In re Commitment of Bauer ( 2020 )

Digitally signed by
Reporter of
Decisions
Reason: I attest to
Illinois Official Reports the accuracy and
integrity of this
document
Appellate Court Date: 2022.01.03
10:42:51 -06'00'
In re Commitment of Bauer, 2020 IL App (2d) 180905Appellate Court In re COMMITMENT OF NICHOLAS R. BAUER (The People of the
Caption State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Nicholas R. Bauer,
Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. Second District
No. 2-18-0905
Filed June 4, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee County, No. 09-MR-64; the Hon.
Review Daniel A. Fish, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Allison B. Fagerman, of Law Office of Allison B. Fagerman, P.C., of
Appeal Rock Falls, for appellant.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,
Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Nicholas Moeller,
Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Respondent, Nicholas R. Bauer, appeals the trial court’s orders (1) finding, after a hearing
pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), that the diagnosis of hebephilia
has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community and (2) finding him to be a
sexually violent person (or SVP). Hebephilia is defined as “the strong, persistent sexual interest
by adults in pubescent children who are in early adolescence, typically ages 11-14 and showing
Tanner stages 2 to 3 of physical development.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Hebephilia (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/L3BG-5P6E]. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Respondent was convicted in 2007 of one count of indecent solicitation of a child (720
ILCS 5/11-6(a) (West 2006)) and sentenced to six years in the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC), to be followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. In 2009, the
State filed a petition for an order of commitment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)), seeking an order of detention
pursuant to section 30(a) of the Act and commitment to the Illinois Department of Human
Services for control, care, and treatment pursuant to section 40 of the Act. The State alleged,
inter alia, that respondent had been evaluated by Dr. Ray Quackenbush, a clinical
psychologist, who diagnosed respondent as suffering from the mental disorders of
(1) “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified, with Mixed Features” and (2) “Personality Disorder,
Not Otherwise Specified, with Antisocial Features.” In 2015, the State amended its petition,
deleting any reference to Quackenbush and his diagnoses. Instead, the State cited the diagnoses
of two other doctors: (1) Dr. Richard Travis diagnosed respondent as having “Other Specified
Paraphilic Disorder, Sexually [sic] Arousal To Early Pubescent Females, Nonexclusive Type”
and (2) Dr. Angeline Stanislaus diagnosed respondent as suffering from “Other Specified
Paraphilic Disorder—Hebephilia.” Paraphilia is defined as “a pattern of recurring sexually
arousing mental imagery or behavior that involves unusual and especially socially
unacceptable sexual practices (such as sadism or pedophilia).” Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paraphilia (last visited Jan. 1, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/D878-RQA6].
¶4 Respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the testimony of the State’s evaluators
or to subject portions of it to a hearing pursuant to Frye, 293 F. 1013. Respondent amended
his motion in light of the State’s amended petition, deleting certain evaluators and adding
Travis and Stanislaus. According to respondent, both Travis and Stanislaus submitted “a
diagnosis of hebephilia.” Respondent argued that, pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in
In re Detention of New, 2014 IL 116306, a Frye hearing was required to determine whether
the diagnosis of hebephilia (defined as a preferential sexual interest in pubescent (early stages
-2-
of puberty) children) had gained general acceptance in the psychological and psychiatric
communities.
¶5 Both the State and respondent agreed that a Frye hearing was necessary to evaluate Travis’s
and Stanislaus’s diagnoses, and a hearing was held in October 2016. After hearing testimony
from State’s witnesses Dr. David Thornton and Dr. James Cantor, and respondent’s witness
Dr. John Fabian, the trial court found that “there is more than a reasonable subset, there is a
substantial subset of the psychologists and psychiatrists who as a substantial part of their work
evaluate, treat or research sex offenders who accept hebephilia as a diagnosis.” Thus, the trial
court denied respondent’s motion to exclude at trial the evidence of the diagnosis.
¶6 The matter then proceeded to a bench trial on the commitment petition. The State presented
the testimony of Stanislaus and Travis, both of whom found that respondent met the criteria to
be committed as a sexually violent person. Respondent presented the testimony of Fabian. The
trial court found respondent to be a sexually violent person and committed respondent to the
Illinois Department of Human Services. This appeal followed.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Respondent first contends that the trial court erred in finding that the diagnosis of
hebephilia has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community and that expert
reliance on the diagnosis was reasonable.
¶9 The admission of scientific evidence is governed by the Frye standard (New, 2014 IL
116306, ¶ 25), which is now codified in the Illinois Rules of Evidence:
“Where an expert witness testifies to an opinion based on a new or novel scientific
methodology or principle, the proponent of the opinion has the burden of showing the
methodology or scientific principle on which the opinion is based is sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.” Ill. R. Evid. 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
The Frye test is used to exclude new or novel scientific evidence that undeservedly creates “a
perception of certainty when the basis for the evidence or opinion is actually invalid” (internal
quotation marks omitted). It serves to prevent a factfinder from simply adopting the judgment
of an expert because of the natural inclination to equate science with truth and, therefore,
accord undue significance to any evidence labeled as scientific. New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 26.
“General acceptance” does not mean universal acceptance; it does not require that the
methodology in question be accepted by unanimity, consensus, or even by a majority of
experts. In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 530 (2004). It is sufficient that the
underlying method used to generate an expert’s opinion is reasonably relied upon by experts
in the relevant field. Id. We review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether a Frye
hearing is necessary and whether there is general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 26. In conducting this de novo review, a reviewing court
may consider the trial court record and, where appropriate, sources outside the record,
including legal and scientific articles, as well as judicial opinions from other jurisdictions.
Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 531.
¶ 10 In New, our supreme court determined that “the diagnosis of hebephilia is subject to Frye”
and remanded the cause “for a Frye hearing to determine if hebephilia is a generally accepted
diagnosis in the psychiatric and psychological communities.” New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 53. The
-3-
parties here agreed that a Frye hearing was necessary, and we have not found any reported
cases that have examined the diagnosis of hebephilia under Frye since the supreme court
addressed the issue in New. Thus, we will review the trial court’s decision as it relates to the
Frye hearing.
¶ 11 At the Frye hearing, both Thornton and Cantor testified that the diagnosis of hebephilia is
generally accepted by experts who assess and treat sexual disorders. Thornton testified that the
term “hebephilia” was first used in 1955 by a researcher named Glueck, who was researching,
among other things, sexual offenders. Thornton defined hebephilia as “a sexual preference for
children in the early stage of puberty, Tanner stages II and III,” such that the person “is more
attracted to children at that stage of development than they are to either adults or to younger
children.” He distinguished hebephilia (primary interest in pubescent children) from
pedophilia (primary interest in prepubescent children).
¶ 12 Thornton testified that, according to his training and experience, hebephilia is generally
accepted by the majority of people in the scientific community who specialize in the
assessment and treatment of sex offenses and who work clinically with paraphilias or research
paraphilias as mental disorders and mental conditions. In forming his opinion, Thornton relied
on clinical experience, published research, and his own research. The main studies on
hebephilia had come from Canadian laboratories, including the Kurt Freund Laboratory at the
Center for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), which Thornton described as the “standard
of excellence” in the field.
¶ 13 Cantor testified that the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), which is
published by the World Health Organization (WHO), is generally accepted by experts who
assess or research the assessment of sexual offenders and is used “essentially everywhere
outside of the United States.” Hebephilia could be diagnosed using the ICD-10, although the
ICD-10 included it under its definition of “paedophilia,” which describes “attraction to
prepubescent or early pubescent children.”
¶ 14 Cantor testified that there were 40 peer-reviewed studies on hebephilia, 34 of which made
specific comparisons between pedophiles, hebephiles, and teleiophiles (those attracted to
adults).He testified that, of those 34, 32 demonstrated “a statistically significant difference
between—between the hebephiles and the teleiophiles or demonstrated that there were no
significant differences between the pedophiles and the hebephiles.”
¶ 15 Cantor also reviewed the report that Fabian had produced for the proceedings, including
Fabian’s discussion regarding a review by Karen Franklin of literature on hebephilia.
Franklin’s review categorized 117 documents on the diagnosis of hebephilia as “pro,” “con,”
or “other.” Cantor had read each of the documents and he noted that Franklin was “a bit
ambiguous” in her analysis and often “grossly misrepresented what the authors were actually
saying.” Of the 117 documents listed, Franklin found 27 to be “pro” diagnosis and 60 “anti”
diagnosis, with the rest “other”; Cantor’s analysis was 56 “pro” and 43 “anti,” with the rest
“other.” Looking at only the 65 peer-reviewed documents in the list, Franklin found 19 “pro”
and 20 “anti,” while Cantor found 41 “pro” and 12 “anti.” Cantor also reviewed an additional
16 peer-reviewed articles not included in Franklin’s list, all of which he found to be “pro”
diagnosis.
¶ 16 Cantor opined that the mental condition of hebephilia was “almost unanimously accepted”
in the scientific community of experts in mental health who, as a substantial part of their work,
assess or research the assessment of sexual offenders, as was the general acceptance of
-4-
hebephilia under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). He also
stated that he was not in favor of SVP legislation and had spoken out against it in the media.
¶ 17 Respondent’s expert, Dr. Fabian, opined that hebephilia was not a generally accepted
diagnosis. Fabian described the relevant scientific community as made up of three subgroups:
(1) forensic-expert psychologists, neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists; (2) “folks that have a
quasi-forensic clinical background who are doing assessments and treatments in the
community”; and (3) “folks like Dr. Cantor who are in a lab—laboratory in a university or
government setting who will do research.” He found that “the study of hebephilia is most
scientific and most credible in the research domain, and that research is coming out of CAMH.”
¶ 18 Fabian opined that hebephilia was not generally accepted by forensic experts, in group 1,
but was generally accepted by researchers, in group 3, although he thought that it was more
accepted in Canada than in the United States. As to clinicians, in group 2, Cantor explained
that the “few people” that he knew “do not adhere to it.” He thought that, in the area of SVP
civil commitments, experts who testify for the State “do condone, agree, and support *** this
diagnosis,” while experts who often testify for respondents do not, “so I don’t know if that’s
general acceptance or not.” However, he did state that clinicians working in the SVP civil-
commitment field were “typically” trained in issues related to hebephilia but that it was up to
each clinician to decide “whether they will then incorporate this information as to, yes, I
believe there’s enough to diagnose or not with hebephilia.”
¶ 19 Respondent first argues that the trial court assessed the relevant scientific community too
broadly in that it included factors and scientific knowledge on the diagnosis of hebephilia from
outside the United States. This argument is directed against the testimony of Thornton, who
testified that, outside the United States and Canada, the ICD-10 is the authoritative text
regarding diseases and mental disorders. The ICD-10 included a diagnosis of hebephilia within
its definition of “paedophilia,” which describes “attraction to prepubescent or early pubescent
children.”
¶ 20 Respondent cites no authority to support the claim that, for Frye purposes, the relevant
scientific community is limited to persons residing and publishing in the United States. In
Simons, our supreme court looked to judicial decisions from other states in its analysis of the
general acceptance of actuarial risk assessment in a sexually-dangerous-person proceeding.
The court analyzed Roeling v. State, 880 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which found
that actuarial risk assessment satisfied the general-acceptance standard of Frye. The court
noted that the Roeling court had “exhaustively examined” the relevant academic literature,
including Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy and the Predictive Validity of the PCL-R.: An
International Perspective, 18 Behav. Sci. & L. 623 (2000). Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 538 (citing
Roeling, 880 So. 2d at 1239). The court had no issue with a sister court’s examination of, and
reliance on, an explicitly international perspective in making a Frye determination (left unsaid
was whether any of the other literature included analysis of international studies), and we find
no basis for making a contrary decision here. Thus, the trial court here did not err in considering
scientific information and factors from outside the United States. 1
¶ 21 Respondent next contends that a diagnosis of hebephilia is not valid. Respondent correctly
asserts that the American Psychiatric Association (APA) rejected a proposal to include the
1
We further note that, in his brief, respondent cites with approval a 2001 vote against the adoption
of the diagnosis of hebephilia by the International Association for the Treatment of Sex Offenders.
-5-
diagnosis of “pedohebephilia” (sexual preference for both prepubescent and early pubescent
children, with pedophilia and hebephilia subtypes) in the DSM-5, the most recent edition of
the DSM. See New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 42 (noting the “proposal to include hebephilia as a
diagnosis was rejected in the DSM-5”). However, respondent then claims that the DSM-5 is
“the authoritative text governing the assessment and diagnosis of sex offenders” and that
Fabian testified that all professionals in his field “are bound by” it. First, respondent fails to
direct us to any evidence that any professionals are “bound” by the DSM. Second, such a claim
is refuted by our supreme court, which, while noting that DSM-5 is “an undisputed
authoritative reference manual in the field of psychology and psychiatry” and that “numerous
experts do apply and rely upon the DSM as an authoritative source to support civil
commitment,” also noted that “an expert in a civil commitment proceeding is not required to
rely upon the DSM.” (Emphases added.) Id. The court has noted the importance of the DSM’s
consideration and rejection of the hebephilia diagnosis. See id. ¶ 51. However, while
important, it is not paramount, let alone dispositive, regarding the issue of general acceptance
of the diagnosis.
¶ 22 Our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that the diagnosis of hebephilia is generally
accepted in the psychological and psychiatric communities. The concept of hebephilia has been
in existence for 65 years, and its diagnosis has been included in the ICD-10, which, according
to experts in mental health who, as a substantial part of their work, assess or research the
assessment of sexual offenders (“almost unanimously accepted,” according to Cantor).
¶ 23 Fabian included in his report Franklin’s list of literature addressing the issue of hebephilia.
Of the documents that Franklin found to take a position on hebephilia, almost 33% were found
to be “pro” diagnosis. Cantor’s analysis of these same documents resulted in a score of 56%
“pro” diagnosis. The results were even more in favor of the diagnosis when only peer-reviewed
documents were considered; Franklin found an almost-even split, while Cantor found 77%
supporting the diagnosis (82% when considering peer-reviewed documents not on Franklin’s
list).
¶ 24 While Fabian opined that the diagnosis of hebephilia was not generally accepted in the
scientific community, his description of acceptance within the various subgroups thereof
demonstrates otherwise. He testified that researchers generally accepted the diagnosis and that
forensic experts did not. As to clinicians, Cantor testified that the “few people” that he knew
“do not adhere to it.” Further, while experts that usually testify for the State “do condone,
agree, and support *** this diagnosis,” experts that often testify for respondents do not, “so I
don’t know if that’s general acceptance or not.” Fabian did not identify a lack of general
acceptance. He identified a significant group of experts that do accept the diagnosis.
¶ 25 Respondent spends a great deal of his brief emphasizing Fabian’s testimony attacking the
methodology of some of the studies supporting the diagnosis of hebephilia. However, “[u]nder
the Frye standard, the trial court is not asked to determine the validity of a particular scientific
technique.” Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 532. A trial court is not required to conduct a two-part inquiry
into both the reliability of the methodology and its general acceptance; the reliability of an
expert’s methodology is naturally subsumed by the inquiry into its general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community. Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63,
81 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Simons, 213 Ill. 2d at 532. Once it is determined that
a methodology is generally accepted in the applicable community, it follows that it has
-6-
achieved a sufficient degree of reliability and validity to cross the threshold of admissibility.
In re Commitment of Sandry, 367 Ill. App. 3d 949, 966 (2006).
¶ 26 During oral argument, it was pointed out that the WHO released a proposed revision to the
ICD-10 that was accepted by WHO member states in May 2019. The new edition of the ICD,
ICD-11, will go into effect on January 1, 2022. This court ordered supplemental briefing on
the issue of general acceptance in light of the ICD-11.
¶ 27 The ICD-11 has eliminated the classification of “paedophilia” that the ICD-10 listed under
its nine types of “Disorders of Sexual Preference.” The ICD-11 does list “pedophilic disorder”
within its five specific “Paraphilic Disorders”; this disorder concerns only a sexual interest in
“prepubertal children” and makes no mention of early pubescent children, as “paedophilia”
did. In addition, the ICD-11 added a general category of paraphilic disorders called “Other
paraphilic disorder involving non-consenting individuals” that focuses on an interest in
individuals “who are unwilling or unable to consent [to sexual activity] but that is not
specifically described in any of the other named Paraphilic Disorders categories.”
¶ 28 Our review of the ICD-11 revisions does not affect our conclusion that that the diagnosis
of hebephilia is generally accepted in the psychiatric and psychological communities. First, as
we have already stated, the DSM-5, while important, “is not paramount, let alone dispositive,
regarding the issue of general acceptance of the hebephilia diagnosis.” Supra ¶ 21. This applies
as well to the ICD. No one publication or source is dispositive on the question of general
acceptance.
¶ 29 Second, even the deletion of the ICD-10 reference to “early pubescent children”—and the
failure to make any reference to hebephilia—cannot be conclusively read to mean that
hebephilia is not a recognized diagnosis. The ICD-11 reduced from nine to five the number of
specifically named sexual disorders but included OPD, the general category of paraphilic
disorders. This category focuses on a person’s interest in individuals “who are unwilling or
unable to consent [to sexual activity] but that is not specifically described in any of the other
named Paraphilic Disorders categories.” Hebephilia is defined as a preferential sexual interest
in pubescent (early stages of puberty) children, a group whose age renders them unwilling or
unable to consent. Thus, a diagnosis of hebephilia would fit within the ICD-11’s sexual
disorder of OPD.
¶ 30 Ultimately, the issuance of the ICD-11 does not affect our analysis and our determination
that the diagnosis of hebephilia is generally accepted in the psychiatric and psychological
communities. As we have stated, “general acceptance” does not mean universal acceptance or
even acceptance by a majority of experts; it requires only that the underlying method used to
generate an expert’s opinion is reasonably relied upon by experts in the relevant field. Simons,
213 Ill. 2d at 530. The revisions to the ICD-11 do not negate the testimony of Thornton, Cantor,
and Fabian at the Frye hearing that identified significant segments of the relevant scientific
community that have accepted the diagnosis of hebephilia. Thus, we determine that the State
proved that the diagnosis of hebephilia has achieved general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community, and the trial court’s judgment was not in error.
¶ 31 Respondent next contends that the trial court erred in finding him to be a sexually violent
person. In reviewing a trial court’s finding that a respondent is sexually violent, we ask only
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier
of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Detention of
Lieberman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 585, 598 (2007).
-7-
¶ 32 Pursuant to the Act, a person is a sexually violent person if he (1) has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense, (2) suffers from a mental disorder, and (3) is dangerous because the
mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence.
725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2018). Respondent concedes that he was convicted of a sexually
violent offense but argues that the State failed to prove the remaining elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.
¶ 33 At trial, the State presented the testimony of Stanislaus, the forensic psychiatrist and
licensed sex-offender evaluator. Stanislaus testified that she performed a clinical evaluation of
respondent but never met with him, as he did not wish to participate in an interview. She
completed two reports, in 2014 and 2018, based on her review of various records.
¶ 34 Respondent had pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, arising
out of several incidents in 2003 involving three girls who were 13 to 14 years old at the time,
while respondent was approximately 20 years old. Respondent had sex several times with one
14-year-old victim while he was on bond for charges involving another victim. At around that
same time, there were allegations that respondent was chatting online with another 14-year-
old girl, persistently asking for sex. He also had sexual contact with a 16-year-old friend of
one of his victims.
¶ 35 Respondent was paroled in August 2005. He was ordered not to have any Internet access
or possess electronic devices such as a cell phone. In November 2006, he was found to have
violated his parole by sending sexually explicit messages to a 13-year-old girl, after setting up
a MySpace account, claiming to be a 16-year-old high school student. Respondent was 23 to
24 years old at the time. This led to his conviction of indecent solicitation of a child (720 ILCS
5/11-6(a) (West 2006)) and a sentence of six years in prison. Around that time, the police
discovered that respondent had gotten in touch with one of his prior victims, who was then
approximately 15 years old, and was engaging in sex with her. Respondent did not participate
in any sex-offender treatment while he was imprisoned but did receive some sex-offender
treatment while on parole.
¶ 36 Using the DSM-5, Stanislaus diagnosed respondent with the mental disorder of “Other
Specified Paraphilic Disorder—Hebephilia.” Stanislaus defined a paraphilia as any intense
persistent sexual interest in anything other than with phenotypically normal, physically mature,
consenting human partners. According to Stanislaus, it is not just a deviant sexual interest—
the person must have acted on it and resulted in harm to another or significant distress to the
person committing the behavior. Respondent had engaged in recurrent sexual behavior with
13-year-old and 14-year-old female victims. This led to his imprisonment. This diagnosis did
not require that pubescent girls were his only attraction; respondent could be attracted to
physically mature partners as well.
¶ 37 Stanislaus also stated that the mental disorder affected respondent’s emotional or volitional
capacity and predisposed him to engage in continued acts of sexual violence. Static-99 and
Static-99R risk-assessment tests showed that respondent was above-high risk to reoffend, the
second-highest risk category. Stanislaus opined that, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric
certainty, it was substantially probable that respondent would reoffend. She then opined that
respondent met the criteria to be found a sexually violent person.
¶ 38 Travis diagnosed respondent, pursuant to the DSM-5, as “Other Specified Paraphilic
Disorder, sexually attracted to early pubescent females, Nonexclusive,” also known as
hebephilia. He described the criteria for this diagnosis as “over the period of at least six months
-8-
having intense fantasies, urges or engaging in behaviors—sexual behaviors toward persons
who are in the time period, we’ll call pubescent, which is 11 to 14 generally.” He also found it
to be a mental disorder because respondent acted out on it, causing harm to other people. He
cited respondent’s lack of control, acting out with a 14-year-old when he was on bond and
attempting to “become sexual” with a 13-year-old while he was on parole.
¶ 39 Respondent presented the testimony of Fabian, who diagnosed respondent as suffering
from “specific learning disorder,” a disorder recognized by the DSM-5. Fabian did “not
support” the possibility that this disorder would predispose respondent to acts of sexual
violence. Fabian believed, with “some conjecture,” that respondent’s “lower functioning ***
could be in part related to him gravitating towards younger, you know, let’s say adolescents.”
Fabian opined that the prefrontal cortex of the brain does not fully develop until a person is 23
to 24 years old; respondent committed his offenses while in his late teens to 24 years old and
suffered at that time from specific learning disorder. Fabian could not say that respondent had
a paraphilic disorder and agreed that respondent “does not in any respect suffer from a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes
him to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Respondent did “in part” have a history of being
hypersexual, but that was not a diagnosis of a paraphilia, it was more related to a risk factor.
¶ 40 Fabian reiterated his opinion that respondent did not have a paraphilic disorder and that
hebephilia “does not exist.” Because respondent did not suffer from a relevant mental disorder,
the issue of risk of sexual reoffense was irrelevant.
¶ 41 Fabian did state that, “technically based on DSM-5 criteria,” respondent “would have
qualified” for a diagnosis of pedophilia, but two of his victims were almost 14 and almost 16;
thus, Fabian saw a “pubescent/postpubescent interest,” where respondent was at the “high-end
cutoff of pedophilic disorder,” and he could not say that he could not reasonably diagnose
respondent as such.
¶ 42 We conclude that, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a
rational trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lieberman,
379 Ill. App. 3d at 598. Respondent’s conviction of a sexually violent offense was not at issue.
Both Stanislaus and Travis testified that they diagnosed respondent with the mental disorder
of “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder—Hebephilia,” pursuant to the DSM-5, a diagnosis
amply supported by respondent’s history of sexual offenses involving 13-year-old and 14-year-
old girls. Fabian, respondent’s own expert, testified that respondent was on the cusp of a
diagnosis of pedophilia. Respondent’s commission of some of these offenses while on bond or
on parole and his “above-high risk to reoffend” score pursuant to the Static-99 and Static-99R
risk-assessment tests also support a finding that it was substantially probable that respondent
will engage in future acts of sexual violence. Thus, we conclude that there was no error in the
trial court’s finding that respondent is a sexually violent person under the Act.
¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lee County is affirmed.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
-9-