People v. Roberson ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (1st) 181213-USIXTH DIVISION
June 12, 2020
No. 1-18-1213
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 17 CR 11213
)
LOYDELL ROBERSON, ) Honorable
) Mary Margaret Brosnahan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for failure to register in violation of the Sex Offender
Registration Act is reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was under a duty to register as a sex offender nearly 40 years after his conviction
for the underlying offense.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Loydell Roberson was convicted of failing to register
under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016)) and sentenced to
42 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Roberson contends that the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt because the State did not prove that he was required to register as a sex
No. 1-18-1213
offender pursuant to SORA. For the reasons set forth herein, we agree and reverse the judgment
of the trial court.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Mr. Roberson was charged by indictment with one count of violating section 6 of SORA
between November 3, 2016, and July 11, 2017, “in that he, having been previously convicted of
rape under *** number 746824, lacked a fixed residence and knowingly failed to report weekly,
in person, to the Chicago police department.” 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016). The indictment stated
that the State sought to increase the penalty for the offense to a Class 2 felony based on Mr.
Roberson’s previous conviction for failure to register in case No. 12 CR 01656.
¶5 At trial, Detective Dustin Scholtes testified that, on October 26, 2016, he was working in
the criminal registration unit when Mr. Roberson reported to complete his weekly registration.
Detective Scholtes explained that persons without a fixed address are required to register once per
week and persons with a fixed residence register every 90 days. The State introduced Mr.
Roberson’s registration form. When Mr. Roberson came in, Detective Scholtes asked him whether
any information had changed, and Mr. Roberson said it had not. The form listed Mr. Roberson’s
responsibilities as a registrant, and Mr. Roberson initialed each one. The form stated that Mr.
Roberson had to report back to the Chicago Police Department by November 2, 2016. Mr.
Roberson signed the form in Detective Scholtes’s presence. The State also presented a form, signed
by Mr. Roberson, stating that he did not have a fixed address. This form was dated August 29,
2016, and contained an affidavit, initialed by Mr. Roberson, that he was registering as homeless,
did not have a fixed address, and had to register once per week. The form contained a log that was
signed by Mr. Roberson and initialed by the officer or detective who registered him each week he
came in. The form indicated that Mr. Roberson had reported every seven days in September. The
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last date on the form was October 26, 2016, when it was signed by Mr. Roberson and initialed by
Detective Scholtes.
¶6 Detective Scholtes gave Mr. Roberson a copy of his registration, filled out a log, and
uploaded the registration form into the computer system. He did not register Mr. Roberson after
October 26, 2016, and logs indicated that Mr. Roberson did not register between November 3,
2016 and July 11, 2017.
¶7 Detective Johnnie Mentor-Edwards testified that she was assigned to Mr. Roberson’s case
for his failure to register as a sex offender. Detective Mentor-Edwards spoke with Mr. Roberson
in the emergency room at Roseland Hospital on July 11, 2017. He was in police custody at that
time. Mr. Roberson told Detective Mentor-Edwards that he was homeless and did not register
because he had been in the hospital and missed his registration date. He said he had been living
with his wife and stepchildren for approximately six months, at an address which he provided. He
said he did not register after he missed his registration date because he was afraid of being arrested.
Detective Mentor-Edwards spoke with Mr. Roberson’s wife, who confirmed he was living with
her at the address he had provided.
¶8 The State presented a certified copy of disposition stating that Mr. Roberson was charged
with rape in 1974. He was found guilty in 1977 and sentenced to a term of 25 to 40 years in the
Illinois Department of Corrections. The State rested, and the defense made a motion for a directed
verdict. The court denied the motion and the defense rested.
¶9 In announcing its decision, the court reviewed case law and pointed out that the statute
required individuals lacking a fixed address to report weekly. The court noted that once an
individual obtains a permanent residence, he must report that during the weekly report to change
the nature of the reporting. Based on the testimony, the court found that Mr. Roberson was required
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No. 1-18-1213
but failed to register weekly for a significant period of time and entered a finding of guilty. Counsel
did not file a post-trial motion.
¶ 10 Following a hearing, the court sentenced Mr. Roberson to 42 months in prison. The court
denied Mr. Roberson’s motion to reconsider the sentence.
¶ 11 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 12 Mr. Roberson’s motion to reconsider was denied on May 1, 2018, and he timely filed his
notice of appeal that same day. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6), and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 (eff. Feb. 6,
2013) and 606 (eff. Dec. 11, 2014), governing appeals from final judgments of conviction in
criminal cases.
¶ 13 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, Mr. Roberson contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he failed to comply with SORA where the State did not present evidence that he had a duty to
register.
¶ 15 The standard of review on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Beauchamp,
241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011); People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007). This standard applies to all
criminal cases, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v. Herring, 324 Ill. App.
3d 458, 460 (2001). It is up to the trier of fact to determine the witness’s credibility, the weight
given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). All reasonable inferences must be
allowed in favor of the State. People v. White, 2017 IL App. (1st) 142358, ¶ 14. While we will
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No. 1-18-1213
consider all of the evidence, we will not retry the defendant on appeal. See Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at
117; People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004). Accordingly, we will not overturn a conviction
unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable
doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48; People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL
113510, ¶ 42.
¶ 16 SORA was designed to aid law enforcement agencies in monitoring the whereabouts of
sexual offenders by allowing “ ‘ready access to crucial information’ ” about their residency and
movements. People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 499 (2006) (quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d
381, 388 (1991)). Under SORA, persons convicted of a criminal sexual offense are required to
register with the police or other law enforcement authority in whatever jurisdiction the offender
resides. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2016). Under section 6 of SORA, “any person who lacks a fixed
residence must report weekly, in person, to the appropriate law enforcement agency where the sex
offender is located.” 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016). “In order to sustain a conviction under section
6 of [SORA], the State must generally prove that (1) [the] defendant was subject to the reporting
requirements under [SORA], and (2) [the] defendant knowingly failed to report in person at the
requisite reporting agency.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jones, 2017 IL App (1st)
143718, ¶ 15; see 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016).
¶ 17 SORA requires a person convicted of certain sex offenses prior to July 1, 1999, to register
for 10 years following his or her release from prison and extends that to a requirement that the
person register for life if the person is convicted of a felony after July 1, 2011. People v. James,
2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 12. Section 7 of SORA states that “[r]econfinement due to a violation
of parole, a conviction reviving registration, or other circumstances that do not relate to the original
conviction or adjudication shall toll the running of the balance of the 10-year period of registration,
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No. 1-18-1213
which shall not commence running until after final parole, discharge, or release.” 730 ILCS 150/7
(West 2016).
¶ 18 We have held that “[w]here a sex offender’s duty to register has been tolled by
imprisonment or extended by a subsequent conviction, the State should provide evidence of such
at trial.” People v. Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143718, ¶ 22 Thus, the state must introduce, at a
minimum, prison release dates and dates of confinement. People v. James, 2019 IL App (1st)
170594, ¶ 13. Evidence of the original sentence for a pre-1999 sexual offense without a release
date is insufficient to establish a duty to report. Id.¶ 19 Mr. Roberson argues that evidence of a pre-1999 sexual assault conviction and evidence
that both the police and Mr. Roberson believed that he was required to register is insufficient to
sustain his conviction. In support of this argument, Mr. Roberson relies on this court’s decisions
in James and Jones.
¶ 20 In James, this court found the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was subject to the reporting requirements of SORA where the only evidence the State
presented of the defendant’s criminal history was of a 1996 conviction for attempted aggravated
criminal sexual assault, for which the defendant received a 10-year prison sentence. 2019 IL App
(1st) 170594, ¶ 14. The State did not provide information regarding when the defendant was
released, evidence that his registration period was extended or tolled, or evidence that he
committed a felony after July 1, 2011, which would have mandated lifetime registration. Id. In
Jones, we found the evidence was insufficient to prove a registration duty where the State proved
only that the defendant had a prior conviction for a 1979 attempted rape. 2017 IL App (1st)
143718, ¶¶ 15-16.
¶ 21 In this case, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
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No. 1-18-1213
it was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Roberson was still subject to the
reporting requirements of SORA nearly 40 years after his pre-1999 conviction for rape. Although
the State presented evidence of Mr. Roberson’s underlying conviction and 1977 sentence, it failed
to provide any information regarding when Mr. Roberson was released or when his registration
period began. See James, 2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 14. The State did not introduce any
information regarding whether Mr. Roberson’s registration period was tolled due to
reconfinement. Id.; Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143718, ¶ 22. Further, the State failed to present any
evidence at trial that Mr. Roberson was convicted of a felony after July 1, 2011, that would have
triggered a duty to report. See James, 2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 14. While Detective Scholtes
testified that he registered Mr. Roberson on October 26, 2016, he provided no explanation as to
why Mr. Roberson’s underlying conviction required him to register on that date.
¶ 22 The State points to Mr. Roberson’s own statements and signature on the registration form
as evidence that he knew that he was required to register. But, as we recognized in James, a
defendant’s belief that he was required to register is not proof that he is actually required to do so.
2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 16. The State relies on People v. Scott, 2017 IL App (4th) 150529,
where the court found that by registering as “homeless,” the defendant acquiesced to the weekly
reporting requirement for people who lack a fixed residence. Id. ¶ 25. In Scott, however, the court
said nothing about relying on the defendant’s own statements. Instead it held that the State was not
required to prove that the defendant lacked a fixed residence, since that was not an element of a
SORA violation. Id. ¶ 26. Moreover, a SORA defendant would have personal knowledge as to
whether he was homeless but would not necessarily be aware of the intricacies of the SORA
reporting requirements.
¶ 23 We are also not persuaded by the State’s argument that, “unlike in James or Jones, there
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No. 1-18-1213
was information in the record that, as a matter of law, obligated [Mr. Roberson] to register in
SORA.” The State points to the indictment as a source of this information in the record. The State
argues that the indictment shows that Mr. Roberson “was charged as a Class 2 felon as he had been
convicted of a prior felony failure to register conviction, 12 CR 10656,” and that this conviction
would have retriggered Mr. Roberson’s registration requirement. An indictment, however, “is not
any evidence against the defendant” (Ill. Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal 2.02 (West 2020)), and
the State failed to introduce any evidence of this conviction at Mr. Roberson’s trial.
¶ 24 Finally, we reject the State’s argument that this court should take judicial notice of
information not contained in the record, including records from the Illinois Department of
Corrections’s (IDOC) website. “[I]ntroducing a fact for judicial notice on appeal *** does not
relieve the State of its burden to prove each element of the offense at trial.” (Emphasis in original.)
People v. Clark, 406 Ill. App. 3d 622, 634 (2010); see also James, 2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 15
(refusing the State’s request to take judicial notice of IDOC records on appeal, which “w[ere] not
properly presented as evidence at trial”); Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143718, ¶¶ 21-22 (holding that
the State cannot present additional evidence on appeal to prove that a defendant still had a duty to
register under SORA). “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not a question of what
the State could have proved at trial; it is a question of what the State actually proved at trial.”
Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143718, ¶ 21. Here, we find that the evidence adduced at trial was
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Roberson was still subject to the reporting
requirements of SORA nearly 40 years after his underlying conviction for rape.
¶ 25 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we reverse Mr. Roberson’s conviction.
¶ 27 Reversed.
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