People v. Trammell , 2021 IL App (2d) 200327-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (2d) 200327-UNo. 2-20-0327
Order filed October 7, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 18-CF-2621
)
TONIO LERON TRAMMELL, ) Honorable
) Brendan A. Maher,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Zenoff and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s 11-year sentence for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon was not an
abuse of discretion given the seriousness of the offense (defendant shot the victim
in the leg), the lack of serious provocation (defendant returned with a gun to the
scene of an argument and shot the victim), and defendant’s juvenile and criminal
history, which included attempted murder.
¶2 Defendant, Tonio Leron Trammell, pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon by a felon
(UUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)). The trial court sentenced him to 11 years’
imprisonment. Defendant appeals his sentence. He contends that his sentence was an abuse of
2021 IL App (2d) 200327-Udiscretion given his (1) accepting responsibility by pleading guilty, (2) genuine remorse,
(3) relative lack of criminal history, and (4) strong dedication to his family. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 After a shooting incident on October 3, 2018, the State charged defendant with aggravated
battery (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)) and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)).
Defendant pleaded guilty to UUW and, in exchange, the State dismissed the aggravated battery
charge. There was no specific agreement about a sentence, but defendant would be eligible for
day-for-day credit against his sentence.
¶5 The factual basis for the plea was as follows. On October 3, 2018, Rockford police officers
responded to a report of shots fired on the 1500 block of Birch Court. Officers learned that a
victim, Woody Ward, had been taken to SwedishAmerican Hospital. Officers met with Ward,
who said that he had been shot in the leg. Ward reported that he saw a man and two women enter
a convenience store, A & M Food Mart (A & M). When the man left A & M, he walked toward
the Blackhawk Courts Housing Complex. Ward saw that the man had a gun. The man fired several
shots, and one of the shots wounded Ward. By comparing A & M ’s surveillance video and
defendant’s photograph from the Winnebago County jail, defendant was identified as the shooter.
¶6 At the sentencing hearing, Officer Kathryn Kubik testified that she responded to the scene
of the shooting. Officers found shell casings in front of an apartment at 1515 Birch Court, and the
unit itself had been struck. She interviewed Nazeaire Henderson, who said that, before the
shooting, he was at the Boys and Girls Club with his friend “Boogie.” A fight broke out among
some children, and later some of the parents became involved. Henderson walked away and was
standing in front of A & M when he saw some of those adults arguing outside 1500 Birch Court.
One of the adults was someone Henderson referenced only as Boogie’s uncle. Boogie’s uncle
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2021 IL App (2d) 200327-Uwalked to A & M with two women. As Henderson spoke with Boogie’s uncle, he lifted his shirt
and revealed a gun in his waistband. Boogie’s uncle then went inside A & M with the two women.
When the three emerged from A & M, they walked toward 1500 Birch Court. Henderson then
heard gunshots but did not witness any shooting.
¶7 Officer Joshua Arthur testified that, on October 9, 2018, he interviewed Ward at the
Winnebago County jail. Ward had been charged with possessing and firing a gun during the
October 3 incident. Ward told Arthur that there had been a fight between some children at the
Boys and Girls Club earlier that day. Later, some adults became involved. Ward saw a man in
the company of two women. The man was looking and pointing at him. The three went inside
A & M and, when they came back out, the man shot at Ward, hitting him in the leg. Ward returned
fire.
¶8 Surveillance video from A & M showed a black man enter the store, followed a short time
later by two women. The man left the store and walked toward Blackhawk Courts. He stopped at
a street corner. He held up his right arm and pointed it northeast in a shooting stance. There was
what appeared to be a muzzle flash.
¶9 Arthur testified that he showed the video to another officer, who identified defendant as
the shooter. Also, Arthur obtained a still photo of the shooter from the video. Based on that photo,
Arthur confirmed that defendant was the shooter.
¶ 10 The video was played in court as Arthur described defendant walking into and out of the
A & M, then raising his hand in a shooting stance. Arthur described what appeared to be a muzzle
flash. Arthur testified that he learned that the fight at the Boys and Girls Club involved a relative
of defendant and a relative of Ward.
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2021 IL App (2d) 200327-U¶ 11 Defendant’s grandmother, Ella Trammel (Ella), testified in mitigation. She said that,
before his incarceration, defendant took her to doctor’s appointments, helped around the house,
and cooked for her. When defendant was four years old, the Department of Children and Family
Services removed defendant from his mother’s custody and placed him with Ella. His mother was
“being wild” at that time, and his father was not in his life.
¶ 12 Jasmine Box testified that she has been in a relationship with defendant since 2003. They
had a son, T.J., who was three years old at the time of sentencing. Defendant had been working
and supporting T.J. Before going to jail, defendant spent every day with T.J. Box and T.J. would
visit defendant in jail. T.J. did not want to leave after the visits.
¶ 13 Defendant’s presentence report showed that he had numerous contacts with the juvenile
justice system, beginning at age seven. In 2004, at age 16, he was convicted of attempted murder.
Describing that offense, defendant reported that he and others were paid to harm someone. He
was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and was paroled in 2014. Since then, he was convicted
of misdemeanor possession of cannabis and two minor traffic offenses, until his arrest on the
present charge.
¶ 14 The trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years’ imprisonment. In imposing the sentence,
the court noted that defendant’s conduct not only threatened serious harm but that Ward was shot
in the leg. The court also stressed the need to deter gun violence. The court was concerned that a
shorter sentence might send a message “that it’s not a big deal to have a gun, that it’s not a big deal
to use a gun, that it’s not a big deal to fire a gun at someone, that it’s not a big deal to be a felon
and have a gun because the sentence imposed is not going to be a [sic] serious.” Although the
court noted the disturbing facts underlying defendant’s 2004 attempted murder conviction, the
court stated that it was not giving much weight to defendant’s juvenile and criminal history in light
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2021 IL App (2d) 200327-Uof recent research suggesting that the adolescent brain is not fully formed. The court noted,
however, that defendant was 31 years old when he committed the present offense and that “[t]his
isn’t attendant characteristics of youth territory.” The court found that the offense was the result
of reflection, not serious provocation as defense counsel argued. The court noted that defendant
went into a convenience store. While there, he had the opportunity to detach himself from the
situation by simply walking away in a different direction. Instead, defendant decided to return to
the scene and use a gun. The court found it “disheartening” that a defendant, who had a stable
relationship and a young, son “would put himself in a situation voluntarily, purposely and
intentionally to go back to a scene, whatever that scene was, instead of go[ing] home.” Defendant
timely appeals.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant contends that the 11-year sentence was an abuse of discretion. He maintains
that the trial court gave insufficient consideration to his rehabilitative potential, as demonstrated
by his taking responsibility by pleading guilty. He further argues that the court failed to consider
adequately his relative lack of juvenile and criminal history, his expressions of remorse, his sincere
devotion to his family, and the hardship that his extended incarceration would impose on his family
members. While acknowledging his prior conviction for the extraordinarily serious offense of
attempted murder, defendant notes that he was only 16 years old when he committed that offense.
Since being released from prison in 2014, he had led a relatively law-abiding life until his arrest
for this offense.
¶ 17 While Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) grants a reviewing court
the power to “reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court,” a reviewing court “may not alter
a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” People v. Alexander, 239
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2021 IL App (2d) 200327-UIll. 2d 205, 212 (2010). A court’s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference because the
court “has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general
moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the
reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would
have weighed these factors differently.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). In weighing
the factors, “a trial court is not required to give a defendant’s rehabilitative potential more weight
in its sentencing decision than it gives the seriousness of the offense. [Citation.] In fact, the
seriousness of the offense has been called the most important factor to consider in imposing
sentence.” People v. Spencer, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102 (1992). A sentence within the statutory
limits will not be disturbed unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or
manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Mauricio, 2021 IL App (2d)
190619, ¶ 33.
¶ 18 The trial court here did not abuse its discretion. The offense was undoubtedly serious.
Ward was hospitalized. Moreover, the shooting occurred in a residential area, and Kubik testified
that a bullet struck a residence in the area, creating the potential for more injuries. And, despite
his attempts to downplay it, defendant’s juvenile record is a lengthy series of offenses of increasing
seriousness culminating in his conviction of attempted murder. Also, the court properly noted the
need to deter others from casually carrying and using guns.
¶ 19 Defendant argues that the court did not adequately consider several mitigating factors. He
argues that he accepted responsibility by pleading guilty without a sentencing cap in place, thus
essentially throwing himself on the court’s mercy. Defendant’s characterization is not entirely
accurate. Defendant was eligible for an extended term sentence of up to 14 years on the aggravated
UUW conviction. The State agreed to dismiss the aggravated battery charge, which would have
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2021 IL App (2d) 200327-Urequired him to serve at least 85% of his sentence. Defendant’s plea to UUW would allow him to
serve as little as 50% of any sentence imposed. Thus, defendant can still be said to have “cut a
deal” for himself. See People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399 (2009) (given the charges
the State dismissed in exchange for the defendant’s pleas, it was not clear whether the defendant
was “ ‘owning up’ ” to his conduct or merely cutting a deal for himself). In any event, this fact
alone does not require minimum sentences. Id.¶ 20 Defendant emphasizes that his sole prior felony conviction was for an offense committed
when he was 16 years old. He contends that this conviction was entitled to little weight given
studies that show a person’s brain is not fully developed until their mid-20s. See generally Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471-72 (2012). Indeed, the trial court stated that it would not give much
weight to defendant’s criminal history. But the court also noted that defendant committed the
present offense when he was 31 years old and that this was not “attendant characteristics of youth
territory.” The court further observed that the offense was not a product of impulsivity. Instead,
defendant made a conscious decision to carry a gun despite knowing that, as a convicted felon, he
was not allowed to have one. He then entered a convenience store before returning and escalating
the dispute with a gun. Thus, as the court noted, defendant had an opportunity to “cool off” and
distance himself from the situation but instead chose to return to the conflict.
¶ 21 Defendant argues that his devotion to his family, including his grandmother, his girlfriend,
and his young son, deserved more weight in mitigation. However, the trial court found it
“disheartening” that defendant, despite his professed devotion to his family, made a considered
decision to attempt to settle a petty dispute with a handgun. In summary, the trial court
appropriately balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors. We will not substitute our judgment
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2021 IL App (2d) 200327-Ufor that of the trial court just because we would have weighed them differently. See Stacey, 193
Ill. 2d at 209.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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