People v. Washington , 2021 IL App (4th) 200196 ( 2021 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2022.09.21
13:55:53 -05'00'
People v. Washington, 2021 IL App (4th) 200196Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption TORY RASHAD WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
No. 4-20-0196
Filed October 22, 2021
Rehearing denied December 15, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 14-CF-793; the
Review Hon. J. Casey Costigan, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Natalia Galica, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
Don Knapp, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David
J. Robinson, and Linda Susan McClain, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In July 2014, the State charged defendant, Tory Rashad Washington, with two counts of
murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) and two counts of murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(2) of the
Criminal Code (id. § 9-1(a)(2)). The charges alleged that in June 2014, defendant beat a man
named Ronald Smith to death. Defendant was 19 years old at the time of the murder.
¶2 In September 2015, defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the State.
The State agreed that if defendant testified against his codefendants and pleaded guilty to count
II (id.), the State would (1) dismiss the remaining three counts, (2) recommend a sentencing
cap of 35 years in prison instead of the 60 years authorized by statute, and (3) not pursue an
enhanced prison term of natural life based upon a finding that the murder was committed in a
brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty.
¶3 In April 2016, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing and sentenced him
to 32 years in prison. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a motion to
reconsider his sentence. At a subsequent hearing, however, defendant moved to withdraw both
motions. The court explained to defendant that withdrawing the motions would preclude him
from appealing the case, but he persisted in his wish to withdraw the motions. Defendant did
not file a direct appeal.
¶4 In December 2019, defendant filed pro se a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Post-Conviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) in which he argued
that (1) the truth-in-sentencing statute—section 3-6-3(a)(2)(i) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2014))—was unconstitutional as applied to
persons under the age of 21 at the time of the commission of the offense, including defendant,
(2) his guilty plea was involuntary because “he would not have pled guilty if he had understood
the implications of the eighth amendment,” and (3) the trial court did not properly consider his
youth and attendant circumstances during sentencing.
¶5 In January 2020, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently
without merit.
¶6 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it dismissed defendant’s petition
because (1) his guilty plea was involuntary “in light of recent changes in the jurisprudence
surrounding emerging adults, like [defendant],” (2) the truth-in-sentencing statute, as applied
to defendant, violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, and
(3) defendant made an arguable claim that his guilty plea was involuntary because (a) it was
secured by the threat of an unconstitutional natural life sentence and (b) his sentence grants no
meaningful opportunity for release. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred because it
relied on an unpublished order to dismiss defendant’s petition. We affirm.
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¶7 I. BACKGROUND
¶8 A. The Charges
¶9 In July 2014, the State charged defendant with two counts of murder pursuant to section 9-
1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) and two counts of murder
pursuant to section 9-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code (id. § 9-1(a)(2)). The charges alleged that
in June 2014, defendant, along with two others, beat Smith to death.
¶ 10 B. The Guilty Plea Hearing
¶ 11 In September 2015, the trial court conducted defendant’s guilty plea hearing. The court
explained to defendant that, if convicted, he would (1) receive a sentence between 20 and 60
years in prison and (2) not be eligible for day-for-day credit under the truth-in-sentencing
statute.
¶ 12 The trial court then discussed the terms of defendant’s plea agreement with the State. The
State agreed that if defendant testified against his codefendants and pleaded guilty to count II
(id.), the State would (1) dismiss the remaining three counts, along with charges in three other
felony cases pending against defendant in McLean County, (2) recommend a sentencing cap
of 35 years in prison, instead of the 60 years authorized by statute, and (3) not pursue an
enhanced prison term of natural life based upon a finding that the murder was committed in a
brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty.
¶ 13 After the trial court read the terms of the agreement regarding the “wanton cruelty”
sentencing enhancement, the court asked the parties what they believed would happen if the
enhancement was pursued. The State responded, “I believe it’s mandatory natural life [in
prison].” Defendant’s counsel agreed. The court then told defendant that if the State proved at
trial that the murder was committed in a brutal and heinous manner indicative of wanton
cruelty, “You would have to serve the rest of your life.”
¶ 14 The State read the factual basis for the crime, stating as follows:
“That on June 2nd of 2014, Ronald Smith was transported to BroMenn hospital
from the area of O’Neil Park and Sheridan School in Bloomington. He was taken there
due to a severe beating that he had received at that location. About a month later,
Ronald Smith passed away due to the injuries, and that was confirmed by an autopsy
that was conducted in the McLean County coroner’s office where the results in that
autopsy was that Ronald Smith died as a result of the beating that he suffered on June
2nd of 2014.
After being transported to the hospital on June 2nd, 2014, an investigation began.
Numerous witnesses that were in and about the area of O’Neil Park on the day in
question were interviewed. Several of those that were interviewed were eyewitnesses
that indicated that the individuals that beat Ronald Smith included three people, which
[sic] were Willie Chambers, [defendant,] and Anthony Davis-Dixon. Those witnesses
indicated that essentially Ronald Smith was sleeping under a tree at O’Neil Park,
Ronald Smith being a homeless individual at that time, and that the three codefendants
approached him and punched, kicked, and stomped Ronald Smith numerous times.
Subsequently, Anthony Davis-Dixon was arrested, as well as this defendant and
Willie Chambers. A short time after the arrest of Anthony Davis-Dixon during one of
his several interviews he admitted to being involved in the beating of Ronald Smith.
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He indicated that he was the first person to knock Ronald Smith over and then further
implicated his codefendants, that this defendant, as well as Willie Chambers, punched
and kicked Ronald Smith many times.
Also, recently, as part of his plea in this case, Willie Chambers pled guilty to first
degree murder in this case as well. At his plea hearing he testified under oath to his
involvement in punching and beating Ronald Smith and also indicated that Anthony
Davis-Dixon, as well as this defendant, participated as well.”
¶ 15 Defendant pleaded guilty.
¶ 16 C. The Sentencing Hearing
¶ 17 In April 2016, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing. Defendant
presented letters that people wrote to the judge. The letters described (1) defendant’s positive
qualities, (2) difficulties in defendant’s life, particularly his struggles with the death of his
father when defendant was 14 years old, (3) defendant’s potential, including his plans to join
the military, and (4) how defendant was well-loved and deeply missed by his family. The court
noted that it read and considered all of the letters.
¶ 18 Defendant’s mother, Cynthia Stallings, testified about defendant’s difficulties growing up,
including his struggles due to her drug addiction. Cynthia also testified that defendant had
“matured” while he had been in jail since his arrest. Cynthia asked for mercy for her son and
described how he had told her many times about how remorseful he was and how he wished
he could take back his actions.
¶ 19 The State recommended that the trial court sentence defendant to 35 years in prison.
Defense counsel recommended a sentence of 20 years in prison.
¶ 20 Defendant made a statement in allocution in which he expressed his remorse and
apologized to the victim’s family, as well as to his own family and friends. Defendant said that
he did not deny his part in the crime and also did not deny that he should be punished for it.
He said, “I’m just taking on responsibility as a man, and I’m ready to move on with my life
and show my nephews and my cousins and my sisters I can do better.”
¶ 21 The trial court stated that it considered everything presented at the sentencing hearing, as
well as the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The court said, “I find myself
figuratively just scratching my head trying to figure out why a young man, especially a young
man with no real prior history, would choose to get involved in something this brutal, this
violent, this wicked. I just don’t understand it.” The court noted that the evidence in mitigation
as well as the people in the courtroom who came to support defendant “suggests that you’re a
young man with a lot of potential, with a lot of good character traits.” The court characterized
the people defendant was with the night of the murder as “a gang of thugs.”
¶ 22 The trial court noted that “there is a great deal of mitigation in this case, primarily your
youth, your lack of any prior criminal record, your childhood and *** all of the issues that you
had to endure as a young man.” Before stating its conclusion, the court again noted, “The Court
also recognizes the mitigation, including the lack of prior record and the defendant’s youth.”
The court then sentenced defendant to 32 years in prison.
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¶ 23 D. Defendant’s Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea
and Reconsider Sentence
¶ 24 In April 2016, defendant filed (1) a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing he did not
knowingly and intelligently enter his guilty plea and (2) a motion to reconsider his sentence,
arguing his sentence was “excessive and [d]efendant has rehabilitative potential.”
¶ 25 In June 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing at which it began by acknowledging that
the parties had raised an issue that “had to do with admonishments during the presentation of
the plea of guilty.” The State explained that defendant was incorrectly admonished at his guilty
plea hearing that the sentencing enhancement that would result from a finding of wanton
cruelty was mandatory life in prison, but “[t]hat admonishment was incorrect. The
admonishment is actually that he would have been subject to up to natural life.”
¶ 26 Defense counsel then informed the court, as follows: “Knowing [the incorrect
admonishment] occurred, I continued to speak with [defendant], and it is his desire to withdraw
both Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea as well as the Motion to Reconsider Sentence.”
¶ 27 The trial court told defendant that it was prepared to hear argument on both of the motions.
The court also told defendant that “if you withdraw these motions, basically that precludes
your right to appeal in this case.”
¶ 28 Defendant persisted in his wish to withdraw the motions. Defendant did not file a direct
appeal.
¶ 29 E. The Postconviction Petition
¶ 30 In December 2019, defendant filed pro se a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Act
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)), in which he argued that (1) the truth-in-sentencing
statute was unconstitutional as applied to persons under the age of 21 at the time of the
commission of the offense, such as defendant, (2) his guilty plea was involuntary because “he
would not have pled guilty if he had understood the implications of the eighth amendment,”
and (3) the court did not properly consider his youth and attendant circumstances during
sentencing.
¶ 31 In January 2020, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently
without merit. In its written order, the court noted that defendant was not a juvenile because
he was 19 years old at the time of the offense. The court disagreed that people between 18 and
21 years old could be “in the same category” as juvenile defendants. The court noted that the
truth-in-sentencing statute was previously upheld by the courts, citing People v. Cohn, 2014
IL App (1st) 122562-U. The court concluded that defendant’s argument was meritless because
defendant “does not fall within the class of juvenile offenders which his authorities address”
and “the constitutionality of the statute which *** defendant cites has already been considered
and found constitutional.” The court also concluded that the record showed defendant was
admonished of his rights and had an understanding of those rights. Additionally, the sentence
was within the range to which defendant agreed.
¶ 32 This appeal followed.
¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 34 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it dismissed defendant’s petition
because (1) his guilty plea was involuntary “in light of recent changes in the jurisprudence
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surrounding emerging adults, like [defendant],” (2) the truth-in-sentencing statute violated the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to defendant, and
(3) defendant made an arguable claim that his guilty plea was involuntary because it was
secured by the threat of an unconstitutional natural life sentence and his sentence grants no
meaningful opportunity for release. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred because it
relied on an unpublished order to dismiss defendant’s petition. We affirm.
¶ 35 A. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed Defendant’s Petition
Because Miller and Its Progeny Do Not Apply to “Emerging Adults”
¶ 36 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition when the court “did
not consider recent jurisprudence that allows Miller and its progeny to be extended to emerging
adults who demonstrate that their brain and maturity levels are still developing.” See Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding mandatory life sentences imposed on juveniles violate
the eighth amendment).
¶ 37 1. The Applicable Law: Miller and Its Progeny
¶ 38 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “that mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 470. In People v. Holman, 2017
IL 120655, ¶ 46, 91 N.E.3d 849, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that a court may sentence a
juvenile defendant to life in prison in limited circumstances, writing as follows:
“The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s youth and its
attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the
following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the
offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home
environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and
any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile
defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile
defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.”
However, in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318-19 (2021), the
United States Supreme Court clarified “that a separate factual finding of permanent
incorrigibility is not required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a
murderer under 18.”
¶ 39 In People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61, 120 N.E.3d 900, the Illinois Supreme Court
noted “that claims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older have been
repeatedly rejected.” The court agreed that “for sentencing purposes, the age of 18 marks the
present line between juveniles and adults.” Id. The court concluded by rejecting defendant’s
facial constitutional challenge of his sentence. However, the court suggested that the defendant
in that case could possibly pursue an as-applied constitutional challenge through alternative
proceedings, such as a postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 48.
¶ 40 In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 42, 137 N.E.3d 763, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that a juvenile’s sentence of 50 years was a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth
amendment. The court concluded “that a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a
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juvenile offender does not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth
amendment.” Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 41 2. Defendant’s Cases Are Inapplicable
¶ 42 Defendant cites numerous cases, all of which are inapplicable to the facts of this case. All
of defendant’s cited cases involve a defendant who was either (1) an actual juvenile,
(2) sentenced to a term of life or de facto life in prison, or (3) both. However, in this case,
defendant was (1) not a juvenile and (2) sentenced to 32 years in prison, not a de facto life
sentence.
¶ 43 Defendant in particular relies heavily on a series of First District decisions that involve
defendants older than 17 years of age. The first is People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-
B, a case in which the defendant, age 19 at the time of the offense, was sentenced to mandatory
natural life in prison. Obviously, this case is readily distinguishable from the facts in House
because defendant was not sentenced to life in prison, or even a de facto life sentence.
¶ 44 Second, defendant cites People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, a case in which
the 18-year-old defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of between 200 and 600
years in prison. This is a de facto life sentence, making Carrasquillo clearly distinguishable
from the case at hand. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27.
¶ 45 The remainder of defendant’s authority is similarly easily distinguished. Harris, 2018 IL
121932 (76-year sentence); People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, 43 N.E.3d 984 (natural life
sentence); People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 (85-year sentence); People v. Brown,
2015 IL App (1st) 130048, 31 N.E.3d 336 (50-year sentence). Every single case defendant
cites in support of the notion that Miller could be applied to “emerging adults” involves
sentences that are either natural life in prison or de facto life in prison. The State makes
persuasive arguments disputing the merits of the holdings from the cases defendant cites, but
because they are all inapposite, we need not discuss them further.
¶ 46 In short, defendant does not provide any case that has extended Miller to an offender who
was not (1) a juvenile or (2) sentenced to a natural or de facto life sentence. We decline to be
the first.
¶ 47 The trial court was correct to conclude that defendant’s claim was frivolous and patently
without merit.
¶ 48 B. The Truth-in-Sentencing Statute Was Constitutionally Applied
¶ 49 Next, defendant argues that his 32-year prison sentence, pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(i)
of the truth-in-sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2014)) violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as
applied to defendant because of his developing brain and maturity levels. Defendant’s
argument again fails because all of his cited authority involves juveniles and natural life
sentences or de facto life sentences.
¶ 50 “The proportionate penalties clause, which is similar to but not identical with the eighth
amendment, provides that ‘[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness
of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.’ ” In re
Shermaine S., 2015 IL App (1st) 142421, ¶ 28, 25 N.E.3d 723 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§ 11). “An as-applied challenge arises from a defendant’s contention that the statute or law as
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it is applied to his particular situation is unconstitutional.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Guns Save Life, Inc. v. Raoul, 2019 IL App (4th) 190334, ¶ 44, 146 N.E.3d 254. The challenge
depends upon the “particular circumstances and facts” of the defendant’s case and requires the
defendant to show how, based on those circumstances, “the statute violates the constitution.”
Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 36-37.
“Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality of
a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity. A court must construe a
statute so as to uphold its constitutionality if reasonably possible. The constitutionality
of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL
120958, ¶ 57, 91 N.E.3d 876.
¶ 51 In support of defendant’s position, he cites Miller and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48(2010). Defendant notes in his brief that Graham held that juvenile nonhomicide offenders
sentenced to life without parole must be given a meaningful opportunity for release. Id. at 75.
Meanwhile, Miller held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the
age of 18 violates the eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller,
567 U.S. at 470. Defendant also cites People v. Othman, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823, 143 N.E.3d
32; however, that case is distinguishable because it involved a juvenile serving a de facto life
sentence. Also, the portion of Othman that defendant relies upon has since been vacated. See
People v. Othman, No. 125580 (Ill. Jan. 9, 2020) (supervisory order). Thus, none of
defendant’s cited cases stands for the proposition that the truth-in-sentencing statute is
unconstitutional as applied to a person over the age of 18 who received a sentence other than
life imprisonment.
¶ 52 Next, defendant argues that recent legislation shows that defendant’s sentence violates the
proportionate penalties clause. But defendant’s argument defeats itself. Defendant notes that
“legislation is the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”
Defendant argues that new legislation that allows for parole for first degree murderers
committed before the offender turned 21 demonstrates those contemporary values. See 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West Supp. 2019). However, defendant notes, “The statute only applies
prospectively *** and, therefore, was not in effect at the time of [defendant’s] 2016
sentencing.” Apparently, according to defendant, Illinois’s contemporary values are reflected
in the part of the new law allowing for parole but are not reflected in the part of the law stating
that the law applies only to cases going forward. We disagree and conclude that the legislation
provides absolutely no support for defendant’s position. In fact, it shows the opposite—the
legislature had the opportunity to make this law apply retroactively and chose not to, indicating
that whatever “contemporary value” could be gleaned from the law does not extend to
defendant’s case.
¶ 53 No court in Illinois has ever concluded that a nonlife sentence for a nonjuvenile offender
violated the proportionate penalties clause on the basis of the defendant’s developing brain,
and we will not be the first. Additionally, we note that a sentence of 32 years in prison for an
adult who beat a vulnerable homeless man to death is entirely appropriate. Convicted
murderers are often given sentences similar to the one in this case. Accordingly, the trial court
was correct to conclude that defendant’s claim was frivolous and patently without merit.
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¶ 54 C. Defendant Did Not Raise an Arguable Claim
That His Guilty Plea Was Involuntary
¶ 55 Next, defendant contends that he made an arguable claim that his guilty plea was
involuntary because it was secured by the threat of a life sentence that would have been
constitutionally impermissible for a juvenile. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. In support,
defendant cites People v. Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192, a case in which the defendant, 16
years old at the time of his arrest and sentenced to 35 years in prison, successfully argued that
he should be granted leave to file his successive postconviction petition. The defendant in
Parker argued that “he would not have pled guilty to felony murder in exchange for a
sentencing cap of 50 years if the guidelines set forth in Buffer were established at the time that
he entered his guilty plea.” Id. ¶ 18. The Fifth District was persuaded by the defendant’s
contention that he “pled guilty after being repeatedly admonished that he could receive a
natural-life sentence, which, given the facts of the case and the issuance of Buffer, is no longer
a reasonable threat.” Id. The Fifth District reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for
further postconviction proceedings. Id. However, Parker is again readily distinguishable from
the case at hand—Parker involved a juvenile, whereas this case does not.
¶ 56 We further note that defendant had initially filed in the trial court motions to withdraw his
guilty plea and reconsider his sentence but decided to withdraw both motions. Before he did
so, the trial court specifically told defendant that “if you withdraw these motions, basically that
precludes your right to appeal in this case.” Defendant withdrew the motions anyway. We
recognize that defendant’s current argument is different from the one raised in the trial court;
however, it is noteworthy that defendant was apparently sufficiently satisfied with the sentence
he bargained for that he intentionally waived any arguments related to it.
¶ 57 Because defendant cites no case with facts remotely similar to the present case—namely,
a case involving a defendant who was not a juvenile and was not sentenced to natural or
de facto life in prison—we conclude that defendant’s claim that his guilty plea was involuntary
is frivolous and patently without merit. The trial court correctly dismissed the petition.
¶ 58 D. The Trial Court’s Reliance on an Unpublished Order
Was Harmless Error
¶ 59 Last, defendant argues that the trial court improperly relied upon People v. Cohn, 2014 IL
App (1st) 122562-U, an unpublished order. We agree that this was an error; however, because
the trial court otherwise came to the correct conclusion, we conclude that this error was
harmless.
¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 62 Affirmed.
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