People v. Noble ( 2020 )

NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 180013-UThis order was filed under Supreme FILED
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-18-0013 May 29, 2020
as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender
the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Adams County
ERIC K. NOBLE, ) No. 16CF728
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Robert K. Adrian,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court dismissed the appeal because defendant did not withdraw his
guilty plea before attempting to challenge his sentence as excessive, as required
by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d).
¶2 Defendant, Eric K. Noble, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the offense of
aggravated domestic battery in exchange for, in relevant part, the State’s promise to cap its
sentencing recommendation at nine years’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the State recommended
a nine-year sentence, which the trial court ultimately imposed. Defendant appeals, arguing his
federal due process rights were violated by the court’s reliance on an improper aggravating
factor. Pursuant to our supreme court’s recent holding in People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956,
¶¶ 1, 57, 129 N.E.3d 1239, we must dismiss defendant’s appeal, as he has failed to comply with
the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Charges
¶5 The State charged defendant by information with aggravated domestic battery
(count I) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2014)), aggravated battery (count II) (id. § 12-
3.05(d)(2)), and attempt (first degree murder) (count III) (id. § 8-4(a)). All three counts alleged
“that [defendant] choked [the victim] by placing his hands around her neck, knowing [the victim]
to be pregnant ***.”
¶6 B. Negotiated Plea Agreement
¶7 Defendant pleaded guilty to count I—aggravated domestic battery—in exchange
for the State’s promise to, among other things, dismiss the remaining charges and cap its
sentencing recommendation at nine years’ imprisonment. Prior to accepting defendant’s plea, the
trial court admonished him that count I carried with it a statutory sentencing range from 3 to 14
years in prison.
¶8 C. Postplea Proceedings
¶9 Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He alleged his plea
was invalid because the day before he entered it, he had “refused and did not receive his late
evening dose of” a prescribed mood stabilizer. At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the
following exchange occurred between defendant and the trial court:
“THE COURT: The court has considered the evidence and the arguments
of Counsel. The court would deny the [d]efendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.
[Defendant] is obviously lying to the [c]ourt when he gets up here and
testifies that he doesn’t remember. [Defendant] seems to remember whether or not
he took medication on the day when he doesn’t remember whether or not he took
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the plea. He—you can go ahead and take him back there. He knows where he’s
going.
DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know. You’re racist. That’s what the f*** you is.
That’s what the f*** it is. You’re a racist.
THE COURT: You can take him out. Your motion is denied.
DEFENDANT: F*** you.
***
THE COURT: Okay. [Defendant] should be advised *** that his
comments in this courtroom today will certainly be considered in the sentencing
hearing. And I’m going to direct the [court] reporter to provide, if she took down,
provide the transcript of what was said as [defendant] was walking out of the
courtroom and provide that to the [d]efendant and put that in the record because
the [c]ourt will certainly make note and will use that as consideration in the
sentencing.”
¶ 10 D. Sentencing Hearing
¶ 11 In imposing a nine-year prison sentence, the trial court stated the following to
defendant at the sentencing hearing:
“THE COURT: ***
The court would note that your record also shows, and although you
apologized to the court today, and the court accepts your apology for that. You
have shown disrespect to this court, and the court would note other courts which,
because the court is aware of your sentencing in the last case, where you showed
disrespect to that court, and also you have at least two violations of order[s] of
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protection[], which means there were court orders that you violated. So that shows
disrespect to the court and disrespect to the law.
***
The court notes that you got a negotiation which cut down on the cap for
your sentence in this case. It is a cap of nine years.
***
The court is going to sentence you to nine years in the [D]epartment of
[C]orrections on this case. It is an [85%] sentence by law. It will be followed by
four years of mandatory supervised release.”
¶ 12 E. Postsentencing Proceedings
¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, raising an excessive-sentence
claim, which the trial court denied. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea
following his sentencing.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court violated his federal due process rights
by denying him both the benefit of his plea bargain and a fair sentencing hearing, “when the
court sentenced him to the maximum sentence due to its treating of his behavior in court as an
improper factor in aggravation.” The State responds by asserting the requirements of Rule 604(d)
prevent us from reaching the merits of defendant’s appeal. The proper application of Rule 604(d)
is reviewed de novo. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 22.
¶ 17 A. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
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¶ 18 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), governs the procedure
criminal defendants must follow when challenging a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty. It
provides, in relevant part:
“No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty
challenging the sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within
30 days of the imposition of sentence, files a motion to withdraw
the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. For purposes of this
rule, a negotiated plea of guilty is one in which the prosecution has
bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range
of sentence, or where the prosecution has made concessions
relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge
or charges then pending.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
The timely filing of a Rule 604(d) motion “is a condition precedent to an appeal from a judgment
on a plea of guilty.” People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 300-01, 802 N.E.2d 1174, 1180 (2003).
Failure to comply with the rule does not deprive this court of jurisdiction, but it does preclude us
from considering the appeal on the merits, which requires dismissal. Id.¶ 19 The rationale underlying the Rule 604(d) filing requirement is premised on “the
nature of the plea agreement” and “the application of contract law principles.” Johnson, 2019 IL
122956, ¶ 27. When a plea agreement includes sentencing concessions by the State, “the guilty
plea and the sentence ‘go hand in hand’ as material elements of the plea bargain.” People v.
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332, 673 N.E.2d 244, 250 (1996). As such, our supreme court has held
that it would violate principles of contract law to allow a defendant to attempt to unilaterally
modify the bargained-for sentence, while simultaneously holding the State to its end of the
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bargain. People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 74, 708 N.E.2d 1169, 1172-73 (1999). In other words,
“[b]y agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended sentencing cap, a defendant is, in
effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence imposed below that cap on the grounds it is
excessive.” Id.¶ 20 B. Our Supreme Court’s Holding in Johnson
¶ 21 Recently, our supreme court resolved a split in authority in the appellate court
over the issue of “whether a defendant who enters into a negotiated plea agreement may
challenge a sentence that conforms to the plea agreement, on the ground that the trial court relied
on improper aggravating factors, without withdrawing his guilty plea under [Rule 604(d)].”
Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 1. Answering this question in the negative, the supreme court
rejected the defendant’s attempt to distinguish his claim from an excessive-sentence claim, on
the basis that “his challenge is one of constitutional dimension that implicates due process and
fundamental fairness.” Id. ¶ 36. The court found the argument “to be a distinction without a
difference for purposes of Rule 604(d)” (id. ¶ 41):
“[W]hen a defendant contends the court improperly
considered a statutory aggravating factor that was implicit in the
offense, the defendant is asserting that the court imposed a harsher
sentence than might otherwise have been imposed had the court
not considered the improper statutory factor. [Citation.]
Thus, defendant’s argument is essentially that, had the trial
court not erred in its application of the statute and had it not
erroneously considered those statutory factors, he would have
gotten a lower sentence than the 11-year sentence that was
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imposed. Stated another way, defendant contends the court
imposed an excessive sentence.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, “would result in making Rule 604(d)’s requirements
superfluous” by “allow[ing] almost every sentencing challenge in a criminal case to be restated
in a constitutional due process framework as a way to avoid the rule.” Id. ¶ 41. The court further
found that, where “the defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement to a sentence that was
authorized by statute and was within the terms of the agreement[,]” it “does not undermine
judicial integrity” to hold that the “defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the plea and
return the parties to the status quo ***.” Id. ¶ 53.
¶ 22 The Johnson court concluded by stating “we hold that a defendant who enters into
a negotiated plea agreement may not challenge his sentence on the basis that the court relied on
improper statutory sentencing factors. This type of sentencing challenge is an excessive sentence
challenge. Under Rule 604(d), a defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the guilty plea and
return the parties to the status quo before the plea.” Id. ¶ 57.
¶ 23 C. Rule 604(d) Precludes
Consideration of the Merits of Defendant’s Appeal
¶ 24 The instant case closely resembles Johnson. Here, defendant moved to withdraw
his guilty plea but was unsuccessful. On appeal, defendant has abandoned any argument that his
request to withdraw his guilty plea was erroneously denied. Instead, he argues the trial court
“sentenced him to the maximum sentence [under the negotiated plea] due to its treating of his
behavior in court as an improper factor in aggravation.” According to Johnson, this is essentially
an excessive sentence challenge which is not allowed under the circumstances.
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¶ 25 Defendant attempts to skirt the holding in Johnson by arguing “[t]he trial court
altered the terms of [his] plea agreement by considering an improper factor at sentencing, which
denied [him] the benefit of his bargain where he did not waive his constitutional rights to a fair
sentencing hearing and violated his federal due process rights.” Defendant goes on to claim
“[t]he term of the plea agreement altered by the trial court was [defendant’s] understanding that
he would be sentenced based on proper sentencing factors.”
¶ 26 We find defendant’s argument to be without merit. Indeed, according to
defendant’s theory, in any case involving a negotiated guilty plea, if a trial court were to err in its
consideration of a factor in aggravation, it would constitute an error of constitutional magnitude
as it would have “altered the terms of [the defendant’s] plea agreement”—because “he did not
waive his constitutional rights to a fair sentencing hearing”—thus, denying the defendant the
benefit of his bargain. Defendant has not cited to any authority supporting his theory that a
court’s error in sentencing as described is tantamount to an alteration of the terms of a plea
agreement. We decline to so find.
¶ 27 Here, where defendant was sentenced according to a negotiated plea agreement,
his only recourse was to move to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 604(d). He was
unsuccessful in doing so and has abandoned any claim of error in that regard. The claim he
makes on appeal is an excessive sentence claim which is not allowed according to Johnson.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal.
¶ 30 Appeal dismissed.
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