, and domestic
violence. In making that assertion, respondent acknowledges that the need for permanency is a
factor in the analysis but points out that permanency, by itself, is not a conclusive factor, and in
this case, is even less of a factor as to C.R. who was of a young age and had not been in care as
long as the other children. Respondent asserts further that she should not be punished for things
that are out of her control, such as delays caused by the pandemic, the fact that she had a mental
illness, or the fact that she had been a victim of domestic violence. For all of the reasons stated,
respondent asks that we reverse the trial court’s best interest determination and remand this case
for further proceedings.
¶ 67 The State argues that the trial court's best interest finding was proper and should be
upheld. The State asserts that a review of the evidence presented in this case and the statutory
best-interest factors shows that the trial court’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. In making that assertion, the State recognizes that respondent periodically made
progress in this case. The State points out, however, that by the time of the parental fitness
hearing, respondent had stopped taking her medications, had lost her apartment, and had lost her
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job—none of which were caused by the pandemic. In addition, the State maintains, although a
relationship still existed between respondent and her children, the statutory best interest factors
weighed in favor of termination. For all of the reasons set forth, the State asks that we affirm the
trial court's best interest determination.
¶ 68 In a termination proceeding, once the trial court finds that a parent is unfit as defined in
section 1(D) of the Adoption Act, the trial court must then determine, pursuant to the Juvenile
Court Act, whether it is in the minor's best interest to terminate parental rights. See 705 ILCS
405/2-29(2) (West 2018); Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 891. The burden of proof in the trial
court is upon the State to show by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the
minor's best interest. Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 891. The trial court's ruling in that regard
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence; that is,
unless it is clearly apparent from the record that the trial court should have reached the opposite
conclusion or that the conclusion itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence
presented. Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90.
¶ 69 In a best interest hearing, the focus of the termination proceeding shifts to the child, and
the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest
in having a stable and loving home life. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The issue is no longer whether
parental rights can be terminated but, rather, whether in the child's best interest, parental rights
should be terminated. See id. In making a best interest determination, the trial court must
consider, in the context of the child's age and developmental needs, the numerous statutory best
interest factors listed in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)
(West 2016); Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 892-93. Some of those factors include the child's
physical safety and welfare, the development of the child's identity, the child’s background and
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ties, the child's sense of attachment, the child's need for permanence and stability, and the
preferences of the persons available to care for the child. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West
2018); Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 892-93. The trial court may also consider the nature and
length of the child's relationship with the current caretaker and the effect that a change in
placement would have on the child's emotional and psychological well-being. Tiffany M., 353
Ill. App. 3d at 893. Although the trial court is required to consider the statutory factors in
making its best-interest determination, it is not required to articulate any specific rationale for its
decision. Id.¶ 70 In the present case, after having reviewed the record, we find that the trial court's best
interest determination (that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights to all of the children) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The
evidence presented at the best interest hearing showed that T.W. was 15 years old, S.E. was 7
years old, M.E. was 6 years old, and C.R. was two years old. The children had been in care
anywhere from 2 years (C.R.) to 5½ years (S.E., and M.E.). The older children (T.W., S.E., and
M.E.) had been placed in the same non-relative foster home since August 2020, and C.R. had
been placed in the home of his paternal grandmother since shortly after his birth. The children
had loving relationships, and had bonded, with their foster parents. The children were doing well
in their foster homes, were involved in school and extracurricular activities (the older children),
and were having all of their needs met by the foster parents. T.W., the oldest of respondent’s
four children, had expressed to the trial court her desire to remain in the foster home and to not
be returned to respondent. Both of the foster homes had at least one other child in the residence;
were willing to provide permanency to respondent’s children; and were willing to allow, or at
least consider, letting the children maintain a relationship with respondent. In addition, it was
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the opinion of the caseworker and the GAL that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
in the best interest of the children, and the trial court specifically noted that it did not think
another change in placement after 5½ years in care would do well for the emotional and
psychological well-being of the children. The trial court's best interest determination in this case
was well supported by the evidence and, based upon the standard of review, must be affirmed.
See Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90.
¶ 71 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 72 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island
County.
¶ 73 Affirmed.
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