People v. Duckworth , 2021 IL App (4th) 180740-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 180740-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-18-0740 August 27, 2021
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
CHUCK DUCKWORTH, ) No. 16CF443
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Roger B. Webber,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
Justice Steigmann specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to three of defendant’s nine
convictions, the convictions are upheld as they were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(2) As the State concedes, one of the convictions for theft of services is reduced
from a felony to a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) Defendant has not established the trial court committed plain error when it
privately reviewed an audio recording of defendant’s sworn statements from a
bankruptcy proceeding.
(4) Defendant has not established he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when his sentencing counsel failed to challenge restitution ordered for
debts discharged in bankruptcy.
(5) The restitution order to Phoenix Insulation, Inc., is vacated as defendant was
found not guilty of theft of property from Phoenix Insulation, Inc.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant, Chuck Duckworth, was convicted of multiple
counts of both theft of services (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)) and theft of property
exceeding $500 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)) and one count of theft of property
exceeding $10,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)). Defendant was sentenced to
probation and ordered to pay restitution to the victims of those offenses. Defendant appeals,
arguing (1) multiple convictions must be vacated as the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; (2) his conviction for theft of property over $500 from Contractor Services of
Illinois, count VIII, must be reduced to misdemeanor theft as the State failed to prove the value
of the taken property; (3) defendant’s right to be present at all critical stages of his trial was
violated by the trial court’s private listening to an audio recording of bankruptcy proceedings;
(4) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel, at sentencing, failed
to argue the restitution order was improper as those debts were discharged in federal bankruptcy
proceedings; and (5) the restitution order to Phoenix Insulation, Inc., should be vacated as
defendant was acquitted of the count involving that business. We affirm as modified, vacate in
part, and remand with directions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In December 2013, defendant purchased a building located at 114 North
Kentucky Avenue in downtown Rantoul, Illinois (Kentucky Building). The Kentucky Building
was an old brick building, formerly housing a hardware store on the first floor and unfinished
storage space on the second floor. Defendant intended to renovate the Kentucky Building with a
storefront on the first floor and residential space on the second floor.
¶5 In July 2014, defendant acquired a “microloan” from the Village of Rantoul for
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$50,000. The Village of Rantoul created the Village of Rantoul Microloan Program to assist in
the rehabilitation of downtown Rantoul by providing low-cost funding to small businesses for
real estate improvement. The maximum amount a debtor could acquire under the program was
$50,000.
¶6 To complete the renovation of the Kentucky Building, defendant hired multiple
contractors. Beginning in late summer or early fall 2014 and continuing through approximately
March 2015, various contractors worked on renovating the Kentucky Building. Multiple
contractors submitted defendant invoices that defendant did not pay.
¶7 In June 2015, defendant petitioned for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code (Bankruptcy Code) (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2014)). A few months
later, the bankruptcy court discharged defendant’s debts to his creditors, including the
contractors involved in the rehabilitation of the Kentucky Building.
¶8 The State, in March 2016, charged defendant with 14 counts of theft of property
or services related to the renovation of the Kentucky Building: count I, theft of services having a
value exceeding $300 from Waters Electrical Contracting, Inc. (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West
2014)); count II, theft of property having a value exceeding $10,000 from Waters Electrical
Contracting, Inc. (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)); count III, theft of services having a
value exceeding $300 from Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West
2014)); count IV, theft of property having a value exceeding $500 from Phoenix Insulation, Inc.
(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)); count V, theft of services having a value exceeding
$300 from Good Vibes Sound, Inc. (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)); count VI, theft of
property having a value exceeding $500 from Good Vibes Sound, Inc. (720 ILCS
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5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)); count VII, theft of services having a value exceeding $300 from
New Age Home Improvement, Inc. (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)); count VIII, theft of
property having a value exceeding $500 from Contractor Services of Illinois (720 ILCS 5/16-
1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)); count IX, theft of property having a value exceeding $500 from Herr
Kids, Inc., d/b/a/ Classic Granite and Marble (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)); count X,
theft of services having a value exceeding $300 from Victor Treat and Sons, Inc. (720 ILCS
5/16-3(a) (West 2014)); count XI, theft of services having a value exceeding $300 from ServPro
of Clinton (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)); count XII, theft of services having a value
exceeding $300 from Miracle Method (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)); count XIII, theft of
property having a value exceeding $500 from Custom Flooring (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West
2014)); and count XIV, theft of property having a value exceeding $10,000 from Lanz Heating
and Cooling (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2014)).
¶9 A. Defendant’s Trial
¶ 10 A bench trial was held in April 2017. Below is a summary of the evidence
regarding the charges at issue in this appeal. We note defendant was acquitted of counts I, II, IV
(the count pertaining to Phoenix Insulation, Inc.), XII, and XIII.
¶ 11 1. Count III, Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing
¶ 12 Danny Lee Davis testified he met defendant on November 24, 2014, at the
Kentucky Building. Defendant wanted the floors on the entire second floor refinished. Defendant
told Davis that payment would be through a village loan; defendant mentioned no other source of
payment. Davis provided an estimate to defendant. Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing did not
begin working on the Kentucky Building after the initial estimate.
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¶ 13 Davis and defendant met a second time on January 19, 2015. Defendant’s plans
for refinishing the floors changed, leading to a more expensive estimate. When Davis informed
defendant of the increased cost, defendant said “that was no problem because he had $31,000 set
aside for floor work.” For the work to the scale of defendant’s request, Davis would have
considered requiring a deposit. Davis did not do so for the Kentucky Building because defendant
told him that he had $31,000 set aside for flooring. After the work was completed, defendant did
not pay Davis.
¶ 14 2. Counts V & VI, Good Vibes Sound, Inc.
¶ 15 Michael Roy, a manager at Good Vibes Sound, Inc. (Good Vibes), testified
defendant entered his store in September 2014, wanting some audio and video work done on the
Kentucky Building. Initially, defendant stated he wanted to rehab a second floor for living
quarters and a first floor for retail space. Defendant wanted in-ceiling speakers with an audio
receiver. Generally, Good Vibes requested money before such an installation. Good Vibes did
not do so for defendant, however, because defendant said he procured a loan through the Village
of Rantoul for $50,000 to cover the installation and equipment Good Vibes would provide.
¶ 16 Good Vibes invoiced defendant in January 2015 for $1403.92 worth of
equipment. At that time, defendant was not billed for services as billing for services would occur
when the job was completed.
¶ 17 Roy testified the second round of equipment and installation included a speaker
selector, television mounts, a subwoofer, and some wiring (see Exhibit 17B). In April 2015, Roy
invoiced defendant for the labor. Around this time, defendant also ordered another receiver and a
speaker placement on the mezzanine level. At this point, Roy became concerned about payment.
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On May 10, 2015, Roy contacted the Village and the Bank of Rantoul. He learned no money was
available.
¶ 18 Steve Suderman, the owner of Good Vibes, testified he went to the Kentucky
Building on May 10, 2015, to attempt to repossess equipment they installed. After he could not
enter the building, he contacted the number on file for defendant. He spoke to a person
identifying himself as defendant, who stated he would allow them to reclaim the equipment and
walk away from the installation. They agreed to do so at the end of that week or the next week.
However, defendant later called back and said he was unwilling to do so.
¶ 19 3. Count VII, New Age Home Improvement
¶ 20 Ryan Stitt, formerly a general contractor and sole proprietor of New Age Home
Improvement (New Age), testified he worked on the Kentucky Building from June or July
through December 2014. New Age performed framing work, installed drywall, built stairs,
performed metal installation and demolition, and repaired flooring. Stitt testified defendant found
him online, asking for a quote on putting in an upstairs balcony. The two discussed how
payments would be made. Stitt would deliver invoices “and he would—I don’t know if it was
funded through the—through the City of Rantoul or if they signed off with the bank, but he
would have to take the invoice.” Defendant mentioned the source of payment was a microloan
fund. Defendant did not mention he expected to receive an inheritance or insurance settlement.
Defendant also mentioned he received some money from his father. Stitt did not remember
details from the conversation. For his early work, through August 2014, Stitt was paid promptly.
Stitt was not paid for an invoice dated October 6, 2014, for “hanging, finishing, sanding,
drywall.” The invoice did not separate charges for labor and materials. The two were treated the
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same on the invoice. Stitt and defendant had an arrangement for payment of that invoice.
Defendant paid for the material, which was drywall and insulation. He made a partial payment
for labor. Stitt was to receive the rest of the payment at the end of the job. Stitt believed he would
be paid from the village loan fund. Defendant initialed and dated the outstanding balance.
¶ 21 According to Stitt, defendant failed to pay the December 18, 2014, invoice. When
Stitt gave defendant the invoice, defendant first said he paid for the work and refused to give Stitt
more money. Then, defendant said he had no more money to give him. Stitt testified he would
not have extended services on credit to defendant had it not been for the village loan fund.
¶ 22 4. Count VIII, Contractor Services of Illinois
¶ 23 Arlyn Rudin, a partner and subcontractor for Contractor Services of Illinois
(Contractor Services), testified Contractor Services installed whole house, central vacuum
systems; closet organizers; shower glass; mirrors; and bath accessories. Defendant called
Contractor Services in late November 2014 seeking to have a central vacuum system installed in
the Kentucky Building. Rudin met defendant at the job site. Later, defendant discussed having
closet organizers installed. When Rudin asked defendant how to invoice him, defendant said he
was getting money from a grant from the Village of Rantoul. It was important for Rudin to
establish how payment would be made as defendant was not a contractor they worked with
regularly. Rudin wanted to know how defendant would pay for the work. Because defendant said
the money was coming from the Village of Rantoul, Contractor Services did not require payment
in advance. Defendant mentioned no other source for payment.
¶ 24 Rudin testified installation was difficult, as the building was old. Contractor
Services charged defendant $2250 for installation of the central vacuum system. Contractor
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Services charged defendant $3895.85 for installation of the closet organizers. Defendant paid for
neither.
¶ 25 5. Count X, Victor Treat & Sons, Inc.
¶ 26 Victor Treat testified defendant approached him in September 2014 to install
drywall on three levels of the Kentucky Building. At that time, the building was “in pretty sad
shape.” Treat provided an estimate of $16,750. Defendant did not accept that estimate. In
January 2015, defendant contacted Treat again to ask for a new estimate. By that point, the
building “looked a lot better.” A good portion of the drywall had been installed. Defendant told
Treat he and his brother had installed the drywall. Defendant said his brother, however, had other
obligations and could not complete the work. Treat provided an estimate. Treat initially told
defendant he would need half of the money as a down payment. Defendant told Treat he could
not do that. Treat asked how he would be paid. Defendant responded he would pay Treat from “a
grant or something through the [Village] of Rantoul.” Treat was a little skeptical about the source
of payment. He talked to some of his other customers in town and confirmed defendant had
received a loan through the Village of Rantoul. Treat did not know the amount of the loan.
¶ 27 Treat testified he put a finish coat on the existing drywall and installed drywall in
areas that were not completed. The price for this work was $8250. Treat sent defendant a
February 9, 2015, invoice for this work. Defendant responded by telling him the Village of
Rantoul performed an inspection and wanted more work done on the first floorl before it would
release the funds. Treat agreed to perform additional work, installing drywall in a small
bathroom. Treat sent defendant an April 13, 2015, invoice for $850 for the additional work.
Defendant did not pay Treat.
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¶ 28 6. Count XI, ServPro of Clinton
¶ 29 Richard Roth, owner of ServPro of Clinton (ServPro), testified defendant
contacted his business to perform work on the Kentucky Building. Roth met defendant on May
19, 2015. At that time, the second floor, “[o]ther than being dusty *** was a beautiful setup.”
When one walked up the stairs, there was a bedroom and a bathroom. To the right was a sliding
barn door that opened to a great room with a kitchen, living room, and dining room. Televisions
had been hung. There was also a “dumbwaiter type of elevator system.” Defendant hired ServPro
to do a postconstruction cleanup, specifically cleaning the dust from the floor that had been
sanded. Defendant told Roth the flooring company had agreed to pay for the cleanup once
ServPro sent them the bill. According to defendant, the flooring company wanted to see the bill
to determine whether it would pay out of pocket or submit a claim to their insurance company.
On May 21, 2015, a contract was signed and ServPro began work on the Kentucky Building. The
total cost for the work was $4445.30. Defendant did not pay ServPro. Defendant identified no
other source of payment other than the flooring company.
¶ 30 7. Count IX, Classic Granite & Marble
¶ 31 Richard Herr, owner of Classic Granite & Marble, testified defendant entered his
showroom in the summer of 2014, asking about kitchen countertops to be installed in the
Kentucky Building. Defendant contracted with Classic Granite & Marble in December 2014. The
amount of the bid agreed upon by defendant was $8255. Generally, Classic Granite & Marble
required a 50% deposit. That was “whited out” on the contract, as defendant had a loan through
the Village of Rantoul. Herr testified defendant told him the work had to be done first and then
the Village would inspect the work and issue a check “in full.” Defendant told Herr the Village
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would not issue a partial payment. Defendant identified no other source of payment.
¶ 32 Herr explained he visited defendant at the Kentucky Building during the fall of
2014 and noticed the cost of the work done exceeded $50,000. Herr said the Kentucky Building
“was a very nice place.” When they stopped at the middle level, defendant told him it was going
to be a theater room. Herr said, “you obviously didn’t do this for $50,000.” Defendant responded
Herr was correct. Defendant assured Herr “he saved the $50,000 for the flooring and the
countertops [because] he felt like those were the two most expensive things that he was doing.”
Defendant mentioned no other source of income for the granite work. Herr noted defendant did
say he had a cleaning business.
¶ 33 Defendant was sent an invoice for the granite work in March 2015. Defendant
told Herr he submitted the bill to the Village, which was in the process of “doing the
collections.” At some point, Herr received a call from defendant. Defendant told him there was
to be a report on the news about some contractors not being paid and the Village had revoked his
loan. Defendant further told Herr he was the victim of identity theft.
¶ 34 On cross-examination, Herr testified Classic Granite & Marble had earlier
completed work on a house defendant owned in Rantoul. Defendant paid for that work.
¶ 35 8. Count XIV, Lanz Heating and Cooling
¶ 36 Jacob Farmer, a comfort consultant for residential sales for Lanz Heating and
Cooling, testified defendant, in 2014, called the Lanz Heating and Cooling sales coordinator to
make an appointment to discuss improvements at the Kentucky Building. On August 22, 2014,
Farmer met defendant at the Kentucky Building. Defendant wanted to make the second floor of
the building a residential space. For the mezzanine level, defendant was considering office space.
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Lanz Heating and Cooling installed two ductless units. On the second floor, defendant wanted a
system for the great room with a family area and a kitchen as well as a system for the bedroom,
master-suite area. On August 26, 2014, Farmer presented the plan to defendant. At that time,
they discussed payment. Defendant told Farmer about the loan he was getting from the Village of
Rantoul. He further told Farmer about the other projects defendant had completed. The two
looked at video of the other projects.Defendant told Farmer the Village of Rantoul was giving
him a loan for his work as he was restoring an older historical building.
¶ 37 The first invoice was sent to defendant on September 19, 2014, after 90% of the
work had been completed. Lanz Heating and Cooling requested 90% of the payment for that
work. The total for the project was $28,120.
¶ 38 Normally all proposals from Lanz Heating and Cooling require a down payment
of 50% with the rest due upon completion. In this case, Farmer did not require the down payment
“[b]ecause [defendant] had mentioned the Village of Rantoul loan.” Farmer also stated:
“[Defendant] had mentioned that he had done this before, and it seemed like a very noble cause I
thought at that time. And then on top of that, I was required to meet another time with what I
expected to be two gentlemen from the Bank of Rantoul. They had me walk through and show
them exactly what we were going to do before the work was even begun.” The two men wanted
to know about the scope of the work. This meeting occurred the week before work began, in
September 2014. Defendant further told Farmer the bank would not release funds until the work
was completed.
¶ 39 According to Farmer, defendant identified no other source of funds for payment.
Defendant had mentioned he owned a cleaning business in the context of scheduling meetings
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and installation. Defendant signed the August 27, 2014, estimate for $28,120. In October and
early November, Lanz Heating and Cooling did plumbing work for defendant, amounting to
$6525. By this point, 90% of the work was completed. All of the work was to be done by
December 1, 2014. Defendant told Farmer “there had to be a final walkthrough from the bank
after all of the work was done before they would pay.”
¶ 40 Troy Lanz, owner of Lanz Heating and Cooling, testified Lanz Heating and
Cooling did not require a deposit for work at the Kentucky Building because of the involvement
of the Bank of Rantoul. In January or February 2015, defendant said he would give Lanz $2000,
but defendant did not do so. No payment was made by defendant to Lanz Heating and Cooling.
Lanz testified his business lost $5109 in labor charges and $26,724 in equipment charges.
¶ 41 9. Village of Rantoul
¶ 42 Daniel Culkin, the director of the inspection department for the Village of
Rantoul, testified he was asked in July 2014 to oversee and verify expenditures of the $50,000
loan to defendant. This process involved the owner of the property delivering a bill or statement
for work that was being done. Culkin would then go to the property, verify the work was
completed, and initial the statement or bill or contact the bank officials to authorize payment.
Culkin’s role did not include approving whether expenditures were appropriate. Vendors did not
need to wait until the project was finished to submit an invoice for payment. They could perform
the work in phases.
¶ 43 According to Culkin, when he first visited the Kentucky Building to oversee
defendant’s expenditures, the building was, zoning-wise, a commercial district property. The
property was in “rough condition.” It was not finished above the first floor. Culkin had regular
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contact with defendant. Defendant submitted an invoice from New Age, which Culkin approved.
For that invoice, Culkin contacted the bank representative to authorize payment. When Culkin
was shown two other invoices for work performed by New Age, Culkin testified defendant did
not submit those invoices for payment.
¶ 44 Culkin testified defendant had not submitted invoices for Contractor Services,
Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing, Classic Granite and Marble, Lanz Heating and Cooling,
Custom Flooring, ServPro, Victor Treat and Sons, Good Vibes, Phoenix Insulation, Inc.
(Phoenix Insulation), Waters Electrical Contracting, or Miracle Method of Central Illinois.
¶ 45 Around September 2014, Culkin became concerned about the amount of money
left in the loan fund. A large payment had been made to Roto-Rooter and “something like
$12,000” remained. This concerned Culkin because he knew other bills were coming due,
including an estimate provided from Lanz Heating and Air Conditioning for around $28,000.
¶ 46 On cross-examination, Culkin testified the Bank of Rantoul made the payments
after receiving verification from Culkin. Culkin did not know how the bank dispersed the
payments. He did not see any of the checks.
¶ 47 10. Bank of Rantoul
¶ 48 Craig Rogers, a commercial loan officer for the Bank of Rantoul, described the
process of the microloan program. Under the program, the Village approved loans to individuals
and the Bank of Rantoul serviced the loans. The Village’s loan funds were tracked via “paper
trail.” According to Rogers, “The village would give us a check for a dollar amount. After
disbursements to the customer *** or person, we would then take the remaining funds into
another cashier’s check until the next draw request.” Rogers agreed “instead of having numbers
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on a computer account, you physically draft a cashier’s check for the balance and then replace it
with a new one each time there is a disbursement” because the money was not the bank’s money
and that was how the bank kept track of the remaining amount left on the loan.
¶ 49 Rogers testified the bills would go to either the Village of Rantoul or to himself. If
Rogers received a bill, the Village would sign off on the bill before funds were disbursed. If the
bills went to the Village, the Village would contact the bank and tell them to disburse the funds.
Culkin was the contact with the Village. Rogers was not aware of any disbursement made
without defendant’s and the Village’s approval.
¶ 50 According to Rogers, defendant’s loan was for $50,000. Each time a disbursement
was made, Rogers confirmed the outstanding balance with defendant. A State’s exhibit shows
the balance of the loan was $50,000 when it was new as of July 9, 2014. As of September 3,
2014, only $17,500 remained. As of October 7, 2014, only $8170.70 remained available to
defendant. Three days later, approximately $3700 remained. By January 16, 2015, that number
was approximately $900. At no point did Rogers receive an invoice for payment for Custom
Flooring, Hesterberg Electric, Good Vibes, Miracle Method of Central Illinois, Victor Treat and
Sons, Davis Flooring Sanding and Refinishing, Phoenix Insulation, Contractor Services, Waters
Electric Contracting, Lanz Heating and Cooling, Classic Granite and Marble, or ServPro.
¶ 51 Dennis Long, chairman of the board of the Bank of Rantoul, testified he sat on the
committee that reviewed and approved loans through the Village of Rantoul Microloan Program.
Defendant applied for the loan in 2014 after he acquired the Kentucky Building. The Kentucky
Building was the old Litchfield Hardware building. Defendant wanted to do extensive
remodeling with plans to rent the first floor as commercial space and reside on the second floor.
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Defendant requested a loan for $50,000, the maximum amount allowed under the program. The
loan was “closed-end credit,” meaning the loan would not be readvanced.
¶ 52 In the course of applying for the loan, defendant informed Long of his sources of
income. Defendant’s tax returns showed income from a cleaning business. Defendant also
received disability income from social security. The funds from the microloan were to be spent
on rehabilitating structural issues within the Kentucky Building. At no point during the
conversations regarding defendant’s income did defendant mention anticipating an inheritance or
insurance settlement. He also did not mention a payment related to a child-support obligation.
¶ 53 Long testified defendant had rehabilitated an old church in Rantoul. Defendant
sold that property, and the committee understood the proceeds from that sale went to purchase
the Kentucky Building and rehabilitation of that building.
¶ 54 Long testified regarding an incident where he received a phone call from a
plumbing contractor inquiring as to the availability of funds to be paid on work he had done for
defendant. Long told the contractor the funds were available at that time. Defendant approached
Long the next day. Defendant was “rather irate” Long had told the man funds were available. On
September 3, 2014, a $17,500 payment was issued to Roto-Rooter.
¶ 55 11. Defendant’s Testimony
¶ 56 Defendant testified he had lived in Rantoul since 2010. He owned a cleaning
business, which did janitorial work for offices and factories. At the time of his testimony,
defendant’s cleaning business had no employees.
¶ 57 Defendant had building and renovation experience. In 2001, he and his then-wife
constructed a house. For that project, defendant acted as a general contractor and hired multiple
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contractors. The contractors were paid for their work. Defendant and his wife resided there for
five years until they divorced. Defendant then purchased a church in Rantoul and renovated the
building into a residence. He hired contractors to complete the project and lived there for three
years before selling it in 2013.
¶ 58 When defendant purchased the Kentucky Building in December 2013, he had a
plan in place to pay for the renovation. Defendant used $84,000 in proceeds from the sale of the
church to purchase the building. He intended to use proceeds from that sale to purchase materials
such as appliances, toilets, lights, and drywall. To further help finance the renovation, defendant
applied for a microloan from the Village of Rantoul. His intent was to use microloan proceeds
for brick work, plumbing, and some materials. Defendant’s renovation plans included $175,000
he believed he would receive from his father’s estate. Defendant’s father told defendant he
would leave him $175,000 upon his death. Defendant’s father died in December 2012. As of the
date of his testimony, defendant had not received any money from his father’s estate. Defendant
believed he was going to, as his “grandmother was to distribute it to [him] for the purchase of
another property.” Defendant intended to use that $175,000 for the larger jobs, such as floor
sanding, insulation, countertops, air conditioning, and electrical work.
¶ 59 Defendant testified regarding the rules of receiving the microloan. At the June
2014 meeting regarding his loan, defendant took notes. Defendant was told he had to hire
licensed contractors and inform the contractors that he had been approved for the microloan.
Defendant told everyone about the loan because he was instructed to do so. The microloan
appeared in the newspaper in 2014. More than half of the contractors contacted defendant after
the information was published in the paper, including Stitt from New Age. Defendant could not
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name other contractors who initiated contact with him. There were “so many people,” about six.
Defendant denied telling any of the contractors they would receive payment from the loan.
Defendant told the contractors he would pay them from the inheritance.
¶ 60 In November 2014, a television producer contacted defendant, asking him if he
would be interested in doing a reality show rehabbing commercial properties into homes. The
producer saw some photos on Facebook. The two reached an agreement. Defendant told all of
the contractors about the reality show, some of whom were interested in participating.
Specifically, defendant identified Davis and Hess as having been recorded for the show. The
show had not been produced, but defendant wanted to pursue it.
¶ 61 Defendant testified regarding the $175,000 he expected to receive from his father.
He had several conversations with his mother, stepmother, and grandmother about the money.
He and his stepmother, Lisa Brown, had multiple conversations in December 2014. Lisa wrote
defendant a letter explaining she had health issues and would contact defendant’s grandmother to
try to take care of things in a timely manner. Defendant’s grandmother visited defendant four
times at the Kentucky Building. The first time was in December 2013, shortly after defendant
purchased the property. She returned in November 2014 to see the progress. His grandmother
wanted to follow his father’s wishes to continue with defendant’s project. Defendant first
suspected a problem with the money in April 2015. Defendant’s grandmother stopped returning
his calls. His uncle would not allow him to see her. In March 2016, defendant learned his
grandmother was in a nursing home. He visited her there. She did not recognize him. Defendant
knew he was not going to receive the money from his father.
¶ 62 Contractors began to file liens against the property. After a news story appeared
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on television regarding the Kentucky Building, a lawyer called defendant and recommended he
file for bankruptcy.
¶ 63 On June 17, 2015, defendant filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2008)). In his petition, he estimated
his assets as valued between $0 and $50,000 and his liabilities between $100,001 to $500,000.
On September 28, 2015, defendant was granted a discharge in bankruptcy. On the back of the
order was a general summary of the bankruptcy discharge. The order specifically stated that
“most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal[-]restitution obligations” were not debts
discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.
¶ 64 On cross-examination, defendant testified he was present when his father signed a
will leaving him $175,000. Defendant was told the money was in bonds, which were kept in a
safe at his grandmother’s house. Defendant’s name was on the bond. When asked why he did not
gain possession of the bonds upon his father’s death, defendant said it was his grandmother’s
intent to honor his father’s wishes. The money would be used toward the purchase of another
property.
¶ 65 At no point during the process of applying for the microloan did defendant tell the
lenders about the inheritance “because [he] had not received it.” Defendant denied telling
contractors the loan was his only source to pay them.
¶ 66 In January 2014, defendant’s grandmother gave him $10,000 to purchase a mobile
home for him to reside in. In 2008 or 2009, his grandmother gave him $30,000 to purchase a
vehicle.
¶ 67 On examination by the trial court, defendant testified he did not know if the will
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had been probated. Defendant testified he paid his grandmother back for the $30,000 she gave
him for the car. Defendant affirmed he was required by the microloan committee to tell
contractors he had the loan; he did not have to tell them they would or would not be paid from
the loan.
¶ 68 12. Rebuttal Evidence
¶ 69 The State called multiple witnesses in rebuttal. Davis testified it did “kind of ring
a bell” about the possibility of a reality television show. Davis, however, testified at no point was
it agreed part of his compensation came from the exposure he would get on the television show.
Davis reported defendant told him he would be paid through the loan. According to Davis,
defendant also stated, “When you’re done the bank will come in and inspect the work’s done and
you’ll be paid.”
¶ 70 On examination by the trial court, Davis testified he did not agree to be filmed or
interviewed for the television show, stating “[t]hat was not even discussed.” He did not believe
he was video recorded.
¶ 71 Long testified, during his two or three conversations with defendant regarding
applying for the microloan, he did not tell defendant contractors had to be told of the existence of
the loan. Long was aware of no such requirement and he was present at every meeting of the
loan committee that defendant attended. Long did not hear any member of the committee tell
defendant of such a requirement. Although he could not recall every conversation with
defendant, Long testified he would have remembered a conversation involving the alleged
requirement as “it’s so unusual, I would remember if I did it.”
¶ 72 Rogers and Culkin also testified of not being aware of any such requirement.
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¶ 73 The State sought to enter into evidence an audio recording of defendant’s sworn
statements during bankruptcy proceedings. The proceeding was a meeting of the creditors and
defendant’s statements were made under oath. After defense counsel agreed to the trial court
listening to the nearly hour-long recording in chambers, and a four-week adjournment of the
trial, the trial court listened to the audio recording.
¶ 74 At the bankruptcy proceeding, defendant testified to the following: He received a
letter dated February 24, 2015, signed by his stepmother Lisa. Earl Brown was defendant’s
biological father. He died in August 2012. Earl had an insurance policy he promised defendant
would receive. Lisa was listed as the beneficiary. Defendant was not listed as a beneficiary.
Defendant stated he was to receive half of the funds or $150,000. There was nothing in writing.
Defendant had not seen the insurance policy. Defendant did not know why he had not received
the money. He did not know if he would. Whenever he asked Lisa about the money, she would
“break down” or say, “I’ve been busy.” Defendant testified he had not seen a will. He believed
there was no will. He did not know if probate proceedings were started in Ohio upon Earl’s
death. Lisa told defendant she had not received any money.
¶ 75 Defendant testified he believed he would receive his inheritance. Defendant said
the only way he could cover the payments to the contractors was with that money. Earl had eight
children. None of the other children were promised any proceeds from the life insurance. Lisa
knew defendant bought the Kentucky Building and planned to renovate the building. Defendant
stated the Kentucky Building property was worth $34,000.
¶ 76 Defendant testified he received $160,000 from the sale of the church property. He
believed $42,000 to $45,000 remained on the mortgage. There were no other liens or secured
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loans. Defendant paid $35,000 for the Kentucky Building.
¶ 77 Work had been done on the first floor of the Kentucky Building, including
demolition work and removing plaster from the walls. Molina Masonry had been paid for the
work from the microloan. Hesterberg Electric installed some electrical conduit but was not paid
for the work. The only other work done at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings was painting
by “Brad.” Defendant paid “Brad” ``a “couple hundred dollars” from defendant’s cleaning
business proceeds. Later, however, defendant stated Brad had not yet started painting.
¶ 78 Defendant was living in the building at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings.
He denied receiving letters from the Village of Rantoul telling him he could not live in the
residence. Defendant made payments on his mortgage. When told the construction permit for the
Kentucky Building expired, defendant stated he no longer needed one as there was no work left
to be done.
¶ 79 B. Verdict
¶ 80 The trial court found no dispute defendant received the goods and services as
alleged in the complaint and he failed to pay fully for all of them. The court found defendant
“clearly intended to permanently deprive the respective owners of the use or benefit of the
property.” The court thus noted the sole issue in dispute was “whether [defendant] knowingly
obtained these goods and services by deception.” The court found the reasonableness of any
belief defendant would obtain anything from his father in terms of inheritance “was fading by the
fall of 2014 when the bulk of the project, at least that part that is subject to the 14 counts of the
complaint in this case, was alleged to have taken place.” The court further found incredible
defendant’s testimony the funds from his previous rehab project were to be used. The court noted
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it listened to the audio recording of defendant’s testimony from the bankruptcy proceedings,
when defendant was questioned “thoroughly” regarding “the disposition of the funds from the
sale” and defendant’s explanation “was confusing and vague at best.” The court addressed each
count individually and found defendant not guilty of a number of counts upon finding no
evidence in those counts to show defendant obtained those goods or services through deception.
This included count IV, by which the State alleged defendant committed theft of property
exceeding $500 in value from Phoenix Insulation, Inc. The court found defendant guilty of
counts III, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XIV.
¶ 81 C. Sentence
¶ 82 At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a prison sentence of five years and
an order of restitution in the case. Defense counsel began argument by stating he was saddened
by the State’s request for five years. Counsel argued the following:
“I said from the onset, you know, [defendant] should be
held liable in terms of, you know, paying these contractors back.
But right now we have a criminal justice that has 2.3 million
people incarcerated, your Honor, and if there is anyone deserving
of the opportunity to not go inside of a prison or a jail, it’s
[defendant]. Prison doesn’t get you better. ***
[Defendant] goes away for five years, the building is gone.
No one has it, right? It’s absolutely gone.”
Counsel further argued, “I would hope that even the contractors themselves don’t want to see this
man go to prison. Yeah, they want to be paid back, but to see him go to prison?”
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¶ 83 The trial court sentenced defendant to probation. On counts III, V, VII, X, and XI,
which were convictions for theft of services having a value of over $300, defendant was
sentenced to 12 months’ probation. For counts VI, VIII, and IX, convictions for theft of property
exceeding $500, defendant was sentenced to 30 months’ probation. On count XIV, defendant
was sentenced to 48 months’ probation. The trial court also ordered defendant to pay $95,331.10
in restitution. Of this amount, $3322 was ordered to be paid to Phoenix Insulation.
¶ 84 This appeal followed.
¶ 85 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 86 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 87 Defendant first challenges his convictions for counts III, VII, and VIII, alleging
the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he knowingly obtained services or products
by deception. Defendant’s conviction on count III was for theft of services having a value
exceeding $300; defendant’s convictions on counts VII and VIII were for theft of property
having a value exceeding $500.
¶ 88 Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction, this court considers the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and
determines whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 322, 830 N.E.2d 556, 559
(2005). In this undertaking, we examine the record as a whole and not simply the evidence
supporting the State’s theory of the case. See People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 117-18, 871
N.E.2d 728, 742 (2007).
¶ 89 1. Count III, Theft of Services
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¶ 90 As to count III, defendant was convicted of theft of services from Davis Floor
Sanding and Refinishing (see 720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)). Under section 16-3(a) (720
ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)), one “commits theft when he or she knowingly obtains the
temporary use of *** services of another which are available only for hire, by means of threat or
deception or knowing that such use is without the consent of the person providing the ***
services.” “Deception” is defined as to do the following “knowingly”:
“(a) Create or confirm another’s impression which is false
and which the offender does not believe to be true; or
(b) Fail to correct a false impression which the offender
previously has created or confirmed; or
***
(e) Promise performance which the offender does not
intend to perform or knows will not be performed. Failure to
perform standing alone is not evidence that the offender did not
intend to perform.” 720 ILCS 5/15-4(a), (b), (e) (West 2014).
Defendant cites case law establishing the offense of theft-by-deception requires proof the
defendant acted with “specific intent to defraud.” See People v. Reich, 241 Ill. App. 3d 666, 667,
670, 610 N.E.2d 124, 125, 126-27 (1993) (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 16-1(b)(1)). The
State does not contradict defendant’s conclusion regarding the offense here, as theft of services
based on deception (see 720 ILCS 5/16-3(a) (West 2014)) also requires proof defendant acted
with specific intent to defraud Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing.
¶ 91 Defendant argues there was no evidence the services of Davis Floor Sanding and
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Refinishing were provided as a result of deception or defendant specifically intended to defraud
the company. Defendant emphasizes, while Davis’s testimony established defendant told Davis
he would pay him from the proceeds of the microloan in November, when the decision was made
to provide the services in January 2015, defendant said he had $31,000 set aside to pay for the
refinishing but did not state those funds would come from the microloan. Defendant further
emphasizes his testimony he believed he was to receive funds from his father’s estate and he
intended to pay Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing from those funds.
¶ 92 We find the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
sufficiently establishes defendant had the specific intent to defraud Davis Floor Sanding and
Refinishing. That the microloan was not mentioned specifically in January 2015 does not render
this element unproved. The testimony establishes on November 24, 2014, defendant told Davis
the floors would be paid for through a village loan. He mentioned no other source of payment.
When the two met again, less than two months later, he said $31,000 was set aside for floor
work. Defendant did not tell Davis the flooring would be paid for through any other financial
source. The failure to “correct a false impression which the offender previously has created”
sufficiently establishes deception. 720 ILCS 5/15-4(b) (West 2014). While defendant testified he
intended to pay for these services through an inheritance, the trial court plainly did not believe
him. This conviction is upheld.
¶ 93 2. Count VII, Theft of Services
¶ 94 Defendant next argues the evidence was insufficient to establish he intended to
deceive Stitt and New Age and, therefore, his conviction for count VII was improper. Defendant
emphasizes Stitt’s decision not to require a deposit was not the product of deception. He focuses
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on the fact defendant paid Stitt’s invoices and performed his part of the agreement until the loan
fund was nearly exhausted.
¶ 95 We disagree. The evidence establishes Stitt would not have agreed to perform the
services had he not been told of the microloan fund. That defendant paid part of the invoices
does not lead to the conclusion defendant intended to pay Stitt fully and, therefore, was not
acting to deceive him. Instead, in the light most favorable to the State, this conduct shows
defendant wanted New Age to continue working on the Kentucky Building. New Age performed
work over several months. The July 24, 2014, invoice for “Site Work week 1,” in the amount of
$3500, was paid. The August 1, 2014, invoice for $1500 was also paid. New Age continued to
work on the Kentucky Building, performing framing work, installing drywall, and building
stairs. When presented with the October 6, 2014, invoice, defendant did not pay the entire
invoice. Stitt and defendant worked out an agreement. Defendant paid for the materials and
would pay for the labor when the work was completed. New Age continued to work. Defendant
then refused to pay the December 18, 2018, invoice, totaling $5100, asserting no money was left.
As defendant continued to have Stitt work for him, the microloan funds were dwindling and he
was acquiring debt to other contractors, such as Contractor Services. As of October 10, 2014,
when the agreement with Stitt was renegotiated, approximately $3700 of the microloan
remained. The evidence sufficiently established the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant intended to deceive Stitt and New Age to acquire services from them.
¶ 96 3. Count VIII, Theft of Property
¶ 97 a. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 98 Defendant next argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
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doubt of theft of property from Contractor Services. Defendant argues there was no fraudulent
representation on his part and no evidence the products Contractor Services provided were given
as a result of that deception or that he had the specific intent to defraud Contractor Services.
Defendant emphasizes Rudin, an owner of Contractor Services, stated, regarding the deposit, he
“assumed that it would be taken care of.”
¶ 99 Defendant’s emphasis on he “assumed that it would be taken care of” is
misleading as Rudin expressly testified he would not have provided the property had he not been
informed of the microloan and, after he asked how defendant “was getting the money,”
defendant said he was getting money from the Village of Rantoul. There is sufficient evidence
from which it may be determined the misrepresentation was the reason Rudin and Contractor
Services entered into the agreement with defendant and installed their equipment.
¶ 100 In addition, there is ample evidence defendant had the specific intent to defraud
Rudin. As of November 2014, when defendant first contacted Contractor Services to contract for
over $6000 of goods and services, less than $3700 remained in the microloan. Defendant had
failed to pay at least one other contractor (New Age in October 2014), and defendant continued
to gain services and products from other contractors. There is ample evidence undermining
defendant’s alleged belief he would receive funds from his father’s estate. No contractor stated
defendant mentioned the inheritance as the means of paying for services. Earl died in December
2012, and defendant had not yet received funds from his father’s estate. Testimony from the trial
and the bankruptcy proceedings was inconsistent as to whether Earl had a will and whether the
funds were from insurance proceeds or bonds. Given these inconsistencies, the trial court
reasonably did not believe him.
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¶ 101 b. Misdemeanor
¶ 102 Defendant argues, in the alternative, his conviction for count VIII should be
reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor because the State failed to establish he stole property
valued at more than $500, an element of the offense. Defendant acknowledges the exhibits
introduced by the State show Contractor Services performed work on the Kentucky Building but
emphasizes those exhibits fail to differentiate between the value of the property defendant was
convicted of taking and the services provided. Defendant reasons, because there was no proof of
the value of the property taken, an element of the offense, his conviction for theft of property
exceeding $500 cannot stand and must be reduced.
¶ 103 Theft of property under section 16-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720
ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2) (West 2014)) is a Class 3 felony if the value of the property taken exceeds
$500 but is less than $10,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(4) (West 2014)). However, if the value does
not exceed $500 and the theft of property does not occur “from the person,” then the theft is a
Class A misdemeanor. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1) (West 2014).
¶ 104 The State concedes no evidence was presented to show the property involved in
the installation of the vacuum system and shelving exceeded $500 and defendant’s conviction
should be reduced to a Class A misdemeanor. While evidence demonstrated the total owed to
Contractor Services approached $6000, there was no division of the parts and labor.
¶ 105 We accept the State’s concession the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt defendant committed theft of property over $500. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2),
(b)(4) (West 2014). We further accept both parties’ concession the evidence is sufficient to
establish misdemeanor theft. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2), (b)(1). We therefore reduce defendant’s
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conviction from theft of property exceeding $500 to misdemeanor theft and remand the cause to
the trial court for resentencing on the lesser charge. See People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 101,
890 N.E.2d 487, 498 (2008) (reducing the conviction from felony retail theft to misdemeanor
retail theft and remanding for resentencing).
¶ 106 B. Defendant’s Right to Be Present
¶ 107 Defendant next argues plain error occurred when his right to be present at all
critical stages of trial was violated. Defendant contends the trial court’s private listening to an
audio recording of the bankruptcy proceeding, even with trial counsel’s consent, denied him a
fair trial. Defendant acknowledges the issue was not preserved for our review but asserts, under
People v. Lucas, 2019 IL App (1st) 160501, 141 N.E.3d 341, we should reverse under the
plain-error doctrine.
¶ 108 Under the plain-error doctrine, a clear or obvious error forfeited below may be
remedied on appeal if (1) the evidence was closely balanced or (2) the error was sufficiently
grave it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.
People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613, 939 N.E.2d 403, 413 (2010). The first task in
plain-error analysis is consideration of whether a clear or obvious error occurred. Id. The burden
of proving such error falls on defendant. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187, 830 N.E.2d 467,
479-80 (2005).
¶ 109 The clear or obvious error complained of allegedly occurred when the trial court,
upon defense counsel’s express agreement, listened to an audio recording of defendant’s
testimony during the bankruptcy proceeding. A defendant’s general right to be present at all
critical stages of criminal proceedings, from arraignment to sentencing, is guaranteed by both the
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Illinois and United States Constitutions. People v. Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45, 55, 772 N.E.2d 1268,
1275 (2002). Case law shows the analysis of whether a defendant has been denied the right
generally involves two considerations: (1) whether the criminal proceeding at issue is a “critical
stage” and (2) whether defendant’s denial of that right is an error for which reversal is required.
See id. (considering whether the jury waiver was a critical stage of proceedings); see also Lucas,
2019 IL App (1st) 160501, ¶¶ 5, 14 (evaluating whether defendant was denied her right to be
present when a video of her arrest was viewed during trial outside her presence). Here, the
parties do not dispute the trial court’s listening to an audio recording of defendant’s testimony
occurred during a critical stage of proceedings. We note such an argument could reasonably have
been made. See People v. Groebe, 2019 IL App (1st) 180503, ¶¶ 51-52, 145 N.E.3d 411 (finding
the defendant’s presence at the trial court’s in camera viewing of a traffic stop and arrest during
trial was not at a critical stage of the proceedings as the officer testified to the events and
accuracy of the video and the defendant was able to cross-examine the officer and argue
regarding the contents of the video); People v. Richardson, 2021 IL App (1st) 190821, ¶¶ 2, 61
(finding the defendant was not denied his right to be present when the trial court viewed
videotaped evidence in camera during a pretrial hearing upon concluding the viewing did not
occur at a critical stage of proceedings); People v. Young, 2013 IL App (4th) 120228, ¶¶ 24-25,
996 N.E.2d 671 (same); cf. Lucas, 2019 IL App (1st) 160501, ¶ 5 (distinguishing Young on the
basis the in camera viewing of the video was for the purposes of establishing admissibility at
trial and not the “actual offer as substantive evidence”). However, because such argument was
not raised or countered and the matter may be readily resolved based on consideration of whether
defendant was denied a fair trial, we make no determination on this ground.
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¶ 110 The Supreme Court of Illinois has held “even where a defendant has the general
right to be present because the proceeding is a ‘critical’ stage, a defendant’s absence is not a
per se constitutional violation” and “a defendant’s absence from such a proceeding will violate
his constitutional rights only if the record demonstrates that defendant’s absence caused the
proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted in a denial of an underlying substantial right.”
Lindsey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57. The question of whether the fairness of the trial was affected by the
defendant’s absence from part of the trial must be considered based on the record as a whole. Id.We note defense counsel cannot waive a defendant’s right to be present on the defendant’s
behalf. See People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 66, 740 N.E.2d 782, 797 (2000).
¶ 111 Defendant contends, under Lofton, reversible error is established when the record
as a whole shows “the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his
opportunity to defend himself against the charges.” Id. at 67. Defendant maintains his presence at
the listening to the audio recording would have unquestionably allowed him to contribute to his
defense.
¶ 112 Defendant’s argument is based on a misapplication of Lofton. In Lofton, the court
was asked to determine whether defendant was denied his right to be present during a hearing
conducted pursuant to section 115-10(b)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1) (West 1996)), a hearing to determine whether to admit an out-of-court
statement by an alleged victim of predatory sexual assault. See Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d at 62-64. The
Lofton court considered whether “the defendant’s presence at the proceeding would have
contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges” in deciding whether the
hearing at issue occurred during a “critical stage.” See id. at 73. After finding defendant’s
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presence would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself, the court then turned to
the question of whether defendant was denied a fair trial: “By the time trial began and [the]
defendant was present to defend against the charges, it was too late for him to protest the
admissibility of [the alleged victim’s] hearsay statements, damaging in the extreme to his
defense.” Id. at 72. The court found reversal warranted after not only finding the defendant’s
presence would have contributed to his opportunity to defend himself but also after finding due
process was denied:
“Because the record indicates that defendant’s presence at the
section 115-10 hearing would have contributed to the fairness of
the criminal proceeding against him and that a fair and just hearing
was thwarted by his absence, we conclude that the section 115-10
hearing was a stage critical to the outcome of the criminal
proceeding at which defendant had a right to be present. Hence, we
are brought to the conclusion that defendant’s absence resulted in
his being denied a fair and just trial, thereby violating his due
process right of presence.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 72-73.
¶ 113 Contrary to defendant’s contention, Lofton shows defendant, to prevail, must
establish both the alleged error occurred during a critical stage of proceedings, as defendant’s
presence would have contributed to the fairness of the proceeding, and he was denied a fair and
just trial. We thus turn to the question of whether defendant has established he was denied a fair
trial when the trial court listened to the audio recording in defendant’s absence.
¶ 114 In his appellant briefs, defendant relies heavily on the decision in Lucas to support
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his claim he was denied the right to a fair trial. In Lucas, a bench trial was held on the charges
the defendant committed, among other offenses, driving under the influence of alcohol and
misdemeanor resisting a peace officer. Lucas, 2019 IL App (1st) 160501, ¶¶ 1, 4. Before
witnesses were called, the State sought to publish a video of the defendant’s traffic stop captured
by an officer’s squad car. Id. ¶ 5. The parties stipulated to the authenticity of the video. Id. The
trial court then addressed the defendant, telling her, because the courtroom did not have video
capabilities, he would view the video in chambers in the presence of the attorneys. Id. The court
asked the defendant if she understood and the defendant replied she did. Id. The court then
recessed the proceedings to watch the video in chambers. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
¶ 115 On appeal in Lucas, the majority found the defendant’s right to be present was
denied as the fairness of the proceedings was undermined when the defendant was unable to
view the evidence against her and aid in her own defense. Id. ¶ 14. Notably, the court highlighted
the fact the defendant could not hear or see the evidence presented in chambers and the evidence
did not show the defendant “viewed the video before trial.” Id. ¶ 16. The court further found the
defendant’s absence impacted a fundamental right; the right to testify on her own behalf. Id.
¶ 19. Because “[t]he violation of [the defendant’s] right to be present had a cascading impact on
fundamental rights,” the majority found second-prong plain error and reversed the defendant’s
convictions. Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 116 In this case, there are marked differences in the underlying facts rendering the
defendant’s reliance on Lucas unpersuasive. First, the video in Lucas captured (1) an interaction
between the defendant and a police officer and (2) the events leading to an arrest for driving
while under the influence—events recorded from a point of view not shared by the Lucas
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defendant. The Lucas defendant may not have observed events contained in the video recording
and, because of the under the influence charges, may not have fully recalled or remembered
others. In contrast, here, the audio recording was of defendant’s sworn statements during a
bankruptcy proceeding—an event of which defendant had firsthand knowledge and there is no
indication he was “under the influence” at the time of the recording. Second, in Lucas, the record
establishes the defendant learned of the trial court’s decision to view the video recording in
chambers immediately before it was to be viewed outside of her presence. Id. ¶ 5. Here,
however, defendant had over four weeks between the notice that the audio recording would be
heard outside his presence and the day the trial court listened to the audio recording. At the trial,
on April 11, 2017, during the State’s presentation of rebuttal evidence, the State indicated it
would introduce the audio recording from the bankruptcy proceeding. The record shows the
audio recording was produced during discovery. Defense counsel agreed to the State’s
stipulation the audio recording was a true and accurate recording of defendant’s testimony at the
bankruptcy proceeding. When the trial resumed on May 10, 2017, the trial court indicated it
listened to the audio recording the night before. The record demonstrates the audio recording was
provided during discovery, defendant was present during these discussions, and defendant had
ample opportunity to revisit his sworn testimony, of which he had firsthand knowledge, to aid in
his defense.
¶ 117 Given the record, we find defendant has not shown the denial of the right to be
present resulted in an unfair trial or impeded another constitutional right, such as the right to aid
in his defense or to choose not to testify on his own behalf. Defendant has not established he was
denied a fair trial and thus, we find no clear error occurred.
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¶ 118 C. The Effect of the Bankruptcy Discharge
¶ 119 Defendant next argues his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the restitution order. Defendant argues the bankruptcy discharge of the debts he owed to the
contractor-creditors prevented the trial court from ordering defendant to pay restitution to those
contractors for their losses. Defendant maintains the case lies at the intersection of bankruptcy
law and criminal-sentencing law and the discharge of his debts, the debts for which restitution
was ordered, barred the trial court from ordering restitution in this case. Thus, defense counsel
was ineffective for not challenging the restitution award.
¶ 120 The case law establishes a two-part test to determine whether a defendant was
denied the effective assistance of counsel. A defendant must prove (1) his or her counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there exists a
reasonable probability the proceeding’s outcome, absent counsel’s error, would have been
different. People v. Young, 341 Ill. App. 3d 379, 383, 79 N.E.2d 468, 472 (2003). The burden of
proving ineffectiveness falls on defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) ((holding “the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”) (Emphases
added.)). The failure to prove either prong of this test precludes a finding counsel was
ineffective. People v. McGath, 2017 IL App (4th) 150608, ¶ 37, 83 N.E.3d 671.
¶ 121 In this case, defendant has not met his burden of establishing the first prong of his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as he has not established the Bankruptcy Code’s
discharge precludes this State’s courts from imposing restitution orders during sentencing to
compensate victims for debts unlawfully obtained. To support his argument, defendant cites
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multiple cases regarding the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but he cites only two
cases that have considered whether a trial court can order restitution following a conviction in a
criminal proceeding for a debt discharged in bankruptcy. Defendant cites United States v.
Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1984). Neither supports defendant’s claim.
¶ 122 In both Carson and Alexander, the courts found restitution orders could be made
following a conviction in a criminal proceeding for debts discharged in bankruptcy. In Carson,
the defendant secured a loan through false pretenses. Carson, 669 F.2d at 217. In 1979, that debt
was discharged in bankruptcy, but in 1980 the defendant was convicted of making a false
statement to secure that loan and then ordered, as a condition of probation, to provide restitution
to the victim of his crime. Id. The court observed the defendant’s claim the bankruptcy’s
discharge of the debt precluded the order of restitution “might have some appeal” if the primary
goal “of the probation condition were to make the bank whole.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The court
found the probation condition of restitution served a rehabilitative purpose “by strengthening the
individual’s sense of responsibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 218. The court
further noted that “ ‘conditioning probation on making restitution also protects the community’s
interests in having the victims of crime made whole.’ ” Id. (quoting Huggett v. State, 266
N.W.2d 403, 407 (Wis. 1978)). The Carson court concluded the discharge of the defendant’s
debt to the victim did not foreclose the district court from conditioning probation on restitution.
Id.¶ 123 In Alexander, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for a debt incurred
under a scheme to defraud as a condition of his sentence of probation. Alexander, 743 F.2d at
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473-74. The Seventh Circuit, while not “in full agreement” with the analysis in Carson, found its
result “eminently correct.” Id. at 480. The court concluded the following, finding no indication
Congress intended to prevent judges from ordering restitution in sentencing:
“The trial judge specifically noted ‘that restitution is a critical
element of the rehabilitation process that I think has to occur in this
case.’ Although imposition of a fine may have the same pecuniary
effect as restitution on the probationer, the rehabilitative effect may
well be augmented by the act of making one’s victims whole. We
discern nothing in the bankruptcy code that evinces a
congressional intent to prevent sentencing judges from imposing
such potentially rehabilitative probation conditions.” (Emphases in
original.) Id.¶ 124 Thus, the only two cases relied upon by defendant show the Bankruptcy Code
should not be read so broadly as to limit courts from imposing restitution.
¶ 125 Defendant argues, however, Alexander shows restitution is permissible only when
the purpose of the restitution is rehabilitative. Defendant contends the trial court did not make a
finding the restitution ordered in this case served that purpose and highlights language showing
the court ordered restitution, despite questioning the State about the application of the
Bankruptcy Code, to make the victims whole: “[O]ne of my goals in sentencing in a case such as
this is to see that any contractors or other victims are made whole to the—to the extent that that’s
possible.” Defendant argues this is an end-run around the bankruptcy judgment.
¶ 126 We disagree that Alexander should be read so narrowly. Alexander does not hold
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restitution may be ordered only when the trial court specifies the purpose of the imposition of
restitution is rehabilitative. Instead, the court’s analysis, like that in Carson (see Carson, 669
F.2d at 218), shows restitution is by nature rehabilitative. The Alexander court pointed to the trial
judge’s language stating “restitution is a critical element of the rehabilitation process that I think
has to occur in this case” and observed “the rehabilitative effect may well be augmented by the
act of making one’s victims whole.” (Emphasis in original.) Alexander, 743 F.2d at 480. The
court also found “nothing in the bankruptcy code that evinces a congressional intent to prevent
sentencing judges from imposing such potentially rehabilitative probation conditions.” Id. If
restitution has a rehabilitative effect, then it follows a trial court’s comment it seeks to make the
victims whole does not negate that effect and the cases relied upon by defendant thus support a
finding the Bankruptcy Code does not bar the order mandating restitution to the wronged
contractors.
¶ 127 The authority relied upon by defendant permits the action which he argues is
barred. Defendant has thus not shown the discharge barred the order of restitution and, therefore,
cannot prove counsel provided ineffective assistance by not challenging the order in the trial
court.
¶ 128 D. Restitution for Debt to Phoenix Insulation
¶ 129 Defendant next asks this court to vacate the restitution order to Phoenix Insulation
as he was acquitted of committing theft from Phoenix Insulation. Defendant acknowledges this
error was not raised below but contends we may correct the error as plain error or by finding
counsel’s failure to raise the issue to be a denial of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 130 The State urges this court to deny the relief defendant seeks, arguing defendant
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invited the error to occur. The State contends defense counsel argued at sentencing restitution
should be ordered to all contractors to avoid a prison sentence. The State, citing People v.
Ramirez, 2013 IL App (4th) 121153, ¶ 79, 996 N.E.2d 1227, emphasizes “invited errors are not
subject to plain-error review.”
¶ 131 We are not convinced defendant invited this alleged error. The State made a
similar argument in response to defendant’s contention the restitution order was barred by the
discharge of his debts under the Bankruptcy Code. As to that issue, the State maintained
defendant should not have been permitted to agree to restitution, when the trial court showed
concern about the effect of the bankruptcy discharge, in an attempt to avoid imprisonment and
then be allowed on appeal to have the restitution order vacated. Had we not rejected defendant’s
claim due to his failure to show error, this argument would likely have carried weight in the
analysis of that claim. See generally In re Vik, 45 B.R. 64, 69 (N.D. Iowa 1984) (“An individual
on the one hand, should not be allowed to avoid incarceration by agreeing to make restitution
and then on the other, seek to avoid a significant portion of his penal obligations merely by filing
bankruptcy.”).
¶ 132 As to this issue, however, the record does not show defendant invited the error of
a criminal sentence of restitution on a count for which he was acquitted. Unlike the
discharge/bankruptcy argument, there is no indication the trial court or the parties were aware a
sentence of restitution was proposed or being imposed despite the absence of a crime against
Phoenix Insulation. In addition, it is unlikely counsel decided to include the restitution for the
debt to Phoenix Insulation, in the amount of $3322, in his attempt to avoid imprisonment when
over $90,000 in restitution would be ordered. The general invitation to impose restitution as to
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all contractors to avoid a prison sentence was not an invitation to impose restitution on offenses
defendant did not commit.
¶ 133 Turning to defendant’s argument, under the plain-error doctrine, sentencing errors
are reviewable though raised for the first time on appeal if (1) the evidence is closely balanced or
(2) the error is sufficiently grave it deprived defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. People v.
Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 16, 99 N.E.3d 590. Defendant carries the burden of
establishing the doctrine applies. Id.¶ 134 The first step in plain-error analysis is determining whether clear error occurred.
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 410-11 (2007). Here, we find clear
error occurred. “ ‘It is well established that a court may not impose restitution for charges upon
which a defendant is acquitted.’ ” People v. Clausell, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1081, 904 N.E.2d
108, 110 (2008) (quoting People v. Owens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 222, 234, 753 N.E.2d 513, 523
(2001)). It was error for the trial court to order restitution to Phoenix Insulation when Phoenix
Insulation was not the victim of a crime for which defendant was convicted.
¶ 135 We further agree with defendant the second prong of the plain-error doctrine
applies. It is difficult to imagine a more serious threat to the fairness of a sentencing hearing than
to allow the imposition of a criminal sentence when no conviction occurred. We therefore vacate
the order of restitution to Phoenix Insulation.
¶ 136 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 137 We reduce defendant’s conviction on count VIII to misdemeanor theft, affirm
defendant’s other convictions, vacate the restitution order to Phoenix Insulation, and remand for
resentencing on count VIII.
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¶ 138 Affirmed as modified and vacated in part.
¶ 139 Cause remanded with directions.
¶ 140 JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:
¶ 141 I completely agree with my distinguished colleagues in the majority regarding
their analysis of a defendant’s right to be present at all critical stages of trial. I specially concur
only because the matter at issue in this case—namely, the trial judge’s private listening to an
audio recording of the bankruptcy proceedings—did not constitute a critical stage of trial.
Indeed, the trial judge’s doing so constituted no hearing at all.
¶ 142 A fundamental difference exists between this case, on the one hand, and Lucas
and all the other cases defendant cites, on the other. That difference is that in the present case,
the trial judge was considering evidence that had already been admitted, as opposed to all of the
other cases in which the defendant was not present (for whatever reason) at a time the evidence
was presented.
¶ 143 Especially given that this was a bench trial, a defendant has no right to be present
when the trial judge considers and evaluates (as trier of fact) evidence that had already been
admitted, such as the audio of the bankruptcy proceedings in this case. After all, under these
circumstances, there is no possibility that defendant’s presence or absence could in any way
affect the trial judge’s consideration of the admitted evidence.
¶ 144 Even in Lucas, the case defendant primarily relies upon, the First District
correctly quotes the United States Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987),
that “ ‘a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding
that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ ”
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(Emphasis omitted.) Lucas, 2019 IL App (1st) 160501, ¶ 12 (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745).
The Lucas court then goes on to write that “[w]hether a defendant’s absence affects the trial’s
fairness depends on an assessment of the whole record; analysis ‘turn[s] on the nature of the
hearing from which the defendant ha[s] been excluded.’ ” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Lofton,
194 Ill. 2d 40, 68, 740 N.E.2d 782, 798 (2000)).
¶ 145 Technically speaking, no “hearing” ever occurred in the present case from which
defendant had been excluded; a trial judge’s consideration of already admitted evidence does not
constitute a “hearing.” This is in addition to the earlier point that there is no chance that
defendant’s presence or absence could possibly affect the fairness of the procedure.
¶ 146 Perhaps another way of considering this point is to imagine a scenario (possibly it
could have happened even in this case, given all of the evidence about how the proposed
remodeling was supposed to have come about) in which the State offered 160 pages of
documents pertaining to the proposed remodeling project. Assume in this scenario that the
defendant in this bench trial did not bother to challenge the foundation of the documents
(because doing so would have been fruitless) and stipulated that the judge as trier of fact could
consider all of them in reaching his decision as to defendant’s guilt. Assume further that the trial
judge then decided to either (1) review the documents in chambers with his feet up while
drinking a cup of coffee or (2) to take the matter under advisement, during which time the judge
would review these documents at his leisure and then ultimately announce his decision.
¶ 147 Under the foregoing scenario, an argument that the defendant was denied his
right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings—namely, when the judge was
considering this admitted evidence—would simply make no sense at all. Yet, that is essentially
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what happened in this case. After all, the audio recording of the bankruptcy proceedings had
been admitted into evidence, and the parties even agreed the judge could consider the recording
in chambers. Even absent this agreement to do so, the judge acted entirely appropriately by
reviewing the audio recording in chambers.
¶ 148 And what sense does it make to claim that a defendant has a right to be present
while the trial judge, sitting as trier of fact, reviews already admitted evidence? Going back to
the scenario I just posed, could anyone really argue that a defendant had a constitutional right to
be present at this so-called “critical stage of the trial” so defendant could watch the judge as he
reviews these 160 documents on the bench?
¶ 149 Last, I believe that the First District decision in Lucas was wrongly decided.
Although the proposed Rule 23 order does a good job of distinguishing it (see supra ¶ 116), I
agree with Justice Lavin’s dissent in Lucas.
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