People v. Robinson ( 2020 )

NOTICE FILED
This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 180058-U June 2, 2020
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in 4th District Appellate
the limited circumstances allowed
NO. 4-18-0058
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
ANNA LYNN ROBINSON, ) No. 16CM597
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) John R. Kennedy,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), where the State met its burden of proving
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing defendant to 12 months’ supervision.
¶2 This case comes to us on the motion of the Office of the State Appellate Defender
(OSAD) to withdraw as counsel on appeal because any request for review would be without
merit. Specifically, OSAD asserts it can make no meritorious argument that (1) the State failed
to meet its burden of proving defendant guilty of battery beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the
trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to 12 months’ supervision. We grant
OSAD leave to withdraw as counsel and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In June 2016, the State charged defendant, Anna Lynn Robinson, with two counts
of battery for spraying David Wills and Gladys Fancher with pepper spray.
¶5 A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶6 In September 2016, defense counsel filed a motion for the appointment of a
psychiatrist to evaluate defendant’s “fitness to proceed to a hearing and sanity at the time of the
offense.” Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and appointed Dr. Albert Lo to
examine defendant. Dr. Lo’s report found defendant able to understand the legal system but
unable to work with an attorney to provide a proper defense. Dr. Lo therefore found defendant
unfit to stand trial. Following a November 2016 hearing, the court found defendant unfit to stand
trial. The court subsequently ordered defendant to participate in outpatient treatment at
Rosecrance.
¶7 In a January 2017 report, Becky Griffin, a licensed clinical social worker at
Rosecrance, stated, “Due to [defendant’s] report of no active mental health symptoms and
minimal history of psychiatric symptoms or treatment she does not meet the criteria for a DSM-
V diagnosis and she is not being recommended for outpatient mental health treatment at this
time.” The trial court concluded the report provided insufficient information to find defendant
had been restored to fitness. The court subsequently sent Griffin a letter requesting further
evaluation of defendant and a report addressing issues related to defendant’s fitness.
¶8 In a March 2017 report, Griffin wrote, in part, as follows:
“[Defendant] is able to clearly state she has been charged
with [b]attery. She demonstrates her understanding that this is a
misdemeanor offense. She also appears to understand the court
proceedings and can identify the different participants, their roles,
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and functions during the proceedings. She is able to describe and
explain what a plea consists of, a judgment, and a sentence.
[Defendant] provided a detailed description of *** her
interpretation of the alleged incident that led to her arrest and
current charges. She identifies her [p]ublic [d]efender *** and she
acknowledges that [she] has been uncooperative with him in the
past interactions though she indicates that she would like to know
all of the facts of the case to be able to better understand how to
proceed with her attorney’s assistance.”
Defense counsel argued that, based on the March 2017 report and his own observation of
defendant’s behavior, the court should find defendant fit. In finding defendant fit, the court
indicated it considered the reports, the factors in the fitness statute, and the court’s own
observation of defendant’s demeanor, presence, speech, and manner of communication with her
attorney.
¶9 B. Jury Trial
¶ 10 In June 2017, the matter proceeded to trial, where the jurors heard the following
evidence.
¶ 11 1. David Wills
¶ 12 David Wills testified he was a security guard at Restoration Urban Ministry
(Restoration), where defendant previously resided. On June 21, 2016, defendant drew Wills’s
attention because she appeared to be intoxicated. According to Wills, residents were not allowed
to be under the influence or have drug activity while living at Restoration. Because defendant
appeared to be intoxicated, Wills and Gladys Fancher asked her to leave the property for 24
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hours. Wills allowed defendant to gather some belongings from her room while he and Fancher
waited outside. According to Wills, defendant opened her door and angrily charged at him.
Wills testified defendant got close to him and sprayed him directly in the face and eyes with
pepper spray. Wills instantly felt a burning sensation and had difficulty breathing. After Wills
was sprayed with the pepper spray, he called 911. The police arrived in approximately five
minutes and provided Wills with wipes and water to counteract the pepper spray. Wills testified
he knocked defendant down after she sprayed him with pepper spray.
¶ 13 2. Gladys Fancher
¶ 14 Gladys Fancher testified she was a case manager and assistant housing director at
Restoration. On the afternoon of June 21, 2016, Fancher and Wills contacted defendant.
According to Fancher, defendant appeared intoxicated and was asked to leave the property.
Fancher testified she and Wills stood in the parking lot near defendant’s door while she packed a
bag. When defendant exited her room, she had her hands behind her back. According to
Fancher, defendant ran up to Wills and sprayed him in the face with pepper spray. Fancher
testified Wills grabbed his face and rubbed his eyes and defendant turned toward Fancher and
started spraying. When asked where defendant sprayed her with pepper spray, Fancher testified,
“Well, she was pointing it towards my face but the wind had already caught it and blew it back in
my face, so I was rubbing my eyes. I was coughing. I was gasping for air because I couldn’t
breathe.” The police arrived within approximately seven minutes and provided wipes for the
pepper spray.
¶ 15 3. Jonathan Kristensen
¶ 16 Jonathan Kristensen, an officer with the Champaign Police Department, testified
that on June 21, 2016, he was dispatched for a report of a battery. When Kristensen arrived at
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Restoration, he observed defendant slurring her speech, and he detected the odor of an alcoholic
beverage when she spoke. Kristensen also observed Wills, who appeared to have been exposed
to the effects of pepper spray. Kristensen provided Wills with Sudecon wipes to help counteract
the effect of pepper spray. According to Kristensen, Fancher had watery eyes, was blinking and
wincing, and stated she had been pepper sprayed. Kristensen acknowledged his report
documented that he provided Sudecon wipes to Wills but failed to mention providing wipes to
Fancher.
¶ 17 4. Verdict
¶ 18 The jury found defendant guilty of battery by making contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with Wills. However, the jury found defendant not guilty of battery by making
insulting or provoking contact with Fancher.
¶ 19 C. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 20 In July 2017, defense counsel filed a second motion for appointment of a
psychiatrist. Defense counsel stated recent contact with defendant led him to doubt her fitness to
proceed to sentencing and he believed defendant was unable to assist in her representation.
Defense counsel requested that defendant be evaluated regarding her fitness to proceed to
sentencing and that there be a retroactive evaluation of her fitness at trial. The trial court granted
the motion and appointed Dr. Lo to conduct the requested evaluations.
¶ 21 In a September 2017 report, Dr. Lo concluded defendant was unfit to proceed to
sentencing but was fit at the time of trial. Dr. Lo stated defendant currently suffered psychosis
not otherwise specified and she made efforts to “dissimulate (appear to be less ill than she truly
is).” Dr. Lo recommended defendant “obtain treatment in a facility where she can be intensively
observed to clarify her diagnosis and need for treatment.”
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¶ 22 The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s fitness and found that she was fit at
the time of trial. In so finding, the court considered Dr. Lo’s report, the court’s own observations
of defendant during trial, and the previous reports from Rosecrance. The court noted defendant
did not demonstrate any evidence of unfitness during her trial. However, the court found
defendant unfit to proceed to sentencing. The court noted that in addition to Dr. Lo’s report,
defendant’s appearance and demeanor were different from the trial and the court’s observations
were consistent with the expert opinions.
¶ 23 The trial court ordered defendant be remanded into the custody of the Department
of Human Services (DHS) for inpatient treatment. The court noted Dr. Lo opined defendant had
further decompensated, her symptoms were more severe than in his prior evaluation, and the
severity of her illness changed over time. Defendant pleaded with the court to not order inpatient
treatment, stated she had a psychiatrist in Danville, and stated this happened because she refused
to take a plea deal. Defendant further stated inpatient treatment would cause her to lose her
housing and she should not have come to court.
¶ 24 An October 2017 report from DHS stated defendant’s evaluation demonstrated
her need for inpatient treatment at McFarland Mental Health Center. The report estimated
defendant’s fitness would be restored within two months. A November 2017 report indicated
defendant was fit to proceed to sentencing. The report stated defendant was aware of the charges
against her, the class of offense, the possible sentence, and the next phase in her court process
was sentencing. Defendant related her dissatisfaction with her attorney’s use of the phrase
“down and out” and she wanted her attorney to instead emphasize her good work history and
relatively clean criminal record. However, defendant acknowledged “ ‘I’ve stayed with him
[(defense counsel)] this far. I guess I should stay with him the rest of the way.’ *** ‘He’s
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supposed to work on my behalf. We will get the best result if we are working together as a
team.’ ” The report concluded defendant was fit because she had an “adequate understanding of
necessary information related to criminal proceedings and the parties involved in them. She
[wa]s capable of cooperating appropriately in her defense and otherwise capable of behaving and
cooperating in an appropriate, self-serving manner.”
¶ 25 Following a December 2017 hearing, the trial court found defendant’s fitness was
restored and ordered her discharged from DHS custody. The court noted its observations of
defendant were consistent with her fitness being restored. In making its findings, the court
considered its own observations, the report from the experts, the relevant evidence, and the
fitness statute.
¶ 26 That same month, the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing. Defendant
testified she had a degree in economics and a master’s degree in technology education.
Defendant also held a Mississippi teacher’s license and a special education certificate from
Eastern Illinois University. Defendant served in the United States Air Force from approximately
1982 to about 1992 and in the Reserves until approximately 1998. Defendant also worked for
the Department of Children and Family Services, the Champaign School District, and the Urbana
School District.
¶ 27 Defendant testified she became homeless and had some difficulties obtaining
assistance with finding housing. Eventually, defendant was able to secure housing in Danville
through the Department of Veterans Affairs, which she was able to keep while she was in DHS
custody. Defendant testified her experience at McFarland was very educational. According to
defendant, she helped get patients to safety during a “Code Red” and remained with a distraught
patient until DHS staff arrived. Defendant used her own experiences and training to help some
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patients. For example, defendant taught a patient and staff members behavior modification
techniques to help the patient learn “not to touch people.”
¶ 28 The State recommended a sentence of 164 days in jail with 82 days of presentence
credit. Defense counsel argued defendant had no criminal history prior to the events that led to
the current case and she had dedicated her life to serve, help, and educate other people. Defense
counsel recommended a sentence of court supervision.
¶ 29 The trial court considered the nature and circumstance of the offense, the
presentence report, the mitigation evidence, and the recommendations of the attorneys. In
mitigation, the court emphasized defendant’s lack of a prior criminal history, her education, and
her “substantial experience in assisting other people and in service to the country.” The court
noted defendant’s character and attitude indicated she was likely to comply with a community-
based sentence and was unlikely to commit further offenses. Accordingly, the court concluded a
sentence of 12 months’ court supervision would best serve both defendant and the interests of the
public.
¶ 30 This appeal followed.
¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 OSAD seeks to withdraw as counsel on appeal, asserting it can make no
meritorious argument that (1) the State failed to meet its burden of proving defendant guilty of
battery beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
defendant to 12 months’ supervision. For the following reasons, we agree and allow OSAD’s
motion to withdraw.
¶ 33 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
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¶ 34 A defendant may only be convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970). When determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction,
“our function is not to retry the defendant.” People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242, 860
N.E.2d 178, 217 (2006). Instead, we must resolve “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins,
106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)). We allow all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. People
v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 944 N.E.2d 319, 323 (2011). It is the province of the finder of
fact to determine the credibility of a witness, and the finding is entitled to great weight. People
v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 542, 708 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1999). We reverse only where the evidence
is so unsatisfactory, unreasonable, or improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s guilt. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004).
¶ 35 Here, defendant was charged with two counts of battery for allegedly spraying
Wills and Fancher with pepper spray. The jury found defendant guilty of the battery against
Wills and acquitted her of the battery against Fancher. To sustain a conviction for battery, the
State must prove defendant “knowingly without legal justification by any means *** ma[de]
physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature” with Wills. 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West
2016). A person has knowledge when she is consciously aware that the result of her conduct is
practically certain to be caused by her conduct. 720 ILCS 5/4-5(b) (West 2016).
¶ 36 At trial, Wills and Fancher testified defendant was asked to leave Restoration
because she had been drinking in violation of Restoration’s rules. Wills and Fancher testified
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they waited outside while defendant went to her room to pack a bag for the night. Wills testified
defendant exited her room, angrily ran up to him, and sprayed him in the face with pepper spray.
Fancher testified defendant exited her room with her hands behind her back, ran up to Wills, and
sprayed him in the face with pepper spray. Officer Kristensen testified he responded to the
incident and observed that Wills appeared to be suffering from the effects of pepper spray. Wills
testified his eyes and face burned and he had difficulty breathing. Kristensen testified Wills’s
eyes were red and watery and he provided Wills with Sudecon wipes to counteract the chemicals
of pepper spray. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving
proper deference to the trier of fact’s credibility determination, we conclude the jury could have
reasonably concluded defendant was guilty of battery. We therefore agree that no arguably
meritorious basis exists upon which OSAD can challenge the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.
¶ 37 B. Excessive Sentence
¶ 38 A trial court’s sentencing decision is given substantial deference. People v.
Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d 656. A sentence within the statutory limits will be
disturbed only where the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155,
157, 935 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (2010).
¶ 39 In December 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to 12 months’ court
supervision. Defendant’s conviction for a Class A misdemeanor battery carried a maximum
sentence of “less than one year” in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) (West 2016). However, in
certain circumstances a sentence of court supervision may be imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-70(a)
(West 2016). Section 5-4.5-70(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides, in part, as
follows:
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“[T]he court may enter an order for supervision after considering
the circumstances of the offense, and the history, character, and
condition of the offender, if the court is of the opinion that:
(1) the defendant is not likely to commit further crimes;
(2) the defendant and the public would be best served if the
defendant were not to receive a criminal record; and
(3) in the best interests of justice, an order of supervision is
more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this
Code.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-70(a) (West 2016).
A sentence of supervision must be reasonable and “may not be longer than 2 years.” 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-70(b) (West 2016).
¶ 40 Here, the trial court complied with the requirements for imposing a sentence of
court supervision. The court expressly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the presentence report, the mitigation evidence, and the recommendations of the attorneys. In
mitigation, the court emphasized defendant’s lack of a prior criminal history, her education, and
her “substantial experience in assisting other people and in service to the country.” The court
noted defendant’s character and attitude indicated she was likely to comply with a community-
based sentence and was unlikely to commit further offenses. Finally, the court concluded a
sentence of 12 months’ court supervision would best serve both defendant and the interests of the
public.
¶ 41 We agree with OSAD that no meritorious argument can be made that the trial
court abused its discretion where it sentenced defendant to a statutorily authorized sentence of 12
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months’ supervision after making the necessary findings. We therefore grant OSAD’s motion to
withdraw as counsel on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
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