People v. Wheatley ( 2021 )

NOTICE
2021 IL App (5th) 190061-UNOTICE
Decision filed 08/02/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0061 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County.
)
v. ) No. 16-CF-428
)
SABRINA WHEATLEY, ) Honorable
) Jerry E. Crisel,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s imposition of a 15-year sentence of imprisonment is affirmed
where the trial court properly considered the evidence presented at
sentencing and the defendant has made no showing to the contrary.
¶2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Sabrina Wheatley, was convicted of theft of
governmental property valued at over $100,0000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1), (b)(6.1) (West
2016)), a Class X felony; official misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33-3(a)(2) (West 2016)), a Class
3 felony; and two counts of filing a fraudulent Illinois income tax return (35 ILCS 5/1301
(West 2016)), both Class 4 felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 15 years in
the Illinois Department of Corrections, followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised
1
release. The defendant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $382,850.13.
The defendant appeals her sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On November 17, 2016, the defendant was charged by indictment with one count
of theft of governmental property in violation of section 16-1(a)(1) and (b)(6.1) of the
Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1), (b)(6.1) (West 2016)), one count
of official misconduct in violation of section 33-3(a)(2) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/33-3(a)(2)
(West 2016)), and two counts of filing a fraudulent Illinois income tax return in violation
of section 1301 of the Illinois Income Tax Act (35 ILCS 5/1301 (West 2016)). On July 17,
2018, the defendant’s case proceeded to a jury trial. A summary of the evidence presented
at trial is as follows.
¶5 The defendant worked as a bookkeeper for Webber Township High School
(Webber) in Bluford, Illinois, from 1999 until September 30, 2015. In her capacity as
bookkeeper, the defendant was responsible for the accounting of Webber’s day-to-day
finances, including payroll and bills, and had computer access to Webber’s bank account
and accounting software. The defendant also prepared “board packets,” which included the
payroll and bills to be approved by the Webber school board at its meetings.
¶6 On February 18, 2013, the defendant submitted her letter of resignation to the
Webber Township High School Board. The defendant’s letter indicated that the board had
previously agreed to pay for her early retirement, 1 and that the defendant wanted to ensure
1
The defendant’s last authorized paycheck from Webber was issued in December 2012, and the
defendant began receiving Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) pension benefits that same month.
2
that her replacement was comfortable before the defendant “cut the purse strings.” The
defendant stated that she would be willing to continue working from home until Webber
had completed their consolidation into a single school district with Bluford Grade School.
Because the school board had already paid for the defendant’s early retirement, she
requested that they only pay for her monthly health insurance. On February 26, 2013, the
school board accepted the defendant’s resignation, and the defendant continued working
for Webber in the limited capacity outlined in the letter of February 18, 2013.
¶7 In July 2015, the consolidation of the Webber and Bluford schools was completed.
On September 18, 2015, the school district notified the defendant that the district no longer
required her services in exchange for monthly health insurance benefits but offered to keep
the defendant enrolled in the insurance program at her own expense. The district also
offered to pay the defendant $30 per hour for any future consulting services.
¶8 Thereafter, school administrators discovered discrepancies in Webber’s general
ledger, and it was discovered that some of Webber’s funds had been deposited into the
defendant’s personal bank account. On December 23, 2015, co-superintendents John
Ashby and Rod Stover met with the defendant and questioned her regarding her
understanding of the terms of her postretirement employment and the unauthorized funds
deposited into her bank account. The defendant indicated that she understood that she was
to receive health insurance premiums as payment for her work postretirement. The
defendant also acknowledged that she continued to pay herself but claimed that Stover had
given her permission to do so.
3
¶9 April Moore, an agent with the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Criminal
Investigations Division, testified that she became involved in the case after the Illinois State
Police contacted her agency regarding a theft at Webber. Agent Moore reviewed the
school’s ledgers, bank statements and associated check images, and direct deposit listings,
as well as documents relating to the defendant’s personal accounts at Banterra Bank and
the Jefferson County Schools Credit Union. Agent Moore determined that the defendant
used four methods to appropriate money from Webber over an approximately five-year
period. First, the defendant wrote checks drawn on Webber’s bank account at Peoples
National Bank which were subsequently deposited into the defendant’s account at the
Jefferson County Schools Credit Union. Agent Moore calculated that there were 65
unauthorized transactions totaling $175,422.58. Second, the defendant transferred money
via direct deposit from Webber’s account at Peoples National Bank to her personal bank
account at Banterra Bank. Agent Moore calculated that there were 67 unauthorized direct
deposits into Banterra Bank, totaling $187,687.94. Third, the defendant wrote six duplicate
payroll checks to herself drawn on Webber’s account at Peoples National Bank totaling
$14,496.93. Finally, the defendant, without authorization, added a dependent to her health
insurance plan, which resulted in the defendant receiving unauthorized health insurance
payments in the amount of $5242.68. In sum, Agent Moore concluded that the defendant
received a total of $382,850.13 in unauthorized payments.
¶ 10 Agent Moore also reviewed the defendant’s Illinois tax returns for the years 2010
through 2014. The State only questioned Moore regarding 2011 and 2012. The tax returns
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for these years did not include the additional payments from Webber that the defendant
had deposited into her personal bank accounts.
¶ 11 The defendant testified and acknowledged that money was deposited into her bank
accounts between 2010 and 2015 that “should not have been there.” She denied, however,
transferring any unauthorized funds into her bank accounts. The defendant claimed that
she did not keep track of the amount of money in her bank accounts and was unaware of
how the unauthorized funds were deposited into her accounts. The defendant testified that
she continued to pay herself a salary from February 2013 through 2015 because she was
never told that she could no longer be paid. When asked whether the amounts she deposited
into her accounts during this time were “rightfully earned income,” the defendant replied,
“It’s my salary. It’s what I earned what they are talking about this whole five years.” The
defendant also testified that she believed she was authorized to add her son to her health
insurance plan postretirement. The defendant further testified that she worked various other
jobs during the time period at issue, which included bartending, serving, and some
accounting work on the side. While not all of the defendant’s income was reported on her
W-2’s, the defendant was “confident” that she earned more money than was reflected on
her W-2’s.
¶ 12 The jury found the defendant guilty of each count alleged in the indictment. The
trial court ordered that a presentence investigation report (PSI) be prepared for sentencing.
The defendant’s bail was revoked, and she was taken into custody. The defendant did not
file a motion for new trial.
5
¶ 13 The PSI provided that prior to her incarceration for these offenses, the defendant
was residing in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The PSI also reported that the defendant’s elderly
mother resided in Port St. Lucie, and the defendant’s father was deceased. The defendant
reportedly had three siblings and two adult children, all of whom resided in Illinois. The
defendant was previously divorced in March 2012.
¶ 14 The defendant’s education history revealed that she graduated from high school in
1979. She then attended Rend Lake College from 1979 to 1981, earning an associates
degree in criminal justice. The defendant subsequently attended Southern Illinois
University’s School of Technology from 1983 to 1985 and reportedly studied to be an
executive legal secretary, earning an associates degree in that field. The PSI further
indicated that the defendant received a certificate for medical coding and billing through
an internet program. The defendant’s employment history indicated that, in addition to her
employment at Webber, the defendant worked as a bartender and server at various
establishments while living in Florida.
¶ 15 The PSI went on to relate that the defendant reported that she drank alcohol socially
and experimented with marijuana in high school. She denied any history of alcohol or drug
abuse and had never sought treatment for any substance abuse. The defendant had no
physical or mental impairments and had never sought treatment for any mental health
disorders.
¶ 16 The defendant’s criminal history revealed that she did not have any history of
delinquency as a juvenile. As an adult, she was charged in 1998 with driving under the
influence (DUI) and received 12 months of court supervision.
6
¶ 17 On December 6, 2018, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Because the offense
of theft of governmental property was a Class X felony, the defendant faced a sentencing
range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release,
and was not eligible for probation or a conditional discharge. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25
(West 2018). Before the parties presented evidence, the trial court indicated that it had
reviewed the PSI and considered it, as well as the financial impact of incarceration.
¶ 18 The State then presented its evidence in aggravation. 2 Kim McCormick replaced the
defendant as bookkeeper following the consolidation of the Webber and Bluford schools.
McCormick testified regarding Webber’s financial status. In 2014, Webber lacked
programs such as art, music, and band. Over half of the students in the school district
received free or reduced lunches. Due to Webber’s financial straits, the high school sold
bonds in 2014 to “keep them afloat,” and McCormick indicated that the defendant had
signed the “bond agreement.” During this time, Webber also experienced decreased
enrollment which, in turn, decreased the State aid Webber received. On March 19, 2015,
the school board held a meeting during which Webber laid off four full-time teachers and
two support personnel. McCormick described this board meeting as “very emotional.”
McCormick estimated that the defendant had caused approximately $380,000 in financial
damage to the school district. McCormick testified that the school district had received
approximately $260,000 from insurance and was waiting on an additional insurance claim
2
At sentencing, the State introduced several exhibits which included Webber’s annual financial
reports from 2010 through 2015, bond paperwork between Kings Financial Consulting Inc. and Webber,
minutes from school board meetings, and 61 copies of checks written to the defendant from 2002 through
2005 which had been found in storage.
7
to cover the remaining losses. McCormick acknowledged that from 2012 to 2014 “every
school district was in trouble” because of State funding.
¶ 19 Paul Manning, a member of the school board, testified that he considered the
defendant a friend and believed that he had a good working relationship with her.
Nevertheless, Manning believed that the defendant tried to manipulate him on one occasion
and was not always honest with him. Manning testified that he voted in favor of issuing
bonds and made decisions on the board to lay people off and cut school programs based
upon the financial information provided to him by the defendant.
¶ 20 Superintendent John Ashby testified that Bluford, Illinois, and the surrounding area
consisted of lower socioeconomic, working class citizens and that poverty existed in the
area. When Ashby took over Webber in 2014, the school was struggling financially and
working cash bonds for $180,602.36 were issued, of which the school received “172,000
and some.” The total principal and interest to be paid for the bonds was $286,300, which
was being paid for by the taxpayers. Ashby further testified that in 2010, Webber’s
education fund had a balance of $596,737. By 2014, the fund’s balance was $16,000.
Ashby confirmed that the defendant helped with the budget during this time and would
have known the school’s financial difficulties.
¶ 21 After the State presented its witnesses in aggravation, the defendant presented her
evidence in mitigation. Ken Sentel, the defendant’s former employer and friend, testified
that the defendant performed accounting work for his company. Sentel considered the
defendant to be a good employee and stated that he would hire the defendant again after
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she is released from prison. Sentel also described the defendant as a dedicated grandmother
and a “special lady.”
¶ 22 Elijah Sentel, Ken’s son, testified that he had known the defendant his entire life.
Elijah admitted that he struggled with both alcohol and drugs. Elijah stated that the
defendant “got [him] off the street” and provided him with a place to stay after he left a
rehab facility. The defendant also helped Elijah return to his family and persuaded him to
go to another rehab facility, where he ultimately completed the program. Elijah credited
the defendant with saving his life and believed that he would not be clean and sober without
the defendant’s help.
¶ 23 Larry Gibson, a friend of the defendant, testified that he had known the defendant
for approximately 15 years. The defendant had volunteered to serve as a bartender for
parties he and his wife held in the summers of 2017 and 2018. Gibson believed that the
defendant had a great character and considered her trustworthy.
¶ 24 Salina Hilliard, the defendant’s daughter, described the defendant as a “great”
grandmother whom Hilliard relied upon significantly to help care for her children. Hilliard
further testified that the defendant was an integral part of her grandchildren’s lives and that
her incarceration was having a negative impact on the grandchildren.
¶ 25 Shlonda Horton, the defendant’s sister, testified that the defendant’s mother lived
with the defendant in Florida, and that the defendant was her mother’s caregiver. The
defendant had also cared for their father until he passed away years earlier. Horton testified
that the defendant’s incarceration adversely affected the entire family. Horton stated that
the defendant’s sentence was a sentence for the whole family.
9
¶ 26 Derek Nowicki, the defendant’s friend, testified that he had known the defendant
for 35 years. Nowicki described the defendant as a giving person who “would do anything
for you.” Nowicki believed that the defendant was a “very good member of society” and a
good person who deserved leniency.
¶ 27 Michelle Ashby, the general manager of a golf club, testified that she knew the
defendant for 10 to 12 years, and that the defendant had volunteered her time to help at the
golf club. Ashby testified that she “explicitly” trusted the defendant, and that the defendant
was like a mother to Ashby’s children.
¶ 28 Susie Williams testified that she knew the defendant for more than 30 years and
became friends with her when they worked together at an elementary school. Williams
stated that the defendant helped Williams through her divorce and when she lost her father
to cancer. Williams also testified that she had observed the defendant helping children at
the elementary school when “the kids needed taken care of.” Williams described the
defendant as a good friend and a good person.
¶ 29 Finally, the defendant submitted 39 letters of support. These letters generally spoke
highly of the defendant’s character and work ethic. The trial court indicated that it had read
the letters prior to the sentencing hearing.
¶ 30 The trial court then heard arguments regarding the imposition of the defendant’s
sentence. The State argued that numerous factors in aggravation applied to the defendant’s
case. The State contended that the defendant utilized her professional reputation or position
in the community to commit her offenses or to afford her an easier means to commit the
10
offenses. The State further argued that the trial court’s sentence would be necessary to deter
others from committing the same crime.
¶ 31 The State also argued that several nonstatutory factors in aggravation applied to the
defendant’s case. The State contended that the defendant lied at trial when she testified
regarding her lack of knowledge as to how the unauthorized funds were deposited into her
accounts and lied about her income on certain loan documents which had been previously
admitted into evidence at trial. The State also asked the trial court to consider the financial
condition of the school at the time of the defendant’s crimes. The State asserted that the
defendant knew of Webber’s financial trouble and made the problem worse, rather than
“helping to right the ship.” Finally, the State argued that the defendant used the stolen
money to support expenditures, such as a boat, plastic surgery, golf, country clubs, travel,
entertainment, spas, resorts, and dining. The State requested that the trial court sentence
the defendant to 15 years’ imprisonment and order the defendant to pay restitution.
¶ 32 Defense counsel first argued that the aggravating factor regarding the defendant
using her professional reputation or position in the community to commit the offenses or
to afford her an easier means to commit the offenses did not apply. Defense counsel also
argued that the minimum sentence of six years was a significant sentence that would deter
others from committing similar crimes. Defense counsel contended that in similar cases,
other defendants received probation.
¶ 33 The defense also argued that several statutory factors in mitigation applied. Defense
counsel argued that the defendant’s conduct neither caused nor threatened to cause serious
physical harm to another; that the defendant did not contemplate her conduct would cause
11
or threaten physical harm to another; that the defendant lacked a criminal history; that the
crimes were the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; that the defendant’s attitude
indicated she was unlikely to commit another crime; and that imprisonment would cause
excessive hardship to the defendant’s dependents, including the defendant’s mother.
Defense counsel reminded the trial court of the witnesses who testified on the defendant’s
behalf at sentencing and the positive effects the defendant had on their lives. Defense
counsel further noted that the defendant lost her pension as a result of her conduct and
argued that the defendant should be given consideration for this against restitution.
Defense counsel concluded by requesting that the trial court sentence the defendant to six
years’ imprisonment.
¶ 34 The defendant made a statement in allocution in which she expressed regret for the
harm caused by her actions. She apologized and asked that the trial court allow her to return
to her family as soon as possible.
¶ 35 The trial court indicated that it had considered all of the aggravating and mitigating
evidence and the arguments of counsel presented at sentencing, as well as the evidence
presented at trial. As factors in aggravation, the trial court found that the defendant used
her position in the community to commit her offenses and to afford her an easier means of
committing the offenses. The trial court also found that its sentence would be necessary to
deter others from committing the same crimes. In mitigation, the trial court found that the
defendant’s conduct did not cause or threaten to cause serious harm, and that the defendant
did not contemplate that her conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to
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another. The trial court also found that the defendant had no prior history of delinquency
or criminal activity and was not considering the defendant’s prior DUI.
¶ 36 The trial court declined to find that the defendant’s criminal conduct was the result
of circumstances unlikely to recur because the court had not received evidence regarding
this factor. The trial court also declined to find that the defendant’s character and attitude
indicated that she would be unlikely to commit another crime. The trial court explained
that it could not make this finding because the defendant was “convicted of stealing
$382,000.00 plus from basically school kids.” In addressing whether the defendant’s
incarceration would cause an excessive hardship on the defendant’s dependents, the trial
court considered this factor “close.” The trial court acknowledged that the defendant cared
for her elderly mother but observed that the defendant had three siblings. The trial court
also noted that the defendant would go to prison no matter what sentence the court imposed.
The trial court stated that under the circumstances, the court would not find this as a factor
in mitigation.
¶ 37 Before imposing sentence, the trial court remarked that the evidence of the
defendant’s guilt at trial was overwhelming, and that the defendant’s testimony at trial was
disingenuous. The trial court commented that the defendant had been trusted by the
community and could not have committed her offenses without that trust. The trial court
further commented that the effects of the defendant’s offenses will never be known. The
trial court stated that the defendant had stolen an “enormous amount of money for any little
school district” and referred to the school district as “one of the poorest ones probably in
the State of Illinois.” The trial court noted that the defendant was taking money from
13
children and struggling taxpayers to “finance whatever you were financing by spending the
money.” The trial court acknowledged that many people spoke highly of the defendant’s
character, but that the defendant had “let them down.”
¶ 38 The trial court sentenced the defendant to 15 years for theft of governmental
property, 5 years for official misconduct, and 3 years for each count of filing a fraudulent
Illinois income tax return. The trial court ordered that the sentences were to run
concurrently and be followed by three years of mandatory supervised release. The trial
court stated that it would have likely imposed a greater sentence had the State not
“mentioned” 15 years. The trial court also entered judgments against the defendant in favor
of “Bluford Unit School District #318” 3 in the amount of $122,447.29 and in favor of
Travelers Casualty and Surety Company in the amount of $260,402.84 for a total amount
of $382,850.13.
¶ 39 On December 11, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. In her
motion, the defendant asserted that the trial court improperly relied on its personal
knowledge when it noted that the defendant stole money from one of the poorest school
districts in Illinois. The defendant contended that no evidence had been presented at trial
or sentencing to establish how the school district compared to other districts in Illinois. The
defendant also claimed that her sentence was excessive in light of her personal
characteristics, most notably her lack of criminal history. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied the defendant’s motion. This appeal follows.
3
By the time of sentencing, the Webber school and the Bluford school had consolidated.
14
¶ 40 ANALYSIS
¶ 41 On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing her to 15 years’ imprisonment. The defendant requests that this court vacate her
sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing or, alternatively, exercise our
authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) and reduce her
sentence.
¶ 42 At the outset, we note that the defendant’s 15-year sentence was within the
permissible statutory range for a Class X offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25 (West 2018).
When the defendant’s sentence is within the statutory limits, a rebuttable presumption
exists that the sentence is appropriate. People v. Gooch, 2014 IL App (5th) 120161, ¶ 8.
¶ 43 It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a sentence,
and the trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Stacey, 193
Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). The trial court is given such deference because the trial court,
having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a superior position to consider
the appropriate factors at sentencing. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010).
Accordingly, we review the sentencing court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, and a
reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because
the reviewing court would have weighed the factors differently. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.
¶ 44 Although the trial court is vested with broad discretion in sentencing, the court’s
discretion is not without limitation, and reviewing courts have the power to reduce a
defendant’s sentence pursuant to Rule 615(b)(4). Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. When a
sentence falls within the statutory limits for an offense, however, it will not be deemed
15
excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion by the trial court unless the sentence
imposed is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210.
¶ 45 The Unified Code of Corrections permits the trial court to consider certain statutory
factors in aggravation and mitigation when arriving at a sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1
(mitigating factors), 5-5-3.2 (aggravating factors) (West 2018). In fashioning an
appropriate sentence, the trial court must carefully consider all aggravating and mitigating
factors including, inter alia, the defendant’s age, demeanor, habits, credibility, criminal
history, social environment, and education, as well as the nature and circumstances of the
crime and the defendant’s conduct in the commission of the crime. People v. Quintana,
332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). When such factors have been presented for the trial court’s
consideration, we presume, absent some indication to the contrary, that the trial court
considered the factors. People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158 (2010). The trial court
is not required to enumerate and assign value to each factor it considered in fashioning the
defendant’s sentence. People v. Mayoral, 299 Ill. App. 3d 899, 913 (1998). Additionally,
the trial court is not required to impose a minimum term or reduce a term from the
maximum because of the existence of mitigating factors. People v. Madura, 257 Ill. App.
3d 735, 741 (1994).
¶ 46 The defendant contends that the trial court did not adequately consider the
defendant’s character and reputation in the community; the effect of the defendant’s
incarceration on her elderly mother; and the defendant’s age. The record belies the
defendant’s contention.
16
¶ 47 At sentencing, the trial court indicated that it had considered the evidence presented
at trial, the aggravating and mitigating evidence, and the arguments presented at
sentencing. The evidence at sentencing included the testimony of several defense witnesses
and 39 letters regarding the defendant’s character and work ethic. The trial court also
indicated that it had reviewed and considered the PSI. The record reveals that the defendant
was 57 years old at the time of sentencing. As to the effect of the defendant’s incarceration
on her mother, the trial court admitted that this factor was “close” and found it admirable
that the defendant had been caring for her mother. The trial court observed, however, that
the defendant had three siblings and was going to receive a prison sentence regardless of
the sentence imposed by the trial court. Under these circumstances, the trial court declined
to consider this factor in mitigation.
¶ 48 The defendant also contends that the trial court overstated the harm to the taxpayers,
the school district, and the government. The defendant argues that the trial court did not
consider the fact that the school district had been partially reimbursed by insurance and
that the school district anticipated future reimbursement to cover the remainder of the
school district’s loss; that the school district saved money because the defendant continued
to work full-time as a bookkeeper postretirement; and that the defendant’s IMRF pension
had been terminated as a result of her conduct.
¶ 49 The defendant’s contentions here are meritless. The trial court was presented with
evidence that the school district had been partially reimbursed from insurance at the time
17
of sentencing and expected future reimbursement. 4 Based on the record, the trial court was
also well aware of the fact that the defendant continued to work full-time postretirement.
The defendant’s argument that the school district received a benefit because it expected to
be fully reimbursed by insurance monies, and that the defendant’s postretirement work
allegedly saved the school district money, reflects a lack of remorse for taking the money
from the school district. The evidence showed that the defendant, in her position as
bookkeeper, continuously took money over a five-year period from Webber, which was
struggling financially. This five-year period included the defendant’s postretirement work
where she received monthly health insurance premiums because the school board had paid
for her early retirement. We are not persuaded that the defendant somehow saved the school
district money while she also engaged in the ongoing theft scheme for which she was
charged. Finally, the record shows that the trial court was made aware of the fact that the
defendant’s IMRF pension had been terminated as defense counsel mentioned this point at
sentencing.
¶ 50 Upon a review of the record, it is clear that the trial court considered the evidence
in aggravation and mitigation before imposing its sentence on the defendant. When
mitigation evidence is before the trial court, we presume the court considered the evidence,
absent some indication, other than the length of the sentence imposed, to the contrary.
4
The defendant suggests that had she stolen money from the insurance company rather than
Webber, she would have been charged with a “probationable Class 1 felony” rather than a Class X offense.
To the extent the defendant believes this should have some bearing on her sentence, her contention is not
persuasive. The defendant did not take money from an insurance company, but instead stole from a high
school. The legislature has designated such a theft as a Class X offense. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1), (b)(6.1)
(West 2016).
18
Madura, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 740. The defendant has made no showing that the trial court
failed to consider any of the evidence presented at sentencing, and the trial court did not
overstate any of the factors relative to the harm suffered by the school district. Thus, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the defendant’s sentence is not excessive in light
of the evidence presented.
¶ 51 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s sentence.
¶ 52 Affirmed.
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