Phoenix NPL, LLC v. Shah , 2021 IL App (2d) 191130-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (2d) 191130-UNo. 2-19-1130
Order filed October 25, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
PHOENIX NPL, LLC, as Successor in Interest ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
to National Republic Bank of Chicago, ) of Du Page County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 15-L-446
)
SHAILESH SHAH and BHAVNA SHAH, )
Individually and as Trustee of the Bhavna )
Shah Trust Under Trust Agreement Dated )
3/24/06, LAW OFFICE OF PAUL CAGHAN, )
P.C., and LAW OFFICE OF PAUL CAGHAN, )
LLC, )
)
Defendants ) Honorable
) Robert W. Rohm,
(Paul Caghan, Defendant-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Zenoff and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying Caghan’s section 2-1401 petition or his motion
to reconsider the denial, Caghan lacked standing to challenge judgments against the
underlying defendants, we had no basis to reverse the trial court’s nunc pro tunc
change to an order, and we found no error in the trial court’s denial of Caghan’s
request to disqualify plaintiff’s attorneys. Therefore, we affirm.
¶2 Defendant, attorney Paul Caghan, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition
2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Uunder section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)), the denial
of his motion to reconsider the aforementioned dismissal, and several other orders. On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the section 2-1401 petition, that summary
judgment for plaintiff was improper as a matter of law, that the trial court erred in amending a
judgment nunc pro tunc more than 60 days after its entry, and that the trial court erred in failing to
disqualify plaintiff’s attorneys. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 12, 2015, plaintiff, Phoenix NPL, LLC, as successor in interest to National
Republic Bank of Chicago, brought suit against defendants, Shailesh Shah and Bhavna Shah,
individually and as trustee of the Bhavna Shah Trust Under Trust Agreement Dated 3/24/06, as
personal guarantors of a loan. Caghan entered his appearance as defendants’ attorney on October
25, 2016.
¶5 On April 27, 2017, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to strike all but one of
defendants’ affirmative defenses, and it granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss all of defendants’
counterclaims. It also denied defendants’ motion for leave to file second amended counterclaims.
Defendants sought reconsideration of this ruling on November 6, 2017, and they also sought a stay
of the case pending resolution of an alleged common issue in related federal cases. The trial court
denied the motion to reconsider on February 15, 2018, but expressly reserved ruling on defendants’
request to stay the proceedings. Defendants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on March 16,
2018, on the basis that the trial court refused to grant an injunction in the form of their request for
a stay of all proceedings. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and
we granted the motion on May 1, 2018. Our mandate issued the same day. Defendants filed a
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Upetition for leave to appeal to the supreme court on May 31, 2018, which was denied on September
26, 2018. The supreme court mandate issued on October 31, 2018.
¶6 On October 22, 2018, defendants filed a motion in the supreme court for a supervisory
order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 383 (eff. July 1, 2017), which the supreme court
denied on November 8, 2018.
¶7 Meanwhile, on August 1, 2018, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff against defendants for $2,750,791.99. The order stated that a separate order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) was entered that day with monetary sanctions in
addition to the judgment amount. Finally, the order stated that the case was closed.
¶8 The order granting plaintiff’s motion for sanctions under Rule 137 was actually entered on
August 9, 2018. The trial court awarded plaintiff $129,375.09 against Caghan and the Law Office
of Paul Caghan, P.C. It additionally awarded $10,000 against these parties and Shailesh Shaw. On
October 11, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the order to add the Law Office of Paul Caghan,
LLC, as a judgment debtor. The trial court granted the motion on October 15, 2018, stating that
plaintiff should submit an order for entry. The order was entered on October 17, 2018, adding nunc
pro tunc the Law Office of Paul Caghan, LLC, to both sanction amounts, and stating that the named
parties were liable jointly and severally.
¶9 Several months later, on March 21, 2019, defendants and Caghan filed a section 2-1401
petition alleging that the August 1, August 9, October 15, and October 17, 2018, 1 orders were void
1
The section 2-1401 motion listed an order dated October 16, 2018, rather than October
17, 2018. The trial court’s nunc pro tunc order was dated October 16, 2018, but filed on October
17, 2018. A written judgment order is considered entered when it is entered of record (People v.
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Ufor lack of jurisdiction because the supreme court had not yet returned the mandate when the trial
court entered the judgments. Defendants argued that the revestment doctrine did not apply.
Defendants further contested the grant of summary judgment and argued that the trial court should
allow certain discovery.
¶ 10 On May 2, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the section 2-1401 petition under
section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)). Plaintiff argued
that the petition was barred by res judicata and that the trial court never lost jurisdiction of the
case.
¶ 11 On August 15, 2019, the Shah defendants withdrew their participation in the section 2-
1401 petition, and the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the petition as to Caghan. It
stated that it did not believe that res judicata applied but that an interlocutory appeal filed without
proper Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) grounds did not divest the trial court
of jurisdiction.
¶ 12 On September 13, 2019, Caghan filed a motion to reconsider various orders, including the
August 15, 2019, order. Caghan also argued that plaintiff’s attorneys should be disqualified. On
December 2, 2019, Caghan filed an emergency motion to stay proceedings pending a final
determination on his motion for disqualification of plaintiff’s attorneys. The same day, the trial
court denied the emergency motion with prejudice, and it denied Caghan’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 13 Caghan filed a notice of appeal on December 23, 2019. In his brief’s jurisdictional
statement, he states that he is appealing the trial court’s December 2, 2019, order denying his
motion to reconsider the August 15, 2019, order that granted plaintiff’s section 2-619 motion to
Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 29), so we refer to this order as the October 17, 2018, order.
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Udismiss Caghan’s section 2-1401 petition. Caghan points out that we have jurisdiction under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), which allows the appeal of an order
granting or denying any relief requested in a section 2-1401 petition.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 16 Caghan first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his section 2-1401 petition,
because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the August 1, August 9, October 15, and October
17, 2018, orders, rendering these orders void. Caghan asserts that the trial court did not retain
jurisdiction over the case during defendants’ interlocutory appeal filed on March 16, 2018, because
the interlocutory appeal was proper.
¶ 17 Plaintiff argues that this is the sixth appeal/request for review in this case that Caghan has
filed in this court and/or the Illinois Supreme Court, and that the previous five were all either
dismissed or denied outright. Plaintiff also argues that Caghan has a long history of sanctionable
conduct and that he is currently seeking to delay plaintiff’s collection action against him and
pending criminal contempt charges. Plaintiff maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter
all orders at issue on appeal for many reasons, including because it did not rule on defendants’
request for a stay, defendants’ request for a stay was not clearly articulated, and defendants never
sought a stay of trial court proceedings pending their interlocutory appeal. Plaintiff also argues
that even if defendants’ interlocutory appeal was proper, the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear
and determine matters arising independent of and unrelated to the portion of the proceedings at
issue on appeal (see Payne v. Coates-Miller, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 601, 608 (1979)), which would
include the orders related to sanctions.
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-U¶ 18 We note that the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the section 2-1401 petition
under section 2-619. A section 2-619 motion admits the sufficiency of the complaint but asserts
an affirmative matter that defeats the claim. Carroll v. Community Health Care Clinic, Inc., 2017
IL App (4th) 150847, ¶ 17. We review de novo the grant of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Id.¶ 19 Section 2-1401 typically allows for relief from final orders and judgments more than 30
days but less than two years after their entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018). Under section 2-
1401, a party may challenge a final judgment by bringing to the trial court’s attention issues of fact
outside the record which, if known when the judgment was entered, would have affected the
judgment, or a party may argue that the judgment was legally defective. Warren County Soil &
Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. A party asserting a fact-dependent
challenge must set forth specific factual allegations showing (1) the existence of a meritorious
defense or claim; (2) due diligence in presenting the defense or claim in the original action; and
(3) due diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition. Id. ¶ 51. However, relevant to this case, the
time limitation and aforementioned criteria do not apply if the section 2-1401 petition seeks to
vacate a void judgment. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2002); see
also 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2018). Instead, “[t]he allegation that the judgment or order is
void substitutes for and negates the need to allege a meritorious defense and due diligence.” Id. at
104. We review de novo the ruling on a section 2-1401 petition where it was denied or dismissed
on legal grounds. People v. Abdulla, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13.
¶ 20 We conclude that Caghan’s argument, that his March 16, 2018, appeal was proper and
therefore divested the trial court of jurisdiction, is meritless because we dismissed that appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. Thus, relitigation of the appeal’s merits is precluded under the law of the case
doctrine. See People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 20 (in general, the law of the case doctrine bars
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Urelitigation of an issue previously decided in the same case, such that the determination of a
question of law by an appellate court in the first appeal may bind the court in a second appeal); see
also Lurie v. Wolin, 2017 IL App (1st) 161571, ¶ 27 (the law of the case doctrine does not have a
jurisdictional exception).
¶ 21 We also note that “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal from an order or judgment which the
supreme court rules do not make appealable neither deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to
proceed with the case nor vests the appellate court with jurisdiction to consider it.” North
Community Bank v. 17011 South Park Ave., LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133672, ¶ 24; see also People
v. Aleman, 281 Ill. App. 3d 991 (1996) (notice of appeal was not proper at a particular stage of the
proceedings, so it did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction). Defendant sought the interlocutory
appeal of an unappealable order, such that the trial court never lost jurisdiction of the case, as it
reasoned in granting plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the section 2-1401 petition. There are important
policy reasons why the trial court does not lose jurisdiction if a party appeals an unappealable
order. As we stated in In re Marriage of Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 48:
“If the appeal from an unappealable order were to divest the trial court of
jurisdiction while the appellate court sorted it out, and only upon the issuance of the
appellate mandate would jurisdiction be restored to the trial court, then a bad-faith litigant
could file a notice of appeal on any order, halt the proceedings in the trial court until the
appellate mandate, and repeat the process over and over so as to prolong the action in the
trial court indefinitely and drain the resources of the other litigant or litigants.”
¶ 22 Caghan next argues that a mandate in the supreme court divests a lower court of jurisdiction
until the mandate is returned, such that the trial court lacked jurisdiction during the time the
mandate was in the supreme court. Caghan cites Illinois Supreme Court Rule 368 (eff. July 1,
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-U2006) and related caselaw. Rule 368 states that when supreme court review is sought in cases not
involving the appellate court modifying or setting aside an injunction:
“the mandate is stayed automatically if, before it may issue, a party who is entitled
to seek review by the Supreme Court files a petition in the Supreme Court for such review.
The stay is effective until the expiration of the time to seek review, and, if review is timely
sought, until disposition of the case by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, the
Appellate Court, or a judge of either court may, upon motion, order otherwise or stay the
mandate upon just terms.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 368(b) (eff. July 1, 2006).
Additionally, “the Appellate Court, the Supreme Court, or a judge of either court may, upon just
terms, stay the issuance of or recall any mandate of the Appellate Court until the time for seeking
review by the Supreme Court expires, or if review is timely sought, until it is granted or refused,
or if review is granted, until final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
368(c) (eff. July 1, 2006). Caghan argues that because the supreme court mandate did not issue
until October 31, 2018, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make its August and October 2018
rulings.
¶ 23 Plaintiff argues that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(b) (eff. July 1, 2017) applies directly
to whether the trial court loses jurisdiction pending an interlocutory appeal. That rule, entitled
“Stay of Judgments Pending Appeal,” provides in relevant part that a trial court may stay
enforcement of an interlocutory order. Plaintiff argues that even if Rule 368 applies, that rule
provides that in cases involving injunctions, the trial court loses jurisdiction only upon an order of
the court providing for such. Plaintiff further argues that an automatic stay only occurs if “a party
who is entitled to seek relief by the Supreme Court” files a petition, but defendants were not
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Uentitled to seek relief because the order appealed never formed the basis for a proper interlocutory
appeal.
¶ 24 We conclude that Rule 305(b) is not directly applicable because it involves staying the
enforcement of judgments rather than discussing the continuing jurisdiction of the trial court.
Looking at Rule 368, we agree with plaintiff that it forecloses defendant’s argument, though for a
different reason. We disagree with plaintiff that in all cases involving injunctions, the trial court
loses jurisdiction only upon order of the court. Rather, the rule limits this to “cases in which an
injunction has been modified or set aside by the Appellate Court” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 368(b) (eff. July
1, 2006)), which is not the situation here. Further, Caghan was “a party who is entitled to seek
relief by the Supreme Court” even if his appeal itself was without merit. Still, Caghan’s argument
is contrary to the rule’s language. Rule 368 states that “the mandate is stayed automatically if,
before it may issue, a party who is entitled to seek review by the Supreme Court files a petition in
the Supreme Court for such review.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 368(b) (eff. July 1, 2006).
We issued the mandate on May 1, 2018, and defendants did not file a petition for leave to appeal
until May 31, 2018, which means that the mandate was not automatically stayed. Also, as
discussed, the trial court never lost jurisdiction of the case because defendants appealed from an
unappealable order.
¶ 25 B. Res Judicata
¶ 26 One of the arguments that plaintiff set forth in its motion to dismiss the section 2-1401
petition was that the petition was barred by res judicata because the supreme court denied
defendant’s October 22, 2018, motion for a supervisory order. Caghan argues that res judicata
does not serve as a basis for dismissing the section 2-1401 petition because the denial of a motion
for supervisory order by the supreme court did not have the effect of a ruling on any issue. See
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-UPeople ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 407 Ill. App. 3d 207, 218 (2010). He also
argues that the petition was based on a lack of jurisdiction in the trial court to enter the orders.
¶ 27 We have already determined that the trial court was not deprived of jurisdiction by virtue
of defendants’ appeal to this court or their May 31, 2018, petition for leave to appeal to the supreme
court. This was also the basis for the trial court’s dismissal of the section 2-1401 petition. The trial
court stated that it did not believe that res judicata applied, and we also need not address this issue.
¶ 28 C. False Statements
¶ 29 Caghan next asserts in a five-sentence argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the
section 2-1401 petition because the trial court failed to identify any false statement, which is
required for Rule 137 sanctions.
¶ 30 Caghan did not make this argument in his section 2-1401 petition, thereby forfeiting this
issue for review. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 39. Moreover, this issue does not
raise a voidness challenge, and Caghan has not explained how it meets the criteria for section 2-
1401, thereby also forfeiting this issue for review. See Atlas v. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C.,
2019 IL App (1st) 180939, ¶ 33 (a reviewing court is not a repository into which an appellant may
dump the burden of argument and research, nor is it our obligation to act as an advocate, and the
failure to clearly define issues and support them with authority results in forfeiture of the
argument). Finally, Caghan’s argument also fails on the merits, as a false statement is not necessary
to impose Rule 137 sanctions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017); In re Estate of Hanley, 2013 IL
App (3d) 110264, ¶ 81.
¶ 31 For all of these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Caghan’s section 2-
1401 petition, nor in the denial of his motion to reconsider that ruling.
¶ 32 D. Summary Judgment and Affirmative Defenses
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-U¶ 33 Caghan’s next three arguments relate to the merits of the underlying action. He argues that
summary judgment was defective and improper as a matter of law because there was no evidence
of assignment to plaintiff, and because plaintiff’s employment of the firm SmithAmundsen, LLC,
made plaintiff aware of fraud claims involving National Republic Bank hotel loans. Caghan also
argues that the affirmative defense of appraisal fraud and fraudulent inducement were viable and
well-pleaded.
¶ 34 Plaintiff asserts that Caghan has no standing to make these arguments, and we agree. See
Knox v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2018 IL App (1st) 162265, ¶ 20 (standing requires an injury
in fact to a legally cognizable interest). Defendants were originally parties to the section 2-1401
petition but withdrew their participation in the motion on August 15, 2019, such that the only
remaining proponent of the petition was Caghan. The rulings at issue were against defendants and
were unrelated to the sanctions judgment entered against Caghan. Therefore, Caghan alone has no
injury to a legally cognizable interest arising from those rulings and thus has no standing to raise
these arguments on appeal.
¶ 35 E. Nunc Pro Tunc Order
¶ 36 Caghan additionally argues that the trial court erred in attempting to amend the sanctions
judgment nunc pro tunc more than 60 days after entry. Caghan maintains that the trial court’s use
of nunc pro tunc was improper because the remedy is limited to correction of errors by the clerk
of the circuit court and cannot be used to remedy an attorney’s failure to act.
¶ 37 Plaintiff argues that the trial court properly modified the sanctions order because just one
month after plaintiff filed its motion for sanctions, Caghan dissolved his law firm, the Law Office
of Paul Caghan, P.C., and immediately started a new law firm, the Law Office of Paul Caghan,
LLC, which was organized on August 9, 2017. Plaintiff maintains that Caghan nonetheless
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Ucontinued to file every pleading under the name of the Law Office of Paul Caghan, P.C., up until
April 25, 2018. Plaintiff argues that the trial court granted the motion for sanctions on August 9,
2018, with the intention of entering sanctions against Caghan and his current law firm, and since
Caghan had only listed the Law Office of Paul Caghan, P.C., the trial court entered judgment
against that firm. Plaintiff states that it was only when the process server personally served Caghan
and the P.C. firm with the citations to discover assets that Caghan told the process server that the
firm no longer existed. According to plaintiff, this makes clear that Caghan’s intention all along
was to fraudulently continue to use the P.C. name in all pleadings to avoid a judgment against his
current firm. Plaintiff cites Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238 (1991), for the proposition that the
trial court had jurisdiction to modify its sanctions order, even though more than 30 days had passed,
to correct and name the proper judgment debtor to reflect the court’s true intent.
¶ 38 We note that in the section 2-1401 petition, Caghan argued that the October 17, 2018, nunc
pro tunc ruling was void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it, an argument that we
have already discussed and rejected. He did not raise his current argument, thus forfeiting it for
review. See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 39. Caghan also cannot challenge the nunc pro tunc
order directly because he did not timely appeal from that order. See Ill. S. Ct. Rule 303 (eff. July
1, 2017). Rather, Caghan has appealed under Rule 304(b)(3) (Ill S. Ct. R. 304(b)(3) (eff. Mar. 8,
2016)), which allows for review of a ruling on a section 2-1401 petition.
¶ 39 F. Disqualification of Plaintiff’s Attorneys
¶ 40 Last, Caghan argues that the trial court erred in failing to disqualify two of plaintiff’s
attorneys. Caghan contends that the advocate-witness rule precludes one of the attorneys from
acting as an advocate and witness in the same case, and that combining these roles can prejudice
a tribunal. Caghan also argues that the attorney is an unreliable witness having made false
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Ustatements in open court and having committed forgery and aggravated battery while representing
plaintiff. Caghan maintains that the second attorney must also be disqualified because if one
member of a firm has a conflict of interest, the conflict is imputed to all members of the firm.
¶ 41 Plaintiff argues that we do not have jurisdiction over the subject December 2, 2019, order
denying Caghan’s motion to have its counsel disqualified. Plaintiff cites Chicago Police Sergeants
Ass’n v. Pallohusky, 2017 IL App (1st) 162822, ¶ 15, where the court stated that an order is not
final while a citation is still pending and supplemental proceedings are ongoing. Plaintiff highlights
that on March 11, 2019, the trial court entered an order continuing the Caghan citation until further
order of the court, and they assert that the trial court is still in the midst of contempt proceedings
involving Caghan’s conduct in the pending citation proceedings. Plaintiff also argues that Caghan
has no standing to seek the disqualification of its attorneys under Renard v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 563, 567-68 (1984), where the court stated that
“[a]bsent a complaint by the affected client, a party has no status to object to the representation of
an adverse party by an attorney of his choice.” Last, plaintiff argues that based on Caghan’s own
admissions, many of the facts alleged in support of disqualification occurred in a separate case,
and that there is no evidence that its counsel lied.
¶ 42 Caghan’s argument fails for several reasons. First, as stated, Caghan is appealing under
Rule 304(b)(3) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), which allows the appeal of an order granting or denying any of
the relief requested in a section 2-1401 petition, but his request to disqualify the attorneys was not
part of his section 2-1401 petition. Second, as plaintiff notes, we lack jurisdiction over this ruling
because Caghan’s request to disqualify the attorneys occurred in the context of the citation
proceedings against him, which are ongoing. Pallohusky, 2017 IL App (1st) 162822. Third,
Caghan’s motion in the trial court argued that the attorneys should be disqualified because they
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2021 IL App (2d) 191130-Uhad conflicts of interest with their client. We agree with plaintiff that a “party does not have
standing to challenge opposing counsel’s ability to represent a client without some showing that
the representation adversely affects interests of the party challenging opposing counsel’s
representation.” In re Estate of M.L., 2018 IL App (3d) 170712, ¶ 27.
¶ 43 Finally, we generally review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to disqualify an attorney for
an abuse of discretion. Jones v. Brown-Marino, 2017 IL App (1st) 152852, ¶ 11. In order to assess
whether the trial court abused its discretion, we would need to consider its reasons for denying the
request, which are not delineated in the written order. We would therefore need to examine the
report of proceedings for the hearing, but Caghan has not filed reports of proceedings with this
court. As the appellant, Caghan has the burden to provide a sufficiently complete record of the
trial proceedings to support his claims of error, and we must resolve any doubts arising from the
lack of a complete record against the appellant, including presuming that the trial court’s order
was entered in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99
Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). We acknowledge that Caghan has included a voluminous appendix to
his brief that contains purported reports of proceedings, but “attachments to briefs not included in
the record on appeal are not properly before the reviewing court and cannot be used to supplement
the record.” Godfrey Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Toigo, 2019 IL App (1st)
170473, ¶ 49. Accordingly, even if we did not lack jurisdiction to review this issue, we would have
to assume that the trial court properly denied Caghan’s motion to disqualify plaintiff’s counsel.
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 46 Affirmed.
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