People v. Swift ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (5th) 190305-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/04/21. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0305
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Edwards County.
)
v. ) No. 18-CF-48
)
FREDDIE L. SWIFT JR., ) Honorable
) Michael J. Valentine,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence because the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion when he allowed testimony, at the defendant’s jury trial, about
the fact that on the day the defendant was arrested for the offense of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon, the defendant had an active warrant for his arrest
for another offense. The trial judge’s decision was narrowly tailored and supported
by longstanding Illinois precedent.
¶2 The defendant, Freddie L. Swift Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for the offense of
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 13, 2018, the defendant was charged by information with one count of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon. The information alleged that on August 8, 2018, the defendant
(1) had a previous felony conviction, from a 2012 Wabash County case, and (2) “knowingly
possessed metal knuckles.” Of relevance to the issue raised by the defendant in this appeal, on
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May 10, 2019, the defendant filed a motion in limine in which the defendant asked the trial judge
to bar the State from introducing evidence at the defendant’s upcoming jury trial that, inter alia,
“an arrest warrant had been issued for [the defendant] on August 8, 2018,” on an aggravated assault
charge out of White County. In the motion, the defendant argued that information about the
warrant, the charge, and the defendant’s subsequent conviction on the charge was not relevant to
the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon charge, and would be highly prejudicial if adduced
in front of the jury at trial.
¶5 At a May 14, 2019, hearing on the motion, the defendant reiterated this argument, and
noted that the defendant would be stipulating to the fact that he had a previous felony conviction,
as that was an element of the present offense. The defendant posited that in light of his stipulation
to a previous felony conviction, it would be highly prejudicial for the jury also to learn that there
was an active warrant for the defendant’s arrest at the time he was arrested for the present offense.
The defendant contended that the fact was “not very probative of any issue in the case,” because
the defendant was in a public parking lot when arrested in this case, rather than on private property,
and so, the defendant contended, there would not “be any question in the jury’s mind of why the
officer came to that location.”
¶6 The State responded that it did not seek to elicit information about the nature of the warrant
(that it was for aggravated assault), or about the fact that the defendant ultimately was convicted
of that charge in separate proceedings. The State argued that it should, however, be allowed to
adduce at trial the fact that a warrant existed, because that fact “was a necessary part of the
[arresting officer’s] narrative to give the jury an explanation of why the officer even made contact
with [the defendant] in the first place.” The State posited that without that fact, “there’s going to
be a gap in the narrative that I think would have a high probability of confusing the jurors when
all they hear is ‘Well, an officer just rolled up on him in the parking lot while he was in his
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vehicle.’ ” The State asked to be allowed to have the officer testify that his reason for making
contact with the defendant was to execute the arrest warrant, without going into “details about
what the warrant was for or what ultimately happened in that case.”
¶7 The trial judge stated that he believed the officer should be allowed to mention the warrant,
so as to “present a narrative,” because he presumed that if the officer had not known of the warrant,
he would not have had the contact with the defendant that led to the present charge. He noted that
although omitting the warrant would not force the officer to testify falsely, it would leave “holes”
in the State’s story as to why the officer interacted with the defendant. He ruled that there could
be no mention of the “reason for the warrant” unless the defendant wished for there to be, and he
expressly told the State, “I don’t want *** any further inquiry into that warrant.”
¶8 The following morning, May 15, 2019, testimony in the defendant’s jury trial began. Prior
to the questioning of witnesses, the State read to the jury the defendant’s stipulation that on August
8, 2018, the defendant “had previously been convicted of a felony.” The stipulation was admitted
into evidence. The sole witness to testify at the trial was Deputy Sheriff Travis Roosevelt of the
Edwards County Sheriff’s Department, who testified for the State. Roosevelt testified that on
August 8, 2018, while on duty, he observed the defendant’s vehicle in the IGA parking lot in
Albion. He got out of his vehicle and approached the defendant, who was in the driver’s seat of
the defendant’s vehicle. Roosevelt testified that two children were in the back seat of the
defendant’s vehicle. He testified that he advised the defendant that the defendant “had a White
County warrant” and asked the defendant if the children’s mother was in the IGA. He testified that
when the defendant subsequently opened the driver’s side door of the defendant’s vehicle,
Roosevelt “observed metal knuckles in the storage compartment of the door.” He testified that he
was able to see the knuckles without moving anything, and without climbing into the defendant’s
vehicle at all. He testified that he took possession of the metal knuckles for safety reasons, and that
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when he asked the defendant about the knuckles, the defendant told him that the defendant had
forgotten the knuckles were there, and that the knuckles belonged to the defendant’s brother.
Roosevelt testified as to the chain of custody of the knuckles, identified the knuckles at trial, and
testified that based upon his previous experience, he believed the knuckles were made of metal.
He also testified that they were in the same condition as when he took possession of them from the
defendant.
¶9 On cross-examination, Roosevelt testified that the defendant did not seem nervous to him,
or as if he were hiding anything. Roosevelt agreed that although he had a body camera at the time,
he did not activate it and did not video record the knuckles or any other contents of the vehicle. He
agreed that the defendant was compliant, cooperative, and appeared to answer all of Roosevelt’s
questions fully. Roosevelt further agreed that he informed the defendant that the defendant was
not being charged with any crime related to the knuckles “at that time.”
¶ 10 On redirect examination, to respond to an issue raised by the defendant on cross-
examination, Roosevelt was asked to clarify why in his police report he stated that he “later
identified” the defendant. When asked, Roosevelt testified that the reason he approached the
defendant on August 8, 2018, was “[t]o serve an active arrest warrant,” and he agreed that he was
familiar with the defendant at that time. He testified, “I identified him in the beginning, but ‘later
identified’ is I’m just confirming it.” Roosevelt testified that because of the limited battery life of
his body camera, he did not activate it at all times during his shifts. He testified that it was his
“common practice” to activate the body camera when serving arrest warrants, but that he forgot to
do so on August 8, 2018.
¶ 11 Thereafter, outside the presence of the jury, the State rested, and the defendant made a
motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. Subsequently, the State formally announced
before the jury that it was resting its case, and the defendant announced the same. Following
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closing arguments, the jury was instructed and began its deliberations. Approximately 36 minutes
later, the jury returned with a verdict that found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon.
¶ 12 On June 20, 2019, a sentencing hearing was held. Following the presentation of evidence,
and argument, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to 7½ years of imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections, followed by 2 years of mandatory supervised release. This timely
appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, the defendant contends the trial judge abused his discretion when he allowed
Roosevelt’s trial testimony about the fact that on the day the defendant was arrested for the offense
of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, the defendant had an active warrant for his arrest
for another offense. The defendant argues that the elicited information “had no relevance to any of
the disputed elements at trial, because [the defendant] was in a public place and Roosevelt did not
need any pretext to approach or talk to him” and because the probative value of the elicited
information “if any, was significantly outweighed by” the potential prejudice, in that the elicited
information had a “tendency to prove conformity with previous bad actions.” He acknowledges
that the State did not argue that the information was necessary to prove an element of the charged
offense, and instead argued that the information was necessary to prevent confusion among the
jurors as to why Roosevelt approached the defendant, but contends that the State’s argument did
not give the jurors enough credit for being able to overlook a small gap in Roosevelt’s narrative,
and argues that, in any event, the trial judge could have avoided the problem simply by instructing
the jury that the defendant was in a public place and that, therefore, Roosevelt had every right to
approach and question the defendant.
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¶ 15 With regard to prejudice to the defendant, he argues that “[w]hen a defendant is charged
with being a felon in possession of a weapon and the State introduces evidence that the defendant
had an active warrant out on the day of his arrest, the logical conclusion” the jurors would reach
would be, in essence, that the defendant is an incorrigible criminal from whom society needs
protection. The defendant further argues that this issue is preserved for appeal, and reiterates his
concern that because of the elicited information, the jurors in his case were “too focused on alleged
past criminality to accurately weigh the facts” related to the charged offense.
¶ 16 The State, on the other hand, first contends that the defendant has not properly preserved
this issue, because it was not included in a posttrial motion, which is required even if an issue is
raised in a motion in limine prior to trial. With regard to this contention, the State also notes that
“[t]he defendant has not argued for first-prong plain error review and has, therefore, waived any
argument that the evidence in this case was closely balanced.” The State also argues that if this
court considers the issue under the plain-error doctrine, this court should conclude that no error
occurred, because the trial judge appropriately limited the elicited information to the fact that a
warrant existed, without allowing information about the nature of the warrant or the case’s
disposition, which is in line with longstanding Illinois precedent. The State posits that if Roosevelt
had “not been able to testify as to the existence of the warrant, the jury may well have looked with
suspicion on *** Roosevelt for placing the defendant under arrest before even observing him
commit an offense or seeing the metal knuckles in his possession.” The State argues that this is
“especially true since, during cross-examination *** Roosevelt agreed he informed the defendant
he was not being charged ‘at that time’ for possessing the metal knuckles,” which would leave the
jurors wondering why the defendant was arrested, which, in turn, might lead them to call into
question Roosevelt’s competence, professionalism, and possible bias.
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¶ 17 The State posits that the defendant’s suggestion on appeal that the trial judge could have,
essentially, instructed the jury that because the defendant was in a public parking lot, Roosevelt
had every right to approach the defendant for a consensual conversation is problematic too. The
State contends that “[i]n light of *** Roosevelt’s testimony that he was not charging the defendant
with the metal knuckles at the time he arrested him, the defendant’s arrest then, at the conclusion
of the proposed consensual encounter, would have been an unreasonable seizure of an innocent
citizen,” which further would have inflamed juror mistrust of Roosevelt. The State contends that
“[t]he defendant fails to explain how, absent the mention of the outstanding warrant, a jury would
not be confused about a consensual encounter that turned into a seizure of the defendant, as
happened in this case, absent any criminal activity on the part of the defendant prior to the seizure.”
(Emphasis in original.)
¶ 18 Having advanced the reasons it believes the elicited information was relevant, the State
acknowledges that the information still could “be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially
outweigh[ed] its probative value.” The State argues that in this case, admission was proper,
because “[n]othing about the mere existence of a warrant would cause the jury to convict the
defendant on” an improper basis. The State notes that the jurors “heard from one witness—not
multiple—that the defendant had one outstanding warrant—again, not multiple—on his arrest
date,” and that the jurors “did not hear the nature of the charge or that he was convicted of it.” The
State posits that the jurors might have believed “the warrant could have been for something
relatively minor, such as a traffic offense.” The State adds that there was no argument at trial that
“the defendant was a bad person or habitual criminal prone to committing offenses,” and that
“[a]lthough the defendant speculates the jury may have concluded this, he provides no evidence to
support this assertion.”
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¶ 19 Finally, the State argues that even if there was an abuse of discretion in this case, the
defendant cannot show, as is required, that “he was unduly prejudiced by the error, as the evidence
in this case was not close.” In support of this argument, the State discusses the evidence adduced
at trial, described in detail above. The State concludes that although “the existence of the
outstanding warrant may have reflected negatively on the defendant, the defendant could not have
been unduly prejudiced by such testimony in light of the strength of the State’s case against him.”
The State also suggests that “[t]he alleged error in this case, if any exists, does not rise to the level
of the errors in the cases where courts have found second-prong plain error warranted a reversal
for a new trial.” Accordingly, the State asks this court to affirm the defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
¶ 20 In his reply brief, the defendant contends the case could have proceeded at trial without
any mention of the outstanding warrant, and suggests various testimonial scenarios on the part of
Roosevelt that could have accomplished this goal. He notes that Roosevelt would not have been
required to lie, although his proposals require that Roosevelt leave out many true elements of the
events leading up to the defendant’s arrest and curtail much of his narrative about how the present
charge unfolded factually. The defendant reiterates his argument that “[a]voiding jury confusion
is not a compelling reason to introduce other bad acts evidence when there are other ways to avoid
this alleged confusion.” He also argues that the State could have tried the case without ever
mentioning the defendant’s arrest on the current charge.
¶ 21 When presented with a situation potentially involving plain error, the first step for a
reviewing court is to determine whether any error occurred at all. See, e.g., People v. Mueller,
2015 IL App (5th) 130013, ¶ 23. “Rulings on evidentiary matters, including motions in limine, are
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion.” People v. Morris, 2013 IL App (1st) 110413, ¶ 47. A reviewing court will find an
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abuse of discretion only “when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or
when no reasonable person would take the same view as the trial court.” Id. Even if a reviewing
court finds that there has been an abuse of discretion, reversal is warranted only if “the record
indicates the existence of substantial prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 265 (2009).
¶ 22 As the State aptly notes—and as the defendant does not dispute, and does not to attempt to
distinguish—this court has previously held that a trial judge “exercised proper discretion in
permitting testimony regarding the existence of [a] warrant, while precluding testimony as to its
nature, since it was relevant in describing the consequential steps taken in [a] police investigation.”
People v. Goka, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1030 (1983). We reasoned that “[e]vidence of prior crimes
is admissible if it explains the circumstances surrounding [the] defendant’s arrest and is part of a
continuing narrative,” and that a trial judge can “eliminate[ ] potential prejudice to [a] defendant
by excluding testimony” as to the nature of the warrant, particularly where the warrant involves
serious charges. Id.¶ 23 We reiterated our holding and reasoning in People v. Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d 140,
148-49 (1991). Therein, we ruled that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge because
“the evidence relating to [the] defendant’s arrest on an outstanding warrant was part of narrative
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding [the] defendant’s arrest,” and because “the
nature of the underlying crime for which the warrant issued was not disclosed to the jury.” Id. at
149. We added that, “[a]s our past cases show, this evidence was relevant to show the steps police
took in their investigation, and the manner in which [the] defendant’s custody began.” Id. We
reiterated the longstanding proposition that “[r]elevant evidence need not be excluded merely
because of its prejudice to [a] defendant.” Id.9
¶ 24 We agree with the State that in light of our holdings in Goka and Fauntleroy, the trial judge
in this case did not abuse his discretion when he allowed the State to adduce Roosevelt’s testimony
about the defendant’s arrest warrant, because the trial judge’s decision was not “arbitrary, fanciful,
[or] unreasonable,” and because there is absolutely no legal basis to claim that “no reasonable
person would take the same view as the trial court” (Morris, 2013 IL App (1st) 110413, ¶ 47). The
trial judge in this case carefully tailored his ruling, as did the judges in Goka and Fauntleroy, so
that the nature of the defendant’s warrant was never disclosed, and the trial judge in this case also
ensured that no mention was made as to the disposition of the case for which the warrant issued.
Moreover, the trial judge’s determination that testimony about the existence of the warrant should
be allowed as part of Roosevelt’s continuing narrative about the events leading to the defendant’s
arrest was completely reasonable, as it was based upon existing and longstanding Illinois
precedent. For this reason, and for the reasons argued by the State at trial and on appeal, described
above, we agree with the State that the trial judge did not err when he determined that the elicited
information was relevant in this case. We also agree with the State that the trial judge adequately
eliminated the potential prejudice to the defendant by excluding testimony as to the nature of the
warrant, and as to the disposition of the case for which the warrant was issued. Because the trial
judge did not err in his determination that the evidence was relevant, and that its probative value
was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (see, e.g., People v. Clark, 2018 IL App
(2d) 150608, ¶ 26), we decline to conclude that his ruling was “arbitrary, fanciful, [or]
unreasonable,” or that “no reasonable person would take the same view as the trial court” (Morris,
2013 IL App (1st) 110413, ¶ 47). Thus, no error occurred in this case, and there is no need to
invoke a plain-error analysis. See, e.g., People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 184 (2005) (before
invoking plain-error doctrine, reviewing court must find that an error occurred).
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¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
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