People v. Merriweather , 2020 IL App (1st) 172464-U ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 172464-UOrder filed: May 29, 2020
FIRST DISTRICT
FIFTH DIVISION
No. 1-17-2464
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 08 CR 26918
)
MICHAEL MERRIWEATHER, ) Honorable
) Darron Edward Bowden,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: First-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is reversed, where
defendant’s assertion—that a natural life sentence imposed upon him for crimes
committed when he was 21-years-old violated the proportionate penalties clause—
was not frivolous or patently without merit.
¶2 Defendant-appellant, Michael Merriweather, pleaded guilty to—inter alia—two counts of
first degree murder, and was sentenced to a term of natural life in prison for those convictions. He
did not file a direct appeal, but rather filed a postconviction petition asserting—inter alia—that his
life sentence—imposed for crimes he committed when he was 21 years old—violated the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, Art. I, § 11). For the
following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 1-17-2464
¶3 On January 8, 2002, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree murder, one
count of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of armed robbery in exchange for receiving
a sentence of natural life without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, which would
be served concurrently with 30-year sentences on each of the other three convictions. The State
originally sought the death penalty for defendant, but dropped that demand as part of the plea
agreement.
¶4 The factual basis provided to the trial court in connection with the plea came in the form
of a written stipulation signed by defendant. Therein, defendant admitted to participating in the
armed robbery of a gun shop in 1998, during which defendant and others shot three men, killing
two. It was also stipulated that defendant was 21 years old at the time of the robbery.
¶5 After the trial court accepted the factual basis for the plea, defendant waived his right to a
presentence investigation report (PSI). The trial court also explained to defendant, and defendant
indicated he understood, that the only sentencing options available to the trial court for the murder
convictions were the imposition of the death penalty or a term of natural life without the possibility
of parole. The State offered no evidence in aggravation, while defense counsel indicated that there
were two statutory mitigating factors: (1) defendant’s lack of prior criminal history, and
(2) defendant’s completion of a Jobs Corps training program and his prior work history, indicating
the possibility for rehabilitation.
¶6 After again noting that it had no statutory discretion to reduce defendant’s sentence further,
the trial court sentenced defendant in conformity with the plea agreement to a sentence of natural
life without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, to be served concurrently with
30-year sentences on the other three convictions. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
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No. 1-17-2464
¶7 On June 22, 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1, et. seq. (West 2016)) raising several claims.
Among them was an assertion that, as applied to him, it was a violation of the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution to impose a statutorily-mandated minimum natural life
sentence for crimes he committed when he was 21 years old. In support of this argument,
defendant’s petition attached several articles discussing how human brains are not fully mature
immediately upon a person turning 18 years of age, and also included information regarding his
abusive childhood and troubled young adulthood, spent living in a Chicago public-housing project
rife with gang activity.
¶8 Specifically, defendant outlined in great detail numerous scientific studies concluding that
the minds of those 18 to 24 years of age are still developing, with such young adults being highly
subject to peer influence and subject to exhibit poor decision-making in highly volatile situations.
He also extensively detailed his childhood and young-adult history of poverty, homelessness,
abuse at the hands of his mother and siblings, witnessing multiple murders as well as three suicide
attempts by his mother, and being subject to multiple gang beatings. Despite this history, defendant
also detailed his efforts to obtain an education, avoid joining a gang, and find employment.
Defendant asserted that it was only pressure from a gang to which he owed money, due to a loss
of employment, that caused him to agree to participate in the armed robbery. Finally, defendant
directly tied this history to the neurological research cited in his petition, both to explain his poor
decision-making in agreeing to participate in the armed robbery and to show his capacity for
rehabilitation.
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No. 1-17-2464
¶9 On July 7, 2017, the trial court entered a brief order on the docket sheet summarily
dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition, stating “previous order to stand case failed stage 1
of PC.” Defendant now appeals.
¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition at the first
stage because—inter alia—he sufficiently stated an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. We agree.
¶ 11 The Act “provides a remedy to a criminal defendant whose federal or state constitutional
rights were substantially violated at trial or sentencing.” People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28.
At the first stage of a postconviction proceeding, the trial court independently reviews the
defendant’s petition, taking the allegations as true, and determines if it is frivolous or patently
without merit. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009). If the petition is not dismissed at the first
stage it advances to the second stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2016). At the second stage, the
defendant must make a substantial showing of a deprivation of constitutional rights or the petition
is dismissed. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. If such a showing is made, the postconviction petition
advances to the third stage where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122–6
(West 2016).
¶ 12 A petition is frivolous or patently without merit if it “ ‘has no arguable basis *** in law or
in fact.’ ” People v. Papaleo, 2016 IL App (1st) 150947, ¶ 19 (quoting Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11–
12 (2009)). A petition has no arguable basis in law or fact if it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. “A legal theory is
‘indisputably meritless’ if it is ‘completely contradicted by the record,’ and a factual allegation is
‘fanciful’ if it is ‘fantastic or delusional.’ ” Papaleo, 2016 IL App (1st) 150947, ¶ 19 (quoting
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No. 1-17-2464
Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16–17(2009)). We review the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction
petition de novo. People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 131359, ¶ 28.
¶ 13 In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005), the Supreme Court found that the death
penalty was unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide." Id. at 82. Then, in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), the Supreme Court concluded that the eighth amendment
“forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders" convicted of homicide. In each case, the Supreme Court relied in part on the lesser
moral culpability and greater rehabilitative potential of minors in support of its decisions, and "it
is clear the United States Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller has provided juveniles
with more constitutional protection than adults." People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶
68.
¶ 14 However, Miller itself did not impose an outright ban on the imposition of a life sentence
upon a juvenile convicted of homicide, let alone a ban on lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed
upon juveniles. See, Miller, 567 U.S. 479-80 (refusing to completely foreclose the possibility that
a life sentence could be constitutionally imposed upon a juvenile convicted of homicide). Rather,
the Supreme Court held only that such a sentence could not be mandated, and that before a life
sentence could be properly imposed, "mitigating circumstances" such as "an offender's youth and
attendant characteristics" must be considered. Id. at 483, 489.
¶ 15 The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that Miller applies to discretionary, as well as
mandatory life sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40), and also to de facto life
sentences, or sentences “that cannot be served in one lifetime” and have “the same practical effect
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No. 1-17-2464
on a juvenile defendant's life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole” (People
v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10).
¶ 16 Thus, while a juvenile offender may be sentenced to a natural life or de facto sentence of
life imprisonment, before doing so the trial court must:
“[D]etermine[ ] that the defendant's conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.
The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant's youth and its
attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited to, the following
factors: (1) the juvenile defendant's chronological age at the time of the offense and any
evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant's family and home environment; (3) the juvenile
defendant's degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer
pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant's incompetence, including
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own
attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant's prospects for rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL
120655, ¶ 46;
¶ 17 Obviously, a number of these decisions involved analysis of the protections provided by
the eighth amendment, while here we address defendant’s as-applied challenge brought pursuant
to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. However, as our supreme court
has indicated, the proportionate penalties clause provides “a limitation on penalties beyond those
afforded by the eighth amendment.” People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 69.
¶ 18 Furthermore, defendant—aged 21 at the time of the crimes to which he plead guilty—was
not a “juvenile” offender. “Because defendant was an adult, Miller [and its progeny] does not apply
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No. 1-17-2464
directly to his circumstances.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45.
¶ 19 Nevertheless, our supreme court specifically considered Miller's applicability to a young
adult defendant in both People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, and Harris, 2018 IL 121932. It is
true that, in neither case did our supreme court expressly accept the premise that the protections
provided to juvenile offenders by Miller and its progeny should be extended to young adult
offenders; however, the court did not explicitly reject that assertion either. Moreover, in both cases
our supreme very explicitly did indicate that a postconviction proceeding would be an appropriate
venue to address that very issue. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48.
¶ 20 More recently, another panel of this court concluded that a postconviction petition was
improperly dismissed at the first stage, and explicitly concluded that a mandatory natural life
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to a defendant who was 19 years
old at the time he committed murder, pursuant to Miller and its progeny. People v. House, 2019
IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 65, appeal allowed, 140 N.E. 3d 231 (Ill. 2020).
¶ 21 We find that the allegations underlying defendant's as-applied proportionate penalties
claim was sufficient under Thompson, Harris, and House to avoid summary dismissal at the first-
stage for being frivolous or patently without merit. Considering these three decisions as well as
the detailed factual allegations contained in the petition, we find that defendant’s as-applied
challenge was not based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory or fanciful factual allegations.
¶ 22 In reaching this conclusion we note that the first stage in the proceeding allows the trial
court “ ‘to act strictly in an administrative capacity by screening out those petitions which are
without legal substance or are obviously without merit.’ [Citation.] Because most petitions are
drafted at this stage by defendants with little legal knowledge or training, this court views the
threshold for survival as low.” People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9.
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No. 1-17-2464
¶ 23 We also acknowledge that on appeal the State raised a number of merit-based arguments
against such a conclusion, specifically asserting that “[w]hile the Illinois Supreme Court may
appear to recognize the possibility that an 18 or 19-year old youthful offender may be able to claim
Miller’s protections under certain circumstances, those decisions do not support extension of
Miller to offenders 21 years and older,” and that, in any case, defendant’s petition was not
supported by sufficient facts. However, we find these arguments to be “more appropriate to the
second stage of postconviction proceedings, where both parties are represented by counsel, and
where the petitioner's burden is to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Tate,
2012 IL 112214, ¶ 22.
¶ 24 In reaching this conclusion, we also necessarily reject the State’s contention that defendant
waived this issue by entering a guilty plea. The State argues that by accepting the plea agreement
and waiving his right to a PSI, the petitioner voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly waived any
consideration of his youth and attendant characteristics in his sentencing.
¶ 25 It is true that “a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities,
including constitutional ones.” People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 545 (2004). However, in
determining whether a legal claim has been waived, courts should examine the particular facts and
circumstances of a case, and any principles of waiver should be construed liberally in favor of the
defendant. People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 62 (2010). Furthermore, waivers of constitutional
rights “ ‘not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’ [Citation.] Thus, a guilty plea
does not waive a contention that the plea itself was involuntary because of faulty admonishments.
[Citations.] Moreover, such claims may be raised for the first time in a postconviction petition.”
People v. Stroud, 208 Ill. 2d 398, 403 (2004).
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No. 1-17-2464
¶ 26 Moreover, this court recently held that where a defendant’s constitutional claim does not
contradict the terms of his indictment or his plea agreement and does not focus upon case-related
constitutional defects that occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea, the defendant does not
waive his constitutional claim by voluntarily pleading guilty. People v. Patterson, 2018 IL App
(1st) 160610, ¶ 21.
¶ 27 Here, defendant does not raise a challenge based upon any case-related constitutional
defects that occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea, nor does it contradict the terms of his
indictment or the admissions he made in his plea agreement. Pursuant to Patterson, it is was
therefore not waived. In addition, by raising a novel constitutional claim based upon case law
unavailable to him at the time of his plea of guilty, we find that defendant is essentially contending
that his plea was not truly voluntary and knowing as he was allegedly not properly admonished
about the constitutionally appropriate sentencing range he faced in light of Miller and its progeny.
Without such a voluntary and knowing plea and waiver, we find that defendant’s as-applied
challenge under the proportionate penalties clause was not waived.
¶ 28 In light of our finding that at least one of defendant’s postconviction claims has arguable
merit, the entire petition must be remanded for second-stage proceedings. See People v. Cathey,
2012 IL 111746, ¶ 34 (partial summary dismissals not permitted under the Act, and entire petition
must be remanded for second-stage proceedings if petition sets forth a single claim survives
summary dismissal).
¶ 29 Finally, we note that our finding in no way expresses an opinion on the ultimate merits of
the assertions contained in defendant’s postconviction petition, or on whether defendant will
ultimately prevail on his postconviction claims. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 22.
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No. 1-17-2464
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition
and remand for second-stage proceedings.
¶ 31 Reversed and remanded.
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