People v. Vazquez ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (2d) 190373-UNo. 2-19-0373
Order filed September 24, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 16-CF-1202
)
HENRY VAZQUEZ, ) Honorable
) T. Clint Hull,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice Hudson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s involuntary commitment of defendant was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence; the evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
defendant suffered from mental illness and posed a serious threat to public safety.
¶2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court committed defendant, Henry Vazquez, to
the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) pursuant to section 104-25(g)(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (West 2016)). Defendant appeals,
and contends that the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
2021 IL App (2d) 190373-U¶4 On July 17, 2016, defendant, then 23 years old, was arrested and charged with six offenses
including two counts of aggravated battery (victim over 60; public way) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c),
(d)(1) (West 2016)), two counts of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a) (West 2016)), one
count of battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2016)), and one count of resisting or obstructing a
peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016)). The charges stemmed from an incident where
defendant began punching his father, Enrique, while Enrique was driving them both in Elgin.
¶5 At defendant’s arraignment, his attorney raised a bona fide doubt regarding defendant’s
fitness to stand trial. On August 31, 2016, the parties stipulated to a report by the Kane County
Diagnostic Center (KCDC). The report indicated that defendant presented with poor hygiene and
did not understand why he was in jail. Defendant could not provide much of his social history or
personal information. Defendant reported that he was diagnosed with a mental health condition at
age 7 but could not recall the diagnosis. He stated that he was taking “Seroquel and stuff like that.”
Defendant stated he did not like to shower because “shampoo is weird.” Defendant abruptly ended
the first interview and demanded to have his attorney present.
¶6 During a second interview, with counsel present, defendant was unable to recognize his
public defender, even though they had met a month earlier. Defendant began to insist that his
public defender was not “a real attorney” and that “they”—meaning the KCDC staff—had given
him “sugar pills” instead of medications. This interview ended abruptly as well. During a third
interview, defendant spoke in a low volume and his speech was slurred to the point of being
unintelligible. Defendant stated that he was in jail but could not identify the month, day, or season.
At one point, defendant said the season was “cold outside”—however, it was August, and the
weather was warm. The report noted that defendant was often guarded and mumbled, occasionally
volatile, and particularly suspicious of his medication, soap, and showers. KCDC’s staff
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-Upsychiatrists diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia (unspecified), and he was given Haldol (an
antipsychotic) and Cogentin (an anti-convulsant, for tremors).
¶7 After receiving the parties’ stipulation, the trial court (Judge Linda Abrahamson) found
defendant unfit to stand trial. The court noted that defendant was uncooperative in the courtroom
and did not appear oriented to the time, place, or circumstances. The court found it was clear
defendant did not understand the charges against him, the possible penalties, the roles of
individuals in the courtroom, or how to work appropriately with his attorney. The court committed
defendant to DHS for a treatment plan and possible restoration to fitness.
¶8 DHS placed defendant in Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC). On October 16, 2016, the
court received a report indicating defendant had not made much progress at EMHC. It was reported
that defendant was still suffering from acute psychosis “characterized by illogical thinking,
paranoid and persecutory delusions, [and] auditory hallucinations.” Defendant often refused to
leave his cell and had been observed talking loudly to himself and “responding to internal stimuli.”
¶9 On November 1, 2016, defendant was transferred to Chester Mental Health Center, a
maximum security, forensic facility. Defendant consented to receive medication and a treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Terrence Casey, opined that there was a substantial likelihood defendant could be
restored to fitness within one year. Casey noted however that defendant remained acutely
psychotic, confused, and disoriented. He also refused to follow directions which led to harmful
behavior towards himself and aggressive behavior towards others. A subsequent report noted that
on November 6, 2016, defendant struck a staff member and had to be placed in restraints.
Defendant was also sexually inappropriate with female staff, asking them to come into his room
and “show me something” and telling them “you’re beautiful.”
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-U¶ 10 Defendant’s treatment plan noted that defendant did not understand why he was at Chester
and denied the charges against him. The report noted that defendant suffered from a serious mental
illness, that defendant’s “confusion and psychosis interfere[ed] with his ability to listen and follow
directions[,]” and that defendant needed to “learn how to interact with others in a less aggressive
manner.”
¶ 11 By January 2017, defendant appeared to have made some progress and was now taking
Haloperidol (an antipsychotic), Lorazepam (for anxiety), Trazadone (for insomnia), and
Oxcarbazepine (a mood stabilizer).
¶ 12 Dr. Casey’s report in April 2017 indicated that defendant had made additional progress and
was medication compliant. Staff reported that defendant was generally “calm and cooperative” but
remained “internally preoccupied.” In July 2017 Casey noted defendant continued to improve but
declined to participate in “fitness education,” which would assist him with understanding basic
court proceedings.
¶ 13 Casey next reported in September 2017 that defendant had only made minimal progress.
Due to “increased behaviors” defendant’s medication doses were likewise increased; defendant
remained compliant with taking his medications but was generally noncompliant with staff
requests and remained aggressive towards staff and peers. Defendant continued talking to himself,
though not as much, and appeared to experience auditory hallucinations less frequently. Still,
Casey found that defendant remained confused about the circumstances surrounding his arrest and
about court proceedings. In Casey’s view, defendant lacked the capacity to assist in his own
defense. Casey ultimately opined that defendant continued to require inpatient psychiatric
treatment because defendant remained unfit in the year following the initial unfitness finding (see
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-U725 ILCS 5/104-23 (West 2016)), and there was not a substantial probability that defendant would
attain fitness.
¶ 14 At a discharge hearing (725 ILCS 5/104-25 (West 2016)), defendant’s father testified
regarding the attack in Elgin on the night of July 17, 2016. Enrique was driving and defendant
threw some trash out of the car window. Enrique asked defendant why he did that and said
something to defendant about how he looked like “Uncle Juan ***.” At that point, defendant
became irate and started punching his father. Enrique stopped the car on the shoulder of the
offramp in Elgin on Route 20. Enrique got out of the car; defendant followed and continued to hit
him as Enrique yelled for someone to call the police. Another driver stopped, called the police,
and defendant was taken into custody after a brief struggle. Enrique had a bloody lip and injuries
to the right side of his face. After the close of evidence and arguments, the trial court found
defendant “not not guilty” of one count aggravated battery (public way), two counts of domestic
battery, and resisting and obstructing a peace officer. (The court acquitted defendant of aggravated
battery (victim over 60) after finding that the State failed to prove that defendant knew his father’s
age.) Because the most serious offense, aggravated battery, was a Class 3 felony (see 720 ILCS
5/12-3.05(c), (h) (West 2016)), the court extended defendant’s commitment for a period of 15
months, unless he was restored to fitness sooner. See 725 ILCS 5/104-25(d)(1) (West 2016).
¶ 15 Following the discharge hearing, the court continued to receive reports every 90 days from
Dr. Casey who noted that defendant had made minimal progress in inpatient treatment. Defendant
continued to experience auditory hallucinations and failed to manifest a basic understanding of his
situation. Casey consistently reported that defendant lacked insight into his aggressive behavior,
continued to experience auditory hallucinations, and demonstrated minimal progress or
willingness to become fit.
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-U¶ 16 The State then sought defendant’s extended commitment on the grounds that defendant
was a “serious threat to public safety[,]” (see id.) and a hearing was held on March 13, 2019. The
parties stipulated to Dr. Casey’s qualifications as an expert in forensic psychiatry and Casey’s
February 2019 report was admitted by stipulation as well. In this report, Casey outlined
defendant’s criminal history as well as five recent “episodes of acute instability and violence”
while at Chester. Of significance, Casey discussed an incident in September 2014 where defendant
was arrested in Cook County for aggravated criminal sexual abuse and aggravated battery (victim
over 60).
¶ 17 The court received in evidence a certified copy of conviction for aggravated battery and
the felony minutes related to this incident. In sum, defendant accosted a 63-year-old woman as she
arrived to their apartment building carrying groceries. Defendant smacked the victim on her
buttocks and took her groceries. Frightened, the victim ran up the stairs to her apartment; defendant
followed her and cornered her and attempted to kiss her. Defendant asked her for a kiss and when
she refused he asked her for sex and then offered her money to perform a sex act. The victim
repeatedly said no and told defendant she was married. Defendant then grabbed the victim’s left
breast over her clothing. Defendant was sentenced to probation.
¶ 18 Returning to Dr. Casey’s final report, Casey noted that defendant failed to appreciate the
consequences of the Cook County incident as well as the Elgin incident involving his father and
the police. In particular, Casey noted that defendant was particularly likely to lash out at victims
who were “especially vulnerable,” like the elderly. Regarding the incident with his father,
defendant acknowledged that he hit Enrique because he was hungry and wanted food. Casey
further noted four incidents at Chester where defendant was placed in restraints “as a result of
severe physical violence.” Casey concluded that defendant’s cognitive impairments and
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-Upsychiatric condition could not be effectively managed with medication and would also cause him
to discontinue psychotropic medication in an outpatient setting. Casey’s report concludes as
follows:
“[Defendant] requires the support and environmental cues provided in the inpatient
psychiatric setting. He does not currently demonstrate self-care skills necessary to
reintegrate into the community. If released [defendant] would attempt to meet his needs
without regard for the welfare of others, and would engage in violent behaviors that would
pose a risk of immediate harm to himself and to others.
OPINION: [Defendant] does not yet possess adequate knowledge of basic court
proceedings. Nor does he have a thorough understanding of his charges, including the
seriousness of the charges and potential penalties if convicted. He does not demonstrate
the capacity to assist in his own defense. It is the clinical opinion of his treatment team that
he is Unlikely to Attain Fitness Stand Trial.
Additionally *** [w]ithout the support of the inpatient psychiatric setting, he would be
unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm.”
¶ 19 After the close of evidence, the State argued that defendant was violent, impulsive, and a
serious threat to public safety. The defense argued that the State’s evidence failed to show his
illness was “severe enough” to constitute a serious threat.
¶ 20 The trial court found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that
defendant should be involuntarily committed. The court determined that defendant had not been
restored to fitness and that he could not be without significant assistance. The court then
determined that defendant posed a serious threat to the public's safety. While the court gave little
weight to the incidents that occurred at Chester, for which the court had limited information, the
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-Ucourt observed that the evidence against defendant indicated that he had committed violent
offenses and was impulsive.
¶ 21 The trial court found that defendant was eligible for an extended term sentence based on
his prior conviction for aggravated battery, but it nevertheless ordered that defendant be committed
for a period not to exceed five years from the date of his arrest. The State, however, filed a motion
to reconsider, pointing out that the Code requires the court to order “[a] period of commitment
equal to the maximum sentence to which the defendant would have been subject had he or she
been convicted in a criminal proceeding.” 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2); see also id. § (g)(4). The trial
court then granted the State’s motion, and set the maximum commitment date at 10 years.
Accordingly, defendant’s term date was set at July 12, 2026. Defendant appeals.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Defendant contends that the trial court’s order involuntarily committing him was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. The State argues that the evidence was more than sufficient.
We affirm.
¶ 24 Defendant was involuntarily committed pursuant to section 104-25(g)(2) of the Code
during the pretrial phase of his criminal case. “A defendant is unfit if, because of his mental or
physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against
him or to assist in his defense.” 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2016). In addition, section 104-25(g)(2)
of the Code provides:
“If the defendant continues to be unfit to stand trial, the court shall determine whether he
*** is subject to involuntary admission under the Mental Health and Development
Disabilities Code or constitutes a serious threat to the public safety.” Id. § 104-25(g)(2).
Accordingly, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant (1) suffers
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-Ufrom a mental condition and (2) constitutes a serious threat to public safety.
¶ 25 As the parties acknowledge, “[t]he standard of review for an involuntary-commitment
proceeding is whether the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Shirley
M., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1187, 1194 (2006). Under the manifest-weight standard, we are required to
give great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and may not substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court regarding the weight to give evidence or the inferences to be drawn. People
v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 19; In re Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d 887, 888 (1993); In re Houlihan,
231 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682-83 (1992). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence
“only if ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary,
or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” People v. Relwani, 2019 IL 123385, ¶ 18 (quoting
People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)).
¶ 26 Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he is mentally ill; rather,
defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he is a serious threat to public safety
requiring commitment. Defendant’s argument largely consists of picking apart the evidence in Dr.
Casey’s reports. Of the incidents that occurred when defendant first arrived at Chester in
November 2016, defendant posits that these events occurred “likely before he would have been
able to be stabilized by medication ***.” Defendant protests that Casey’s treatment reports were
too vague, and used words like “aggressive,” “uncooperative,” “acute instability” and “increased
behaviors” without describing the events that formed those conclusions. Defendant also complains
that Casey’s reports (and therefore, his testimony) were based on hearsay reports from defendant’s
“treatment team” and not from Casey’s personal observations. Defendant cites our decision in In
re Cutsinger, 186 Ill. App. 3d 219 (1989), wherein we recited the proposition that “explicit medical
testimony” (internal quotation marks omitted) is required to find that a person is a serious danger
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-Uto himself or others to justify involuntary commitment. Id. at 223.
¶ 27 Although our decision in Cutsinger applied to involuntary commitment under the Mental
Health Code rather than unfitness proceedings under the Criminal Code, there is no danger in
applying the “explicit medical testimony” standard here. Dr. Casey is a forensic psychiatrist—i.e.,
a physician—and he explicitly stated in his stipulated testimony his opinion that defendant was
unfit to stand trial, suffered from a mental illness, and constituted a serious threat to public safety.
¶ 28 Furthermore, while defendant complains that Casey’s reports were based, in part, on
hearsay, we find nothing improper. Under Illinois Rule of Evidence 703 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), Dr.
Casey (an expert witness) was entitled to base his opinion on defendant’s records and the reports
of others as those are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of forensic psychiatry. As we
have said before, any report on the defendant’s psychiatric condition “would be incomplete and
unreliable if it did not include the observations of nurses, social workers, and other personnel at
the hospital where the patient has received psychiatric treatment.” In re Houlihan, 231 Ill. App. 3d
at 683. Accordingly, “a treating psychiatrist’s opinion *** need not be derived from firsthand
observations *** and may be based on knowledge of incidents derived from medical history
records.” In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill. App. 3d 586, 594 (2007) (citing In re Houlihan, 231 Ill. App.
3d at 683). Moreover, under Illinois Rule of Evidence 705 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), Dr. Casey was
entitled to give his opinion without disclosing the facts underlying his opinion. See generally
Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 194 (1981). Accordingly, the time for defendant to challenge Dr.
Casey’s testimony, or to test it through cross-examination, has long since passed and it is not our
province to reweigh the evidence.
¶ 29 Defendant’s final point is that both of his criminal cases were probationable offenses. He
asserts that, “[t]he conduct in those cases, while serious, is not conduct that would require the
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2021 IL App (2d) 190373-Udefendant to be locked up for ten years with no good time [credit] as a serious threat to the public
safety.” This assertion misses the mark. Defendant has not been convicted in this case (People v.
Mayo, 2017 IL App (2d) 150390, ¶ 3) and has not been sentenced to prison. Instead, he has been
committed, albeit against his will, to a mental health facility after having been discharged from
criminal process. Defendant is in a fundamentally different position than a criminal defendant who
has been convicted and sentenced. See People v. Williams, 142 Ill. App. 3d 858, 863 (1986). The
purpose of defendant’s civil commitment “ ‘is to treat the [his] mental illness, and at the same time
protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.’ ” (People v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189,
197 (1995) (quoting People v. Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 216, 228 (1986)) and the court does not
have to wait until defendant harms himself or someone else before ordering the State to provide
the treatment he needs (In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 594).
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 In sum, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kane County. The evidence in this
case undeniably showed that defendant was mentally ill, violent, and a serious threat to the public’s
safety. Additionally, defendant’s trouble with understanding consent and respecting social and
sexual boundaries makes him even more of a serious threat. As such, the trial court’s finding that
defendant constituted a serious threat to the public’s safety was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
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