Garza v. Pritzker ( 2021 )

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 200623-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-20-0623 August 20, 2021
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
DANIEL GARZA, ) Appeal from the
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Logan County
J.B. PRITZKER, in His Official Capacity as Governor of ) No. 20MR188
the State of Illinois; ROB JEFFREYS, in His Official )
Capacity as Director of Corrections; and EMILY )
RUSKIN, in Her Official Capacity as the Warden of ) Honorable
Lincoln Correctional Center, ) Thomas W. Funk,
Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition for an injunction was proper.
¶2 In September 2020, petitioner, Daniel Garza, filed a pro se petition for an
injunction against respondents, J.B. Pritzker, in his official capacity as governor of Illinois; Rob
Jeffreys, in his official capacity as Director of Corrections; and Emily Ruskin, in her official
capacity as the warden of the Lincoln Correctional Center. In his petition, petitioner sought an
injunction to compel respondents to reduce the population of Lincoln Correctional Center by half
or, in the alternative, discharge him from prison. He contended respondents acted with
deliberate indifference to the health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in violation of the
eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). In September 2020, respondent Jeffreys filed
what was essentially a combined motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)) and a supporting memorandum,
asserting petitioner failed to state a cause of action and failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies at the institutional level. In November 2020, the Logan County circuit court entered a
written order dismissing with prejudice petitioner’s petition.
¶3 Petitioner appeals pro se, asserting the circuit court erred by dismissing his
petition because (1) he made a good-faith effort to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies did not apply to his claim, and (3) he specified he was
seeking relief under the eighth amendment and did not need to allege he had tested positive for
the coronavirus to state a claim. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On August 19, 2020, petitioner, an inmate at the Lincoln Correctional Center,
filed a grievance alleging deliberate indifference and an eighth amendment violation. Petitioner
stated he recently learned 13 inmates and 12 staff members of the Lincoln Correctional Center
had tested positive for the coronavirus. He further alleged respondents Ruskin and Jeffreys had
approved new inmates to be bused into Lincoln Correctional Center and allowed some inmates to
leave the facility to work in Springfield, Illinois, which increased the risk of bringing the
coronavirus into the prison. Petitioner contended respondents Ruskin’s and Jeffreys’s actions
put his life and the lives of other inmates in danger. He also noted he lived in a dorm situation
which did not have enough space for social distancing. Petitioner asserted respondents had not
responded reasonably to the risk of inmates contracting the deadly virus. Petitioner sought early
release, compensation, the prohibition of new inmates allowed into Lincoln Correctional Center,
and the reduction of inmates at the facility until social distancing was possible. On August 26,
2020, petitioner received a counseling summary noting his grievance was deemed
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“non-emergent” and respondent could continue the grievance process by dropping his grievance
into the grievance box in his housing unit. On August 27, 2020, petitioner received another
counseling summary noting his grievance could not be answered at “this level” because it was
against the chief administrative officer of the institution.
¶6 On September 8, 2020, petitioner filed his petition for a “motion for
emergency/mandatory and/or preventive injunction.” In his petition, petitioner noted he had
filed his grievance with the Administrative Review Board on September 3, 2020, and it remained
unresolved. He asserted respondents were subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by
their deliberate indifference to the serious threat the COVID-19 pandemic posed to human life.
Petitioner noted inmates were unable to socially distance in the dormitory design of the
correctional center, inmates were allowed to leave the correctional center to work, the
correctional center had an inadequate ventilation system, and he was deprived of a means to
preserve his own life. Additionally, petitioner noted his hernia surgery had been delayed due to
the pandemic. Petitioner sought an injunction to compel respondents to (1) reduce the
population of Lincoln Correctional Center by half or (2) release petitioner from the correctional
center. He attached several documents to the petition including his grievance and the related
counseling summaries.
¶7 In October 2020, respondent Jeffreys filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s
petition because petitioner failed to (1) exhaust the administrative remedies available to him,
(2) identify a legal basis for granting his requested relief, and (3) state a claim for deliberate
indifference under the eighth amendment. Petitioner filed a response to the motion, arguing he
(1) filed his grievance with the administrative review board which gave notice of his claim,
(2) made a timely reservation of rights under the Uniform Commercial Code (810 ILCS 5/1-101
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et seq. (West 2020)), (3) was not required to exhaust his remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018)), and (4) was not required to wait for the “tragic
event” to occur before obtaining relief. Respondent also contended he did sufficiently state a
claim for relief.
¶8 On November 18, 2020, the circuit court entered a written order dismissing with
prejudice petitioner’s petition. It found petitioner failed to demonstrate his administrative
remedies had been exhausted. The court also concluded petitioner had failed to allege sufficient
facts showing a deliberate indifference to his condition because petitioner did not assert he
suffered from an objectively serious medical condition.
¶9 On December 10, 2020, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the
dismissal of his petition in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July
1, 2017). Thus, this court has jurisdiction of petitioner’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 In this case, petitioner appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his petition
seeking an injunction. Regardless of whether the circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition
was under section 2-615 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)) or section
2-619 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)), or a combination of both sections
pursuant to section 2-619.1, this court’s standard of review is the same. Jane Doe-3 ex rel. Julie
Doe-3 v. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1092, 951 N.E.2d 216, 223 (2011). We review de novo
the circuit court’s dismissal. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951 N.E.2d at 223. “In doing so,
we will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations.” White, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951
N.E.2d at 223.
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¶ 12 “A party aggrieved by an administrative decision cannot seek judicial review
unless he has first pursued all available administrative remedies.” Ford v. Walker, 377 Ill. App.
3d 1120, 1124, 888 N.E.2d 123, 126-27 (2007). “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies to grievances filed by inmates.” Ford, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1124, 888 N.E.2d at
127. Where an inmate fails to show his grievance had administrative finality, he does not meet
his burden of showing exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ford, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1124,
888 N.E.2d at 127.
¶ 13 Plaintiff attached a copy of his August 2020 grievance to his petition showing he
raised a grievance about his living conditions in the Lincoln Correctional Center during the
COVID-19 pandemic. In his petition, he noted he forwarded his grievance to the Administrative
Review Board on September 3, 2020, and it remained unresolved. Under section 504.850 of
Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code, the Administrative Review Board must submit its
written report of findings and recommendations to the Director, who then must “make a final
determination of the grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when
reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.850(d), (e) (2017).
¶ 14 On appeal, petitioner argues he made a good-faith effort to exhaust administrative
remedies and did not need to exhaust his remedies. To the extent petitioner alleges he had a
reservation of rights under the Uniform Commercial Code, we note the Uniform Commercial
Code governs commercial transactions (810 ILCS 5/1-103(a)(1) (West 2020)) and not prison
grievances. Petitioner also asserts the doctrine of exhaustion only applies to federal actions
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2018)) and not State
actions. However, petitioner raised an eighth amendment argument, a federal claim. Moreover,
as set forth above, the State has its own doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, which applies to
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grievances filed by inmates. See Ford, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1124, 888 N.E.2d at 127. Thus,
petitioner has failed to show the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not apply to his cause
of action.
¶ 15 Here, petitioner alleged his grievance remained unresolved. In fact, petitioner
signed his petition for an injunction the same day he submitted his grievance to the
Administrative Review Board. We note the attached documents petitioner attached to his
petition also do not show administrative finality. As such, petitioner failed to show he exhausted
his administrative remedies. Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not err by dismissing
petitioner’s cause of action in entirety and with prejudice based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Logan County circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
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