Watford v. Rowe ( 2021 )

NOTICE
2021 IL App (5th) 190434-UNOTICE
Decision filed 10/04/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0434 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
MARLON L. WATFORD, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Randolph County.
)
v. ) No. 16-MR-83
)
JAMES ROWE, JAMIE BOYD, NANCY )
NICHOLSON, and BOBBI WHEELER, ) Honorable
) Eugene E. Gross,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Moore and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the Randolph County circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s
complaint because the plaintiff’s Freedom of Information Act request to the
Kankakee County State’s Attorney’s Office requested discovery materials
that were the subject of a discovery order in the plaintiff’s postconviction
proceedings in the Kankakee County circuit court. Furthermore, the plaintiff
was not entitled to an award of attorney fees, costs, or a civil penalty. Finally,
the Randolph County circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.
¶2 Plaintiff, Marlon L. Watford, appeals from the Randolph County circuit court’s
dismissal of his complaint filed pursuant to section 11 of the Freedom of Information Act
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(FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2016)) and the denial of his motion for default
judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 At all relevant times discussed herein, Watford was an inmate at Menard
Correctional Center in Randolph County, serving a natural life sentence he received in his
criminal case in Kankakee County, case No. 97-CF-578. At the time of the proceedings
below in the Randolph County circuit court, postconviction proceedings regarding his
criminal case were pending in the Kankakee County circuit court.
¶5 On May 21, 2012, Watford, acting pro se, filed a motion for discovery in his
postconviction case in Kankakee County. In his motion for discovery, Watford sought “the
complete autopsy reports and toxicology reports of Michael Calvin” and “a complete copy
of all 412 discovery that the State tendered over during the complete course of [Watford’s]
trial.” The Kankakee County State Attorney’s Office (SAO) opposed Watford’s discovery
motion, arguing that Watford had no right to the materials he sought and alleged that
Watford wished “to go on a fishing expedition.” On February 26, 2016, the Kankakee
County circuit court denied Watford’s motion for discovery, finding that Watford had not
shown “good cause” to grant his motion.
¶6 Thereafter, in April 2016, Watford sent a FOIA request to the SAO requesting, “a
copy of all toxicology reports of Michael Calvin and a copy of all discovery documents
from case number 97-CF-578.” The SAO denied Watford’s request in a letter, citing
section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2016)). The denial letter provided
the following:
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“1. 412 Disclosures. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) exempts information specifically
prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations
implementing federal or State law. The records you have requested are the
subject of a criminal prosecution that has remained an open file. Supreme
Court Rules govern discovery in criminal felony cases (Supreme Court Rule
411). Supreme Court Rule 412 allows the court jurisdiction over disclosures.
Disclosure is further prohibited under Supreme Court Rule 415. Supreme
Court Rule 415(c) further requires that any materials furnished in a criminal
case should remain in the exclusive custody of the attorney and be subject to
other such terms and conditions that the court may provide. The State’s
Attorney risks running afoul of the jurisdiction of the presiding judge if it
were to furnish 412 discovery materials outside of the court proceedings,
without a court order to do so.”
The SAO’s denial letter further provided that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) (eff.
July 1, 2014) exempted any privileged communications or work product from disclosure.
The SAO suggested that Watford direct his request to the “investigating agency” as the
SAO was not “the originating agency of these reports.” Finally, Watford was informed that
he may seek review of the denial of his FOIA request with the Illinois Attorney General’s
Office or institute proceedings in the Kankakee County circuit court.
¶7 On September 27, 2016, Watford filed a pro se complaint pursuant to section 11 of
the FOIA in the Randolph County circuit court. In his complaint, Watford alleged that the
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SAO 1 improperly denied his FOIA request. Watford sought an order compelling the SAO
to turn over the materials he had requested, as well as attorney fees, costs, and a civil
penalty.
¶8 The next day, the Randolph County circuit court entered an order dismissing
Watford’s complaint sua sponte. The Randolph County circuit court found that Watford’s
suit was an attempt to “circumvent the Circuit Court of Kankakee County and to violate
the discovery process.” In its order, the Randolph County circuit court stated that Randolph
County was not the proper venue to direct disclosure of material in Watford’s Kankakee
County case. The Randolph County circuit court further stated that the discovery issues
should be addressed in Watford’s Kankakee County case. Watford appealed.
¶9 On appeal, this court vacated the judgment of the Randolph County circuit court and
remanded Watford’s case for further proceedings because the circuit court prematurely
dismissed Watford’s complaint. See Watford v. Boyd, 2018 IL App (5th) 160468-U. This
court noted that the sua sponte dismissal was entered before the expiration of the 30-day
period for the SAO to file an answer. Watford, 2018 IL App (5th) 160468-U, ¶ 16. We
further noted that there was no indication in the record that the SAO had been served with
summons or a copy of the complaint, or even had actual notice of the filing of the
complaint. Watford, 2018 IL App (5th) 160468-U, ¶ 16.
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At the time Watford filed his complaint, defendant Jamie Boyd was the Kankakee County State’s
Attorney, and defendant Bobbi Wheeler was a paralegal in the SAO’s office. During the pendency of this
case, defendant James Rowe became the Kankakee County State’s Attorney, and defendant Wheeler was
no longer employed at the SAO’s office. Upon Watford’s motion, defendants Rowe and Nancy Nicholson
were substituted for defendants Boyd and Wheeler. For clarity’s sake, we will refer to the defendants
collectively as “the SAO,” unless it is necessary differentiate the individual defendants.
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¶ 10 On remand, Rowe was served with a summons on April 9, 2019. Thereafter, on May
22, 2019, Rowe filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018)). In his combined
motion to dismiss, Rowe asserted that Watford’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to
section 2-619(a)(9) of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018)) because the
requested materials were exempt from disclosure pursuant to section (7)(1)(a) of the FOIA.
Rowe argued that withholding materials pursuant to Rule 415(c) was proper because the
rule precluded disclosure of the materials to Watford because he was not an attorney. Rowe
further argued that Watford’s access to the materials he sought had been limited by the
Kankakee County circuit court, where Watford’s postconviction proceedings were
pending. Rowe contended that Watford “may not utilize FOIA to circumvent the
[Kankakee County circuit court’s] order in his criminal post-conviction proceeding by
suing for the release of the same documents under FOIA.”
¶ 11 As to Watford’s claim for attorney fees, costs, and a civil penalty, Rowe asserted
that Watford’s claim must be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Civil Code (735
ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) for failure to state a claim. Rowe contended that Watford had
failed to allege that the SAO willfully or intentionally failed to comply with the FOIA.
Rowe argued that it responded to Watford’s FOIA request in a timely manner and cited the
applicable exemptions that prevented disclosure of the materials sought. Rowe further
argued that Watford was advised of his right to appeal to the Illinois Attorney General’s
Office or to institute proceedings in the circuit court. Finally, Rowe contended that Watford
was a pro se plaintiff and not entitled to an award of attorney fees or costs. On July 3, 2019,
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Watford filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to Rowe’s motion to dismiss.
The Randolph County circuit court granted Watford an additional 60 days to respond.
¶ 12 On August 9, 2019, Nicholson filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615
of the Civil Code.2 Nicholson argued that she was not a proper defendant in a FOIA action
because she was an individual public employee, not a public body. Nicholson also adopted
Rowe’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 13 On August 12, 2019, Watford filed a motion for default judgment alleging that
Rowe had failed to timely file an answer to Watford’s complaint. Specifically, Watford
argued that Rowe had 30 days to answer Watford’s complaint but filed his motion to
dismiss 13 days after the 30-day deadline. On August 19, 2019, the SAO filed a response
in opposition to Watford’s motion for default judgment. The SAO asserted that they had
answered Watford’s complaint by filing motions to dismiss and that default judgments are
not favored. The SAO argued that Watford’s motion for default judgment should be denied
because he did not move for default judgment before Rowe filed his motion to dismiss.
¶ 14 On August 21, 2019, the Randolph County circuit court denied Watford’s motion
for default judgment. The Randolph County circuit court also granted the SAO’s motion
to dismiss filed on May 22, 2019, and dismissed Watford’s complaint with prejudice.
¶ 15 On September 16, 2019, Watford filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” and a
“Motion in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.” In his motion for reconsideration, Watford
asserted that the Randolph County circuit court improperly dismissed Watford’s complaint
2
The record does not show that Nicholson was ever served. Nevertheless, Nicholson appeared and
filed a motion to dismiss.
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because he had not yet responded to the SAO’s motion to dismiss. Watford argued that the
dismissal order was entered before the expiration of the 60-day extension the circuit court
had granted Watford to respond to the SAO’s motion to dismiss. Watford also argued that
his motion for default judgment should have been granted. In his opposition to the SAO’s
motion to dismiss, Watford argued that the circuit court should have denied the SAO’s
motion.
¶ 16 On September 18, 2019, the Randolph County circuit court entered an order
granting Watford leave to file his opposition to the SAO’s motion to dismiss. The order
provided that after considering Watford’s response, the circuit court determined that the
requested materials were exempt from disclosure. The order further provided that:
“As stated in the Order entered in this case on September 28, 2016, Plaintiff
is an inmate at Menard Correctional Center serving a natural life sentence
(commuted from death) in Kankakee County Case 97-CF-578. Plaintiff has
(or had) pending a postconviction petition in the Kankakee County case. This
action is an attempt to circumvent the Circuit Court of Kankakee County and
to violate the discovery process.”
The circuit court granted the SAO’s motion to dismiss and dismissed Watford’s complaint
with prejudice. This appeal followed.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, Watford argues that the Randolph County circuit court erred in granting
the SAO’s motion to dismiss Watford’s complaint. Specifically, Watford argues: (1) that
the materials he sought in his FOIA request were not exempt from disclosure; (2) that the
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Kankakee County circuit court discovery order did not preclude the disclosure of the
materials he sought in his FOIA request; (3) that he sufficiently pled a cause of action for
attorney fees, costs, and a civil penalty; and (4) that his motion for default judgment should
have been granted.
¶ 19 Before considering whether the Randolph County circuit court properly dismissed
Watford’s complaint, we must set out the parameters of our review. Here, the SAO moved
to dismiss Watford’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Civil Code, which
allowed the SAO to file a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(9) and
2-615. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018). The Randolph County circuit court’s order
provided that the circuit court granted the SAO’s motion pursuant to section 2-619.
¶ 20 The purpose of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is to dispose of issues of law and
easily proved issues of fact early in the litigation. In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor,
2019 IL 122949, ¶ 28. A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) permits the
involuntary dismissal of an alleged claim that is barred by other affirmative matter that
avoids the legal effect of or defeats the claim. Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 28.
The movant admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts that some affirmative
matter defeats the claim. Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 28. When ruling on a
motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619, a court must interpret all pleadings and
supporting documents in favor of the nonmoving party. Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL
122949, ¶ 28. “An affirmative matter is ‘something in the nature of a defense which negates
the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of
material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.’ ” Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL
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122949, ¶ 28 (quoting Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 486 (1994)). We
review a dismissal under section 2-619 de novo. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207
Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003). Furthermore, we may affirm the judgment of the circuit court on
any basis that is supported by the record. Stoll v. United Way of Champaign County,
Illinois, Inc., 378 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1051 (2008).
¶ 21 Here, the Randolph County circuit court found that the materials Watford sought in
his FOIA request were exempt from disclosure and that Watford was attempting to
circumvent the discovery order entered by the Kankakee County circuit court. We begin
our analysis with the effect of the Kankakee County circuit court’s discovery order.
¶ 22 During the pendency of Watford’s FOIA suit in the Randolph County circuit court,
postconviction proceedings were pending in Watford’s criminal case in the Kankakee
County circuit court. In postconviction proceedings, neither the civil discovery rules nor
the criminal discovery rules apply. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000). Nonetheless,
circuit courts have inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in postconviction
proceedings. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264. This authority, however, must be exercised with
caution because postconviction proceedings afford only limited review of constitutional
claims not presented at trial, and there is a potential for abuse of the discovery process in
postconviction proceedings. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264. Accordingly, the circuit court should
allow discovery only after the postconviction petitioner has shown “good cause” for a
discovery request. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264-65.
¶ 23 The record shows that Watford filed a motion for discovery in his postconviction
proceedings, and the SAO’s office contested Watford’s motion. The Kankakee County
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circuit court, exercising its discretion, denied Watford’s motion. In its order, the propriety
of which is not before this court, the Kankakee County circuit court found that Watford
had not shown good cause to grant his discovery request. Thereafter, Watford filed a FOIA
request with the SAO for the same discovery materials he sought in his postconviction
discovery motion. After the SAO denied his request, Watford initiated the proceedings
below in the Randolph County circuit court.
¶ 24 In considering the circumstances of this case, we find that our supreme court’s
decision in Special Prosecutor provides considerable guidance. In that case, our supreme
court analyzed the relationship between a FOIA request that conflicted with a court-ordered
injunction. Our supreme court determined that “where a circuit court with personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction issues an injunction, the injunction must be obeyed, however
erroneous it may be, until it is modified or set aside by the court itself or reversed by a
higher court.” Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 64. Accordingly, our supreme court
held that “a lawful court order takes precedence over the disclosure requirements of [the]
FOIA.” Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 66. As our supreme court further explained:
“The rule that a FOIA lawsuit may not be used to collaterally attack an
injunction prohibiting disclosure of records does not mean that there is no
remedy for the FOIA requestor. Rather, the requester must first have the
court that issued the injunction modify or vacate its order barring disclosure.
If the issuing court refuses, the FOIA requestor may challenge the refusal in
a direct appeal rather than an impermissible collateral attack.” Special
Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 67.
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¶ 25 We find that our supreme court’s analysis applies equally here. We observe that the
Kankakee County circuit court did not issue an injunction prohibiting the disclosure of
certain materials, as was the case in Special Prosecutor. Nevertheless, the Kankakee
County circuit court did enter an order denying Watford’s discovery request, finding that
he had not shown good cause for the disclosure of the requested materials. It bears
repeating, the propriety of the Kankakee County circuit court’s order is not an issue before
this court. The issue before this court is whether a person may use the FOIA to obtain
discovery materials after his or her motion for discovery has been denied in a separate
collateral proceeding that is still pending. Following our supreme court’s guidance, we hold
that the FOIA may not be used in this manner. Thus, the Randolph County circuit court
properly dismissed Watford’s complaint for this reason, and we need not address whether
the requested materials were exempt under section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA.
¶ 26 Next, Watford contends that he sufficiently pled a cause of action for attorney fees,
costs, and a civil penalty. Section 11(i) of the FOIA provides, in relevant part that, if a
FOIA requester “prevails in a proceeding under this Section, the court shall award such
person reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” 5 ILCS 140/11(i) (West 2018). We have
already determined that the Randolph County circuit court properly dismissed Watford’s
complaint, and thus, Watford was not entitled to an award of attorney fees or costs
regardless of whether he pled a sufficient claim for such. See Garlick v. Bloomingdale
Township, 2018 IL App (2d) 171013, ¶ 40 (concluding that the circuit court did not err in
striking the plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and costs, because the plaintiff did not
prevail on his claim). Furthermore, Watford was not entitled to an award of attorney fees
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because he incurred no attorney fees as a pro se litigant. Garlick, 2018 IL App (2d) 171013,
¶ 40. As for civil penalties, section 11(j) of the FOIA allows the circuit court to impose a
civil penalty upon a public body if the court determines that the public body “willfully and
intentionally failed to comply with [the FOIA], or otherwise acted in bad faith.” 5 ILCS
140/11(j) (West 2018). The record in this case does not show that the SAO intentionally or
willfully failed to comply with the FOIA or otherwise acted in bad faith. Accordingly, we
find that the Randolph County circuit court did not err in dismissing Watford’s complaint
as it related to his request for attorney fees, costs, and a civil penalty.
¶ 27 Finally, Watford contends that the Randolph County circuit court erred in denying
his motion for default judgment. A circuit court may enter a default judgment for want of
an appearance or for failure to plead. 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (West 2018). Although a court
may enter a default judgment for these reasons, default judgment is a drastic measure, not
to be encouraged and to be employed as a last result. Rockford Housing Authority v.
Donahue, 337 Ill. App. 3d 571, 573-74 (2003). The law prefers that controversies are
decided on the parties’ substantive rights. Godfrey Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center,
LLC v. Toigo, 2019 IL App (5th) 170473, ¶ 39. We review a circuit court’s ruling on a
motion for default judgment for an abuse of discretion or a denial of substantial justice.
Jackson v. Bailey, 384 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548 (2008).
¶ 28 Here, Rowe was served on April 9, 2019, and Nicholson was never served. The
summons indicated that Rowe was required to appear and plead within 30 days of the
service of the summons. On May 22, 2019, 13 days after the 30-day deadline, Rowe filed
his appearance and motion to dismiss. No motion for default judgment had been filed at
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this time. Nicholson joined Rowe’s motion to dismiss on August 9, 2019, despite never
having been served. Watford filed his motion for default judgment on August 12, 2019, 82
days from the date Rowe filed his motion to dismiss.
¶ 29 We find that the circumstances of this case are akin to that of Bland v. Lowery, 43
Ill. App. 3d 413 (1976). In Bland, the defendants filed their appearance and motion to
dismiss 15 days after the 30-day period to appear and plead. Bland, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 419.
In those 15 days, the plaintiff did not move for default judgment. Bland, 43 Ill. App. 3d at
419. Instead, the plaintiff waited until five months after the motion to dismiss was filed
before moving for default judgment. Bland, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 419. The appellate court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment. Bland, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 419. Likewise, we find that the Randolph
County circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Watford’s motion for default
judgment. Both Rowe and Nicholson, even though she had not been served, appeared and
pled before Watford moved for default judgment.
¶ 30 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Randolph County
circuit court.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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