In re C.W. ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (5th) 210061-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/06/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NOS. 5-21-0061, 5-21-0062 cons.
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re C.W. and N.W., Minors ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Richland County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) Nos. 16-JA-14 and 16-JA-15
)
)
Venessa W., ) Honorable
) Matthew J. Hartrich,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WHARTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where the trial court’s orders finding that Venessa was an unfit parent were not
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm the orders. Where the
trial court’s orders concluding that the best interests of the minor children were
served by termination of Venessa’s parental rights were not manifestly erroneous,
we affirm the orders.
¶2 Venessa W. appeals from the trial court’s orders finding that she was an unfit parent and
that her parental rights should be terminated. On appeal, she argues that these orders are erroneous.
We affirm the trial court’s orders. 1
1
This appeal is subject to the mandatory accelerated disposition rules of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311
(eff. July 1, 2018). The timeline for disposition can be modified for good cause shown. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff.
July 1, 2018). This case is a consolidated case of two appeals. The process of consolidation, the filing of the record
1
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 C.W. is a male child born on May 16, 2014. N.W. is a female child born on May 19, 2015.
Venessa is the mother of both children. The children have different biological fathers. Vincent S.
is the biological father of N.W. and lives in Arkansas. Levi W. is the biological father of C.W. and
lives in Indiana.2
¶5 A hotline report was made regarding C.W. and N.W. after their infant brother, B.W., died
at home. B.W. died at three months of age. The cause of B.W.’s death was not then known, but
Venessa reported that she had placed B.W. to sleep on his stomach and next to her in bed. B.W.’s
medical chart indicated that Venessa had a history of drug abuse. When taken into custody, N.W.
had multiple bruises on her forehead, on the bridge of her nose, under her eyes, on her neck, on
her stomach, on her back, and on her arms. When N.W.’s arm was held down by her side, the line
of bruising on her arm matched up with the line of bruising on her stomach. Tiffany Wilkinson, a
worker with the organization Stopping Woman Abuse Now (SWAN), informed the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) caseworker that she witnessed N.W. fall and
hit her head on a television stand and that generally she always seemed to be bumping into things.
After a full body check of C.W., no bruises were found. Venessa indicated that no one else lived
in the Olney home she shared with her children. Venessa had prior incidents in both the Illinois
and the Indiana departments for children services. All reports, however, were either unfounded or
on appeal, and an appointment of the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor to represent the State
resulted in a later timeline and allowed for modification of the timeline.
2
Neither father is involved in this appeal. The trial court found that Venessa and the fathers were unfit parents
in the same order. While the best interest hearings were held on February 2, 2021, in Venessa’s cases, the best interest
hearings for the fathers were scheduled on a later date.
2
unsubstantiated. Upon removal from Venessa’s home, both C.W. and N.W. were placed in a
traditional foster placement because no family or fictive kin were identified.
¶6 On November 22, 2016, the State held the shelter care hearing. The court found that there
was probable cause to find that both children were neglected, and that there was an immediate and
urgent necessity to remove the minors from Venessa’s home because it was contrary to their
welfare, safety, or best interest to remain. The court granted temporary custody to DCFS.
¶7 DCFS created its initial family service plan on December 29, 2016, for Venessa. Venessa
self-reported criminal charges in Indiana including theft of vehicles and items from stores as well
as drug-related charges. She previously served a three-month incarceration in Indiana. She
participated in and graduated from drug court in 2015. As of the date of the service plan, Venessa
was not then on parole or probation. Venessa had also been in Indiana foster care from the age of
14 to 18 and had a 2011 psychiatric hospitalization in Terre Haute, Indiana, from a drug overdose.
She reported being sexually abused by her stepfather and raped by unknown perpetrators when she
was 16. She also suffered from the absence and mental illness of her mother and physical abuse
by her mother and stepfather. Venessa had been unable to maintain employment or stable housing.
As of the date of the service plan, she was living in a three-bedroom apartment, but believed she
was at risk of losing funding for the apartment because the children had been removed from her
care.
¶8 DCFS had Venessa take a Child Abuse Potential Inventory test on December 13, 2016.
The results revealed that Venessa was at very high risk of future child physical abuse, and she was
in distress and need of assistance to address maladaptive and problematic thoughts, beliefs, or
perceptions. On the same date, DCFS administered the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale.
From that test, DCFS found that Venessa was experiencing possible depressive symptoms.
3
¶9 DCFS’s first service plan for Venessa included the following action steps:
(1) attend, participate, and successfully complete mental health counseling;
(2) agrees to discuss her trauma history and her subsequent emotional problems;
(3) agrees to discuss the grief and loss component to address the recent loss of her son;
(4) agrees to sign a release of information;
(5) agrees to follow the recommendations of her mental health therapist;
(6) agrees to cooperate with DCFS;
(7) agrees to notify worker within 24 hours if anyone moves in or out of the house;
(8) agrees to maintain housing;
(9) agrees to actively participate in weekly supervised visitation;
(10) agrees to provide worker monthly verification of her employment;
(11) agrees to allow the worker in her residence announced and unannounced;
(12) agrees to obtain and maintain employment;
(13) agrees to remain substance free including alcohol;
(14) agrees to complete an assessment for substance abuse if she fails a drug test;
(15) agrees to submit to random drug screens and understands a refusal is a positive
test;
(16) agrees to sign a release with her substance abuse provider from Indiana so the
DCFS worker can ensure she completed substance abuse treatment;
(17) agrees to attend, participate, and successfully complete a psychiatric assessment;
(18) agrees to follow the recommendation of the doctor;
(19) agrees to notify worker of medications she is taking and of all medication changes;
(20) agrees to take her medication as prescribed;
4
(21) agrees to attend, participate, and successfully complete a psychological
evaluation;
(22) agrees to share background information about herself with the psychologist;
(23) agrees to follow the recommendations of the psychological service provider;
(24) agrees to sign a release of information so the psychological evaluation referral
can be completed;
(25) agrees to attend, participate, and successfully complete parenting classes;
(26) agrees to disclose any issues or struggles she has with her parenting;
(27) agrees to follow the recommendations of the parenting instructor; and
(28) agrees to demonstrate her new parenting techniques during her parent/child visits.
This service plan and its action steps essentially remained the same throughout the entire time that
C.W. and N.W. were under DCFS guardianship. Later in the case, DCFS added domestic violence
counseling to the service plan and action steps because Venessa became involved in an abusive
relationship.
¶ 10 On April 27, 2017, the court held the adjudicatory hearing. Only one witness testified at
this hearing. Jamie Wells, the DCFS investigator on this case, testified about her investigation and
the resulting report that she prepared. She was assigned to the case on November 18, 2016, shortly
after DCFS received the hotline call following the death of infant B.W. Wells took photographs of
all of the bruises on N.W.’s body. C.W. did not have any visible bruises or injuries. After the
examination, she took protective custody of N.W. and C.W.
¶ 11 Wells interviewed Venessa, but she offered no explanation of how N.W. received the
injuries, other than to say that N.W. fell often. She told Wells that she was the only person caring
for the children. Venessa stated that she had left bruises on the children after spanking them on
5
their buttocks. A SWAN worker, Wilkinson, informed Wells that she witnessed N.W. fall and
strike her forehead on a corner of a television stand, but that was the only eyewitness information
about N.W.’s injuries. Wilkinson also stated that N.W. fell often. Having gathered information
from a Women, Infants, and Children program (WIC) nurse, Wells was able to establish a timeline
for the bruises on N.W.’s face. On November 14, 2016, the WIC nurse saw N.W. and she had no
bruises on her face.
¶ 12 As Venessa was the only caregiver for N.W. during those four days, Wells indicated
Venessa for a substantial risk of physical injury, environment injurious and neglectful to the health
and welfare of the children, and for violence and intimidation towards her children. She also
indicated Venessa for the bruises and injuries on N.W.’s body. Finally, she indicated Venessa for
bone fractures 3 to B.W. based upon information received from other medical professionals. Wells
testified that both C.W. and N.W. had bone scans which were negative for fractures. Although
Venessa was ultimately found not responsible for B.W.’s death, Wells noted that B.W.’s cause of
death was positional asphyxia which resulted from Venessa placing him on his stomach to sleep
and co-sleeping with him. She noted that records of unfounded investigations involving Venessa
reflect that DCFS advised her multiple times to place the children on their backs for sleep.
¶ 13 At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court noted facts contained within
Wells’s report that he found particularly relevant. First, he noted that when the ambulance arrived
at Venessa’s home on November 18, 2016, EMT Jeff Johnson noted that B.W. had been deceased
for some time. In addition, as later learned, B.W. had a fracture of the radius bone in his left
forearm. The court noted that even though DCFS found that B.W.’s death was not caused by
3
Initially, medical evidence indicated that B.W. had more than one fracture, but later in the final report, it
was determined that he sustained only one fracture.
6
Venessa, that finding did not mean that Venessa had not committed neglectful acts to B.W. Wells’s
report also included information from WIC nurse, Deb Doan, that on October 24, 2016, Venessa
informed her that B.W. slept on his stomach. Doan attempted to educate Venessa about the need
for B.W. to sleep on his back and the risk of sudden infant death syndrome if he continued to sleep
on his stomach. The court also found that B.W.’s fracture discovered after his death was highly
suspicious. The court stated that it was nonsensical that Venessa, the only caregiver for C.W. and
N.W., would have no idea how N.W. came to have so many bruises. Two sets of the bruises—the
abdomen/arm and the face—were in a straight-line pattern. The court cited to In re R.G., 2012 IL
App (1st) 120193, which stated that there was statutory support that physical injury by “other than
accidental” does not require a specific intent to harm the child. The court stated that at this
adjudicatory level, the question is not if the parent abused the minor but whether the minor was
abused. The court concluded that the State met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence based upon the facts presented at the hearing and in the indicated reports that C.W. and
N.W. were at substantial risk of physical injury.
¶ 14 On May 18, 2017, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. Venessa had passed two
random drug tests, and so DCFS did not mandate that she undergo a substance abuse assessment.
She had been prescribed medication by the psychiatrist, but she had inconsistently taken the
medication as prescribed. She was in psychological counseling but had much more work to do.
Venessa was then employed with two jobs. Venessa had completed parenting classes, but DCFS
found that her parenting abilities still needed improvement. C.W. and N.W. had been in three
placements since entering care. The court found that Venessa was unable, for some reason other
than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor children, and
maintained guardianship and custody of the minor children with DCFS.
7
¶ 15 DCFS filed a status hearing report dated July 24, 2017, in preparation for a status hearing
scheduled for August 17, 2017. As of that date, Venessa was in a relationship with a man named
Brian who had a pending child endangerment charge to his biological children. Venessa had quit
one of her two jobs. She was not following the prescription medication guidelines. Visitation with
her children continued to be problematic as Venessa maintained little structure during her visits
and wanted to allow the children to watch inappropriate movies. She overslept for one visit on July
5, 2017, and she called DCFS in a panic. A DCFS aide observed and commented that Venessa was
behaving differently that same day. Law enforcement responded to Venessa’s home at her request
due to a separate harassment issue, and the officer believed that Venessa’s behaviors suggested
that she was at the end of a drug binge. DCFS asked Venessa to submit to a random drug test on
July 7, 2017, but she did not appear, stating that she was in Indiana. After that date, visits with the
children were moved to the DCFS office. For the past couple of months preceding the report,
Venessa had become increasingly combative with DCFS workers. On July 21, DCFS scheduled
another random drug test. At that request, Venessa admitted that she had consumed alcohol and
hydrocodone. She stated that the hydrocodone had been prescribed for her after her June 2017
surgery, but she no longer had the prescription bottle. Based on these admissions, DCFS requested
that Venessa complete a substance abuse assessment.
¶ 16 On October 6, 2017, DCFS filed its permanency hearing report with the court. DCFS
reported that Venessa’s paramour, Brian, had been arrested twice for aggravated battery for
domestic violence incidents involving Venessa. Venessa was arrested at the second of the two
incidents for obstruction of justice for providing false information. Venessa showed up for a visit
with her children and exhibited two black eyes. At this point, DCFS informed Venessa that she
needed to complete domestic violence victimization services. As of the date of the report, Venessa
8
had only missed one of her weekly visits with her children. The permanency goal was to return the
children home within 12 months.
¶ 17 DCFS filed its October 30, 2017, service plan with the court on January 4, 2018. In this
plan, DCFS rated Venessa’s progress on her service plan action steps as unsatisfactory, noting that
while she was engaging in services, there had not been any substantial demonstrated progress.
C.W. was continuing to struggle in placements and with controlling his actions and behaviors. He
was in his fifth foster placement at the time that the service plan was written. The court’s January
11, 2018, permanency order stated that Venessa had not made reasonable and substantial progress
toward returning C.W. and N.W. home. The court also ordered DCFS to help facilitate a new
psychological examination for Venessa with a different examiner.
¶ 18 On June 8, 2018, DCFS filed its permanency hearing report in anticipation of a June 15,
2018, permanency hearing. DCFS indicated that Venessa had not made satisfactory progress or
made reasonable efforts on her service plan action steps. All visits with the children remained
supervised.
¶ 19 DCFS filed an amended report with the court on August 27, 2018. Venessa’s parenting
classes had been terminated due to her threats to staff. Venessa had begun utilizing the domestic
violence services and had joined a victim’s group. Venessa completed her second psychological
evaluation. She quit going to the therapist that she had been seeing because of the distance from
her home. Venessa reported that she was seeing a new therapist but did not have the therapist’s
name or phone number. C.W. was four years old on the date of the report and continued to struggle
in foster placements. He was then in his sixth placement. DCFS recategorized C.W. as a
specialized foster child because of his behaviors. N.W. was then three years of age and was doing
well in her placement. Venessa was consistent with her supervised visits with the children.
9
However, her behavior was considered disrespectful and inappropriate by DCFS in that she would
allow the children to misbehave, eat snacks before finishing their meals, and damage the walls in
the room. In addition, Venessa would lock supervisors out of the room, and after hiding the baby
monitor in the visitation room, Venessa stole the monitor. Both children struggled with behavioral
issues and following rules immediately after each visit with Venessa upon return to their foster
placements.
¶ 20 On September 7, 2018, the trial court entered a permanency order finding that Venessa had
not made reasonable and substantial progress toward returning the children home. The court also
found that Venessa had not achieved the goal of returning the children home because she was not
completing the required services. Guardianship and custody of the two children remained with
DCFS.
¶ 21 DCFS filed its November 7, 2018, service plan with the court. In summarization of
Venessa’s plan, DCFS noted that she had recently been arrested for aggravated battery to a peace
officer and for domestic battery. As of the date of the report, she was not actively engaged in
services. Upon being arrested, Venessa lost her home and her job. DCFS reported that she was
currently homeless and unemployed. Venessa was rated unsatisfactory on most of her action steps,
with satisfactory progress only on administrative tasks like signing documents requested by DCFS.
She had admitted to using marijuana and had begun refusing mandatory drug screens. She also
was not taking prescribed medication for her psychiatric care. Venessa had completed her second
psychological evaluation. She was diagnosed with PTSD, and the evaluator concluded that
Venessa should be considered for inpatient treatment/rehabilitation, and that she required long-
term counseling.
10
¶ 22 DCFS next filed its January 15, 2019, service plan with the court. As of that date, Venessa
continued to be homeless and unemployed. Her progress on her action steps was overall
unsatisfactory. DCFS noted that Venessa had not been demonstrating her ability to avoid a violent
domestic relationship that could put her children in an unsafe environment.
¶ 23 On January 31, 2019, DCFS filed its permanency hearing report with the court and reported
that Venessa had not made satisfactory progress or reasonable efforts on her service plan action
steps. DCFS recommended that the permanency goal be changed to substitute care pending court
determination on termination of Venessa’s parental rights.
¶ 24 On February 4, 2019, the State filed its motion seeking to terminate Venessa’s parental
rights. In that motion, the State alleged that Venessa had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct
the conditions that were the basis of the removal of her children, that she failed to make reasonable
progress toward the return of the minors to her care during any nine-month period following the
adjudication of abuse or neglect, that she had caused extreme or repeated cruelty to the minor
children, that she was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities, and that there was sufficient
justification to believe that the inability to discharge parental responsibilities would extend beyond
a reasonable period of time.
¶ 25 DCFS filed its status hearing report on April 5, 2019. In the report, DCFS reported that
C.W. was continuing to have numerous behavioral and violent issues in school. N.W. was doing
well in her placement and in prekindergarten. Venessa’s mental health therapist reported that an
impediment to successful completion of services was Venessa’s attitude that she did not need
therapy.
11
¶ 26 DCFS filed its April 26, 2019, service plan with the court. Venessa had secured a two-
bedroom home in Olney, and she had obtained a job. She had completed domestic violence
counseling. Venessa had received a prescription for medical marijuana.
¶ 27 DCFS filed a permanency hearing with the court on August 26, 2019. DCFS indicated that
none of the safety threats that were present when the children were removed from the home had
been eliminated. Venessa had not made satisfactory progress or reasonable efforts toward
completion of her service plan action steps. DCFS noted that permanency goals could not be
achieved because of a lack of progress, and that due to the age of the children, it was critical to be
able to offer them permanency.
¶ 28 DCFS filed its November 1, 2019, service plan with the court. DCFS stated that Venessa
would not acknowledge the safety threats or risk factors that were present. Progress on the service
plan action steps remained insufficient.
¶ 29 DCFS filed its permanency hearing report with the court on February 25, 2020. DCFS
reported that Venessa continued to fail to make satisfactory progress or reasonable efforts on her
service plan action steps. DCFS had visited Venessa’s new home and found it to be acceptable.
The court noted that a woman obtained an order of protection against Venessa on October 22,
2019. Venessa had also engaged in a series of threatening events in the local DCFS office and in
phone calls or interactions with DCFS and agency staff. Venessa called and yelled at a DCFS staff
member on January 31, 2020, and then proceeded to call the office 33 additional times. On
November 6, 2019, Venessa violently began banging on a DCFS window after she had left
personal items inside. On November 5, 2019, Help at Home (a DCFS transportation agency) called
because Venessa refused to wear a seat belt and exhibited a lot of possible twitching drug use
related behaviors. On October 30, 2019, police were called to the DCFS office because Venessa
12
refused to leave. Venessa also refused to inform DCFS of the identity of a paramour in her life. In
December 2019, Venessa was arrested on a warrant and charged with possession of a controlled
substance. C.W. continued to have extreme behavioral difficulties and had been approved for
residential care. DCFS noted that Venessa was having increased issues during supervised visits,
including telling the children not to listen to the supervisors. Overall, Venessa refused to follow
visit rules and accept redirection.
¶ 30 On February 24, 2020, DCFS prepared an updated report on the status of visitation. On
February 19, 2020, an incident occurred at Venessa’s visit, and the visit was ended early. Venessa
attempted to prevent the children from leaving the room, and it was later noticed that C.W. had a
mark on his body. The visit was scheduled for two hours. C.W. screamed for more than one hour
of the visit. Venessa, C.W., and N.W. were all throwing items despite attempted redirection by the
visitation specialist. The visit was ended when Venessa told the children that DCFS was keeping
them from coming home with her. The visitation specialist intervened to end the visit, and Venessa
held the children’s coats above her head so that the children could not retrieve them. Venessa told
the children not to go with the visitation specialist and put the children behind her in a corner of
the room. The security guard asked that someone call 911. Law enforcement arrived. The children
were then placed in a DCFS transport car with the visitation specialist and Venessa was outside
next to the car. Venessa banged her hand on a window of the car when the visitation specialist
refused to lower the car window. Venessa went back inside accompanied by law enforcement to
gather her belongings. The security guard asked Venessa to clean up the room, but she refused and
left it in disarray.
¶ 31 After the contentious visit, a hotline call was made due to the mark on C.W.’s body.
Venessa’s mental health therapist was consulted by DCFS and reported that Venessa was unstable.
13
DCFS decided that to keep the children safe, in-person visitation must be suspended. DCFS
informed Venessa of this decision, and Venessa hung up on the caller. Then, Venessa began
immediately sending semi-threatening text messages to a DCFS worker about the suspension of
visitation.
¶ 32 On August 11, 2020, Venessa filed a petition attempting to increase visitation. A hearing
was held on the petition on September 1, 2020, at which DCFS workers appeared and testified
about the disturbing text messages sent by Venessa. The court denied Venessa’s petition.
¶ 33 After numerous difficult interactions with Venessa, DCFS filed a petition seeking an order
of protection. The petition detailed Venessa’s behaviors toward DCFS workers after the September
1, 2020, hearing when the trial court denied Venessa’s petition for unsupervised visitation.
Venessa began persistently sending electronic messages and emails to a DCFS caseworker that
showed “a disrespectful, paranoid, and irrational hostility.” DCFS sought the order of protection
against Venessa to stop direct communication with DCFS case management representatives, and
to ask that all future interactions go through Venessa’s attorney. During the hearing, Venessa
testified that she grew frustrated by not having her children and that she had grown weary of the
case manager “not recognizing everything” she had done. Venessa admitted that she did call the
Olney Police Department and told them that she was going to go and kick down the DCFS door.
Venessa testified that she really had no intent to do that act, but that DCFS “had no right taking
my visit from me, and that made mad; not violent, but mad.” She also testified that although she
could not remember what names she called the caseworker in her emails, she did use derogatory
names. Venessa acknowledged that on two occasions the Olney Police Department had to be called
to the DCFS office during her visitation time. On October 30, 2020, the trial court granted DCFS’s
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petition for an order of protection. On December 30, 2020, the court entered an order that the order
of protection would be enforced until October 20, 2022.
¶ 34 On November 24, 2020, the trial court held the fitness hearing and found that Venessa was
unfit by clear and convincing evidence. Five witnesses testified. We will briefly summarize each
witness’s testimony.
¶ 35 Jamie Wells, the DCFS investigator, was called to testify. Wells has a master’s degree in
community counseling and as of the date of the hearing had worked for DCFS for 18 years. After
DCFS received the hotline call about the death of infant B.W., the sibling of C.W. and N.W., Wells
was contacted to investigate the case relative to the safety of C.W. and N.W., who were still in the
home with Venessa, the mother of these three children. Wells testified consistent with the
testimony she gave at the August 27, 2017, adjudicatory hearing about the bruising on N.W.’s
body, about a SWAN worker witnessing N.W. fall and hit her head on a television stand, and about
B.W.’s arm fracture. Wells also testified that the medical professionals who examined N.W.
believed that some of her bruises were consistent with ligature marks in that N.W. may have been
tied up. Venessa told Wells that she was overwhelmed with the children, and that she was the only
caregiver for them. At the conclusion of the investigation after B.W.’s death, DCFS took protective
custody of the children due to B.W.’s death and his reported fractures, due to the multiple bruises
of concern on N.W., and due to the young ages of the children, which also placed C.W. at risk.
¶ 36 DCFS child welfare specialist, Beth Volk, was next called to testify at the fitness hearing.
Volk has a bachelor’s degree in social work and had also received additional training through
DCFS. Volk was assigned to be Venessa’s caseworker in November 2016.
¶ 37 As of the date of the hearing, Volk testified that C.W. was in a residential facility and N.W.
was in a traditional foster home. C.W. was placed in the residential facility on October 14, 2020,
15
and N.W. had been in her same foster home for 3½ years. C.W. was reported to have several
special needs requiring intense services due to his behavior and mental health. Specifically, C.W.
was receiving individual and group therapy, intense placement services at the residential facility,
and had an Individualized Education Plan. N.W. was being evaluated for an Individualized
Education Plan, and she had recently been provided with mental health counseling to assist with
behavioral issues.
¶ 38 As of the date of the hearing, Volk testified that Venessa had lived for approximately one
year in an Olney apartment. DCFS approved the apartment. Volk testified that she believed that
Venessa was then unemployed, but that Venessa’s attorney may have told her that she had just
been hired in a manufacturing job in early November. Prior to that potential employment,
Venessa’s source of income was unemployment benefits.
¶ 39 Volk testified that there had been 11 service plans prepared for Venessa, with the latest one
dated November 2020. Current services recommended for Venessa were mental health counseling,
parenting services, psychiatric services, substance abuse testing, and domestic violence services.
The services, except for domestic violence services that was added in mid-2017, were all part of
Venessa’s plan since November and December 2016. On two occasions, Venessa was directed to
have a psychological evaluation, and she completed both, and that action step was removed from
her service plan. As of the date of the fitness hearing, Venessa was not engaged in mental health
services, was not following the recommendations of her psychologist, and was not engaged in
parenting classes. Although Venessa had a history of substance abuse, DCFS found that Venessa
was cooperative with substance abuse services. Venessa completed domestic violence services,
but DCFS continued to monitor her personal relationships with men. Volk testified that Venessa
fired her mental health therapist in August of 2020 and had not resumed counseling since that time.
16
¶ 40 Volk testified that although Venessa did not always have her own home throughout the
history of this case, she was never actually homeless in the sense that she was not living on the
streets or in a homeless shelter. However, she did turn to friends for housing at times. Financial
responsibility remained an issue, because Venessa frequently changed jobs.
¶ 41 After identifying the 11 service plans she prepared for Venessa, Volk testified that she had
made unsatisfactory progress on all 11 service plans. Her ratings were based upon a review of
records received from service providers, as well as interaction and in-person meetings with
Venessa. Volk explained that Venessa needed to demonstrate to DCFS and other people involved
with her services that she was not simply going through the motions. More specifically, Volk stated
that Venessa needed to have been actively engaged in the services provided to her and to be able
to exhibit that she was practicing what she had learned from these services in her daily life.
¶ 42 Volk confirmed that C.W. and N.W. had been in DCFS care for almost four years as of the
date of the fitness hearing. She testified that a conservative amount of time for a parent to complete
the initial service plan was 9 to 12 months. Volk testified that looking at Venessa’s behavior, she
had regressed over the four years. Also, throughout the four years of this case, Venessa had become
rasher and began having outbursts during court proceedings, and as a result of some of those
behaviors, DCFS felt that they needed to seek an order of protection against her. Overall, Volk
testified that Venessa was still not close to completing her service plan objectives. Volk opined
that it was unlikely that Venessa would ever complete her services.
¶ 43 Volk testified that Venessa’s supervised visits with C.W. and N.W. were suspended after
the February 2020 incident in a visitation room with C.W. that required police intervention, but
DCFS resumed supervised visitation in April 2020 via Zoom. However, Volk testified that
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Venessa would not follow Zoom protocol and those failures resulted in the early termination of
her Zoom supervised visits on at least five occasions.
¶ 44 Rebecca Arnold, a family service specialist employed by Addus Healthcare, testified that
she supervises visits between mothers and their children. Arnold testified that she had supervised
Venessa’s visits from July 2019 to February 2020. During these visits, there were many problems.
Arnold testified that there was never any structure to the visits. She explained that toys and trash
were always thrown all over the room, and that in general there was constant commotion and
loudness. Arnold was present at the last in-person visit that Venessa had with her children. She
described the scene as one of utter chaos with no one listening or taking any sort of direction.
Police were called. Arnold called to C.W. to exit the room, but before he could exit the room,
Venessa grabbed him and spun him back into the visit room. Arnold testified that Venessa became
very angry when she was informed that the visit had to be ended early. Venessa allegedly told
Arnold that no one could tell her what to do. During these visits, Venessa called Arnold names in
front of the children to undermine her authority. Arnold testified that Venessa was good with
playing with her children, but oftentimes the playing would devolve into wrestling and then hitting
behaviors that Arnold said were not appropriate.
¶ 45 The State also called Rachel Henson, another Addus Healthcare visitation supervisor.
Henson testified that she had known Venessa for approximately three years. During those three
years, she sometimes supervised her visits, but also provided her with parenting services. Over the
time that she worked with Venessa, Rachel testified that Venessa became more defensive and
aggressive and would not comply with the parenting changes recommended. Henson testified that
in the last parenting session she had with Venessa, she had become verbally aggressive, stating
that she would not change her parenting style for DCFS and that she would continue to parent the
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way that she wanted to parent. Henson was pulled out of the parenting session by her supervisor
who indicated that, based upon what had transpired during this session, Henson could no longer
conduct parenting sessions with Venessa without another worker being present for Henson’s
safety. During visits with her children, Venessa would get very upset with DCFS for attempting
to redirect the visits to stop her and the children from engaging in aggressive and loud behaviors.
Venessa told the children not to talk with the Addus workers, telling the children that the Addus
workers were “nobody.” Henson testified that these chaotic and aggressive behaviors occurred
frequently.
¶ 46 Venessa testified at the fitness hearing. She testified that she currently lived in a nice two-
bedroom apartment. She was then unemployed and received unemployment benefits and food
stamps. She testified that she had been otherwise consistently employed during the four years of
this case. Venessa testified that she did not know about the source of all of N.W.’s bruises, but that
she fell down a lot, and that she thought that the straight-line bruising could have come from N.W.
falling on the shower door track. She testified that she believed she had benefited from mental
health therapy, but that she would not resume therapy. She quit going to her last therapist because
of something she said in their last session that Venessa characterized as a betrayal. She told her
therapist that the world “needed a purge,” but she stated that the “purge” comment was not
intended to be about DCFS or about a specific worker. On the final in-person visit in February
2020, Venessa said that DCFS ended the visit because she was talking to the children about the
case. Specifically, she told the children that DCFS caseworker Volk had taken them from her care.
¶ 47 Venessa testified about her frustration with DCFS, noting that she had tried very hard, and
that no matter how many certificates she achieved, DCFS was not satisfied. She testified that
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although she had learned a lot during the four years of classes, she had never been allowed to
utilize what she had learned.
¶ 48 Venessa was asked about another DCFS report about her that occurred in August 2020.
Apparently, Venessa had befriended two children ages 12 and 14 who frequently had nowhere to
go. For a period of four months, she would allow them to sleep over at her apartment, and if they
called her because they were hungry, she would bring them food. On one night, there was an
incident involving Venessa and these children, a semitruck driver, and the police. Venessa had a
BB gun in her vehicle, and it had been alleged that while she was driving her vehicle, she flashed
the gun at the semitruck driver. She denied that she brandished the weapon, but after the police
stopped her vehicle, the police confiscated the gun. The next day, DCFS went to her apartment
with concerns about the two children in her care because she was prohibited from having children
in her care.
¶ 49 On December 1, 2020, the trial court entered its order finding that Venessa was an unfit
parent because she had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the
bases for the removal of the children from her care. Specifically, the court found that she had failed
to make reasonable progress during any nine-month period after the initial nine-month period
following the adjudicatory hearing. In support of the court’s conclusion, the court noted that the
case began with the asphyxiation death of B.W. while Venessa slept next to him. This child also
had an unexplained bone fracture. N.W. had multiple suspicious unexplained bruises on her body.
After DCFS removed the children from Venessa’s care, DCFS created 11 different service plans
over the span of four years. Venessa had not adequately used the services provided to her, and
DCFS rated her progress on all 11 service plans as unsatisfactory. The court commented on
Venessa’s decision to discontinue mental health therapy services in August 2020, even though
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continuation of those services was mandated by DCFS. The court also noted that Venessa’s
behavior throughout the four years never allowed for her to have unsupervised visits with her
children. The court found that Venessa was an unfit parent by clear and convincing evidence and
modified the permanency goal to substitute care pending court determination of termination of
parental rights.
¶ 50 On February 2, 2021, the trial court held the best interest hearing. A copy of a transcript of
the best interest hearing is not in the record on appeal. On February 9, 2021, the court entered its
orders terminating Venessa’s parental rights to both C.W. and N.W. Venessa timely filed her
notice of appeal contesting the February 9, 2021, orders terminating her parental rights.
¶ 51 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 52 On appeal, Venessa argues that the trial court’s orders that she was an unfit parent and that
her parental rights should be terminated were erroneous.
¶ 53 Section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides the procedural basis for the
involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018). The procedure
involves two steps. In step one, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent is unfit as defined by the Adoption Act. Id.; 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018); In re A.J., 269
Ill. App. 3d 824, 828 (1994). If the trial court finds that the parent is unfit, the process moves to
step two. In step two, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the
child’s best interest that the parent’s rights be terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2018); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337-38 (2010).
¶ 54 On appeal from a trial court’s findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating the parental
rights is in the child’s best interest, the reviewing court must not retry the case but, instead, must
review the trial court’s findings to determine if the findings are against the manifest weight of the
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evidence. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2008). A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence if the opposite conclusion is apparent or if findings appear to be unreasonable,
arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 28
(citing In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1089 (2010)); In re S.R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 356, 360-
61 (2001).
¶ 55 We first review the evidence to determine if the State met its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that Venessa met any of the alleged definitions of an “unfit person”
contained in the State’s motion for termination of parental rights. The trial court determined that
the State met its burden of proof that Venessa failed to make reasonable efforts and failed to make
reasonable progress during any of the nine-month periods after the initial nine-month period.
¶ 56 “Reasonable effort” is determined by a subjective standard that refers to the amount of
effort which is reasonable for that parent. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1066-67 (2006).
The court must determine whether the parent has made committed and diligent efforts toward
correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the minor from the home. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL
App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24.
¶ 57 “Reasonable progress” is determined by an objective standard, based upon the amount of
progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken from the parent. In re
D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17 (citing In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067). “The
benchmark for measuring a parent’s reasonable progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption
Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and court’s directives in light of
the condition that gave rise to the removal of the child and other conditions which later become
known that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the
parent.” Id. (citing In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001)). A parent makes reasonable progress
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when the trial court can find that the progress “is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality”
that the trial court may soon be able to order the return of the minor to the parent’s
custody. Id. (citing In re J.H., 2014 IL App (3d) 140185, ¶ 22).
¶ 58 We review the evidence in this case to determine whether the trial court correctly concluded
that Venessa did not make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that resulted in the removal
of C.W. and N.W. from her home. Here, the conditions that were the basis for removal of the
children from the home began with their younger infant brother’s death. When DCFS removed
C.W. and N.W. from her home, it was discovered that N.W. had multiple suspicious bruising
patterns that Venessa could not explain except to admit that she was the only caregiver for the
children. Later, it was determined that before B.W. had died, he had sustained a forearm fracture.
¶ 59 DCFS created a service plan for Venessa to address the following concerns: psychiatric
and psychological treatment and therapy, avoidance of substances of abuse, maintaining housing
and employment, participation in weekly supervised visitation with her children, and parenting
classes. Later, when Venessa engaged in a relationship that became fraught with domestic
violence, DCFS added domestic violence action steps to her service plan. Throughout the four
years that DCFS was managing Venessa’s 11 service plans, she was continuously rated
unsatisfactory. Eventually, Venessa continued to take her psychiatric medications as prescribed,
and DCFS dropped the substance abuse concerns after she had obtained a prescription for medical
marijuana. Venessa completed parenting classes, but she refused to incorporate the parenting skills
she learned into her supervised visits.
¶ 60 Multiple visits with the children were discontinued early. Police were called to the last in-
person visit, and a hotline call was made to DCFS about a mark later found on C.W.’s body. Visits
were notably and consistently chaotic. Venessa continually berated staff and informed the children
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not to follow their directions. Venessa’s anger and hostility towards the process ultimately resulted
in cessation of in-person visitation and in DCFS seeking an order of protection against her. Finally,
although mental health therapy was something that Venessa herself claimed was beneficial,
Venessa fired her provider because she felt betrayed when her therapist contacted DCFS to warn
them of Venessa’s threat that DCFS and its workers needed to be “purged.”
¶ 61 We find that the trial court fully considered the evidence in the record and at the fitness
hearing. We also find support for the court’s finding in the worsening progression of Venessa’s
behaviors directed to anyone involved in this case. Venessa had no qualms in telling DCFS workers
that she would not follow their “rules,” and she told her children not to follow DCFS rules. Most
recently, DCFS learned that she was taking underage children into her home. In fact, Venessa
testified at the fitness hearing that she had been helping these children for an extended period. In
reviewing Venessa’s original service plan, we note that she was obligated to inform DCFS within
24 hours if anyone moved in or out of her home. Venessa never informed DCFS about the children.
Instead DCFS learned about this situation when she was stopped by police for waving a gun at
another driver. Venessa knew what she needed to accomplish to get the right to have C.W. and
N.W. returned to her. Instead, Venessa continuously opted to follow her own path. We conclude
that the trial court’s finding that Venessa was an “unfit person” was not contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 104.
¶ 62 Having determined that the trial court correctly found that Venessa was an unfit parent, we
turn to the best interest of C.W. and N.W. Termination of a parent’s rights is an extreme act. In re
Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274-75 (1990). A parent maintains a superior right to raise his
or her own children. Id. Once a parent has been determined to be unfit, “the parent’s rights must
yield to the child’s best interest.” In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d 165, 170 (2002); In re J.L.,
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236 Ill. 2d 329, 337-38 (2010). Until the court determines that a parent is unfit, the interests of
both the parent and the child are concurrent “to the extent that they both ‘share a vital interest in
preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.’ ” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363
(2004) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982)). After finding that a parent is
unfit, the State must establish proof that termination of a parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest
by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2018); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at
366. On appeal of a best-interest determination, we must decide whether the trial court’s decision
is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re S.J., 368 Ill. App. 3d 749, 755 (2006).
¶ 63 “[A]t a best-interest[ ] hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d
at 364. The trial court must consider several factors within “the context of the child’s age and
developmental needs” when considering if termination of parental rights serves a child’s best
interest. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). These factors include:
“(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and
clothing;
(b) the development of the child’s identity;
(c) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious;
(d) the child’s sense of attachments, including:
(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as
opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a
sense of being valued);
(ii) the child’s sense of security;
(iii) the child’s sense of familiarity;
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(iv) continuity of affection for the child;
(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;
(e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals;
(f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends;
(g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for stability and
continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives;
(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and
(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” Id.
¶ 64 Here, there is no transcript from the fitness hearing and the trial court did not specifically
identify which factors it considered in its written orders. However, the trial court’s ultimate
determination and order does not need to reference and discuss each factor. In re Tajannah O.,
2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.
¶ 65 On appeal from an order terminating a parent’s rights, the reviewing court gives great
deference to the trial court’s decision because the trial court is in a much better position to see the
witnesses and judge their credibility. In re K.B., 314 Ill. App. 3d 739, 748 (2000). A court’s finding
that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest will not be reversed on appeal unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009).
A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly
demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App.
3d at 1072.
¶ 66 In this case, the record clearly reflects that termination of Venessa’s parental rights was the
appropriate outcome for C.W. and N.W. At the time the children were removed from their home,
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C.W. was two years of age and N.W. was one. By the date of the best interest hearing, they had
lived in foster care for over four years. Both C.W. and N.W. had educational and behavioral
difficulties that required special care. Both children were receiving this care within the foster care
system and were safe.
¶ 67 The February 2, 2021, best interest hearing was not transcribed and is therefore not in the
record on appeal. The appellant has the duty to provide a complete record on appeal. People v.
Leeper, 317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 482 (2000); Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d
314, 319 (2003). In the absence of a complete record on appeal, “the reviewing court will presume
that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual
basis [citations].” Midstate Siding & Window Co., 204 Ill. 2d at 319. Stated differently, without a
complete record, any doubts must be resolved against the appellant. People v. Jennings, 254 Ill.
App. 3d 14, 20 (1993).
¶ 68 From the record we know that caseworker Volk and Venessa both testified at this hearing.
We note that the trial court had the ability to observe the conduct and demeanor of Venessa and
the witness Volk as they testified and had the ability to judge their credibility. See Jackson v.
Bowers, 314 Ill. App. 3d 813, 818 (2000). Additionally, the trial court was familiar with this case
and with the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to terminate
Venessa’s parental rights was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.F., 201
Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002). The record on appeal does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion,
and so we affirm the trial court’s order.
¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Richland County.
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¶ 71 Affirmed.
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